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Introduction 
 
The biblical scholar, historian, and Jewish thinker Yehezkel Kaufmann 
(1889–1963) is best known for two magisterial works: a two-volume inter-
pretation of Jewish history, Golah ve-nekhar (Exile and Alienation, 1928–
1932), and a four-volume study of biblical religion, Toledot ha-emunah ha-
yisre’elit (A History of the Israelite Faith, 1937–1956).1 Toledot in particu-
lar is the most monumental achievement of modern Jewish biblical scholar-
ship. His influence is manifest most obviously in works by disciples who 
expand upon his approach–for example, Moshe Greenberg (1928–2010), 
Menahem Haran (1924–2015), Jacob Milgrom (1923–2010), Yochanan 
Muffs (1932–2009), Nahum Sarna (1923–2005), and Moshe Weinfeld 
(1925–2009). 
A great deal of modern Jewish biblical scholarship consists of a dia-
logue with Kaufmann. In Israel, for example, Israel Knohl and Baruch 
Schwartz have modified and built upon Kaufmann’s work, and scholars 
like Alexander Rofé have respectfully taken issue with it.2 Kaufmann’s 
approach to prophecy and the composition of prophetic books comes into 
full flower in the commentaries of Shalom Paul.3 In the United States, Jef-
frey Tigay’s work on monotheism provides extrabiblical support for one of 
Kaufmann’s central contentions.4 Benjamin Sommer’s treatment of mono-
theism is a lengthy defense of a more flexible version of Kaufmann’s the-
sis, and his approach to the composition of prophetic books is thoroughly 
                                                     
1  A list of Kaufmann’s work translated from Hebrew is to be found at the end of the 
Kaufmann-section of this volume. 
2  Israel Knohl, The Sanctuary of Silence: The Priestly Torah and the Holiness School 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995); Israel Knohl, The Divine Symphony: The Bible’s Many 
Voices (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2003); Israel Knohl, Biblical Beliefs 
[in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2007); Baruch Schwartz, “The Priestly Account 
of the Theophany and Lawgiving at Sinai,” in Texts, Temples, and Traditions: A Tribute 
to Menahem Haran (eds. Michael V. Fox, et al.; Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1996), 
103–34; Baruch Schwartz, The Holiness Legislation: Studies in the Priestly Code, [in 
Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1999); Alexander Rofé, “Third Isaiah, After All,” [in 
Hebrew] in Studies in the Composition of the Torah and Prophetic Books (ed. Alexander 
Rofe; Jerusalem: Akademon, 1985), 108–26; Alexander Rofé, Introduction to the Litera-
ture of the Hebrew Bible (Jerusalem Biblical Studies, 9; Jerusalem: Simor, 2009), esp. 
part 2, chap. 3, and part 3, chaps. 1–2. 
3  Shalom Paul, Amos: A Commentary on the Book of Amos (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1991); Shalom Paul, Isaiah 40–66 (Eerdmans Critical Commentary; 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011). 
4  Jeffrey Tigay, You Shall Have No Other Gods: Israelite Religion in the Light of Hebrew 
Inscriptions (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986). 
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Kaufmannian.5 In both the United States and Israel, the first book-length 
works on inner-biblical exegesis (by Michael Fishbane and Yair Zakovitch) 
picked up an insight from the fourth volume of Toledot and shaped it into a 
new scholarly subdiscipline.6 
Kaufmann’s contribution to modern Jewish biblical scholarship is also 
significant in works that make no mention of him. Just as biblical scholars 
often simply refer to “the Documentary Hypothesis” without citing its origi-
nators, because the hypothesis is so central to biblical criticism that no 
footnote is necessary; so, too, Kaufmann’s ideas appear often in Jewish 
biblical scholarship without reference to Kaufmann’s work, because it has 
become, for some Jewish biblical scholars, simply part of the air one 
breathes. This is the case, for example, with Tikva Frymer-Kensky’s book 
on women, culture and the Biblical transformation of pagan myth.7 The 
author presents elegant restatements of Kaufmann’s approach to monothe-
ism with especially sensitive reference to Mesopotamian literature. Yet she 
does not mention Kaufmann. This omission occurs not because she hesi-
tates to acknowledge a source—in fact her scholarship is especially gener-
ous to her sources and teachers—but because Kaufmann’s understanding of 
biblical monotheism is so fundamental to her scholarly world that the 
source need not be cited.8  
Similarly, Kaufmann’s perspectives suffuse four of the five volumes of 
the Jewish Publication Society’s Pentateuch commentary.9 These volumes 
                                                     
5  Benjamin D. Sommer, The Bodies of God and the World of Ancient Israel (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), esp. 145–74, 259–75. See also the essay “Monothe-
ism,” in The Hebrew Bible: A Princeton Guide (ed. John Barton; Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2016), 239–79, as well as his essay in this volume. On prophetic texts, 
see, e.g., Sommer, A Prophet Reads Scripture: Allusion in Isaiah 40-66 (Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press, 1998). 
6  Michael Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985); 
Yair Zakovitch, An Introduction to Inner-Biblical Interpretation (in Hebrew; Even-
Yehudah: Reches, 1992). These books extend observations found in Toledot, 4:291–93 
327–29, 331–38, 341–42, 346–50. Another key influence on Fishbane and Zakovitch 
was the work of Kaufmann’s contemporary at the Hebrew University, Isac Leo Seelig-
mann, especially his essays, “Voraussetzungen der Midraschexegese,” Supplements to 
VT 1 (1953): 150–81, and “The Beginnings of Midrash in the Books of Chronicles” [in 
Hebrew], Tarbiz 49 (1980): 14–32. 
7  Tikva Frymer-Kensky, In the Wake of the Goddesses: Women, Culture, and the Biblical 
Transformation of Pagan Myth (New York: Free Press, 1992). 
8  Many of the teachers who introduced her to biblical studies—especially Yochanan 
Muffs, Shalom Paul, and Moshe Greenberg—advanced Kaufmann’s scholarship. 
9  Namely, the commentaries on Genesis and Exodus, written by Nahum Sarna (Philadel-
phia: JPS, 1989 and 1991, respectively), on Numbers by Jacob Milgrom (1989), and on 
Deuteronomy by Jeffrey Tigay (1996). The volume on Leviticus by Baruch Levine 
(1989) is the single exception. All this is not claim that every view expressed by Sarna, 
Milgrom, and Tigay is identical to that of Kaufmann; their views are sometimes more 
nuanced, and they take into account more recent discoveries and perspectives as they 
update Kaufmann’s legacy.  
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seldom cite specific page numbers from Kaufmann’s works, but the perva-
sive nature of his influence is clear from their approach to monotheism, the 
ways they view the dating of Pentateuchal texts, and their tendency to shun 
simplistic historicist or reductionist explanations in favor of literary and 
theological interpretation.  
Kaufmann’s influence is perhaps even more significant in works by 
modern Jewish scholars who set out to disagree with some of his central 
theses. Thus both Jon Levenson and Michael Fishbane have published 
books that take issue with Kaufmann’s claim that biblical Israel’s religion 
was anti-mythological.10 No less than the work of Kaufmann’s epigones, 
these books, precisely by arguing against one of the core ideas of Toledot, 
show how some of the most intentionally Jewish biblical scholars conduct 
their work in dialogue with Kaufmann.  
Whether by supporting his ideas with new evidence, modifying them in 
light of new discoveries or methods, or attacking them, and whether ad-
dressing his work explicitly or implicitly, a substantial amount of modern 
Jewish biblical criticism builds upon the foundation set by Kaufmann. No 
other figure, not even Martin Buber, has had such a profound influence on 
the work of Jewish scholars of the Bible. 
The reception of Kaufmann’s work outside Jewish circles has been lim-
ited, however. His tours de force remain underappreciated or altogether 
unknown among non-Hebrew readership, for his works are written in mod-
ern Hebrew and intended primarily for Jewish audience. Still less known is 
the depth and breadth of his erudition and outstanding philosophical com-
petency. In fact his doctorate, received in 1918 from the University of Bern 
in Switzerland, was in philosophy. We intend the present volume to begin 
to rectify this situation.11 
                                                     
10  Jon D. Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil: The Jewish Drama of Divine 
Omnipotence (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988); Michael A. Fishbane, Biblical 
Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).  
11  Monograph-length works that introduce Kaufmann’s scholarship in English or German 
include: Thomas Krapf, Yehezkel Kaufmann: ein Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg zur Theo-
logie der Hebräischen Bibel (Berlin: Institut Kirche und Judentum, 1990); Thomas 
Krapf, Die Priesterschrift und die vorexilische Zeit: Yehezkel Kaufmanns vernachlässig-
ter Beitrag zur Geschichte der biblischen Religion (Freiburg: Universitätsverlag and 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992); Aly Elrefaei, Wellhausen and Kaufmann: 
Ancient Israel and Its Religious History in the Works of Julius Wellhausen and Yehezkel 
Kaufmann (BZAW 490; Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016). Krapf’s biography of Kaufmann 
contains very valuable data (interviews etc.), along with a comprehensive list of Kauf-
mann’s publications. Emanuel Green’s unpublished dissertation, Universalism and Na-
tionalism as Reflected in the Writings of Yehezkel Kaufmann with Special Emphasis on 
the Biblical Period (PhD diss., New York University, 1968), also contains an excellent 
biography of Kaufmann, along with a concise summary of each of Kaufmann’s works as 
well as his key concepts. Laurence J. Silberstein’s unpublished dissertation, History and 
Ideology: The Writings of Yehezkel Kaufmann (PhD diss., Brandeis University, 1972), 
presents an exhaustive analysis of Kaufmann’s Golah ve-nekhar. Part of this work was 
XII INTRODUCTION 
The idea of this volume was conceived at an international symposium 
held in Switzerland, from June 10 to 11, 2014, “Yehezkel Kaufmann and 
the Reinvention of Jewish Exegesis of the Bible in Bern.” The symposium 
was organized by the Department of Biblical Studies at the University of 
Fribourg in cooperation with the Institute for Jewish Studies at the Univer-
sity of Bern, in order to commemorate the centenary of Yehezkel Kauf-
mann’s—or Hazkel Koifman’s—matriculation at the University of Bern on 
May 5, 1914, and to document and reassess the significance of his legacy 
and its reception. The symposium had three foci, corresponding with sec-
tions I-III of this volume: Kaufmann’s biography and intellectual back-
ground, his impact on Jewish studies, and his contribution to modern bibli-
cal scholarship. The appreciation of Kaufmann’s life work varied among 
symposium participants—some generally favorable, some rather critical—
but they all agreed that his work merits a significant place both in Jewish 
intellectual history and in modern biblical scholarship.  
The symposium’s participants thought it would worthwhile to publish 
the papers, not like standard proceedings but rather as an “instrumental 
compendium,” a reference text that provides a comprehensive and multi-
faceted account of Kaufmann’s work, through which English readers, stu-
dents and scholars alike, can explore the hitherto unrecognized significance 
and profundity of Kaufmann’s legacy. Accordingly, the volume includes 
not only the symposium papers but also other essays, including some of 
Kaufmann’s own writings in a separate fourth section of this volume—all 
heretofore unavailable in English—that are crucial for a fuller appreciation 
of his life project. 
 
The volume begins with a section on Kaufmann’s life. Thomas Krapf pro-
vides a biography of the man and portrayed the social and intellectual con-
texts that shaped him and in which he worked: Eastern European Jewry, the 
central European academy, and pre-statehood and early statehood Israel in 
Haifa and Jerusalem. Krapf also gives a sense of the inner life of this lonely 
man of learning. Krapf was the first non-Jewish biblical scholar who 
brought to mind the importance of Kaufmann’s studies to his German-
reading colleagues—with rather modest success to say it gently. His essay 
not only summarizes all hitherto known relevant facts and dates but also 
enriches our picture with new insight. 
                                                                                                                          
thoroughly revised and published as “‘Exile and Alienhood’: Yehezkel Kaufmann on the 
Jewish Nation,” in Texts and Responses: Studies Presented to Nahum N. Glatzer on the 
Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday (eds. Michael A. Fishbane and Paul R. Flohr; Lei-
den: E.J. Brill, 1975), 239–56; “Historical Sociology and Ideology: A Prolegomenon to 
Yehezkel Kaufmann’s ‘Golah v’Nekhar,’” in Essays in Modern Jewish History: A Trib-
ute to Ben Halpern (eds. Frances Malino and Phyllis Cohen Albert; Rutherford, NJ: 
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1982), 173–95. 
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The next essay, by Thomas Staubli, focuses on the middle period, 
Kaufmann’s years at the University of Bern during World War I, when the 
city was an Eldorado of Jewish teachers and students of every shade who 
fled from riots and civil commotion. Staubli shows how deeply philosophi-
cal Kaufmann’s orientation was from his early years. Aside from the fact 
that Kaufmann wrote his main oeuvre in Hebrew, this may be a further 
reason why his historic approach not really entered the field of modern 
biblical criticism. The article originally written in German,12 was slightly 
expanded for this English version, translated by Jeremiah Riemer. 
An essay by Kaufmann’s disciple Moshe Greenberg—known, inter alia, 
for his abridged English translation of Kaufmann’s Toledot—describes 
personal and intimate facets of Kaufmann as reflected in their private corre-
spondence.  
 
The volume continues in a second section with studies of the relationship of 
Kaufmann’s work to other modern Jewish thinkers and to modern Jewish 
history. In “Is Kaufmann’s Toledot a ‘Jewish’ Project? Empirical Research 
Between Naturalism and Supernaturalism,” Job Jindo presents a radically 
new reading of Kaufmann, showing that Kaufmann’s method and his cri-
tique of Wellhausen and other Protestant biblical critics are based not mere-
ly on Jewish concerns but more fundamentally on empirical and critical 
ones. Indeed Kaufmann’s main disagreement is less with Wellhausen than 
it is with the entire immanentist philosophical and historical project that 
stems from Spinoza. He would have the same sorts of criticisms of a specif-
ically Jewish or supernaturalist scholarship of the Bible. Thus Kaufmann’s 
methods and perspectives are not particularly Jewish in nature but reflect a 
particular, anti-reductionist approach to studying not only religion but any 
sort of human creativity. 
Ziony Zevit, in “Yehezkel Kaufmann: Observations about his Major 
Ideas in the Past, Almost Present, and the Immediate Future,” begins by 
surveying many of the major intellectual influences on Kaufmann (both 
non-Jewish and Jewish; philosophical, philological, historical, ideologi-
cal—i.e., Zionist). Zevit then provides a useful summary of his major the-
ses concerning biblical religion. He further argues that Kaufmann’s recep-
tion among Jewish biblical scholars is less influential than has generally 
been thought. 
In “Yehezkel Kaufmann, R. Nachman Krochmal, and the ‘Anxiety of 
Influence,’” Lawrence Kaplan discusses a less well known but highly sig-
nificant influence on, and interlocutor with, Kaufmann: the nineteenth-
century Jewish thinker Nachman Krochmal (1785–1840), author of The 
                                                     
12  “Yehezkel Kaufmann: Die Berner Jahre eines Genies,” in Wie über Wolken: Jüdische 
Lebens- und Denkwelten in Stadt und Region Bern 1200-2000 (eds. R. Bloch and J. Picard, 
Zürich: Chronos 2014), 241–55. We thank Hans-Rudolf Wiedmer for the permission to 
publish an English translation of this article. 
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Guide of the Perplexed of the Time, a classic of the Eastern European Jew-
ish Enlightenment. Kaufmann himself delineates the differences between 
his approach and Krochmal’s, but Kaplan shows that the connections—and 
differences—between them were more complex and freighted than Kauf-
mann himself may have realized. In the course of making this argument, 
Kaplan echoes themes from the essays by Jindo and Zevit, showing that 
Kaufmann is, perhaps above all, to be read as a Jewish thinker, in dialogue 
with philosophers such as Krochmal and Maimonides, and not only as a 
historical-philological scholar of the Bible and Jewish history. 
This second section concludes with an essay by the late Menahem 
Haran, Kaufmann’s only doctoral student and later the Yehezkel Kaufmann 
Professor of Biblical Studies at the Hebrew University. His essay, “Judaism 
and Bible in the Worldview of Yehezkel Kaufmann”—originally published 
in Hebrew in 1990 and here translated into English by Leonard Levin—
presents a penetrating overview of Kaufmann’s life project. Readers unfa-
miliar with Kaufmann’s work will find this essay to be an excellent gate-
way for appreciating the scope of Kaufmann’s intellectual enterprise. We 
thank the World Union of Jewish Studies for the permission to publish an 
English translation of Haran’s article, as well as Greenberg’s essay men-
tioned above, both from Mada’ei Hayahadut 31 (1991). 
 
The third section of the book focuses more specifically on Kaufmann’s 
biblical scholarship. Israel Knohl, the current Yehezkel Kaufmann Profes-
sor of Biblical Studies at the Hebrew University, presents a bold revision of 
Kaufmann’s approach to the history of monotheism in ancient Israel in his 
essay, “The Rise, Decline, and Renewal of the Biblical Revolution. Knohl 
argues that archaeological findings corroborate Kaufmann’s contention that 
a religious revolution occurred at the very beginning of Israelite history. 
Along with Kaufmann, Knohl maintains that at that time, Israel thoroughly 
rejected idolatry—and with it also the institution of monarchy—and adopt-
ed the aniconic worship of a single deity. However, against Kaufmann, 
Knohl shows that later in the pre-exilic period, the rise of the monarchies in 
Judah and Israel led to the adoption of polytheistic practices in Israel. Only 
with the elimination of the monarchy did Israel experience a resurgence of 
monotheism in the exilic and post-exilic periods. 
In “The Legacy of Yehezkel Kaufmann’s Commentaries to Joshua and 
Judges,” Nili Wazana points out the irony of two of Kaufmann’s less-
known works. Kaufmann interrupted the writing of Toledot to provide de-
tailed commentaries on Joshua and Judges so as to argue that they support-
ed his view that monotheism was a revolutionary innovation in early Israel. 
This required him to maintain that these two books are for the most part 
historically reliable and that they demonstrate that upon entering Canaan 
the Israelites quickly and decisively overcame the Canaanites. These theses 
have not won adherence—even among many scholars who consider them-
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selves Kaufmann’s followers—and hence these works are rarely studied. 
But Wazana shows that they are valuable, though not for the reasons that 
Kaufmann intended. Both commentaries are fine examples of close reading 
that were decades ahead of their time in their presentation of a literary 
method for analyzing biblical narrative. Further, they are both fine exam-
ples of Kaufmann’s moderate approach to compositional questions 
throughout his oeuvre: he does not deny the several levels of composition 
in biblical texts, but he avoids the capricious and far-fetched discovery of 
multitudinous levels of composition, redaction, and supplementation that 
mar so much biblical critical scholarship. 
In “Kaufmann and Recent Scholarship: Toward a Richer Discourse of 
Monotheism,” Benjamin Sommer at once defends and refines Kaufmann’s 
definition of monotheism. Sommer points out that when compared with 
definitions commonly used among biblical scholars, Kaufmann’s definition 
exhibits both greater sophistication and greater utility from the point of 
view of the phenomenology of religion. But he also notes limitations and 
inconsistencies regarding Kaufmann’s theory of the sudden appearance of 
monotheism early in the history ancient Israel. While Kaufmann’s defini-
tion of monotheism is productive, his historical reconstruction of its origins 
is no less speculative than those of the biblical scholars he opposes. Sommer 
also points to examples of European scholarship that independently came 
up with approaches similar to Kaufmann, on the basis of types of evidence 
not yet known in Kaufmann’s time. Two of these European scholars, Adrian 
Schenker and Othmar Keel respond to Sommer’s essay, adding nuance and 
additional sources to Sommer’s approach.  
This section of the volume concludes with the lecture that Menahem 
Haran delivered on his appointment to the Kaufmann Chair at Hebrew Uni-
versity in 1968. The essay delineates the trajectory of biblical scholarship 
in modern Jewish tradition and the decisive role Kaufmann assumed in that 
trajectory. We thank the Hebrew University Magnes Press, for the permis-
sion to incorporate in this volume Haran’s essay, which was originally dis-
tributed in an offprint format in 1970. 
 
The fourth and final section of our volume includes key texts by Kaufmann 
that we make available in English for the first time. The thesis of Kauf-
mann’s first great work, Golah ve-nekhar (Exile and Alienation), has gen-
erally remained unknown even among scholars of Jewish studies.13 In the 
course of his work on Kaufmann, however, Thomas Krapf discovered in 
Kaufmann’s papers “A Concise Summary of the work Golah venekhar 
(Exile and Alienation),” which Kaufmann penned in German in 1936. 
                                                     
13  Only part of this work is available in English. See the list at the end of the Kaufmann 
section of this volume. 
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Krapf provides an English translation of this document, along with an in-
troduction and useful annotations. 
The second text on “General Characteristics of the Israelite Belief” is 
the ninth chapter of Toledot (vol. 1, 221–54), published 1937, which serves 
as the introduction to Kaufmann’s phenomenological analysis of biblical 
religion. The essay addresses theological assumptions, still predominant in 
biblical studies, that Kaufmann thinks inimical for a phenomenological 
understanding of biblical religion. We thank Ms. Dvora Levinger of the 
Bialik Institute for permission to publish an English translation of that 
chapter. 
The third text, printed in 1940, a review of Freud’s monograph on Moses 
and the monotheistic faith, also evinces Kaufmann’s approach to human-
istic research. It is as much a logical critique of Freud as a historical or 
philological one, and thus it reminds us that Kaufmann was trained as a 
philosopher, who wrote a dissertation on the role of sufficient reason in 
modern continental philosopher. 
The fourth text on “The Secret of National Creativity,” encapsulates the 
gist of Kaufmann’s exhaustive critique of methodological assumptions that 
were not only dominant in humanistic research of his day but remain deep-
ly influential in the early 21st century—especially among biblical scholars. 
It originally appeared in the journal Moznaim 13 (1941) as a reply to re-
views of the first volume of Toledot. In later editions of Toledot, it appears 
as the general introduction to the entire eight-volume set. The edition trans-
lated here is the original version that appeared in Moznaim, with original 
section headings that are omitted in the version of Toledot. We thank 
Mr. David Melamed of Moznaim for granting us permission to publish an 
English translation of that version, and for his permission to publish the 
translation of Kaufmann’s review of Freud, which appeared in Moznaim 10 
(1940). 
 
We are extremely grateful to Lenny Levin for preparing superb translations 
of Kaufmann’s essays, as well as Haran’s recollection and Greenberg’s; to 
Briah Cahana and Lawrence Kaplan for rendering an English translation of 
Kaufmann’s review essay on Freud’s book; to Thomas Krapf for his trans-
lation of Kaufmann’s German summary of Golah ve-nekhar; and to Jere-
miah Riemer for translating Thomas Staubli’s essay. Mr. Richard Tupper of 
Chicago, Illinois, graciously agreed to proofread the volume, and we are 
grateful for the outstanding job he did, which has yielded a more polished 
and reader-friendly volume. Finally, our thanks to Ryan Higgins and Av-
raham Sommer for preparing the indices. 
 
This book is a product of a pleasant, collaborative effort. Thomas Staubli 
originally conceived of the Kaufmann symposium at two neighboring uni-
versities, those of Fribourg and Bern. René Bloch, along with his right 
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hand, Eva Tyrell, joined Staubli to organize the symposium. Benjamin 
Sommer and Job Jindo joined Staubli to edit the volume itself, for which 
Staubli secured funding. The editors are deeply grateful to all participants 
in the conference, who contributed with well-prepared thoughtful papers, 
an open mind and human warmth to a very stimulating meeting. We 
acknowledge with great respect all those who supported this project finan-
cially: the very generous Dr. Celia Zwillenberg (Bern) and the Department 
of Biblical Studies for the symposium, the Nordmann-Foundation for the 
cost of translations, again Dr. Celia Zwillenberg and the Research Fund of 
the University of Fribourg for the subvention of the printing. We are in-
debted to Prof. Christoph Uehlinger and other editors of the OBO series for 
their prompt agreement to publish this volume in their series and Marcia 
Bodenmann for last-minute corrigenda.  
 
August 2016/April 2017  Job Y. JINDO, Riverdale, NY  
    Benjamin D. SOMMER, Teaneck, NJ  
    Thomas STAUBLI, Fribourg, Switzerland 
 
 
 
 
 
I. 
 
Kaufmann’s Life

Yehezkel Koifman: An Outline of his Life and Work1 
Thomas M. KRAPF 
“I don’t have a biography, all I have are books—a bibliography.”2 This was 
the opening of a stimulating discussion, which Yehezkel Koifman conclud-
ed:3 “Look, you were looking for a biography, and you found an idea in-
stead.”4 
Koifman’s self-estimation, according to which erudition and scholarship 
are the sole raison d’être of the savant, circumscribes several patterns de-
termining his life and work—not least the non-physical, the quasi “meta-
physical” propensity of his existence that appears to have translated into the 
personal tragedy of a creative genius of the 20th century. 
A glance at Koifman’s long list of publications with important contribu-
tions to a broad range of disciplines conveys a sense of the quantitative 
dimension of his intellectual work.5 The qualitative dimension of his legacy 
is no less significant, as he had an impact on the world with a phenomenal 
scholarly work consisting of two opera magna and hundreds of studies and 
articles. In all likelihood Koifman had perceived enough of the effect of his 
work to be able to foresee that his legacy would reverberate in the intellec-
                                                     
1  This paper is based on (1) an intellectual biography I published over 25 years ago: 
Thomas Krapf, Yehezkel Kaufmann: Ein Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg zur Theologie der 
Hebräischen Bibel (Studien zu Kirche und Israel 11; Berlin: Institut Kirche und Juden-
tum, 1990); and (2) on additional, hitherto unpublished research, on which I embarked 
after publishing the monograph in 1990. This material includes oral history, i.e. inter-
views I conducted from 1985 through 1998 with people, who had known Yehezkel 
Koifman. Some of their recollections referred as far back as the 1930s. In the following 
the inherently subjective quality of recollections of events and issues perceived in per-
spectives involving such large time spans needs to be borne in mind. 
2  This is often quoted with a somewhat apocryphal ring: “I have no biography, only a 
bibliography”: e.g., Moshe Greenberg, “Kaufmann on the Bible: An Appreciation,” Ju-
daism 13 (1964): 77; repr. in Moshe Greenberg, Studies in the Hebrew Bible and Jewish 
Thought (Philadelphia and Jerusalem: Jewish Publication Society, 1995), 175–88. 
3  During the better part of his life K. used the Yiddish and Hebrew form of his name, 
“Koifman”. In the following the German/English form “Kaufman(n)” is merely used 
(1) in the context of the biographic phases in Western Europe, when K. signed “Kauf-
man(n),” and (2) wherever relevant with regard to bibliographical data. 
4  Avraham H. Elhanai, “Yehezkel Kaufmann,” Sihat Sofrim (in Hebrew [Conversing with 
Authors]; Jerusalem: R. Mas, 1960), 86–92; quotes on pp. 88 and 92. 
5  For the best, but nevertheless incomplete list of his publications see Yehezkel Kaufmann 
Jubilee Volume. Studies in Bible and Jewish Religion Dedicated to Yehezkel Kaufmann 
on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday (ed. Menahem Haran; Jerusalem: Magnes, 
1960), 1–6. Haran remembered Koifman being uncooperative regarding the compilation 
of his bibliography; for some additional titles see Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und 
Erkenntnisweg, 143ff. 
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tual discourse of future generations. And yet, towards the end of his life he 
deeply regretted the high personal price he had paid for his great achieve-
ments: never having married, nor having raised children, he felt he had 
missed out on essential aspects of human existence. He was deeply troubled 
that it was too late to undo his mistake. 
Existentially, Koifman resembled the traveler perennially sitting on his 
packed suitcase. His lifestyle was frugal, and he never possessed more than 
one suit at a time. Although he ranked among the great intellectuals of the 
20th century, the few books in his possession fitted onto one or two book-
shelves—probably taking up far less space than the body of his own publi-
cations. The commodity most precious to Koifman was time, which he 
invested assiduously into creating his ambitious life work. 
A bibliography in lieu of a biography—this formidable notion of a phe-
nomenal life work engulfing its author also circumscribes a paradox of 
Yehezkel Koifman and his legacy. To this day, his scholarship gives rise to 
discourse on a broad range of issues. The many important contributions 
based on Koifman’s work in biblical studies, and the impressive array of 
creative scholars indebted to his thought conjure up associations with phe-
nomena such as a “Wellhausen School” or schools of Koifman’s contempo-
raries, e.g., Herrmann Gunkel, Sigmund Mowinckel, and William Foxwell 
Albright. And yet, despite Koifman’s significant intellectual influence, he 
never took any proactive initiative to found an academic school of thought. 
Thus, there is good cause to surmise that the actual effect of his phenome-
nal contribution to scholarship lags far behind its potential impact. 
To a large extent this appears to result from Koifman’s personality, 
which was also decisive with regard to his personal tragedy. He was a vul-
nerable, shy and unsociable introvert, who did not feel at ease interacting 
with more than one or two interlocutors at a time. When buying a sofa for his 
study he demanded the most uncomfortable seating in stock, because he was 
anxious to discourage his visitors from distracting him for long… Although 
most people who met him, describe him as a stimulating conversant in a 
contained circle of two or three pairs of eyes,6 his presence was experi-
enced as uncharismatic whenever he had to face a larger audience. In such 
situations, he was typically haunted by stage fright, which even induced 
him to stay away from prize award ceremonies of which he was the laure-
ate. On some occasions, he could not even accept the compromise of ad-
dressing the audience from behind a screen. Naturally, this timidity that 
prevented him from communicating at ease with medium sized and large 
audiences manifested itself as a serious handicap in his role as a teacher.7 
                                                     
6  In this context Haran used to describe Koifman as “a brilliant conversationalist,” see for 
example Haran, “Judaism and Bible in the Worldview of Yehezkel Kaufmann” (in this 
volume pp. 147–163), see p. 147. 
7  Interview with Abraham Malamat on 18 October, 1995. 
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A considerable number of Koifman’s students, many of whom became 
scholars in their own right, attest to his dismal performance as an uninspir-
ing secondary school and university teacher.8 His forte was his creative 
thinking, his research and his writing. In paradigmatic terms, Koifman 
thrived in the contained silent spaces of the desk and the library, but was 
unable to interact with the physicality of the world, of which he produced 
profound analyses and interpretations in writing. 
1. Yehezkel Koifman’s Early Life9 
Yehezkel Koifman was born in December 1889, on 24 Kislev, 5650, the 
eve of Hanukkah.10 His birth-place, Dunajewzi, was a shtetl in western 
Ukraine. His haredi11 family belonged to the broad stratum of impover-
ished Jewish traders and peddlers who struggled to eke out an existence in 
the misery of the Pale of the Settlement.12  
As was common in this social milieu, education was highly valued in 
Koifman’s large family. Very little is known about the family of the man, 
who would discuss his books, while saying next to nothing about his pro-
fessed non-life, the very context out of which his phenomenal bibliography 
                                                     
8  Although Koifman was only appointed to a professorship on the eve of his retirement 
age, it is nevertheless remarkable that no one ever succeeded to complete a doctorate 
under his supervision. His only PhD student, Menahem Haran, ultimately obtained his 
doctorate without Koifman’s blessing, because the latter refused to uphold his support of 
the process, which at that stage had been almost accomplished. 
9  For the following see Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 16ff. and Elhanai, 
“Yehezkel Kaufmann,” 89–90. Regrettably, I was not aware of Elhanai’s documentation 
of one of Koifman’s rare testimonies about his childhood and youth when I wrote my 
monograph on Koifman. The present paper provides a welcome opportunity to amend 
this lacuna. 
10  That is, 4 December, 1889 according to the Julian calender, which was in use in Russia 
at the time, before its abolition by the Bolcheviks in 1918. According to the Gregorian 
calendar, Koifman’s birthday corresponds to the 17 December, 1889. While the Julian 
version of his birth date appears in Koifman’s ID documents, the Gregorian date figures 
in publications about him. 
11  Jewish traditional orthodox. 
12  In 1791, Catherine the Great (1729–1796) had established the Pale of the Settlement, the 
area in the Tsarist Empire, where Jews were permitted to abide and work. Its relatively 
small dimensions were deliberately designed to produce counter-productive population 
density: its Jewish and non-Jewish inhabitants were locked in fierce economic compe-
tion, most of them struggling to survive.—At the end of the 19th century, when Koifman 
was growing up, 94% of Russian Jewry lived in the Pale, which at that time included the 
ten provinces of Congress Poland. In the course of the 19th century, the restrictions of 
freedom of movement, common in the Tsarist Empire, had been gradually relaxed for 
non-Jewish subjects. Simultaneously, and in stark contrast, for Jews freedom of move-
ment was drastically reduced, especially during the reigns of the last two Tsars, Alexan-
der III (1881–1894) and Nicholas II (1894–1917). 
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emanated.13 Not even the name of his mother is documented. But his 
mameloishn, his mother tongue, was Yiddish.14 
As a heder-pupil, little Yehezkel would have begun to learn biblical and 
mishnaic Hebrew as well as Aramaic soon after he was able to walk. He 
appears to have been an ilui—a child prodigy in Torah studies—who from 
a very young age not only knew much of the Tanakh, Mishnah, Talmud etc. 
by heart, but who, in comparison with his peers, was well advanced in his 
understanding of many complexities of Torah. In the universe of Jewish 
learning that flourished in the hadarim, yeshivot and bate midrash of East-
ern Europe before the Shoa, this phenomenon was not altogether excep-
tional. However, the other side of the coin becomes apparent in a few re-
marks by the septuagenarian Koifman on how haredi children had to create 
their own space for child’s play, for which his father had no time. Koifman 
describes this lack of interest and understanding of child psychology as 
typical of his haredi milieu.15  
On the other hand, Yehezkel’s father would not permit the obstruction 
of his son’s education by traditional haredi tenets, which tended to anathe-
matize both Modern Hebrew and instruction in what was termed “secular” 
subjects. Rather, Mordechai Koifman accepted the advice that Yehezkel’s 
potential would flourish best beyond the confines of the heder. With a pri-
vate teacher, Fishke Kenigsberg, Yehezkel studied Modern Hebrew and 
Modern Hebrew literature with great enthusiasm, and learned to write es-
says.16 
According to some generic remarks by Koifman, he acquired his secular 
education from private teachers. No doubt his secular education must also 
have benefited from his autodidactic talents. All this conforms with a pat-
tern of education that had become very common in east European Jewry 
since the middle of the 19th century: as in previous generations boys would 
continue to have a traditional education in the heder, yeshiva and bet mid-
rash, while also acquiring a secular education, either simultaneously or 
later on. 
                                                     
13  Koifman had at least six siblings. Although Yehezkel’s father, Mordechai Nachum 
Koifman, does not appear to have enjoyed much education himself, a good deal of evi-
dence attests to his supporting Yehezkel’s education in spite of chronic financial hard-
ship and destitution: even in World War I, when his son was a university student in 
Bern, Mordechai repeated his offers of financial support, which his son refused. See 
Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 17–18. 
14  Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 17. 
15  Elhanai, “Yehezkel Kaufmann,” 89. 
16  Elhanai, “Yehezkel Kaufmann,” 89. 
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2. Odessa and the Modern Yeshiva 
Yehezkel Koifman’s first geographic move was to Odessa. This port city 
on the northern coast of the Black Sea was home to a rich, vibrant, hetero-
geneous cultural life, benefiting from many contributions of expatriates, 
who hailed from a large variety of cultures, including from many Western 
European countries. Likewise, Odessa attracted many Jewish subjects of 
the Tsar, as it offered far better opportunities for economic and cultural 
development than any other location in the Pale of the Settlement. Conse-
quently, the Jewish cultural scene in Odessa was broad and diverse: apart 
from a large contingent of Jews embracing Russian culture, there were 
many representatives of the Yiddish and Hebrew Haskalah17. 
Odessa was also one of the most important centers of the Jewish Na-
tional Movement. It attracted many Hebrew authors, Hebrew publishing 
companies and literary journals. The Hibbat Zion Movement, linked to 
Aḥad Ha-‛Am,18 as well as several Zionist organizations were headquar-
tered in the Black Sea port. 
Throughout the 19th century, traditional anti-Semitism had been culti-
vated by the Tsarist regime and had been on the rise. When Koifman grew 
up, it was evident that Tsarist policies aimed to liquidate Russian Jewry. 
Jews were left with three alternatives. Many opted for emigration; however, 
this was merely a solution on an individual level. For the vast majority the 
choice was between assimilation and Jewish nationalism.19 
In Odessa, the Jewish population had been the target of five pogroms in 
the 19th century.20 The horrors of these events were eclipsed by the October 
Pogrom of 1905, when more than 400 Jews were murdered and 1600 prop-
erties owned by Jews were destroyed. Subsequently, the city’s Jewish 
population of around 160,000 inhabitants decreased by approximately a 
third. Psychologically, the effect of the pogroms at Kishinev, some 200 km 
northwest of Odessa, was no less significant.21 The Hebrew poet, Haim 
                                                     
17  In Hebrew usage, the term haskalah (“enlightenment”) tends to designate the Jewish 
Enlightenment, rather than its contemporary European counterpart, with which it shares 
its philosophical foundations. The beginning of the Jewish Enlightenment is associated 
with Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786).—In east European Jewry, the evolution of the 
Haskalah also thrived on contributions of maskilim (i.e. followers of the haskalah), who 
had little or no impact on the discourse in western Europe, for example Israel Zamosc-
Segal (ca.1700–1772), Baruch Schick (1744–1808) and Menahem Mendel Lefin (1749–
1826). Salomon Maimon (1754–1800), who published in German having moved to 
Germany, also impacted on the discourse in Western Europe, especially with and on 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). 
18  Asher Zvi Hirsch Ginsberg’s (1856–1927) pen name: Aḥad Ha-‛Am (Hebrew: “one of 
the people,” as in Genesis 26:10). 
19  Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 22–24. 
20  In 1821, 1859, 1871, 1881 and 1900. 
21  In the first pogrom of 1903, 47 Jews were slain, 600 injured and over 1,000 properties of 
Jews were destroyed at Kishinev. In 1905, 19 Jews were slain and 56 injured.  
8 THOMAS M. KRAPF 
Nachman Bialik (1873–1934), one of Koifman’s teachers in Odessa, had 
gone to investigate the 1903 Kishinev Pogrom as a member of the Jewish 
Historical Commission in Odessa. The experience inspired his powerful 
poem, “In the City of Slaughter,” borrowing stylistically on biblical lamen-
tations. 
At the beginning of 1907, when Yehezkel Koifman had just turned sev-
enteen, he enrolled at the Modern Yeshiva in Odessa. At this point, the city 
had about 100,000 Jewish inhabitants and was still the second largest Jew-
ish center in the Pale of the Settlement, superseded solely by Warsaw. 
Koifman’s family had previously moved to Odessa, but it is not known 
when.22 No reference by Koifman is on record regarding the October Pog-
rom that had been perpetrated some 15–16 months before he became a 
student at the Modern Yeshiva. Thus, whether the Koifmans witnessed any 
of those horrors, or whether they might even have been harmed by them is 
unknown. Be that as it may, in one or more ways Yehezkel must have been 
exposed to the traumatized atmosphere that would have prevailed among 
Jews in the aftermath of the recent Odessa and Kishinev pogroms. 
Rav Haim Tchernowitz (1870–1949), nicknamed “HaRav HaZa’ir” (the 
Young Rabbi), was the founder and principal of the modern Yeshivah in 
Odessa—also known as the Great Yeshivah or simply as “The Yeshivah”. 
It had opened its doors in 1906, that is, at most twelve months, before 
Koifman enrolled. In addition to Tchernowitz, the young Koifman experi-
enced both Bialik and the historian Joseph Klausner (1874–1958) as stimu-
lating teachers at the Yeshivah.  
Hebrew was the language of instruction at Tchernowitz’s yeshivah, and 
the ideas and agendas of the Jewish National Movement were central to its 
teaching. It soon became a mecca attracting many gifted young men of 
Koifman’s generation from all corners of the Pale of the Settlement, where 
most maskilim were pinning their hopes on the Jewish National Movement. 
The curriculum of the Yeshiva included both the gambit of traditional 
subjects—such as Talmud, Hebrew grammar, and Bible studies23—as well 
as secular subjects: e.g., secular history, Russian, geography, mathematics, 
natural sciences etc. 
The Yeshiva was the birth place of the haburah or “the gang”:24 a group 
of less than a dozen likeminded students forming a fellowship among the 
larger student body, a phenomenon that was common in many parts of 
                                                     
22  Elhanai, “Yehezkel Kaufmann,” 89. 
23  The historical critical approach to the Bible was new and highly controversial. Although 
it was taught at the Modern Yeshivah, there are indications that this gave rise to dra-
matic conflicts, which induced Koifman and like-minded friends to continue their edu-
cation elsewhere. See Gutmann, 11–12. 
24  On the haburah see Baruch Karo, “achad min hahaburah” (“One of the haburah”); 
Yom-Tov Hellman, hagoth vedmuth, prakim basifruth ubahinuch (Thought and Image: 
On Literature and Education; Jerusalem 1963), 16–18; Yehoshua Gutmann, “bereshit 
darko” (“At the Beginning of his Path”), 11–15. 
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Europe at the time. According to Baruch Karo, the haburah were the first 
group of young Jews who (1) were non-orthodox, (2) saw themselves as 
non-partisan and (3) were studying Jewish tradition (hochmat yisrael) out 
of scholarly interest and not as a means to an end.25 The bonding of the 
haburah members lasted for four to five decades. Having grown up in the 
household of a haburah member, Batia Kopilevitz recalled the haburah 
members maintaining family like relations throughout their lives.26 In her 
recollection they interacted and behaved like carefree twenty-year olds, 
when they would meet as middle-aged men. Apart from Koifman the 
names of five other members are documented: Yom Tov Hellman, Zvi 
Wislawski, Haim Aharon Krupnik, Baruch Krupnik and Yoshua Gut-
mann.27 All of them emigrated to the yishuv28 after living in Germany—
with the exception of Yom Tov Hellman, who studied in Bern and went on 
to the USA, from where he emigrated to the yishuv in 1936. Throughout his 
life Koifman maintained his friendships with Hellman, Wisslawski and 
Gutmann—possibly also with the Krupniks.29 
It appears that in the early days of the haburah in Odessa, its members 
did not see eye to eye with the “Talmudists,” i.e., students from Lithuanian 
yeshivoth with comprehensive knowledge of the Talmud. Conceivably, 
these differences could have related to both the study of Tanakh per se and 
the application of historical-critical research methods to Torah. While re-
searching the Tanakh was high on the agenda among followers of the Jew-
ish National Movement, it might not have qualified as Torah study for 
other schools of thought, such as the “Talmudists”. 
Also, at that time many Jews tended to regard historical critical research 
of the Bible with unease and suspicion based on angst that evaluating the 
historical significance of the Scriptures, which had been held holy for the 
entire span of human memory, was prone to undermine traditional faith.30 
This scenario might correspond with Guttman’s recollection of some fifty 
years post factum that Bible was only taught at the Yeshivah during the 
period when Bialik was there.31  
By contrast Koifman recalled, likewise half a century post factum, that 
he had heard about the “new criticism of the Bible” in Klausner’s lec-
                                                     
25  See Karo, “achad min hahaburah,” 17. 
26  My interview with Batia Kopilevitz, née Hellman (1922), and her husband, Emanuel 
Kopilevitz, on 28 June, 1995. 
27  Karo, “achad min hahaburah”; interview with Kopilevitz, who owned a photograph of 
1907, depicting Koifman and the named individuals. 
28  The Yishuv is the community of Jews living in Palestine from the late 19th century until 
the founding of the State of Israel in 1948. 
29  There is no documentations shedding light on his relations with Haim Aharon and Baruch 
Krupnik. 
30  This phenomenon was also prevalent among contemporary Christians of all denomina-
tions. 
31  Gutmann, “bereshit darko,” 11. 
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tures.32 There is no reason to doubt that both of these recollections are 
equally valid. More significantly, they both appear to relate to a controver-
sy of serious consequence regarding the significance of the historical criti-
cal study of the Bible in the curriculum of the Yeshivah. Conceivably this 
might have been a decisive issue in the conflicts surrounding Klausner’s 
dismissal in 1909.33 In this situation the haburah took sides with Klausner, 
questioning Tchernowitz’ authority.34 
At the time, this is likely to have caused distance between Koifman and 
Tchernowitz. Considering the dramatic nature of the conflict, an observer 
might be inclined to imagine the estrangement between the student and his 
teacher as having been severe. However, none of this pre-empted Koifman 
and the principal of the Yeshivah from forging a friendship for life. Four 
years later Tchernowitz, a paternal figure for Koifman,35 probably support-
ed his move to the University of Bern.36 And less than a decade later the 
two men were working in tandem on a successful publishing project that 
involved intensive co-operation for about six years.37 All this appears to 
suggest that there may have been a substantial element of teenage rebellion 
to Koifman’s earlier differences with Tchernowitz. In keeping with this 
paradigm, the conflict back in 1909 had been highly dramatic, escalating 
from the haburah boycotting exams to their exodus from the Yeshiva, em-
barking for distant shores beyond the Pale of the Settlement. 
Bialik, who also taught at the Odessa Yeshiva, was another paternal fig-
ure in Koifman’s life. Their mentee-mentor relationship is already docu-
mented in a letter of December 1909, when Koifman addressed his teacher 
Bialik in the most deferential terms. This relationship appears to have been 
established before Koifman had left the Odessa Yeshiva.38 The letter also 
reflects Koifman’s trust and respect for his mentor, which presumably 
would have been mutual. However, it is not known whether Bialik had 
already perceived Koifman’s promise at that early stage. What we do know, 
however, is that a quarter of a century later, Bialik hailed and supported his 
talented former student as an exceptional asset to the Jewish intellectual life 
of his generation.39 
                                                     
32  Elhanai, “Yehezkel Kaufmann” 89. 
33  See Job Y. Jindo, “Recontextualizing Kaufmann: His Empirical Conception of the Bible 
and Its Significance in Jewish Intellectual History, JJTP 19.2 (2011): 95–129, p. 99, 
fn. 13. 
34  See Gutmann, 11–12. 
35  Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 27–28. 
36  See below, pp. 24-26. 
37  See Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 68ff. 
38  See below, p. 15, fn. 69. In this letter Koifman addresses Bialik: “To my Sir and Rabbi 
H. N. Bialik.” 
39  On Bialik’s passionate, albeit unsuccessful efforts to facilitate Koifman’s appointment to 
the faculty of the Hebrew University see Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 
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In the context of Koifman’s entire life, his relations with Klausner ap-
pear in a highly ambivalent light. Among their contemporaries, there is 
broad agreement that Klausner, who was appointed to the faculty of the 
Hebrew University Jerusalem in 1925, subsequently undermined Koif-
man’s appointment for as long as he could. Evidently, the fallout must have 
taken place after April 1929, when Koifman still had unreserved confidance 
in his former teacher.40 This conforms with Koifman’s early student life in 
Eastern Europe, when he spoke very highly of Klausner, a dynamic young 
scholar in his early thirties, to whom Koifman looked up as a guide and 
teacher.41 Looking back on his student days half a century later, Koifman 
recalled that Klausner had taught the “new criticism of the Bible” at the 
Yeshivah.42 Apparently, this was Koifman’s first encounter with historical 
critical research of the Bible.43 
In his recollections, Koifman also recounted how Klausner had rejected 
a manuscript Koifman had submitted for publication in Hashiloah as a sev-
enteen or eighteen-year-old student at the Yeshivah.44 Per se this does not 
warrant to be interpreted as evidence of primordial antipathy or even jeal-
ousy on Klausner’s part towards his gifted young student. The other side of 
the coin that needs to be factored into this situation is Koifman’s obstinacy, 
which conceivably might have been exacerbated by teenage enthusiasm. 
For almost a decade later, the challenge that Koifman’s obduracy and un-
willingness to revise a manuscript could pose to an editor bent on facilitat-
ing productive interaction between his authors and readers is on record: in 
that instance Martin Buber, irenic by temperament, invested much effort to 
tone down Koifman’s polemical diatribe—albeit in vain.45 
It cannot be established to what extent Klausner’s reasons for rejecting 
Koifman’s manuscript may or may not have been well or poorly founded. 
However that may be, for Koifman’s intellectual biography this text is 
highly significant, because he went on to submit part of that manuscript to 
Heatid in early 1913.46 Inter alia, this text on prophetic literature documents 
that Koifman had already mastered and applied the methodology of histori-
                                                                                                                          
60; see also my introduction to “A Concise Summary of the work Golah ve-nekhar (Ex-
ile and Alienation),” pp. 269–272 in this volume. 
40  As documented by Koifman’s letter to Klausner of 24 April, 1929; see below at fn. 173. 
41  See below, p. 15. 
42  See above, p. 10. 
43  Jindo, JJTP 19.2 (2011): 95–129, p. 99, fn. 13. 
44  Elhanai, “Yehezkel Kaufmann,” 90. 
45  Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 51; see below, pp. 24-26. 
46  Elhanai, “Yehezkel Kaufmann,” 89. However, due to technical complications resulting 
from World War I and the post-war period, the manuscript Koifman had submitted in 
1913 was only published twelve years later, in 1925 (see Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und 
Erkenntnisweg, 45). 
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cal-critical research of the Bible, before he had ever crossed the threshold 
of a university in Western Europe.47 
No less significant for Koifman’s development as an intellectual was his 
encounter with Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s teachings, which appear to have dominated 
the discourse at the Yeshivah in Odessa.48 This provoked Koifman’s ada-
mant opposition, which preoccupied the young intellectual, conceivably 
already before he had quit the Yeshivah. Assessing this phase of critical 
interaction with Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s teaching in the context of Koifman’s en-
tire intellectual biography, it appears that his preoccupation with Aḥad Ha-
‛Am served him well in the medium and long term: the young Koifman, 
still an unknown entity in the contemporary intellectual discourse, needed 
to develop a sound methodology, if he wished to stand a chance of being 
heard when contradicting the towering ideological giant of the Jewish Na-
tional Movement in Eastern Europe. This challenge had a highly significant 
beneficial effect for Koifman, as it catalyzed the mapping out of his own 
position, the very foundation of his creative intellectual career. Back in his 
late teens and early twenties, the process of opposing an authority whom 
many followers of the Jewish National Movement revered as an icon even-
tually empowered the young intellectual to venture into new, unchartered 
waters.49 
Koifman’s first publication was his only literary creation, a short story 
in Hebrew, entitled “Sounds of the City” (1909). It describes the psycho-
logical crisis of Shmuel, a young man from a small shtetl, who ends up 
unemployed and destitute in an unnamed Russian city.50 The protagonist’s 
abject poverty is reminiscent of Koifman’s own experience of material 
deprivation, which, like Torah, had accompanied him from a very young 
age. This only piece of published fiction by the young Koifman is not at all 
on a par with his essayistic and scholarly achievements, which he was also 
beginning to produce at that time. He never pursued his early literary ambi-
tions. 
Some time in the summer or early autumn of 1909—approximately two 
and a half years after Koifman’s enrollment—he and the haburah discon-
tinued their studies at the Yeshivah. Their departure appears to have oc-
curred in a highly dramatic and conflicted situation involving rebellion 
against the Rav Za’ir. The circumstances of Klausner’s dismissal in 1909 
are not documented. This, however, triggered the exam boycott by the ha-
burah, a decision their spokesman, Baruch Karo, was tasked to communi-
cate to Tchernowitz.51 In this context Gutmann recalled a general malcon-
                                                     
47  Yehezkel Kaufmann, “ha-nevuah ha-sifrutit” (in Hebrew, “Prophetic Literature”), Heatid 6 
(1925–26): 45–62. 
48  Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 27–28, 31–34. 
49  Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 32–34; see below, pp. 18-20. 
50  Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 30. 
51  See Karo, 17. 
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tent among students of the Yeshiva, motivating many of them to quit and to 
head for the Academy of Jewish and Oriental Studies in St. Petersburg.52 
3. The Academy of Jewish and Oriental Studies in St. Petersburg53 
In all likelihood, Yehezkel Koifman had never set foot outside the Pale of 
the Settlement until he was almost 20 years of age. In the second half of 
1909 he and the haburah left the Ukraine for St. Petersburg, to enroll at the 
Academy of Jewish and Oriental Studies, which had been sponsored and 
founded by Baron David Goratsiyevich Günzburg (1857–1910), who was 
still serving as its principal in 1909.54 
Since the capital of the Tsarist Empire was located outside the Pale of 
the Settlement, every Jewish subject of the Tsar required a special resi-
dence permit for St. Petersburg. More often than not this proved an insur-
mountable obstacle. Nevertheless, the capital exercised a powerful attrac-
tion on many Jews. Although the Jewish population of St. Petersburg re-
mained relatively small,55 the city was one of the most important political 
and cultural centers for Russian Jewry.56 Albeit often in a purely technical 
sense, advocating Jewish interests could only take place at the appropriate 
fora located in and around the Tsarist Court.57  
Also, several important Jewish newspapers and journals preferred to be 
based in the capital in the hope of concluding reasonable agreements with 
the repressive censorship authorities. Under these circumstances obtaining 
residence permits for the students of Baron Günzburg’s Academy of Jewish 
and Oriental Studies was routinely fraught with complications, which the 
                                                     
52  See Gutmann, 11–12. 
53  Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 35–40. 
54  Zalman Shazar (1889–1974), half a century later, the third President of the State Israel 
(1963–1973), was a contemporary student of Koifman at the St. Petersburg Academy. 
After Koifman’s death Shazar published a very vivid account of this institution and its 
founder: “Baron David Günzberg [sic] and his Academy,” The Seventy-Fifth Anniver-
sary Volume of the Jewish Quarterly Review (eds. Abraham A. Neuman and Solomon 
Zeitlin; Philadelphia: Jewish Quarterly Review, 1967), 1–17. 
55  See Yehuda Slutsky, “Leningrad,” EJ 11 (1971): 14–17. In 1887, the Jewish population 
of St. Petersburg numbered 17254, i.e. 1,4% of the capital’s total population (Slutsky, 
“Leningrad,” 15). 
56  On St. Petersburg at the beginning of the 20th century consider the testimony of Simon 
Dubnow, Mein Leben (ed. Elias Hurwicz; Berlin: Jüdische Buchvereinigung, 1937), 
178–89. 
57  This option rarely went beyond the influence of the Barons Günzburg (see Simha Katz, 
“Guenzburg,” EJ 7 (1971): 960–63): e.g., the failed attempt of Baron Horaz Günzburg 
(1833–1909) to persuade Tsar Alexander III in 1881, to halt the pogroms that were be-
ing encouraged by the authorities, see Simon Dubnow, Weltgeschichte des jüdischen 
Volkes. Von seinen Uranfängen bis zur Gegenwart, I–X (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag 1925–
1929, 131–32; Salo W. Baron, The Russian Jew under Tsars and Soviets (2nd ed., New 
York: Macmillan, 1976), 45–46. 
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Baron’s administrator had to address, often bribing the police and other 
officials.58 
Baron David Günzburg had founded the Academy of Jewish and Orien-
tal Studies in 1907. Educated in Russia, Paris and Greifswald, this erudite 
and polyglot savant of phenomenal cultural and intellectual scope59 shared 
the vision of combining the spirituality of east European Jewish tradition 
with the historical critical methodology of the west European Wissenschaft 
des Judentums.60 This agenda determined the curriculum of the St. Peters-
burg Academy of Jewish and Oriental Studies, where a faculty with some 
of the finest Russian scholars of Jewish and Oriental studies taught a broad 
range of relevant disciplines:61 all periods of Jewish history from biblical 
ages to modern times; apocryphal and pseudapocryphal literature; Mishnah; 
Talmud; Midrash; philology; oriental studies; medieval biblical exegesis 
and literature; and legal history as well as Jewish social and economic his-
tory. These historical disciplines were taught applying the critical method-
ology of contemporary west European scholarship.62 
The language of instruction at the Academy of Jewish and Oriental 
Studies was Russian. Its faculty included Baron Günzburg and the historian 
Simon Dubnow (1860-1941), both of whom Shazar describes as stimulat-
ing and highly charismatic teachers.63 Isaac Dov Ber Markon (1875-1949) 
worked for Günzburg on research projects for many years and also taught 
at the Academy in 1908-1911.64 Judah Leib Benjamin Katzenelson (1846-
1917) already taught at the Academy before heading it after Günzburg’s 
death in December 1910.65  
                                                     
58  Shazar, “Baron David Günzberg and his Academy,” 4. 
59  Katz, 962: “He [= Günzburg] specialized in oriental subjects and linguistics, and medie-
val Arabic poetry, in the universities of St. Petersburg, Greifswald… and in Paris, … 
David gained a knowledge of most Semitic languages …” He published in Russian, 
French, Hebrew and German (Katz, 962–63). Consider also Shazar, “Baron David 
Günzberg and his Academy,” 11: “A uniquely interesting world opened before us when 
he (sc: Baron David Günzburg) lectured on Hebrew philology. Equipped with extraordi-
nary knowledge, he seemed to swim through seas of lexicography. He was said to mas-
ter thirty-six languages and all the intricacies of their respective grammars.” 
60  Shazar, “Baron David Günzberg and his Academy,” 1: “Very few and very distin-
guished were those Russian Jews who were spiritually rooted in eastern Europe but open 
to the West, aspiring to graft western scientific method upon the profound traditional 
learning of eastern Jewry. This synthesis, they felt, would be the salvation of Wissen-
schaft des Judentums itself, as well as a blessing to the development of Russian Jewry.” 
61  Shazar, “Baron David Günzberg and his Academy,” 2ff. 
62  Shazar (“Baron David Günzberg and his Academy,” 7–8) notes, that only much later—
namely, attending seminars of Friedrich Meinecke in Freiburg and Eduard Meier in Ber-
lin—did he realize, how thoroughly he had already acquired critical historical method-
ology in Simon Dubnow’s seminars in St. Petersburg. 
63  Zalman Shazar, “Yehezkel Koifman ve-poalo” (in Hebrew, “Yehezkel Koifman and his 
Work”), Hadoar 43 (1963): 59–61, 59. 
64  Shazar, “Baron David Günzberg and his Academy,” 9. 
65  Yehuda Slutsky, “Katzenelson, Judah Leib Benjamin,” EJ 10 (1972): 832–33. 
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In all likelihood, Koifman would already have been proficient in Rus-
sian, when he enrolled at the Academy. At the beginning of the 20th century 
many Odessa Jews were steeped in Russian culture. Given Koifman’s intel-
lectual talents and curiosity he had probably mastered Ukrainian with its 
close linguistic affinity to Russian from an early age, long before he had 
come to Odessa as a teenager. 
The faculty members and the students of the St. Petersburg Academy of 
Jewish and Oriental Studies had the benefit of a remarkable Judaica library 
in Baron Günzburg’s possession.66 His private library was the venue of the 
seminars and classes during the initial phase of the Academy.67 Whether 
this was still the case when Koifman attended the Academy cannot be es-
tablished. Conceivably, his reference to “tohu wa-bohu”68 at the Academy 
might also refer to such technical issues. More significantly, in the gloomy 
letter he sent to Bialik from St. Petersburg in early January 1910, Koifman 
described the haburah as having “gone from Odessa into Exile, to the place 
of the star worshippers.”69 This text also documents the discontent and dis-
appointment the haburah experienced at the St. Petersburg Academy. 
Although Koifman acknowledged the high caliber of many of the teach-
ers at the St. Petersburg Academy, he was not sure whether it is on a par 
with the Modern Yeshivah in Odessa. His conviction that Klausner’s input 
would greatly enhance the quality of the Academy and might even ensure 
that it would realize its full potential, is testimony to both the high esteem, 
in which the young Koifman held Klausner, and to the charisma the latter 
exercised on the haburah. This letter also provides an insight into the dire 
poverty of the haburah: being strangers and not knowing anyone in 
St. Petersburg, their economic situation “is without basis, if not less than 
that”. Koifman was convinced that, were this to happen, Klausner’s arriv-
ing in St. Petersburg would end their destituteness. As this appears to be 
unlikely, Koifman reminds Bialik of a translation-publication project, on 
which he and his friends of the haburah were pinning hopes of a modest 
income in return for translations from several languages.70 
                                                     
66  Katz, 963: “His [= Günzburg’s] library, which had one of the most important collections 
of Judaica, was one of the largest in private ownership in the world, and contained a 
valuable collection of manuscripts and books, including incunabula (presently in the 
Lenin State Library in Moscow).” See also I. Markon, “Baron David Günzburg,” EJ(D) 
7(1931): 726–27. 
67  Shazar, “Baron David Günzberg and his Academy,” 10. 
68  Sic, in inverted commas (Hebrew for “primordial chaos”). 
69  Letter by Yehezkel Koifman to Haim Nachman Bialik of 25 December, 1909 (i.e., 
7 January, 1910 according to the Gregorian Calendar); Bialik House Archives, 22 Bialik 
Street, Tel Aviv, 63324. 
70  In this context the natural nonchalance, with which Koifman refers to Yiddish as “the 
Jargon,” is noteworthy. According to the obsession he appears to have shared with other 
east European Jewish nationalists it was a given, that Hebrew was the only language a 
self-respecting Jew could cultivate—arrogance that translated to obliviousness to the se-
rious implications of this hateful attitude to Yiddish and those, whose cultural and per-
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Probably most, if not all the members of the haburah had relocated from 
shtetl communities in the Pale of the Settlement, or possibly from Odessa, 
to the capital of the Tsarist Empire. No doubt this involved considerable 
psychological challenges. Thus it does not appear entirely impossible that 
the initial abject mood and reserved attitude of the haburah towards the 
St. Petersburg Academy documented in Koifman’s epistle to Bialik may 
have changed over time. In any event, in 1958, conceivably in commemo-
ration of Günzburg’s 100th birthday (1857), Koifman dedicated a study, “In 
Remembrance of my Teacher and Rabbi, Baron David Günzburg.”71 Con-
sidering that Günzburg fell seriously ill in the autumn of 1910 and died 
soon afterwards, on 22 December, 1910, it appears that Koifman would 
have had the opportunity of meeting and appreciating the savant for ap-
proximately a year. 
Koifman studied at the Academy in St. Petersburg for just over three 
years, until some time in the first half of 1913. His co-student Zalman 
Shazar perceived him as “taciturn” and “focused.”72 Circumstantial evi-
dence appears to indicate that this phase was no less formative for Koif-
man’s personal and intellectual development than the preceding two and a 
half years at the Yeshiva in Odessa. 
At both institutions, students were taught to appreciate and apply histor-
ical critical methodology, as Koifman did throughout his life as a man of 
letters. However, the ideological and intellectual atmosphere prevailing at 
the Odessa Yeshiva and the St. Petersburg Academy appears to have been 
characteristically distinct from each other: since Tchernowitz was an ardent 
disciple of Aḥad Ha-‛Am,73 much, if not the entirety, of the agenda espoused 
at the Young Rabbi’s Modern Yeshiva, appears to have been molded by the 
intellectual influence of Aḥad Ha-‛Am and his vision for the Jewish Na-
tional Movement.74 By contrast, in the intellectual climate of the St. Peters-
burg Academy, the focus of attention was not primarily on the agenda of 
the Jewish National Movement. Since the latter had many followers in Rus-
sian Jewry, it was only natural that many of its prominent advocates were 
among the numerous guest lecturers invited to the Academy.75  
                                                                                                                          
sonal identity was steeped in it. This becomes an issue in one of Koifman’s early dis-
putes, see below, pp. 24-26. 
71  Yehezkel Kaufmann, “‛are ha-leviim” (in Hebrew; “The Levitical Cities”), He-‛avar 6 
(1958): 121–27. 
72  Shazar, “Yehezkel Koifman and his Work,” 59. 
73  Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 27–32. 
74  For a vivid description of Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s irresistable impact on east European Jewry, 
cosnider Chaim Weizmann’s account, which concludes: “He [= Aḥad Ha-‛Am] was, 
I might say, to Jews, what Gandhi has been to many Indians, what Mazzini was to 
Young Italy a century ago” (Weizmann, Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim 
Weizmann [London: Hamilton, 1949], 53–54.) 
75  Hayyim Nahman Bialik (1873–1934), Joseph Klausner (1874–1958), Joseph Trumpeldor 
(1880–1920) et al. 
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However, Dubnow’s thought and teaching, a stark contrast to the Welt-
anschauung of the Jewish National Movement, was an impressive, if not 
imposing intellectual influence at the Academy.76 It stands to reason that 
the vantage point from the St. Petersburg Academy furnished Koifman with 
the liberating geographic and intellectual distance he required from “Aḥad 
Ha-‛Am country” in Odessa and beyond. In any event, it was in St. Peters-
burg that Koifman developed his critical assessment of Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s 
contribution to the Jewish National Movement, which was crucial for his 
own intellectual development.77 At the time, Koifman’s position was dis-
concertingly iconoclastic and subversive for many followers of Aḥad Ha-
‛Am.78 
4. Yehezkel Koifman’s Formative Years and Early Work 
In the first half of 1913, Koifman left the Academy of Jewish and Oriental 
Studies in St. Petersburg. Before moving on to Switzerland at the end of the 
year, he spent the summer at Nicolayev in Podolia, where Haiim Baron 
hired him as a private teacher for his children. According to Chaya Hell-
man, née Baron, her father almost dismissed Koifman because of heated 
disagreement on Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s teaching. However, Koifman made no 
concessions to his employer, who experienced the dissent of his children’s 
teacher with the authoritative doyen of the Jewish National Movement to be 
unacceptable.79 
Haiim Baron had three children: Chaya (born in 1893), and her younger 
siblings Feigele (Zipora) and Salman. Koifman’s friend, Yom-Tov Hellman 
(born in 1890), also served as their teacher, although it is not clear whether 
Baron hired these two members of the haburah simultaneously. However, 
his initiative to employ teachers for his children eventually evolved into a 
small Zionist school for children and teenagers at Nicolayev.80 
It appears that from his young adulthood onwards Koifman felt a strong 
attraction to Chaya Baron, who did not discourage him from courting her, 
while she was evidently also fond of Yom-Tov Hellman.81 These triangular 
                                                     
76  Shazar, “Yehezkel Koifman Kaufmann and his Work,” 59–60. 
77  See above, p. 12. 
78  See in the following section, Koifman’s dissent with Haiim Baron. 
79  See Yehezkel Kaufmann, Christianity and Judaism: Two Covenants (trans. C. W. Efroym-
son; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1988), ix, n. 5. 
80  Interview, Batia Kopilevitz, see above, p. 9. 
81  On the many geographic moves throughout his life, Koifman kept a photograph with the 
portrait of a beautiful young woman of about twenty years of age. The Hebrew dedica-
tion on the back of it reads: “20.1.1914—Don’t forget me!—Heike.—As a souvenir for 
Koifman.” A note attached to this photograph carries the following message: “Koifman! 
I have just received this picture as a test print, and I want to send it to you right away to-
day. But don’t show it to Hellman, until I receive the other pictures, and then I will send 
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dynamics persisted for some forty years. According to Chaya’s daughter, 
Batia, the love of her mother’s life had been Batia’s father, Yom-Tov Hell-
man, whom Chaya married as a young woman. Subsequently, a triangular 
friendship bonded the Hellman couple and Koifman for the rest of their 
lives.82 
Koifman was just under 24 years of age, when he left Eastern Europe, 
never to return. Henceforth, Western Europe, and later both the yishuv in 
Palestine and the young State of Israel, became the geographic context and 
cultural ambience, where he created his phenomenal life work. Its intellec-
tual parameters had, however, already taken shape, before he set foot in a 
west European university. This is evidenced by two publications, the manu-
scripts of which he had authored before leaving Eastern Europe: his tho-
rough critique of Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s thought and methodology83 as well as a 
study on the prophets.84. The author of the latter study already masters the 
historical-critical methodology, which he then went on to use in his future 
work that included the most prolific and important contribution by a Jewish 
savant to 20th century Bible scholarship. Moreover, in these two early pub-
lications significant structural elements of Koifman’s thought are already 
discernible. 
Koifman’s discussion of Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s work covers an extensive 
range of historical issues.85 However, Koifman’s critique focuses on philo-
sophical methodology, while also rejecting Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s philosophical 
tradition. On this backdrop, the basic features of Koifman’s own philosoph-
ical system take shape. His critique of Aḥad Ha-‛Am is based on the per-
ception that metaphysics is a given, and as such is fundamental to the histo-
ry of biblical religion throughout its history, from its early beginnings to its 
latest periods—this being a fundamental, perennial characteristic of Juda-
ism. This notion is central to Koifman’s concept of monotheism, which he 
developed in great detail during the following twenty-five years. By the 
time Koifman’s concept of monotheism evolved in his Toledot ha-emunah 
ha-yisre’elit (A History of the Israelite Faith, 1937–1956, henceforth Tole-
                                                                                                                          
him a picture as well. Apart from that he is so jealous! Why? I can’t write much now, 
because I am very busy. Heike. When you get the picture, answer me straight away.” 
My translation from Hebrew, Yehezkel Kaufmann Archive of the Jewish National Library 
in Jerusalem no 6 (cited in the following as “Kaufmann Archive, no. …”). 
82  On the triangular friendship see below, pp. 34-35. 
83  Yehezkel Koifman, “‘yahaduto’ shel Aḥad Ha-‛Am” (“‘The Judaism’ of Aḥad Ha-
‛Am”), Hashiloah 30 (1913–14): 249–71. See above, p. 12. It is worth noting that Koif-
man’s devastating critique of Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s work was published in the latter’s Fest-
schrift. 
84  See above, pp. 11-12; on the circumstances that delayed the publication of this manu-
script for twelve years until 1925, although Koifman had already submitted its final ver-
sion to the editor in 1913, see Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 45, 117. 
85  For the following, see Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 33f, 41–43, 83–
91. 
 YEHEZKEL KOIFMAN: AN OUTLINE OF HIS LIFE AND WORK 19 
dot) in the 1930s and 1940s,86 he described the characteristics of monothe-
ism by means of phenomenological comparison with polytheistic religions. 
Methodologically this involves defining the morphology and the character-
istics of biblical monotheism by means of deduction.87 In both of Koif-
man’s opera magna this resulted in his tendency to present biblical religion 
as a quasi-closed philosophical system.88 
Apart from taking issue with Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s blind spot that resulted in 
his ignoring the central significance of religion in Israel’s history and cul-
ture, Koifman rejected Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s evolutionist notion of human histo-
ry. In Koifman’s view, changes in human history are not brought about 
through gradual development, but result from revolutions in religious and 
intellectual history. In Koifman’s later work, this supposition leads on to 
his idea of the “monotheistic revolution” that he conceived of being at the 
inception of biblical monotheism. 
Another dimension of Koifman’s rejection of Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s evolu-
tionist approach relates to the necessity of making clear and clean concep-
tual distinctions with regard to the phenomenology of re-definitions of val-
ues that occur in the history of religions. Genuine evolution, i.e., the crea-
tion of new religious traditions, needs to be distinguished from their re-
interpretation by later generations. 
In conclusion, in this critique of Aḥad Ha-‛Am the outline of the fun-
damental characteristics of Koifman’s scholarly life work are already ap-
parent: in methodological terms his predilection for a closed system is evi-
dent, which became a hallmark of his conception of both monotheism and 
of biblical religion. Also, in substantive terms three characteristics are con-
spicuous: first, the centrality of the metaphysical experience in biblical 
religion; second, strong reservations vis-à-vis evolutionist thinking;89 and 
                                                     
86  Yehezkel Kaufmann, History of Israelite Religion: From its Beginnings to the End of 
the Second Temple (in Hebrew; 4 vols.; Jerusalem: Bialik institute, 1937–56). Ending 
with late prophecy, this monumental opus magnum was never completed, as it does not 
cover the late post-exilic period and the inception of Christianity, as the author had ini-
tially intended. 
87  See Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 81–88; Thomas Krapf, Die Priester-
schrift und die vorexilische Zeit: Yehezkel Kaufmanns vernachlässigter Beitrag zur Ge-
schichte der biblischen Religion (OBO 119; Freiburg: Universitätsverlag and Göttingen: 
Vandenhock & Ruprecht, 1992), 71–209. 
88  See Yehezkel Kaufmann, Golah ve-nekhar (Exile and Alienation) (in Hebrew; 2 vols.; 
Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1929–30), 1:257–83; Kaufmann, Toledot, 1:221–737; Yehezkel Kauf-
mann, The Religion of Israel: From its Beginnings to the Babylonian Exile (trans. 
Moshe Greenberg: Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), 7–149.—On Koif-
man’s closed systems, see Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg 83–88, 96–
100. 
89  However, Koifman’s rejection of evolutionst interpretations of the history of biblical 
religion, as expounded in Toledot, ultimately remains somewhat theoretical, as his own 
historiography also features evolutionist structures; see Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und 
Erkenntnisweg, 101–5. 
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third, the significance of intellectual creativity as a decisive factor for the 
course of human history. 
The second publication that Koifman had authored before leaving East-
ern Europe, is a study of prophetic literature.90 Inter alia this study provides 
ample evidence that its author mastered the methodology of historical-
critical Bible research. Apart from that, this first contribution by Koifman 
to the history of biblical religion reveals many essential characteristics of 
his later work very clearly. Thus he rejects the notion of the Wellhausen 
school, who hold monotheism to be a creation of classical prophecy. In 
Koifman’s view the prophets were not founders of a religion, but teachers 
preaching to their co-religionists, thus admonishing a target audience famil-
iar with the religious traditions, on which the values were based and which 
the prophets were endeavoring to revive and to re-enforce. Hence, the sup-
posed historical precedence of the prophets before the priesthood, as postu-
lated by the Wellhausen school, had no basis whatsoever.91 
5. Re-locating to Western Europe 
At the beginning of the 20th century the Jewish inhabitants of the Pale of 
the Settlement were facing a bleak future. Many of them headed for the 
western part of the continent and across the Atlantic. At east European uni-
versities, discriminatory admission impediments for Jews seeking higher 
education were achieving their goal on a large scale: young Jewish intellec-
tuals joined the exodus in droves. Universities in Berlin, Bern and Paris 
were among their most attractive destinations. 
At the end of 1913, Yehezkel Koifman settled in Zurich for several 
months, presumably in preparation of his move to the University of Bern in 
the following spring.92 Throughout the next 15 years, Koifman re-invented 
himself, making great efforts to avoid stigmatization as an “Ostjude,” i.e., 
a Jew from Eastern Europe. According to widespread prejudice prevalent 
among non-Jews and Jews alike in the western half of the continent, Jews 
hailing from Eastern Europe were stereotyped as backward, uncouth, uncul-
                                                     
90  See above, pp. 11-12. 
91  In his later Toledot, Koifman took issue with both Wellhausen’s Hegellian evolutionist 
perception per se and its resulting Christian replacement theology in the scholarship of 
Wellhausen and his disciples. In this early study on prophetic literature in the Bible, 
Koifman merely refers to Wellhausen’s Christian replacement theology in passing. On 
the impact this theological doctrine can have on the historical interpretation of the 
Priestly Code in biblical religion consider, Krapf, Priesterschrift, 3–66 et al.; specifical-
ly on Wellhausen’s ideology, see Moshe Weinfeld, Getting at the Roots of Wellhausen’s 
Understanding of the Law of Israel: On the 100th Anniversary of the Prolegomena (Je-
rusalem: The Institute for Advanced Studies, 1979); Weinfeld, The Place of Law in the 
Religion of Ancient Israel (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004), chaps. 1–4. 
92  See Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 47. 
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tivated, uneducated, unsophisticated, unhygienic, etc. On this backdrop, 
Koifman was anxious to liberate himself from the stigma of the yeshiva 
bocher (yeshiva student) and instead, to come across as a west European 
university student.93 
Having arrived in Switzerland, Koifman adopted “Kaufmann” as the 
transcription in Latin letters of his family name, thus altering the phonetics 
of the Hebrew and Yiddish “Koifman” with its unmistakably east European 
ring. For his first name, he soon settled for the German transcription, 
“Jesekiel.”94 For the next decade and a half that he spent in Western Europe, 
he authenticated all his publications in German with “Jesekiel Kauf-
mann.”95 They proffer substantive contributions to a range of disciplines. In 
the landscape of scholarly publications in German, Kaufmann’s stylistic 
hallmark is conspicuous for the remarkable clarity of his texts, resulting 
from the author’s precise formulations and, more importantly, from his 
predilection for short syntactical structures.96 
During the decade and a half of his transit through Western Europe, K. 
presumably pronounced his family name “Kaufmann” instead of “Koif-
man.” The high esteem in which he held German culture and customs is 
conceivably related to his aim of establishing distance between himself and 
his geographic and Yiddish cultural origins.97 For Koifman’s generation, 
this paradigm was not uncommon: thus in World War I Jews in Eastern 
Europe would often hail German soldiers as harbingers of civilization and 
as saviors from their draconic oppressors and uncultivated, aggressive 
neighbors, who had been making life unbearable for Jews over many gen-
erations. With the benefit of hindsight, the absurdity of the historic irony of 
this paradigm is apparent.  
However, with regard to Koifman’s biography the Zeitgeist in his social 
and cultural milieu goes a long way to explain his predilection for Germany 
and its culture. At a later stage in his life, when he had already been living 
in the yishuv for over a decade, he continued to cultivate German habits, 
                                                     
93  In 1915, his friend and mentor, Rav Chaim Tchernowitz the former principal of the 
Odessa Modern Yeshivah, advised him to do so; see Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und 
Erkenntnisweg, 53f.; see below, p. 27. 
94  Initially, the forms “Chazkel”, “Chaskel”, “Hazkel”, “Haskel” and “Jecheskel” are 
documented. On Kaufmann’s efforts to obscure his east European origins, see Krapf, 
Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 47, 56–59. 
95  With the exception of his first two articles in German, Kaufmann produced all his Ger-
man manuscripts without requiring translations from Hebrew (see below, pp. 24-25, 
fn. 111). 
96  Kaufmann’s first two articles were essays. In addition to this his scholarly bibliography 
in German comprises his PhD thesis (see below, p. 24, fn. 109), another study in philos-
ophy (see Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 143), fifteen entries (1928–
1930) in the German Encyclopaedia Judaica (EJ[D]) on ancient and medieval Judaism 
(see below, p. 38, fn. 168) as well as four papers in biblical studies (see below, pp. 38-
39, fn. 167,176). 
97  Attested by several contemporaries, e.g., Batia Kopilevitz, see above, p.9, fn. 26. 
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which often tended to come across as quaint and unimaginably anachronis-
tic in the local Middle Eastern context: e.g., his calculable punctuality and 
his habit of not only taking a daily walk to keep healthy, but making sure to 
do so at the same hour every day, come what may.98 In 1942, when the 
entire yishuv were glued to their radio sets during the fateful Battles of El 
Alamein, Koifman persisted to go out every day at his fixed hour with his 
walking stick and hat. Doing so he enjoyed teasing Yom-Tov Hellman and 
other friends as “disorganized Russian Jews.”99 On the face of it, this com-
portment is reminiscent of the aloofness of some intellectuals at the time.100 
However, in Koifman’s case, it cannot be ruled out that he was dissimulat-
ing his genuine mood. In fact, there appears to be a high likelihood that 
Koifman very much shared the widespread pre-occupation with the menac-
ing German military advance and its dreaded devastating consequences for 
the Jewish population in the yishuv. Admittedly this comportment would 
have been extremely paradoxical. Nevertheless, Koifman’s refusal to allow 
the military, political and historical drama unfolding on his very doorstep to 
disrupt his daily routine could have been no more than a psychological 
coping mechanism. For he was exceptionally well equipped to understand 
the significance of the Third Reich extending its tentacles to the yishuv. As 
far back as 1933, Koifman had been acutely aware of the uncontainable 
vicious forces behind the murderous fanaticism of Nazi racism and its pur-
pose to wipe the Jewish people off the face of the earth: i.e., at a very early 
stage, when many Jews and most non-Jewish contemporaries had been 
failing to grasp the threat emanating from Nazi Germany.101 
Moreover, Koifman’s idiosyncratic demeanor during the Battles of El 
Alamain might indeed be related to an unexplained but conspicuous phe-
nomenon in his biography. Some of his contemporaries observed that he 
kept altogether silent on the Shoa: he never made any comment on it, nei-
                                                     
98  Ibid.—The details of this idiosyncracy are indeed remarkably reminiscent of the ritual of 
Immanuel Kant’s habit of taking a daily walk, allowing the town folk of Königsberg to 
set their clocks relying on the savant’s quirky, but unfailing punctuality… 
99  Ibid. 
100  Yohanan Meroz (1920–2006), a distinguished Israeli diplomat, was involved in military 
and polical affairs of the yishuv during World War II. In his view, many faculty mem-
bers and students of the Hebrew University tended to adopt isolationist disinterst vis-à-
vis the German threat during the Battles of El Alamein, while only a minority of them 
volunteered for the Jewish Brigade (my interview with the late Yohanan Meroz on 29 
December, 1996). 
101  Yehezkel Koifman, “ha-mapeha ha-antishemit be-Germania,” (“The anti-Semitic Revo-
lution in Germany”), Moznaim 1 (1933): 1–18. This essay documents an astute analysis 
of German Fascism, its historical roots, its social context and the psychological forces 
driving it. According to Koifman’s 1933 assessment, the Nazis had forced their agenda 
on Germany and its society, the objective being persecuting the Jews in order to disap-
pear them. This was already having catastrophic consequences for Jews of all walks of 
life in Germany. At that point, the extent to which the Nazis would be able to implement 
their master plan for humanity remained the great unknown quantity. 
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ther while it was being perpetrated, nor after its unimaginable proportions 
had become known.102 
Apart from admiration of proverbial German punctuality, the psycho-
logical significance of Koifman’s pedantry illustrated by the anecdote about 
his daily walk under any circumstances might also be connected to his so-
cio-cultural roots and to the importance of the structured daily routine prev-
alent in haredi Jewry. For his intellectual biography, it is no less significant 
that his haredi background might have endowed him with a particular sen-
sitivity to the pertinence of spiritual issues in the unfolding of religious 
history. 
For Koifman, the juxtaposition of the spiritual wealth of east European 
Jewish experience with modern west European scholarship might have 
been conflictual at times. As an ilui, he was steeped in the immense wealth 
of Jewish tradition he had learnt to cherish from his early childhood as a 
haredi Torah student. However, being a rationalist by temperament, he was 
likely to experience his background as oppressive, if not claustrophobic. 
The psychological challenges of this situation need to be born in mind re-
garding the aggressiveness, with which he degraded and belittled his Yiddish 
mother tongue. As discussed, it is difficult to avoid dissociating this weak-
ness from some degree of self-hatred targeting not his east European back-
ground per se, but specifically its cultural expressions that used Yiddish as 
its vehicle.103  
While the stages of Koifman’s distancing himself from his socio-
cultural roots are not documented in detail, the result of this process is 
abundantly evident in his biography; for his intellectual potential finds its 
self-expression in the paradigms of post-Renaissance rationalism and its 
methodologies of modern scholarship. And yet, beyond Koifman’s pas-
sionate sobriety and rationalism of a western scholar there is another di-
mension, that appears to connect to the spiritual and cultural wealth of the 
world, which in a subconscious and complex dialectical way he had to 
leave behind, in order to develop his full creative and intellectual potential.  
As a historical-critical scholar, Koifman displayed profound sensitivity 
to central issues in the history of Israelite religion. What he found to be 
unexplainable regarding important questions, he could accept as unfathom-
able without insisting that rationalist explanations were indispensable.104 
His notion of revelation is a case in point: at a certain juncture in the history 
of ancient Israel we encounter a groundbreaking event, which we are una-
ble to illuminate, but can only establish as a historical fact of far reaching 
consequence; all we learn from biblical tradition is that a monotheistic rev-
olution had taken place at a certain time, i.e., in the Mosaic age. Although 
                                                     
102  E.g. Lazarus-Yaffé, see below, p. 34, fn. 156; Haran, see below, p. 41, fn. 189. 
103  See below, pp. 24-26. 
104  Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 92–95. 
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there is no telling how this monumental game changer had come about or 
how it occurred, we cannot ignore its pivotal historic significance.105 
6. The University of Bern106 
On 5 May, 1914, Koifman enrolled at the University of Bern together with 
his friend Yom-Tov Hellman. The entry in the university record reads: 
“Hazkel Koifmann (Jecheskel Kaufmann).”107 Their arrival in Bern might 
have been influenced and facilitated by Tchernowitz.108 
Jewish intellectuals from Eastern Europe had ample reason to perceive a 
PhD from a west European university as an indispensable entrée to academ-
ia in that part of the continent. In March 1918, Jesekiel Kaufmann graduat-
ed as a PhD in philosophy with a study on sufficient reason in Immanuel 
Kant’s philosophy.109 The thesis was supervised by Richard Herbertz.110 
During his PhD studies on logic, Kaufmann remained pre-occupied with 
matters of existential significance to the Jewish National Movement. In 
1916–1917, he published two important texts on the significance of the re-
emergence of Hebrew as a living language and as a unique and indispensa-
ble vehicle for Jewish cultural expression.111 The tone of both of these con-
                                                     
105  Given its context in contemporary New Testament scholarship, another striking example 
of Koifman’s non-rationalist susceptibility of a spiritual dimenension in the history of 
religion appears to be his understanding of Jesus of Nazareth proclaiming himself to 
be the Messiah. Koifman had no difficulty contextualizing this as altogether natural in 
Hellenistic Judaism, at a time when great discussions were under way (Martin Kähler, 
Rudolph Bultmann et al.) on the fundamental difference between the historical Jesus and 
the proclaimed Jesus in early Christian tradition, and on the differing significance of 
these two entities regarding the Messianic quality of Jesus, see Kaufmann, Christianity 
and Judaism, 71ff. 
106  On Kaufmann’s years in Bern see Thomas Staubli, “Yehezkel Kaufmann: The Bern 
Years of a Genius,” pp. 45–59 in this volume, and Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Er-
kenntnisweg, 47–55. 
107  Tracing Koifman’s life in western Europe, his name will be transcribed “Kaufmann” in 
the following. 
108  See Staubli, “Yehezkel Kaufmann: The Bern Years of a Genius,” (p. 46 in this volume). 
109  For a discussion of Jesekiel Kaufmann’s less-than-60-pages-long PhD thesis, Eine Ab-
handlung über den zureichenden Grund, 1. Teil: Der logische Grund (Berlin: Emil Ebe-
ring, 1920); see Staubli, “Yehezkel Kaufmann: The Bern Years of a Genius,” pp. 51–53 
in this volume. 
110  On Herbertz and Kaufmann’s relations to him, see Staubli, “Yehezkel Kaufmann: The 
Bern Years of a Genius,” p. 50 in this volume; Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkennt-
nisweg, 52. 
111  “Unsere ‘Friedensstifter’,” Juedische Rundschau 19 (12.5.1916): 151–52. This newspa-
per article was followed by a long essay: “Die hebräische Sprache und unsere nationale 
Zukunft,” Der Jude 1 (1916–17): 407–18. For a summary of Kaufmann’s argument see 
Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 49–50. Kaufmann authored the manu-
scripts of these first two German publications in Hebrew and had them translated. Sub-
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tributions is extremely polemical, which per se was by no means unusual in 
the heated debate of the “Sprachenstreit” (Language Dispute), that was 
giving rise to violent clashes in the yishuv in those years.  
With regard to Kaufmann’s personal context, the intolerant rejection of 
Yiddish he displays was common among contemporary east European Jew-
ish nationalists including Aḥad Ha-‛Am.112 This context might go some 
way to account for Kaufmann’s unforgiving stance. And yet his embittered 
self-expression might border on self-hatred.113 Conceivably, his inability to 
acknowledge any positive quality of the rich culture of his Yiddish 
mameloishn (mother tongue) could be connected to the strong urge he felt 
to distance himself from the elephant in the room: his east European ori-
gins, specifically his Yiddish stetl roots that he shared with many 
“Ostjuden,” including those, of whom he might have felt ashamed, fearing 
they were giving rise to discriminatory stereotypes against all Jews hailing 
from Eastern Europe.  
Regardless of these psychological aspects, the issues Kaufmann ad-
dresses in his first two publications in German are highly significant, and 
his well-made case can certainly not be dismissed out of hand: since He-
brew was the only common idiom enabling Jewish literary and intellectual 
creativity that could be accessible to all Jews, the successful revival of He-
brew was indispensable for the survival of the Jewish people as a distinct 
ethnic entity with its own cultural identity.114 
Kaufmann’s characteristically aggressive tone of argument was an issue 
throughout his work. Indeed, Moshe Greenberg’s reference to Kaufmann’s 
“typically scholastic style of free-swinging polemic”115 comes across as a 
respectful understatement circumscribing the destructive vitriol that is 
a common feature of much of his writing.  
As the editor of Der Jude, Martin Buber took issue with Kaufmann’s 
aggressiveness and arrogance.116 However, in the end the irenic editor’s 
patient efforts to persuade the young, gifted author with underdeveloped 
social skills to temper the tone of his argument failed because of Kauf-
mann’s stubbornness.117 Initially, Buber had rejected both Kaufmann’s 
reference to “the Jargon (i.e. Yiddish) satisfying the more base intellectual 
                                                                                                                          
sequently, he wrote his German manuscripts without having to resort to translations 
from Hebrew. 
112  For Kaufman his relentless, pejorative labelling of Yiddish as “the Jargon” appears to 
connect to how he definines his identity, see above, pp. 15-16, fn. 70. 
113  See above, pp. 21-23. 
114  For a study of Koifman’s perception of the crucial role of the Hebrew language in Jew-
ish history, see below, p. 30, fn. 139. 
115  Yehezkel Kaufmann, The Biblical Account of the Conquest of Canaan (a preface by 
Moshe Greenberg; trans. M. Dagut; 2nd ed.; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1985), 11. 
116  See above, p. 11. 
117  See Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 51. 
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needs”118 and Kaufmann’s consistent designations of Yiddish as “the Jar-
gon” and of Yiddish speakers as “Jargonists.” As far as the militant au-
thor’s attitude was concerned, in Kaufmann’s milieu of Hebrew speaking 
Jewish nationalists from Eastern Europe demeaning Yiddish as “Jargon” 
and its speakers as “Jargonists” was altogether acceptable, if not politically 
correct; the chauvinistic designation of Yiddish as “vulgar” and “women’s 
speech” came naturally to Kaufmann, who was not afflicted by qualms of 
any kind.  
In the end Buber’s patient efforts to persuade Kaufmann to revise his of-
fensive nomenclature were of no consequence. Having issued warnings to 
the author that his essay would not be published at all—in spite of being 
well argued in methodological terms—Buber did not make good on his 
threat; possibly because he never received promised alternative contribu-
tions on the important language issue by two authors, who failed to deliv-
er.119 In the end Kaufmann’s authentic manuscript went to press, unscarred 
even by Buber’s initial minimal condition, that the offensive “Jargon”-
terminology must be edited away. 
After his graduation in Bern, Kaufmann lived at Lausanne from the 
summer of 1918 for approximately one year, working with Tchernowitz 
preparing an abridged Talmud edition, a publication project, on which 
Kaufmann went on to work for some six years, even after he moved to Ber-
lin in 1920.120 
7. Berlin121 
Jesekiel Kaufmann’s Berlin years were an extremely productive period in 
his life. During the nine years from early 1920 until his emigration to the 
yishuv in the autumn of 1928 Yehezkel Koifman laid the foundations of his 
life work: he ultimately published it in Hebrew, having had to give up his 
initial plans in the 1930s of publishing his Bible scholarship in German—in 
addition to Hebrew.122 
During his Berlin years, Kaufmann made a presumably very modest liv-
ing as a free-lance scholar. He continued to collaborate with Tchernowitz’s 
above mentioned publication project of the Talmud until November 1924. 
Together with Zvi Wisslawski, one of the members of the haburah, Kauf-
mann collaborated in the publication of the short-lived Hebrew journal, 
                                                     
118  “…befriedigt der Jargon die niedrigern geistigen Bedürfnisse…,” Der Jude 1 (1916–17): 
411. 
119  They were Abraham Sonne and Harry Torczyner; see Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und 
Erkenntnisweg, 51, n. 143. 
120  See Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 55. 
121  See Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 56–66. 
122  See Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 68ff. 
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Atidenu (Our Future) in an editorial capacity.123 It is not known, why it 
ceased to be published after merely three months. Conceivably, this might 
have been the result of the overall precarious economic situation prevalent 
in the Weimar Republic, which was particularly acute at that time. 
The dire economic situation affecting most people in the Weimar Re-
public is likely to have been a significant factor thwarting Kaufmann’s 
efforts to find employment, which would have provided him with a reliable 
and stable income. It is not documented why Kaufmann’s applications were 
unsuccessful at both the Jewish Community for a librarian’s position in 
1925, and at the Akademie für die Wissenschaft des Judentums in the fol-
lowing year, where he presumably sought appointment for a teaching or 
research position.  
However, material Kaufmann submitted with these two applications124 
does shed light on how cautious he was to avoid resembling an “Ostjude” 
vis-à-vis his co-religionists in Berlin, one of the most important and vibrant 
west European hubs of Jewish cultural and intellectual life.125 While Kauf-
mann did not attempt to deny his east European background, he was careful 
to insinuate suggestively that his rich Jewish culture and education was the 
outcome of his university education in west Europe. When he has to men-
tion the modern Yeshiva in Odessa he is mindful to replace the dirty word 
“Yeshivah” with the urbane designation “University for Jewish Studies.”126 
8. Yehezkel Koifman’s Life Work 
True to a 19th century tradition of scholarship that was still palpable 
through the beginning of the second half of the 20th century, Yehezkel 
Koifman was one of the last architects of a Lehrgebäude, an intellectual 
system that seeks to explicate its subject matter comprehensively. The dis-
tinctive characteristic of such closed systems tended to be their implicit 
axiomatic presupposition that they provided nothing less than a water-tight 
interpretation of their subject matter—a notion with which succeeding gen-
erations tend to experience unease.127 However that may be, each of Koif-
man’s two opera magna constitute separate Lehrgebäude, while also serv-
                                                     
123  This journal was the mouth piece of tarbut (“Culture”), a Hebrew cultural movement 
that had originated in Eastern Europe, see Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkennt-
nisweg, 56. 
124  A CV submitted with his application to the Jewish Community Berlin of 19 May, 1925 
(documented in Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 116) and a letter of mo-
tivation to the Akademie für die Wissenschaft des Judentums of 28 February, 1926 
(documented in Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 117–19). 
125  Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 56–59.  
126  “Hochschule für jüdische Wissenschaft.” 
127  On Koifman’s Lehrgebäude and its methodological aporia, see Krapf, Kaufmann: Le-
bens- und Erkenntnisweg, 83ff. 
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ing as pillars of his larger Lehrgebäude, a comprehensive two-tier structure, 
that needs to be appreciated as an ensemble. 
It is Koifman’s second opus magnum of some 2,500 pages, Toledot, for 
which he is primarily known outside the Hebrew language discourse as 
Yehezkel Kaufmann. While this work might, rightly or wrongly, be consid-
ered reminiscent of a “Theology of the Tanakh,”128 it is indeed the most 
significant contribution made by a Jewish savant to historical-critical Bible 
scholarship in the 20th century.129 However, prior to this publication, 
Koifman had already been recognized as ranking among the greatest Jewish 
intellectuals of his time for his earlier Hebrew opus magnum of over 1,000 
pages, which had been published around his fortieth birthday: Golah ve-
nekhar (Exile and Foreign Lands A Socio-Historical Study on the Issue of 
the Fate of the People of Israel from Antiquity to the Present, 1929–1930; 
henceforth, Golah).130  
It was this first opus magnum that established Koifman’s fame and 
reputation as an exceptionally profound and creative scholar in the Hebrew 
language discourse. For his intellectual biography this comprehensive so-
cial history of the Jewish people is highly significant. It reveals much of 
both the structure of his entire work, as well as many of the issues that in-
terest and pre-occupy him throughout his life-time. 
In 1933, Golah earned its author the first Bialik Prize for Jewish Studies 
to be awarded.131 Haim Nahman Bialik, one of Koifman’s teachers and 
paternal friends, was euphoric about the significance of his former student’s 
                                                     
128  Regrettably, this non-felicitous notion cannot be undone in the sub-title of my intellectu-
al biography of Koifman (Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg): although 
Koifman’s interpretation of the Bible comes across as a closed system, the theology-
terminology is nevertheless misleading. His work is not indebted to the genre of “Theol-
ogy of the Old Testament,” rooted in Protestant theological tradition. 
129  It was not before 1960 that Kaufmann’s contribution to Bible scholarship has become 
accessible in European languages: Books 1–7 (i.e., vols. 1–3) were published in an 
abridged translation, which became a classic of 20th century Bible scholarship: Yehezkel 
Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, From its Beginnings to the Babylonian Exile, trans-
lated and abridged by Moshe Greenberg, Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1960. In 
1977, this was complemented by an unabridged English translation of book 8 (i.e., 
vol. 4): Yehezkel Kaufmann, History of the Religion of Israel, Vol. IV: From the Babylo-
nian Captivity to the End of Prophecy (trans. C. W. Efroymson; New York and Jerusa-
lem: Ktav, 1977). In a European language the most comprehensive rendering of Koif-
man’s interpretation of the Priestly Code and priestly literature in the Pentateuch is 
Krapf, Priesterschrift, 210–78. 
130  1929: Books 1–2 (= Vol I); 1930: Books 3–4 (=Vol. II) by Dvir Publishers, Tel Aviv. 
While “Gola veNechar” translates effortlessly to German as Exil und Fremde, the He-
brew notion nekhar (German: “Fremde”) needs to be rendered with both “estrangement/ 
alienation” and “foreign lands” in English. Hence the English translation of the title 
ought to convey “Exile and Estrangement/Alienation/Foreign Lands,” followed by the 
subtitle. 
131  In the last decade of his life Koifman was awarded the Bialik Prize a second time 
(1956), followed by the Israel Prize (1958) and the Bublik Prize (1961). 
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contribution to the Jewish and Hebrew academic discourse. As early as 
1930 he prevailed on Judah Leon Magnes (1877–1948), the first chancellor 
of the Hebrew University, to have Koifman appointed to a professorship.132 
However, in spite of Bialik’s moral authority in the cultural and intellectual 
scene of the yishuv, his intervention failed, and he did not live to see Koif-
man’s belated appointment to the faculty of the Hebrew University in 
1949.133 
Considering that Bialik was not alone to realize the significance of Go-
lah as an exceptionally original, if not brilliant work, it might appear para-
doxical that the impact of Koifman’s early opus magnum is not comparable 
to the by far more enduring effect of his second one, Toledot. Inter alia this 
might be due to the lack of an adequately comprehensive translation to a 
widely read European language in a timely fashion. Koifman’s correspond-
ence does indeed document that publishing (abridged) translations of Golah 
to Yiddish, Polish and English was being considered in the 1930s and after 
World War II, albeit without any outcome.134 The short summary of Golah 
authored by Koifman himself in German in 1936 was not published at the 
time.135 However, the circumstances of Koifman volunteering to write it 
illustrate that Golah was generating interest outside the yishuv and among 
an audience for whom the Hebrew language barrier would need to be over-
come.136 Eventually, only after the span of two generations, the three chap-
ters of Golah on the inception of Christianity were published in English.137  
Ultimately, the impact of Golah has never matched its significance. Of-
ten underestimated, Koifman’s highly original early opus magnum provides 
analyses covering a broad range of issues, many of which have lost little of 
their pertinence. Back in the 1930s the relatively small impact of Golah is 
remarkable, considering that Bialik and others regarded it as an outstanding 
work with nothing contemporary in Hebrew to rival it.138 Likewise, there 
appears to be an inescapable irony to such a significant Hebrew work on 
predicaments of Jewish history being authored in Berlin during the 1920s. 
In the context of Koifman’s life work, Golah is a crucial pillar. For it 
was not in spite of Koifman’s interest in the social history of the Jewish 
people that he produced his very comprehensive, albeit ultimately uncom-
pleted history of biblical religion: rather, it was because of Koifman’s in-
terest in Jewish social history that he embarked on authoring another opus 
                                                     
132  For an English translation of Bialik’s letter to Magnes, see pp. 269–70 in this volume.  
133  On the circumstances of Koifman’s overdue appointment, see the paragraph below, 
“The Hebrew University of Jerusalem,” pp. 39–44. 
134  Kaufmann Archive, nos 4, 115, 121; see Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 61. 
135  First published in 1990 by Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 123–33. For 
an English translation see pp. 273-281 in this volume. 
136  Ibidem. 
137  Yehezkel Kaufmann, Christianity and Judaism is the translation of Golah, vol. 1 chaps. 
7–9. 
138  See pp. 269–270 in this volume. 
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magnum on the origins and history of biblical religion, the scope of which 
was more than twice as extensive as Golah. 
The central issues of Golah pre-occupied the contemporary Jewish Na-
tional Movement. The author seeks to explore how the Jewish people, 
without a claim to a land of their own, had succeeded to survive for two 
millennia without losing their identity, in spite of being dispossessed of 
their land and of being constantly exposed to persecution. Koifman’s re-
search elucidates how Jewish religion and its preservation became crucial 
in enabling Jews to maintain their identity as Jews and their Jewish exist-
ence. In this dramatic history the Hebrew language played a crucial role: 
especially in modern times, as religion lost its significance as the cohesive 
social force, the Hebrew language became the sine qua non of Jewish sur-
vival. In Koifman’s view the possibility of Jewish identity as a shared his-
toric and cultural experience hinged on intellectual creativity in the recently 
revived Hebrew idiom, as it was the only language common to Jewry the 
world over. For Hebrew continued to be the medium of Jewish self-
awareness and Jewish experience that it had been since time immemorial, 
i.e., since the time of Moses.139 
Koifman’s interest in Jewish religion as the cohesive force, holding the 
Jewish people together for some two millennia was the pivotal issue of his 
enormous life work. It induced him to focus on researching biblical religion 
and its monotheistic roots. Indeed, conceptualizing, as he does, the phe-
nomenon of monotheism by elucidating its morphology by means of deduc-
tion does raise challenging methodological questions.140 Nevertheless, 
Koifman’s concept of monotheism has much to contribute to ongoing dis-
cussions, that often tend to follow bizarre avenues.141 
Dating the P source (i.e. the Priestly Code or the Priestly Source in the 
Pentateuch) to pre-exilic times, Koifman developed a grand antithesis to 
Julius Wellhausen’s interpretation of the historic significance of the Penta-
teuch. Koifman’s contextualizing the largest Pentateuchal source in the era 
of the First Temple has implications of far reaching purport. This approach 
mandates re-writing the history of biblical religion, as the entire corpus of 
pre-exilic literature requires a historic re-contextualization and re-
                                                     
139  On Koifman’s perception of the crucial role of the Hebrew language in Jewish history, 
see Thomas M. Krapf, “Jüdische Identität und Neuhebräisch. Anmerkungen zu Yehez-
kel Kaufmanns Verhältnis zur Wissenschaft des Judentums,” Judaica 49, no. 2 (1993): 
69–80. 
140  See above, pp. 18-19. 
141  On the relevance of Koifman’s conception of biblical monotheism see in this volume: 
Benjamin D. Sommer, “Yehezkel Kaufmann and Recent Scholarship: Toward a Richer 
Discourse of Monotheism” (pp.204-239) and discussants (pp.240-249). Likewise my 
contribution on the discussion in German in the mid-1990s: Thomas M. Krapf, “Bibli-
scher Monotheismus und vorexilischer JHWH-Glaube: Anmerkungen zur neueren Mo-
notheismusdiskussion im Lichte von Yehezkel Kaufmanns Polytheismus-
Monotheismus-Begriff,” Berliner Theologische Zeitschrift 11 (1994): 42–64. 
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interpretation. Extensive literary corpora need to be re-appraised in relation 
to P in its pre-Exilic context: JE, Deuteronomy, Deuteronomistic literature 
as well as the better part of prophetic literature, wisdom literature and the 
Psalms.142  
Although Koifman made a good case for the pre-exilic dating of P, his 
interpretation did, however, fail to explain why the impact of P never be-
came evident before the dawn of early post-exilic times, i.e., several centu-
ries after its creation. However, this deficit in Koifman’s presentation of the 
history of biblical religion has been addressed: Menahem Haran (1924–
2015) perceived the phenomenon of the late publicizing of P as a conse-
quence of the semi-arcane nature of priestly religion in the First Temple 
era. Hence the origin of P pre-dated its publication within the Pentateuch by 
several centuries.143  
Regardless of the strong case for dating P to the pre-Exilic era, Well-
hausen and his school have had a lasting psychological impact on percep-
tions prevailing in biblical scholarship. This appears to overshadow the 
contribution by Koifman and scholars, who over the course of some eighty 
years have developed a highly differentiating hypothesis on the early dating 
of P. While their important work is largely ignored, the benefit of cultivat-
ing lacunae in scholarship by steadfastly disregarding important evidence, 
which contradicts one’s own position, continues to remain an unexplainable 
mystery.144 
Koifman’s enormous corpus of groundbreaking work is the most out-
standing contribution by a Jewish savant to 20th century Bible scholarship. 
As discussed, it continues to have a significant impact on the ongoing dis-
course. Scholars who followed in his footsteps often discovered his work as 
readers, and found it so compelling that they would pursue their own re-
search along similar lines.145 Meanwhile Koifman was altogether inept as a 
teacher. He failed to inspire and guide students in direct interaction, and he 
never made any attempt to establish his own academic school of thought. In 
light of this, the impact of Koifman’s work on biblical scholarship appears 
to be phenomenal in a way that is characteristically Koifmanian: whatever 
significant contributions scholars indebted to Koifman’s work have made 
                                                     
142  See Krapf, Priesterschrift, 306–12. 
143  Menahem Haran, Temples and Temple Service in Ancient Israel: An Inquiry into the 
Character of Cult Phenomena and the Historical Setting of the Priestly School (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1977); reprint with a new preface, corrections, and an altered sub-title as: 
Temples and Temple Service in Ancient Israel: An Inquiry into Biblical Cult Phenomena 
and the Historical Setting of the Priestly School (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1985). 
144  See Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 106–13; Krapf, Priesterschrift, 3–
66, 306–12. 
145  See for example Moshe Greenberg’s recollections included in the present volume, pp. 
60–67. (I myself discovered the widely ignored pertinence of Koifman’s interpretation 
of P, his conception of biblical monotheism et al., while working on a PhD thesis, which 
subsequently morphed to Krapf, Priesterschrift.) 
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and continue to make to Bible research, effectively amounts to a school of 
thought in biblical studies in its own right.146 Paradoxically, and by no 
means less characteristic of Koifman, this academic school evolved in spite 
of the failure of its spiritus rector to establish it himself.147 
9. Between Haifa and Jerusalem148 
In the autumn of 1928, Jesekiel Kaufmann emigrated from Berlin to the 
yishuv. In March 1932, he became a subject of British administered Pales-
tine,149 where Hebrew was one of the three official languages. After fifteen 
years in Western Europe as “Jesekiel Kaufmann,” the perennial émigré now 
at his destination, reverted to the Hebrew and Yiddish enunciation of his 
name: Yehezkel Koifman. 
Having arrived in the yishuv, Koifman earned his living as a high school 
teacher in Haifa, as the Hebrew University did not integrate him into its 
faculty for more than another two decades. This failure appears to be the 
result of several factors, the most significant ones being personal animosity 
against Koifman and/or his mentor Bialik, as well as the rejection of histor-
ical-critical Bible research. While the latter was the methodological sine 
qua non of Koifman’s ground-breaking discoveries, the savant was acutely 
aware that cultivating or merely countenancing historical critical investiga-
tion of the Bible was beyond the potential of the Hebrew University. Ulti-
mately, the contribution of the Hebrew University to Koifman’s phenome-
nal work was but negligible. For it was without the support of the only uni-
versity in the yishuv that Koifman produced the better part of his second 
opus magnum, Toledot, before he was eventually granted a part-time pro-
fessorship at the Hebrew University in 1949. 
Nevertheless, the twenty-one years following Koifman’s arrival in the 
yishuv were another highly productive period in his life. The credit of fa-
cilitating the conditions that were indispensable for Koifman’s phenomenal 
productivity during the fifth and sixth decades of his life is due to Arthur 
Biram (1878-1967), the founder and principal of the beth hasefer hareali 
(Reali High School) in Haifa: from 1929-1949, Koifman produced more 
than three quarters of his Toledot, many other studies on the history of bib-
lical religion and an impressive list of important journalistic essays.150  
                                                     
146  For a brief survey of research on biblical priestly literature indebted to Koifman’s work 
up to 1992, see Krapf, Priesterschrift, 283–303; regarding more recent contributions see 
Jindo, 98ff. 
147  See above, p. 5. 
148  See Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 67–77. 
149  See Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 67. 
150  Some of his journalistic publications of his earlier Haifa years were published in behevle 
hazman: kovez mehkarim uma’amarim beshe’elot hahove (Tribulations of our Times: 
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In the 1920s Biram, the principal of the Reali, had traveled to Germany 
regularly to recruit highly qualified scholars to teach at his high school. 
Appreciating that serious scholars were keen to obtain positions at the He-
brew University, Biram did his best to discourage desertion by offering his 
staff tempting working conditions at a time, when the standard of living in 
the yishuv tended to be frugal. For example, Ernst Simon (1899–1988), one 
of Koifman’s friends, was paid a salary of £ 25,- at the Reali High School, 
in lieu of £ 12,-, the standard salary of a teacher in the yishuv.151 Neverthe-
less, Simon was happy to join the ranks of those who would not miss the 
first opportunity of moving on to the Hebrew University, as he resented the 
paramilitary culture of the Reali High School.152  
In the context of dynamics such as these, Biram must have been aware 
of the high likelihood that Koifman was a strong candidate to be lured away 
to the Hebrew University. Golah was a sensational achievement, and Biram 
must have appreciated, if not admired, it.153 In the small community of the 
yishuv it would have been almost impossible for Biram not to have heard 
about the—albeit unsuccessful—initiative taken by Bialik, a doyen of the 
intellectual scene in the yishuv, who used all his moral authority to lobby 
for Koifman’s joining the faculty of the Hebrew University as soon as pos-
sible.154 Likewise, Biram would most probably have been aware of Koif-
man being short-listed for an appointment to the faculty of the Hebrew 
University in 1931.155  
These developments took place while Koifman was already on the pay-
roll of Biram’s Reali High School. However, given Biram’s appreciation of 
Koifman’s intellectual caliber, he may already have realized during the 
recruitment process before September 1928, that Koifman was likely to be 
a strong candidate for a position at the Hebrew University before long. 
Thus Biram might already have promised Koifman preferential working 
conditions at the Reali High School during his recruitment process, which 
took place before his arrival in the yishuv. Koifman, for his part, was no 
                                                                                                                          
Studies and Essays on Contemporary Issues; Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1936); see also Yehezkel 
Kaufmann Jubilee Volume, 1–6. 
151  According to Simon’s late widow, Tony Simon, my interview of 12 May, 1995. 
152  Ibid. and according to an interview with Ernst Simon’s son, Professor Emeritus Uriel 
Simon, of 5 October, 1995. On the Haifa Reali High School, see Sarah Halperin, Dr 
A. Biram vebet hasefer hareali. drachim hadashot umaslul kavua (Dr. A. Biram and his 
‘Reali’ School: Tradition and Experimentation in Education; Jerusalem: R. Mass, 1970). 
153  Biram’s letters to Koifman in the 1950s are testimony to the high esteem in which he 
held Koifman and his work (Kaufmann Archive, no. 121c). This is corroborated by the 
late Professor Chava Lazarus-Yaffé, whose student-teacher relations with Biram in the 
late 1940s were very close—“like my own family” (see below, p. 34, fn. 156): according 
to Lazarus-Yaffé, Biram’s admiration for Koifman was beyond any imaginable en-
hancement. 
154  See above, pp. 10, 28-29. 
155  Together with Umberto Cassuto (1883–1951); see Sara Japhet, “Research and Academic 
Teaching of the Bible in Israel,” Jewish Studies 32 (1992): 13–24, esp. 16. 
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doubt keen on opportunities to concentrate on his research, while trying to 
join the faculty of the Hebrew University. 
As a teacher of Hebrew literature at the Reali High School, Koifman 
merely taught the upper two forms, while enjoying both reduced teaching 
loads of no more than six periods per week and the privilege of routine 
sabbaticals:156 he only taught from Succoth through Pessah, spending every 
summer in Jerusalem. Apart from that, every third year Biram gave him 
twelve months sabbatical in a stretch, during which Koifman would also 
work in Jerusalem: researching and writing his Toledot, both at the precur-
sor of the Jewish National and University Library and at the library of the 
Ecole Biblique et Archéologique Française, which to this day houses one of 
the finest and most comprehensive collections of publications on biblical 
studies. 
In 1936 Yom-Tov Hellman, a member of the Odessa haburah, and his 
wife Chaya, immigrated to the yishuv from the United States. Their daugh-
ter, Batia Kopilevitz, née Hellman in 1922, remembered Koifman as a per-
manent lodger at her parents’ home at Beth Hakerem during his extended 
stays in Jerusalem in the 1930s and 1940s. In the Hellman household he 
enjoyed the status of a privileged family member: Batia recalled the rela-
tions bonding her parents with Koifman as “triangular,” the adults sharing 
their very personal issues with each other. To the couple’s daughter the 
perennial lodger was an uncle, who never stopped complaining about her 
practicing the musical scales on the piano. In his spare time he enjoyed 
reading children’s books and thrillers. The latter he would borrow from 
Naftali Herz Tur-Sinai (Harry Torczyner; 1886-1973), Professor of Hebrew 
and Semitics at the Hebrew University (1933-1973) and future president of 
the Academy for Hebrew Language (1953-1973), who in the 1930s and 
1940s was said to own the largest collection of thrillers in town.  
As a bachelor in his late forties, Koifman was a fussy customer. Chaya 
Hellman, Koifman’s former student, whom he appears to have courted as a 
young man,157 would bend over backwards to keep him happy: being a 
vegetarian Koifman asked for four to five egg yolks per day, which she 
duly put on the table for him. On Shabbath she treated him to a gefillte fish 
substitute based on almonds, prepared especially for him. 
Among Koifman’s friends and acquaintances, there is broad agreement 
that he was very frugal. The books he possessed could barely fill a short 
shelf. Indeed, with the paucity of his possessions he resembled the traveler 
perennially sitting on his packed suitcase, according to Batia Kopilevitz. He 
never owned more than one suit at a time. It was tailor-made, and he would 
wear it for many years. On the rare occasions when he did opt for a new 
one, Chaya Hellman obliged to his request to accompany him to the tailor. 
                                                     
156  The following is based on my interviews with the late Professors Chava Lazarus-Yaffé 
on 1 August, 1995 and Abraham Malamat on 18 October, 1995. 
157  See above, pp. 17-18. 
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At some point in the 1940s, Chaya was no longer able and willing to put 
up with Koifman as her perennial lodger. According to Batia’s recollection, 
her mother claiming more space and privacy for herself and her family 
resulted in Koifman renting an apartment of his own near the Helman’s 
home in the Jerusalem neighbourhood of Beth Hakerem. However, consid-
ering Koifman’s modest income as a high school teacher—which conceiv-
ably might have been no more than a part time salary to make up for his 
extended routine sabbaticals—it appears unlikely that he would have been 
able to afford moving to his own quarters in Jerusalem, before being ap-
pointed to a part-time professorship (50%) at the faculty of the Hebrew 
University in 1949. In any event, when Koifman did establish his first Jeru-
salem home, he recruited Chaya’s unfailing support to buy furniture. At 
Wissman’s furniture store she witnessed Koifman demanding the most 
uncomfortable sofa, in order to deter his guests from wasting too much of 
his precious time.158 
There is broad consensus that teaching was not Koifman’s forte. Al-
though he was obstinate, dogmatic and mostly intolerant of dissent to his 
views, his demeanor was soft-spoken and timid. Disciplining a class of 
teenagers was a great challenge for him, which he often failed to master. 
According to insider testimony,159 Biram, the authoritative, if not authori-
tarian principal of the Reali High School, would sit at the back of the class-
room to pre-empt disruptions of Koifman’s lessons. … About half a centu-
ry post factum the veracity of such recollections is beyond verification. 
Likewise, the memories of students, who recalled Koifman as a teacher at 
the Reali High School in Haifa and at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
fifty years later need to be appreciated as subjective recollections, which 
cannot offer the same degree of authenticity as more contemporary testi-
mony could proffer. 
Bearing this reservation in mind, many recollections I was able to obtain 
in the 1980s and 1990s from different sources would appear to corroborate 
a lot of Koifman’s idiosyncrasies outlined so far. According to the vivid 
accounts of both the late Professor Chava Lazarus-Yaffé (1930–1998) and 
of Ora Lipshitz (born in 1933), Koifman would not only have been unchar-
ismatic, but highly inept as a teacher. Lazarus-Yaffé knew Koifman both as 
a teacher at the Reali High School in the late 1940s and at the Hebrew Uni-
versity in the 1950s. Although she was an intellectually alert and ambitious 
student with a very broad range of interests, she never learnt much from 
Koifman in a classroom or seminar setting. Rather, she experienced him as 
tedious, demotivating and incapable of challenging his students’ interests 
and intellectual curiosity. His interaction with them was often counter-
productive. 
                                                     
158  Interview, Batia Kopilevitz, see above, p. 9, fn. 26. 
159  Tony Simon, see above, p. 33, fn. 151. 
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Having experienced Koifman at the Reali High School, Lazarus-Yaffé 
was later incapable of “looking up to him” (sic) as an inspiring teacher. He 
never contributed to her intellectual development, although she did learn to 
appreciate his work at a young age, but that was not the result of any direct 
teacher-student interaction.  
In 1947-1948, most of the male Reali High School students were active 
members of the haganah160 and had precious little time for Koifman’s in-
sights into Jewish social history, nor for his theories on Jewish anti-
Semitism. Emphasizing that neither Koifman nor anyone else could have 
anticipated the unintended bitter irony a non-felicitous incident would take 
on in retrospect, Lazarus-Yaffé recalled what under other circumstances 
could have been written off as routine interaction between big-mouthed 
teenage students tantalizing a vexed teacher in despair. In any event, Koif-
man was provoked to what in retrospect would become a tragic faux pas, 
which Lazarus-Yaffé believed, he might have regretted for many years to 
come. The occasion was an arduous, unproductive lesson, in which Koif-
man vented his frustration with a remark to the effect: “What on earth will 
become of you all?” From the back of the classroom, a smart aleck retorted: 
“In the end, we’ll all die.” To which Koifman responded: “Let’s hope so!” 
Lazarus-Yaffé never forgot this incident, because less than a year later, 
almost the entire class had been killed in the War of Independence. 
For Lazarus-Yaffé it was not Koifman himself, but her inspiring teacher 
Arthur Biram, who introduced her to Koifman’s Toledot. Continuing to 
study this work as a student at the Hebrew University, she came to appreci-
ate Koifman’s intellectual caliber, his depth and his exceptional contribu-
tion to biblical research. But she never experienced his teaching being re-
motely equal to the originality and depth of his scholarship.  
Apart from that she found the constant bickering between Koifman and 
Isac Leo Seeligmann (1907–1982) highly irritating. Although she perceived 
Seeligmann as the main culprit, this nevertheless impeded her interaction 
with Koifman. In oral exams, which the two antagonists would carry out as 
a “team,” candidates tended to feel they needed to square the circle, as 
pleasing one of the examiners entailed the risk of annoying, offending and 
estranging his opponent. For Lazarus-Yaffé, this became one of several 
factors in her decision to discontinue Bible studies after her BA and to im-
merse herself in Islamic studies instead. 
It appears that the outlined counter-productive dynamics were institu-
tionalized. Ora Lipshitz was the last student to face the cantankerous Koif-
man-Seeligmann examination board in the last exam Koifman ever gave. 
She experienced this as traumatic, although she did well, as Koifman was 
                                                     
160  A Jewish paramilitary organization in the British Mandate of Palestine (1921–1948). 
After the founding of the State of Israel in 1948 it became the core of the Israel Defense 
Forces. 
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sentimental due to the personal significance of the occasion.161 Apart from 
these recollections of her final exam, Lipshitz remembered Koifman as 
very punctual, pedantic and unapproachable for students. 
Koifman never made a deep impression on Lipshitz other than being the 
only person to address her—and her peer students—in the third person 
singular. In contemporary Hebrew of the 1950s this was conspicuously 
idiosyncratic, especially to the young generation. Likewise, Uriel Simon, 
having known Koifman as a “sort of Godfather” (sic) in his childhood,162 
found it most irritating to be addressed in this way, when he faced Koifman 
as an examiner at the Hebrew University some twenty years later. In 
Simon’s perception, Koifman “had no psychological sensitivity for his 
students”.163 This is reminiscent of Koifman’s own recollections of his fa-
ther, Mordechai Koifman, failing to appreciate the needs of a child.164 
As a contributor to the cultural and intellectual life of the Jewish Na-
tional Movement, Koifman was keen to take part and to impact on the dis-
course of the yishuv as a Hebrew writer, not least because he attributed 
unique significance to the Hebrew language in cultivating and preserving 
Jewish identity.165 Indeed, this agenda was a pivotal manifestation of the 
purpose of his life work. Nevertheless, his ambitions as a Hebrew author 
did not by any means conflict with those of a scholar of global stature, who 
wished to make his contribution to biblical scholarship accessible to col-
leagues, who depended on a rendition of his work in a European lingua 
franca. 
Since Koifman engaged with the work of Wellhausen and his school of 
thought, publishing his research in German made perfect sense. In a free 
and open-minded discourse, Koifman’s proficiency in German would cer-
tainly have empowered him to reach out to his colleagues around the world, 
when reading German was a sine qua non for any contemporary Bible 
scholar. The cultural context was that of the antiquated and bitter joke 
about students and scholars of Jewish studies having to master German as 
the most important Semitic language before Hebrew. Anything but handi-
capped by linguistic obstacles, Koifman was silenced by insurmountable 
racist obstruction. 
                                                     
161  The following is based on my interview of Ora Lipshitz on 16 December, 1998. 
162  Interview, see above, p. 33, fn. 152; Uriel Simon recalled that when his father, Ernst 
Simon, and Koifman were colleagues at the Reali, the latter often obliged to baby sit for 
the Simons to enable them to go out for an evening. On these occasions Uriel would 
play under the table, at which Koifman would be working—conceivably on his Tole-
dot—and whenever the child would become too loud for the savant’s liking, he would 
grunt, or yell: “sheket! sheket! (silence! silence!).” 
163  Ibid. 
164  See above, p. 6. 
165  See above, p. 30. 
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Koifman’s unsuccessful efforts to publish his work in German in the 
early stages of his career as a Bible scholar are well documented.166 Osten-
sibly his travail amounted to no more than the meager result of two studies 
published in three installments in the Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche 
Wissenschaft (ZAW) in 1930 and 1933 under the heading “Probleme der 
israelitisch-jüdischen Religionsgeschichte.”167 In reality, this represents but 
the tip of the iceberg of Koifman’s attempts to make his contribution to 
biblical studies accessible to the non-Hebrew reading public.168 It does ap-
pear, however, that in the year of his third publication in ZAW, he would 
have shelved his plans to have anything more published in Germany, where 
the words and ideas of Jewish and other indexed authors were consigned to 
public auto-da-fés on 10 May, 1933 and were subsequently ostracized from 
public discourse. Given these circumstances, it probably would have 
seemed altogether irrelevant to Koifman that Johannes Hempel, the editor 
of the ZAW, was joining the ranks of the German intelligentsia who were 
rallying behind Hitler, as early as 1933. Whether Koifman was in fact 
aware of the pro-active Nazi engagement of the editor of the ZAW at that 
time is not known. 
Before the cataclysm struck in 1933, Koifman had been planning to 
publish his Toledot in German for almost an entire decade. An outline of 
this work,169 which predates 1933,170 as well as an impressive number of 
drafts for studies, are preserved in his archives,171 documenting that back in 
the 1920s he had already been making plans for a volume of some 400 to 
500 pages.172 In a letter to Klausner of 1929,173 Koifman refers to his Bible 
research, which does not build on the “Wellhausen system,” and which he 
was hoping to publish in ZAW. Koifman had shared some of his work with 
                                                     
166  See Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 68ff. 
167  Jesekiel Kaufmann, “I. Das sogenannte theokratische Ideal des Judentums,” ZAW 48 
(1930): 23–32; “II. Der vordeuteronomische Charakter der Priesterkodex,” ZAW 48 
(1930): 32–43; ZAW 51 (1933): 35–47. 
168  The two lexicographic columns, Jesekiel Kaufmann, “Elischa,” Encyclopaedia Judaica 
(Berlin), VI (1930): 525–26, are not part of Koifman’s efforts to publicize methodologi-
cally argued biblical research to the non-Hebrew reading public. However, with regard 
to his intellectual biography it is worth noting that most of his fifteen entries in Encyclo-
paedia Judaica. Das Judentum in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Berlin I (1928)–X (1934) 
document his interest of the 1920s and 1930s in the late period of Second Temple Juda-
ism, the very period that was later omitted in his uncompleted Toledot (for a complete 
list of these entries see Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 143–44). 
169  Entitled, “Allgemeiner Plan meines Werkes Geschichte der israelitisch-jüdischen Reli-
gion,” published in Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 120–22 and in 
Krapf, Priesterschrift, 315–17. 
170  Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 70–72. 
171  Kaufmann Archive, no. 76. 
172  For a detailed assessment of this material see Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkennt-
nisweg, 68–72. 
173  Joseph Klausner Archive, National Library of Israel (ARC. 4° 1086/444). 
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Professor Ernst Sellin (1867–1946), who “believes these studies are the 
beginning of a new era in Bible studies”.174 
However, since Hempel was in the process of joining the Nazis, it is not 
at all surprising that his letters and messages to Koifman of 1931–1932 
unequivocally reveal that the editor of ZAW was dragging his feet and sys-
tematically obstructing the publication of Koifman’s work.175 After 1945, 
Koifman never renewed his early efforts to publish his work in any other 
language than Hebrew. Six pages that appeared in 1954 were his last Ger-
man publication: this was merely a response to a former neighbour and 
Bible scholar in Haifa, Elias Auerbach (1882–1971), who published much 
of his works in German, the contents of which Koifman found irritating.176 
As of 1960, three years before Koifman’s death, his Toledot finally did 
become accessible in English, to the non-Hebrew reading public.177 By the 
end of 1962, the Catholic Swiss publishing house, Benziger Verlag, was 
considering to publish either a complete or an abridged German transla-
tion.178 The circumstances that pre-empted the implementation of this pro-
ject are not on record. Conceivably, a large and expensive translation pro-
ject of a scholarly work that had already become available in a European 
language would have involved a high risk, particularly for a publishing 
house already confronted with manifold difficulties, which ultimately led to 
a protracted process of unfriendly take-overs in the 1980s and 1990s. 
10. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
In October 1949, on the eve of Yehezkel Koifman’s sixtieth birthday, the 
distinguished scholar was finally appointed to the faculty of the Hebrew 
University Jerusalem. At that point almost twenty years had passed since 
Bialik had urged J.L. Magnes, the first chancellor of the Hebrew Universi-
ty, not to miss a golden opportunity: having authored Golah, Koifman was 
establishing an exceptional reputation for himself. As far as Bialik was 
concerned, Koifman with his highly promising potential needed to be wel-
comed as a God-sent asset and a blessing to the fledgling university of the 
yishuv.179 Meanwhile Koifman’s poor presentation skills, his shyness and 
his often-lacking social skills, as well as his unforgiving polemical style, 
did little to advance his university career.  
                                                     
174  Letter to Klausner (my translation from Hebrew). 
175  Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 72–75. 
176  Yehezkel Kaufmann, “Der Kalender und das Alter des Priesterkodex,” Vetus Testamen-
tum 4 (1954): 307–13. 
177  See above, p. 28, fn. 129. 
178  See Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 76. 
179  See pp. 28-29 and pp. 269-270 in this volume. 
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Also, back in the early 1930s, historical-critical Bible scholarship was 
still controversial at the Hebrew University. And yet, in the long run this is 
not likely to translate to attenuating circumstances. Historiographers might 
chose to note that for all their high-flying self-perception and visions, the 
members of the only academic institution in the yishuv failed to live up to 
their responsibility of integrating in a timely fashion the savant considered 
to be the most eminent Bible scholar of his generation in both the yishuv-
Israel and in the Diaspora.180  
Among Koifman’s enemies who systematically obstructed his appoint-
ment for two decades, Joseph Klausner stands out: the very teacher to 
whom the young Koifman, as a student in Odessa and St. Petersburg, had 
looked up as an intellectual inspiration.181 Until the end of his life Koifman 
continued to be grateful to Klausner for having initiated him to historical 
critical methods of Bible scholarship at the Odessa Yeshiva.182 Contempo-
raries perceived Klausner’s negative attitude towards Koifman in the 1930s 
and 1940s as competitive jealousy towards the younger gifted scholar, who 
had established his reputation with both his rare scope of expertise in a 
broad field of disciplines, as well as with his exceptionally large corpus of 
substantive published research. 
With regard to Koifman’s belated appointment in 1949, the circum-
stances of his merely obtaining 50% of a professorship at the Bible De-
partment of the Hebrew University are not clear. A reduced teaching load 
certainly suited the time requirements for his research projects, which were 
as ambitious as ever. While some contemporaries believe that he himself 
had requested a half-time position, there does not appear to be any record 
that would confirm this.183 
In September 1957, having served as a university professor for merely 
eight years, Yehezkel Koifman became professor emeritus of the Hebrew 
University at the age of 67. 
Following his move to Jerusalem in 1949, Koifman initially continued 
to work on his Toledot, of which volume 4 was published in 1956.184 This 
was the last part of this work to pass through the printing press, leaving 
Koifman’s phenomenal contribution to 20th century biblical studies uncom-
                                                     
180  The diplomatic manner in which Moshe Greenberg described these dynamics at a time, 
when he himself did not yet have an insider’s perspective of the Hebrew University, cir-
cumscribes some of the pertinent issues without, however, clarifying the crucial respon-
sibility of the university: “His [i.e., Kaufmann’s] unorthodoxy (in both the traditional 
and critical sense), his scope (from the ancient Near East to modern social movements), 
and his uncompromising self-assurance combined to keep him out of the Hebrew Uni-
versity during the best twenty years of his creative life.” Judaism 13 (1964): 78. 
181  See above, p. 11. 
182  See above, p. 9-10. 
183  No significance ought to be attributed to this lacuna, since record keeping and data 
management is not a forte of the administration of the Hebrew University. 
184  See above, p. 28, fn. 129. 
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pleted: according to the savant’s initial plan, he had never intended to have 
his second opus magnum end with the last biblical prophets, but with the 
end of the Second Temple period. However, in Golah185 Koifman had ex-
pounded his earlier perception of the late Second Temple period, some of 
which was later published in English.186 
During the last years of his life, Koifman persisted in digressing from 
his initial plans for his Toledot—to the disappointment of “all (his) 
friends.”187 However, Koifman disagreed. He was pre-occupied with the 
pressing need to research the early periods of biblical history before com-
pleting his ambitious Toledot. The first result of this new pursuit was the 
monograph, The Biblical Account of the Conquest of Canaan (1953).188 His 
final works were two commentaries, published only in Hebrew, on the 
Books of Joshua (1959) and Judges (1962). For Koifman this digression 
was mandatory as these two books were about the beginnings of the people 
of Israel and its religion, which, in his view, contemporary scholarship 
failed to appreciate. 
A legend has it that some time in the forth decade of his life Koifman 
had missed his own wedding: on the spur of the moment, he was said to 
have decided that whatever he was doing at a library in Berlin just then 
needed to take precedence. This universal apocryphal anecdote about a 
stuffy professor losing himself in idiosyncratic pursuits reflects a tragic 
twist to Koifman’s fate. In the last stages of his life he did come to the con-
clusion that authoring a phenomenal bibliography in lieu of leading a more 
fulfilling human existence, was backfiring on him, at the very point, when 
he felt altogether defenseless. He began to perceive his life style as a celi-
bate recluse without raising a family of his own as an irreparable omis-
sion.189 He was indeed desperate wanting to marry his house-keeper, Eliza 
Grinz. They never did, but he bequeathed her some of his modest savings. 
Presumably, it was about one year after his retirement in September 
1957 that Koifman was diagnosed with Parkinson’s Disease. His archives 
contain some scientific publications on his illness, which would appear to 
indicate that psychologically Koifman was trying to engage with his condi-
tion in a pro-active manner. 
                                                     
185  See above, p. 28, fn. 130. 
186  See above, p. 17, fn. 79. 
187  Koifman in a letter to Moshe Greenberg of 12 June, 1960; see Greenberg’s recollections 
inlcuded in the present volume, pp. 60–69, see p. 63. 
188  See above, p. 25, fn. 115. 
189  The following is based on many conversations with Menahem Haran between 1985 and 
1990. Haran admitted that his relations with Koifman were very complex, ranging from 
Koifman’s refusal to support Haran’s PhD in its critical final stage (see above, p. 5, 
fn. 8) to relatively close relations between the student and his teacher towards the end of 
the latter’s life. Be that as it may, much of Haran’s take on Koifman’s personal tribula-
tions at the end of his life was corroborated by accounts of other contemporaries, e.g. 
Abraham Malamat and Batia Kopilevitz. 
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The National Academy of Science, the pre-cursor of the Israel Academy 
of Sciences and Humanities, was founded on 27 December, 1959. Three 
months later, its President Martin Buber invited Koifman to join the Acad-
emy Committee.190 It is not documented, whether Koifman attended any of 
its meetings. Conceivably his deteriorating health prevented him from do-
ing so. Likewise, there is no record that Koifman was elected to join the 
members of the Academy. 
In 1959 or 1960, Koifman moved into an apartment located in the same 
building where his friend and colleague Avraham Malamat resided.191 To-
gether with his wife he provided support to Koifman.192 Although he was 
very frail, he continued his research and his writing. With hardly any books 
to call his own he wrote much of his Commentary on the Book of Joshua in 
Malamat’s study-library. Malamat recalled that his cherished neighbour 
was manually too inept to install a letter-box large enough to accommodate 
off-prints of journal articles. Koifman’s pragmatic solution was to add his 
name to the Malamats’ letter-box. 
During the last two or three months of his life Koifman was haunted by 
hallucinations, a symptom of Parkinson’s Disease that apparently is not 
uncommon. About three times Koifman’s house-keeper or nurse alerted the 
Malamats in the middle of the night. On each of these occasions they found 
their friend trembling with fear, reporting voices he was hearing on the 
street outside and visions of Jehu and his men, who were, Koifman was 
convinced, threatening him. On these occasions Koifman quickly relapsed 
from Hebrew to German and soon into Yiddish—but never into Russian. 
Likewise, when two nurses came to accompany him from his apartment to 
the Hadassa Hospital some three weeks before he passed away, the despair-
ing patient abused them in Yiddish. 
According to Batia Kopilevitz, Koifman was afraid of death.193 For 
many years he had avoided funerals, including that of his closest friends, 
Batia’s father, Yom Tov Hellman, and of Zvi Wisslawski. When Koifman 
lay dying in hospital, close friends did their best to comfort him in his acute 
fear of death. Batia visited him frequently. Haim Gvarjahu was at his bed-
side reading out Psalms. During the last week of his life Koifman is report-
ed to have remarked: “I have never known how to live a full life, now I 
don’t know how to die.”194 
                                                     
190  Letter from Buber to Koifman of 15 March, 1960, Archives of the Academy. I am grate-
ful to the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities for their kind permission to refer 
to this uncatalogued document. 
191  At 1, Rashba Street in the Rehavia neighbourhood of Jerusalem. 
192  The following is based on my interview with Malamat, see above, p. 4, fn. 7. 
193  The following is based on my interview with Kopilevitz, see above, p. 9, fn. 26. 
194  As outlined (see above, p. 36) relations between Koifman and Seeligmann had been 
conflictual and very complex. However, during the last week of Koifman’s life Seelig-
mann paid his former colleague a visit. A few days later he told Lipshitz (see above, 
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On 21 Tishri, 5724, the eve of Simhat Torah, Yehezkel Koifman passed 
away. According to the Gregorian Calendar it was 9 October, 1963. When 
he drew his last breath the widow of his late friend, Zvi Wislawski, was the 
only human being by his side. 
 
At that time Chaim Potok was on sabbatical in Jerusalem. He took up the 
suggestion of his friend, Avraham Malamat, to join the minyan that gath-
ered for ma’ariv in Koifman’s small apartment every night during the shiva 
period. Potok’s moving testimony entitled, “The Mourners of Yehezkel 
Kaufmann”195 describes how kaddish was said for the deceased, who had 
no family, and how after the prayers, the savant’s mourners commemorated 
him with readings from his works. Apart from Chaim Potok and several 
persons who are not named, Ephraim Urbach, Haim Gvaryahu, and Av-
raham Malamat attended every evening after dusk.196 Zalman Shazar, 
Koifman’s fellow student in St.Petersburg, was serving as President of the 
State of Israel, at the time. He joined Koifman’s mourners on most of the 
evenings. 
Epilogue 
The man, who had denied himself a fulfilling life, left a scholarly legacy, 
that two generations after his demise continues to have a significant impact. 
For Yehezkel Koifman, throughout his life a self-made man, no memorial 
could be more befitting than his bibliography. And yet, a concluding irony, 
which the deceased could hardly have imagined, must not go unrecorded. 
For some two decades the Hebrew University of Jerusalem had never 
missed a chance of failing to integrate the most significant Jewish histori-
cal-critical scholar of the 20th century into its faculty. He joined the faculty 
belatedly in 1949, when he had already attained the threshold to retirement. 
In light of this, it does indeed come across as ironic that soon after Koif-
man’s death the Hebrew University mutated to the proud host of a highly 
conspicuous memorial to Koifman—albeit due to generous philanthropy 
from overseas. 
Clarence W. Efroymson (1898-1988), Professor of Economics at Butler 
University, Indianapolis (1933-1968), had already been an ardent admirer 
of Koifman during the latter’s life time. As a translator of substantial parts 
of both Koifman’s Golah197 and Toledot,198 Efroymson did much to make 
                                                                                                                          
fn. 161), his former student and friend, about his last interaction with Koifman, citing 
the dying man’s resigned conclusion to his life. 
195  Chaim Potok, “The Mourners of Yehezkel Kaufmann,” Conservative Judaism 18, no.2 
(1964): 1–9. 
196  At the time Menahem Haran was on sabbatical leave abroad. 
197  See above, p. 17, fn. 79. 
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Koifman’s work accessible to the English language public. Apart from his 
intellectual interest in Koifman’s contributions to Jewish Studies, Efroym-
son was a large-hearted philanthropist, who donated fortunes to a broad 
range of charitable and humanitarian causes. Less than four weeks after 
Koifman’s death Efroymson endowed the Yehezkel Kaufmann Chair of 
Biblical Studies at the Bible Department of the Hebrew University.199 The 
dedication ceremony took place on 5 November, 1963. 
Thus a memorial was established to integrate the eminent scholar in the 
very department that had closed its doors on him throughout the two most 
productive decades of his fruitful life. 
                                                                                                                          
198  See above, p. 28, fn. 129. 
199  It was held by Menahem Haran until September 1993, succeeded by Sara Japhet (Febru-
ary 1996–September 2003), Shalom Paul (March–September 2004) and since January 
2005 by the current incumbent, Israel Knohl. 
Yehezkel Kaufmann: The Bern Years of a Genius 
Thomas STAUBLI 
After attending school and studying in Odessa and St. Petersburg, Yehezkel 
Kaufmann left Czarist Russia for Bern on the eve of the First World War to 
continue his studies in Bern, where he earned his doctorate. What led him 
there? What intellectual environment did he encounter in Switzerland? 
What did he achieve during those years? How was he shaped by his time in 
Bern? 
1. A Ukrainian Jew in Bern 
Yehezkel Kaufmann was born on 24 Kislev 5650 (Julian calendar Decem-
ber 4, 1889,1 Gregorian December 17, 1889) in the Podolian town of Du-
naivtsi (Russian Dunayevtsy, today western Ukraine) as the son of Morde-
chai Nahum Koifmann, who did business with newspapers, among other 
things, and had a large, poor family. 
In 1909, Dunaivtsi had 13,733 inhabitants. Of these, 8966 were Jews, 
2349 Ukrainian-Orthodox, 1266 Lutherans, 1188 Catholics, and four Ar-
menians. 65 percent of the inhabitants were, accordingly, Jewish. On a 
single day, September 21, 1942, in Dunaivtsi, 2588 Jews were murdered by 
the Nazis. We find an indirect commentary on these atrocities in Kauf-
mann’s magnum opus, Toledot ha-emunah ha-yisre’elit (A History of the 
Israelite Faith, 1937–1956, henceforth Toledot), when he characterizes 
Haman’s position in the Book of Esther this way: “In Haman’s antisemitic 
ideology there is, as stated, no religious element. His hatred is racial; he 
makes no religious and no ethical demand. He seeks to destroy uncondi-
tionally. His motivation is personal enmity; the background and fundament, 
mass hatred. […] In the book of Esther antisemitism appears in its original 
bestial form, in which it would reappear only in Germany in this latest gen-
eration.”2 A Jewish cemetery, whose oldest gravestone is dated 1891, still 
exists in Dunaivtsi; there is an industrial structure built over an additional, 
older cemetery.3 
                                                     
1  This date is listed in the matriculation book of the University of Bern, which incorrectly 
assumes use of the Gregorian calendar. 
2  Yehezkel Kaufmann, History of the Religion of Israel. Vol. IV: From the Babylonian 
Captivity to the End of Prophecy (New York/Jerusalem/Dallas: Ktav, 1977), 521ff. 
3  http://www.heritageabroad.gov/Portals/0/documents/reports/survey_ukraine_2005.pdf, 
p. 103. 
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“When Kaufmann left Russia in the second half of 1913, he had already 
acquired the methodological skills for his exegetical lifework, which (how-
ever) he only began to develop in greater detail many years later. It is also 
documented that essential intellectual coordinates of his lifework were at 
least rudimentarily defined even before he visited a west European univer-
sity.”4 This statement by the judicious biographer Thomas Krapf is im-
portant for understanding Kaufmann’s stay in Bern. In truth, Kaufmann 
came to Bern not merely to study, but also to receive an admission ticket 
into the academic world of the West. 
That Kaufmann moved his studies to Bern probably had something to 
do with his teacher and friend Chaim Tschernowitz. On October 25, 1912, 
Tschernowitz, arriving from Berlin and Halle together with another student 
from his school in Odessa, Jankel Surl Berger (1892–?),5 matriculated at 
Bern and took his examinations on December 12, 1913, after studying with 
Karl Marti, Philipp Woker, and Naum Reichesberg.6 It is quite possible that 
Kaufmann took over his student room or that of Berger’s on Seelandweg 7, 
near the Botanical Garden, while Tschernowitz was in Würzburg finishing 
his doctorate with the philologist Maximilian Streck about the formation of 
the Shulchan Aruch. The work was published a year later in Bern by Max 
Drechsel. Tschernowitz sought out his brilliant student to enlist Kauf-
mann’s assistance in bringing out an abridged edition of the Talmud. In 
1918–1919 Kaufmann took a leave from the University of Bern in order to 
work with his former teacher in Lausanne on the publication of this work.7 
In the foreword, he is the only one mentioned by name, and labeled a “bril-
liant student.” On May 5, 1914, Kaufmann matriculated in Bern, along with 
                                                     
4  Thomas Krapf, Yehezkel Kaufmann: Ein Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg zur Theologie der 
Hebräischen Bibel (Berlin: Institut Kirche und Judentum, 1990), 41. See, too, the formu-
lation in the article by Emanuel Green and Haim M. I. Gevaryahu, “Kaufmann, 
Yeḥezkel,” EJ 16 (1971), 1349–51, where there is a discussion not only of Kaufmann 
studying in Bern, but also of his receiving his doctorate there. 
5  Nr. 17296 in the Bern matriculation directory (Berner Immatrikulationsverzeichnis). 
Berger, among others, has produced a certificate from the academy where Kaufmann 
took courses in Jewish studies at Odessa. On the same day, immediately before Berger 
and Tschernowitz, the Russian citizens Dr. med. Oskar Hartoch from St. Petersburg, 
Chaim Leifka Salk from Traschkun, Jahn Tontegode from Kurland, Schlioma Mendlin 
from Kharkow, and Meer Rischin from Minsk were matriculated. It is uncertain whether 
they knew each other. 
6  Tschernowitz’s matriculation number was 17297. On his studies, see Chaim Tscherno-
witz, Die Entstehung des Schulchan-Aruch: Beitrag zur Festlegung der Halacha (PhD 
dissertation, University of Bern: 1915, also published as a monograph under the same title 
Bern: Dreschel, 1915), 80. 
7  Chaim Tschernowitz, Kiṣṣur ha-Talmud: Masekot Berakhot, Rosh ha-Shana, Joma min 
Talmud Babli. Mesudarot u-Meforaschot (Lausanne: Impr. Réunies, 5679/1919). 
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Krasilov native Yom Tov Hellmann, a student of Dubnow.8 He is registered 
with this entry: “Hazkel Koifmann (Jecheskel Kaufmann).” 9 
Jewish Bern on the eve of and during the First World War was an ex-
tremely vital and colorful world. In 1906 the new synagogue was erected in 
the Kapellenstrasse, with a Jugendstil (art nouveau) design that included 
Moorish elements. A majority of the financially strong community’s core 
had Alsatian roots. Albert Einstein, who lived and worked in Bern between 
1902 and 1909, laid the foundations for his theory of relativity here. Bern 
was a center of Bundists (followers of the Algemeyner Yiddisher Arbeyter 
Bund) and had the most active members of this organization outside Russia 
until 1917. This was the site of its central office, established in 1902, and 
the home of its leading mind, Vladimir Medem, who characterized Bern as 
a “veritable fortress of the Bund.”10 For Yiddishists, moreover, Bern was 
stylized into an almost mythological site of emancipation far away from 
their countries of origin. For a short time in 1916–17, even the Yiddish 
newspaper Fraie shtime was published in Bern.11 This facet of the city’s 
Jewish landscape must have been not insignificant for Kaufmann’s unmis-
takable standpoint as a representative of the Hebraist faction in the lan-
guage question (more on this in the final section). 
2. Kaufmann and the Bern Old Testament scholar  
Karl Marti (1855–1925) 
In addition to practical reasons, another consideration dictating the choice 
of Bern might have been the fact that the university’s Old Testament schol-
ar Karl Marti was then known and respected, in the entire German-speaking 
guild well beyond Bern, as a representative of the then-dominant Wellhau-
sen school. Thus, not only did Kaufmann escape the turmoil of the war by 
being in Bern, but he also had the opportunity to study the history of reli-
gion from an intellectual outlook diametrically opposed to his own on 
many points, and to discuss his observations with like-minded people from 
his time in Odessa and Petersburg. 
Karl Marti became Professor of Old Testament in 1895 at Bern, where 
he founded the department of Semitic studies in 1907. In 1911–1912 he 
                                                     
8  See Yomtov Hellmann, “Mein Lehrer Schimon Dubnov,” He-Avar 8 (1961), 10–16 
(Hebr.). 
9  Matriculation number 18507. 
10  Sandrine Mayoraz, “‘Wahrhaftige Festung des Bundes’: Der Allgemeine Jüdische Ar-
beiterbund in Bern,” in Wie über Wolken: Jüdische Lebens- und Denkwelten in Stadt 
und Region Bern, 1200–2000 (eds. R. Bloch and J. Picard; Zurich: Chronos, 2014), 223–
240. 
11  Shifra Kuperman, “Jiddischisten in Bern: Freiheit und Wissenschaft im Alpenparadies,” 
in Wie über Wolken (see previous note), 209–221. 
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was rector of the university. A farmer’s son, he was depicted by colleagues 
as modest, steady, hard-working, dry, not very original, but fair and help-
ful. His initial, strong reservations about source criticism notwithstanding, 
Marti eventually became a follower of Julius Wellhausen (1844–1918). 
“Nobody in Switzerland did as much to disseminate the new view of the 
Old Testament as he did.”12 The “new view” essentially says that Penta-
teuchal law was a late product of the Hebrew Bible that, contrary to its 
position in the canon, does not precede the appearance of the Prophets but 
rather follows them and is a product of the era of the presumed religious 
decline and formalism after the destruction of the First Temple. Beneath 
this late dating lies a value judgment that, in the context of the time, exhib-
ited latent anti-Semitic features. In his rectorial address from 1911 on the 
state of research in Old Testament studies, Marti distinguishes among popu-
lar religion, legal religion, and prophetic religion.13 He viewed prophetic 
religion alone as a genuine forerunner of Christianity. 
It was above all Marti’s readiness to help others that his Jewish students, 
mostly from extremely beleaguered backgrounds, learned to value, a help-
fulness to which New Year’s cards, thank-you notes for letters of recom-
mendation, and similar material that he received between 1902 and 1919 
from thirty Jewish students testify.14 This abundance of Jewish students, 
many of whom later became rabbis, studying with a Christian teacher 
whose theological outlook did not really enable him to appreciate the value 
of the Old Testament message in general and the law in particular, seems 
peculiar from today’s perspective. It shows that daily practical needs, con-
crete opportunities, and making connections were more important than 
worrying about ideology. In an obituary for Marti written by his doctoral 
student Hedwig Anneler we read:15 “Perhaps the warmest, closest children 
of his spirit live and teach—excepting Germany—in Palestine. One has to 
have seen how the eyes of the Zionist teachers there—especially in Jaffa, in 
Jerusalem, in the Jewish colonies—light up: ‘Our Marti!’ And how they 
will now be clouding over! Every year, men who were his students twenty 
                                                     
12  Rudolf Smend, Deutsche Alttestamentler in drei Jahrhunderten (Göttingen: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), 143. 
13  Karl Marti, Stand und Aufgabe der alttestamentlichen Wissenschaft in der Gegenwart 
(Bern: M. Dreschel), 1911. 
14  From A. Bension (1910–12), Adolf Braun (1910), Julius Davidovics (1906–07), 
J.N. Epstein (1912–15), S.B. Eschwege (1910–11 and n.d.), Hermann Felinowitz (1907–
08 and n.d.), Jos. Fenerring (n.d.), Salomon Frankfurter 1902, Adolf Garbatti (1911), 
Max Geyer (1909–11), Joh. Ginsberg (1915), Rudolf Glück (1902 and n.d.), Louis Gol-
de (1908), S. Gronemann (1909), A. Grün (1913), Markus Halpner-Kneller (1910), 
S.A. Horodezky (1910), Marcus Katz (1910–13), Benjamin Lewin (1907–11), Jehuda 
Marschak (1907–12), B. Mossinsohn (1910–11), L. Nebenzahl (1911), Aron Neuwirth 
(1910–13 und n.d.), Leo Niemcewitsch (1913), J. Olschwanger (1914), E. Rosenwasser 
(1902–08), Gerhard Scholem (1919), Moses Seidel (1912–13), Markus Stieglitz (1907–
1908), David Weiss (1907–11).—Berner Burgerbibliothek, N[achlass] Karl Marti 20. 
15  Der Bund, 28 April, 1925, Nr. 175, 4. 
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years ago and longer sent him gifts, in spite of their own poor circumstances 
—for example, the first Hebrew map of Palestine or even if it was only 
oranges, the honey-sweet oranges of Rishon le-Zion.” 
Kaufmann, too, apparently appreciated Marti’s generosity and support-
iveness. But what the young scholar living under conditions of extreme 
material abstinence wanted from him was neither money nor a title, but 
books. The only material from the Marti estate containing Kaufmann’s 
handwriting is found not under the category of “Jewish students” but in-
stead among the documents of nineteen additional students.16 It is a request 
from April 5, 1918, asking for permission to borrow the tractate Yoma in 
the edition of Hermann Strack, along with additional books to be used in a 
scholarly work.17 The scholarly work in question, of course, is the above-
mentioned abridged Talmud edition Kaufmann was helping Tschernowitz 
to edit. Nothing fits in better with a characterization of Kaufmann, who is 
supposed to have said that he had no biography, only a bibliography.18 
In his Toledot (see below), Kaufmann reviews, in addition to the 1903 
fourth edition of Marti’s Geschichte der israelitischen Religion, the latter’s 
works on the prophets Daniel, Isaiah, and the lesser prophets, published 
1900–1904. When Kaufmann mentions Marti in Toledot,19 it is practically 
always together with other followers of Wellhausen. Mostly, but not al-
ways, he puts distance between himself and their opinion, which he some-
times resolutely labels as “strange ideas and casuistries” (161), “ground-
less” (308), “a modern conceit” (442), and “a double and complete absurdi-
ty” (582). For Kaufmann, the merciless, often polemical clarity of the posi-
tion he takes is at least to some extent a legacy of his traditional Jewish 
schooling. The same unsparing sharpness also pierces his teacher Tscherno-
witz when he writes in unvarnished prose: “But Tschernowitz errs” (427). 
3. Kaufmann and Benjamin as doctoral students  
of Richard Herbertz (1878–1959) 
From the outset, it seems, Kaufmann did not intend to earn a doctorate with 
Marti or at a school of theology, as he matriculated, instead, in the school 
of arts and sciences (the “philosophical faculty”). He chose, like Walter 
                                                     
16  Berner Burgerbibliothek, N Karl Marti 33.11 (14).  
 A written text, with meager content written unsteadily in Hebrew letters, about the 
Prophetic literature of the 8th century by a certain H. Kaufmann from 8 Feb., 1918 
(N Karl Marti 7 [3]) has nothing to do with Yehezkel Kaufmann, who at this time con-
sistently signed his name J. Kaufmann. 
17  N Karl Marti 33.11 (14) 
18  Krapf, Kaufmann, 13. 
19  Yehezkel Kaufmann, History of the Religion of Israel, vol. IV: From the Babylonian 
Captivity to the End of Prophecy (New York/Jerusalem/Dallas: Ktav, 1977). 
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Benjamin after him, Richard Herbertz as his doctoral advisor, a scholar 
who had been teaching in Bern since 1910. The Cologne-born son of an 
industrialist had studied chemistry, philosophy, and physics, was a member 
of the dueling fraternity Corps Hansea Bonn, and became a Swiss citizen in 
1939. 
Herbertz held Kaufmann in high esteem. He valued his almost Socratic 
style of questioning and let him manage the library for the philosophy de-
partment. Conversely, Kaufmann also valued his doctoral advisor, with 
whom he took almost all his courses on philosophy and to whom he ex-
pressed his condolences when Germany surrendered at the end of the war, 
one nationalist to another, as it were.20 
What made Herbertz an interesting figure for (such different) highly tal-
ented Jewish students like Kaufmann and Benjamin? Herbertz came out of 
the intellectual tradition of Fichte and Hegel. Benjamin discovered in the 
writings of Hegel the “mental physiognomy […] of an intellectual brute, a 
mystic of violence, the worst kind there is: but a mystic for all that.”21 It 
would have been the professor’s communicative skills, his philosophizing 
in conversation,22 his unconventional style, paired with his kind openness 
to immigrants, his lateral thinking, which facilitated lateral references—for 
example, between philosophy and psychology. This, at least, is the way we 
encounter the old professor in a portrait drawn by the writer Friedrich Dür-
renmatt, who studied with him after 1941.23 
Kaufmann and Benjamin are linked, however, by more than just a 
common doctoral advisor. Both were scholars who knew exactly what they 
wanted, Kaufmann perhaps even more precisely than Benjamin. The choice 
of university and doctoral advisor was therefore secondary for both, and for 
both what must have mattered was what Benjamin wrote at the end of 1917 
to Ernst Schön:24 “I have gotten to know the university here and, since es-
sentially all universities have rather the same attitude toward my work, I am 
thinking of getting my doctorate here, to the extent that one can even envi-
sion something under conditions that are becoming more difficult every day.” 
There is, moreover, no single written testimonial indicating that the son 
of a Berlin bourgeois raised in comfortable circumstances and the poor 
                                                     
20  Krapf, Kaufmann, 52ff. 
21  Letter to Gershom Scholem from 31 January, 1918 in Gesammelte Briefe, vol. I: 1910–
18 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), 423. The translation used here comes from 
Scholem’s essay “My Friend Walter Benjamin” in Commentary, 12 January, 1981, see 
https:// www.commentarymagazine.com/article/my-friend-walter-benjamin/ (accessed 8 
September, 2015). 
22  Phillip W. Balsiger, Richard Herbertz: Leben und Werk (PhD dissertation, University of 
Bern, 1989), 73. 
23  Friedrich Dürrenmatt, “Turmbau. Stoffe IV–IX. Das Haus,” in Gesammelte Werke 6 
(Zurich: Diogenes, 1991), 424–429. 
24  Composer, writer, translator (1894–1960), friend of Benjamin since their school days 
spent together. See Benjamin, Gesammelte Briefe, 415. 
 YEHEZKEL KAUFMANN: THE BERN YEARS OF A GENIUS 51 
student from Podolia ever crossed paths.25 They would have had an endless 
amount to discuss with each other, for both of them were interested in the 
discovery of the Messianic, of the work of redemption, and of the meaning 
of history. And both felt compelled to work their way through Kant: “In 
any case, there are certain questions, like those related to the philosophy of 
history, that are central for us, but about which we can learn something 
decisive from Kant only after we have posed them anew for ourselves.”26 
Yet while Benjamin approaches the problem on the terrain of literary criti-
cism, Kaufmann works his way through logically, as a dialectically trained 
Talmudist. 
4. Kaufmann’s Bern dissertation on sufficient reason 
Sufficient reason is the key philosophical principle that nothing happens 
without a reason, a principle going back to the ancient philosophers, includ-
ing Cicero (nihil fit sine causa), but first explicitly formulated by Leibniz, 
for whom there was no true fact and no correct statement without sufficient 
reason, since nothing happens for no reason. 
But Hume had shown that it is not rationally possible to derive one phe-
nomenon from another necessarily: “The mind can never possibly find the 
effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examina-
tion. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can 
never be discovered in it.”27 There is, Kaufmann explains, “nothing present 
in the phenomena that points to an internal nexus of the same thing that 
some characterize as a reason, others as an origin” (6). From out of the real 
ground (cause > effect) it is not possible logically to deduce a ground of 
knowledge (reason > consequence), nor a “‘reason for becoming’ of the 
effect” from out of the cause (8). Only probabilities are possible. Nonethe-
less, Kant wants to demonstrate a “transcendental” connection, but even 
this does not result in the succession of one thing after another necessarily 
pointing to a causal relationship, and Hume himself asks if we need to be-
lieve in causality on psychological grounds. 
                                                     
25  In the published correspondence of Scholem and Buber we also search in vain for 
Kaufmann’s name. But, on his contact with Buber, see below, last paragraph. 
26  Benjamin in letters to Scholem at the end of 1917. Gesammelte Briefe, 403; see inid., 
362, 390ff., 402ff., 408. English translation used here from The Correspondence of Wal-
ter Benjamin, 1910–1914 (ed. and annotated by Scholem and Adorno, trans. Manfred R. 
Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).  
27  David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (ed. Tom L. Beauchamp; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 111, cited by Kaufmann (13) according to 
id., Eine Untersuchung über den menschlichen Verstand (Leipzig: Meiner, 1911), 39. 
The numbers in brackets refer to the pages from Jesekiel Kaufmann, Eine Abhandlung 
über den zureichenden Grund. Erster Teil: Der logische Grund (Berlin: Emil Ebering, 
1920). 
52 THOMAS STAUBLI 
Kaufmann now points out that whatever applies to the effect also ap-
plies to the cause, that this is not therefore about cause and effect, but about 
the essence of logical reasoning altogether. For this, picking up on Husserl, 
the distinction between (given) content and (logical) form is important. But 
this distinction also applies to logic itself. For logic, the contents of rela-
tionships and therewith meaning are irrelevant. The only relevant thing is 
“placing-in-relationship” (20) itself. This also applies to quantitative deter-
minations like “in general” and “individual,” which is why general premis-
es must also be individualized before reaching a conclusion. The syllogism 
“All human beings are mortal. Socrates is a human being. Socrates is mor-
tal” (37) can only be understood under the condition that Socrates is also 
mortal, for only if Socrates is also mortal are all human beings mortal. The 
necessity of making a clear-cut separation between form and content is 
something Kaufmann illustrates with examples that show how absurd con-
tents can be linked with each other in a way that is logically correct: “Every-
thing rectangular is round. The circle is rectangular. Therefore the circle is 
round.” (52) Logic, according to Kaufmann, only starts to be science at the 
point “where the subject has already been understood and formed in the 
assessment” (54). 
Kaufmann was certainly not the first to criticize Kant’s logic. He had an 
important, even if all too little known, predecessor: Salomon ben Joshua 
(1753–1800), from the Lithuanian town Sukoviborg (near Mir), enjoyed a 
traditional Talmudic education and began as an adolescent to take in an 
interest in Maimonides, which is why he called himself Salomon Maimon. 
He became friends with Moses Mendelssohn and, starting in 1787, became 
intensely preoccupied with Kant.28 The major concern he addresses in his 
critique of Kant’s logic is that every subject of a subject-predicate relation 
is understood intrinsically as an object of consciousness (and not just as 
part of the relation) and that every predicate is conceived as an object of 
consciousness in connection with the subject, but that whatever goes be-
yond this is a purely formal determination, no real thought. In other words: 
Maimon insisted precisely on that consistent distinction between content 
and form that was also a guiding concern for Kaufmann’s thesis. 
Although the east European Jew Salomon Maimon, who never denied 
his Talmudic education, never received higher ordination from the German 
philosophy guild or even from Western Jewry29 and therefore needed to be 
rediscovered, so to speak, by each generation, he was also not a complete 
unknown in the heyday of European anti-Semitism. In 1912 the book Die 
                                                     
28  Salomon Maimon, Versuch einer neuen Logik oder Theorie des Denkens: Nebst ange-
hängten Briefen des Philaletes an Änesidemus (Berlin: Ernst Felisch, 1794; reprint Hil-
desheim: Olms, 2000). Today, tellingly, the reprint is located in the Jewish Studies li-
brary at the University of Bern, not in the Philosophy department library. 
29  See Peter Thielke and Yitzhak Melamed, “Salomon Maimon,” Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/maimon/#4). 
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Philosophie Salomon Maimons by Friedrich Kunze was published with 
Carl Winter in Heidelberg. The book is not featured in today’s catalogue of 
the Bern university library. Possibly, therefore, it was never available there. 
Nonetheless it is hardly imaginable that Kaufmann was not acquainted with 
the works of this early exponent of the Haskalah, or Jewish Enlightenment. 
But why does he not mention Maimon even once in his own dissertation? 
Kaufmann, an intelligent man, certainly had no need to plagiarize. Would it 
have damaged his doctorate if he had cited Maimon as an authority as part 
of his own argument? Did Herbertz even advise him not to do so? Or did 
Kaufmann have to conclude that nobody in Bern was acquainted with 
Maimon? Was this Kaufmann’s quiet and sweet revenge for the lack of any 
serious reception of the ingenious 18th-century Lithuanian Jew in the West 
that Kaufmann should take Maimon’s argument, which must have seemed 
immediately obvious to him as a result of their similar training, and get to 
the heart of it once more with conceptual clarity and conciseness? Was this 
Kaufmann’s way—in an unceremonious, almost playful, and yet (for him) 
quite satisfactory manner—of securing a doctorate for himself in the (for 
him) quasi-self-evident, logical intellectual world preceding all argumenta-
tion, at a time when he had long since switched the focus of his intellectual 
energies to other questions about the history of religion now preoccupying 
his inmost self? Something else pointing in this direction is the fact that the 
planned second part of his dissertation, in which he was to prove that the 
problem of causality could not be solved transcendentally in the Kantian 
manner, never appeared. Maimon had long since produced this proof, and 
for Kaufmann’s work on the religious history of Israel, this kind of work 
was not needed. There is an irony of history here, in that Kaufmann’s con-
tribution to the problem of sufficient reason does not appear to be known 
even in specialist circles, while Maimon’s contribution is indeed acknowl-
edged, though somewhat bizarrely as a thinker continuing the Kantian tra-
dition.30 
5. Kaufmann’s perspective on the religion of Israel 
In retrospect, Kaufmann’s dissertation may seem exotic in the context of 
everything he wrote. Yet the importance of this aspect for his thinking and 
teaching should not be underestimated. Thus, his student Leo Isac Seelig-
                                                     
30  Hans-Jürgen Engfer, “Principium rationis sufficientis,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der 
Philosophie, vol. 7 (1989), 1325–1336, never mentions Kaufmann once among 103 ref-
erences while citing Maimon along with Kiesewetter, Fries, and Jacobi as a founder of 
the strict distinction between ground-consequence and cause-effect relations (1330). In 
Yitzhak Melamed and Martin Lin, “Principle of Sufficient Reason,” Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sufficient-reason/), too, there is no 
reference to Kaufmann. 
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mann is indebted to Kaufmann for the category of dual causality (תויתבס 
הלופכ) as a way to understand the specifically biblical interpretation of how 
divine and human action are intertwined.31 But the connection is even more 
crucial for a complete understanding of Israelite religion. Since, according 
to the Bible, God revealed himself historically, there is no logical “that” 
outside the experience of reality handed down within the people. The only 
source of tradition is God himself. He cannot be derived from anywhere. 
There is hardly any room for evolutionary perspectives in Kaufmann’s 
thought. Monotheism in its Jewish form, according to him, happened in a 
revolutionary way as an unfathomable, spiritual creation. For him, subse-
quent logical developments within the new and, in Kaufmann’s understand-
ing, almost inherently closed system need to be clearly distinguished from 
the original primal insight. 
Kaufmann left Bern for Berlin after the First World War and then emi-
grated to Haifa in 1928. He initially turned to research on the social history 
of Judaism.32 The central thesis of the important work he wrote in an at-
tempt to understand contemporary problems from out of Judaism’s entire 
history is that religion alone saved the far-flung Jews from complete assim-
ilation. Here, already, he formulates the fundamental thesis that is also de-
cisive for his later analysis of the religion of Israel, and which he formu-
lates as follows in a 1936 German summary Kaufmann wrote for the atten-
tion of the Zionist historian Adolf Böhm (1873–1941): “In Israel a wholly 
new religious idea, previously unknown to all of humanity, was born, 
namely the idea of a supra-magical, supra-mythological, single God.”33 
This idea was disseminated by an ethno-politically powerless people as a 
cultural-religious power in a powerful pagan environment in Christian and 
Islamic form. Ironically, the powerlessness of the Jewish people intensified 
in the Age of Emancipation because the Jews, to the extent that they re-
mained true to their ancestral religion, continued to be perceived as an alien 
tribe in modern democracies, and indeed even more so under nationalist 
circumstances, while they simultaneously lost the privileges granted them 
by the monarchs that had promoted them and continued to be landless. 
In his magnum opus on the history of the Israelite religion,34 Kaufmann 
develops this fundamental thesis almost encyclopedically from Israel’s 
                                                     
31  Isac Leo Seeligmann, “Menschliches Heldentum und göttliche Hilfe: Die doppelte Kau-
salität im alttestamentlichen Geschichtsdenken,” in Gesammelte Studien zur Hebräi-
schen Bibel (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 138, n. 1. 
32  Exil und Fremde: Eine sozialgeschichtliche Untersuchung zur Frage nach dem Schick-
sal des Volkes Israel von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (in Hebrew; 2 vols.; Tel 
Aviv: Dvir, 1929–30). Chapters 7–9 from vol. 1 appeared in English under the title, 
Christianity and Judaism: Two Covenants (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, The Hebrew Uni-
versity, 1988).  
33  As cited by Krapf, Kaufmann, 124. 
34  Kaufmann, Tōledōt hā-emūnā hajjiśraʼēlīt mīmē qedem ʻad sōf bajit šēnī (4 vols.; Jeru-
salem: Mosad Bialik and Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1937–1956). The eighth book (vol 4) is availa-
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beginnings to the destruction of the Second Temple. He shows how, under 
the new conditions of an eternal, sovereign God without theogony and thus 
without derivation from any kind of original materials, the mythological 
creatures inherited from Canaanite culture turned into creatures of YHWH, 
the magicians into men of God, and the seers into prophets who did nothing 
other than proclaim the divine will in the form of miracles and teachings. 
How the Israelites arrived at this ingenious and original creation of a reli-
gion completely different from their pagan surroundings is something 
Kaufmann cannot explain any further in his capacity as a historian, so that 
he almost reluctantly becomes a theologian: “Here we are compelled to 
assume a unique intervention of divine guidance.”35 
Something this verticality also makes clear is a striking closeness of 
Kaufmann’s thinking, in spite of all the differences, to that of his Christian 
contemporary Karl Barth (1886–1968), for whom Christ cuts through the 
historical level that we know by an “unknown level” from above. With this 
concept, Barth radically sets himself apart from every kind of liberal, evo-
lutionary, hyphenated theology. And, just as Kaufmann notes this for 
Western Judaism, Barth sees dramatic signs of decay in Protestantism start-
ing with the 18th century. 
Kaufmann was by no means a biblicist, but he was a prisoner of his 
basic thesis, from which he derives the point of view he adopts for every 
case he examines, so that he becomes an ideological apologist whenever 
historical facts contradict the fundamental thesis. One such case is the Jew-
ish colony of Yeb (the Elephantine island near Aswan), which worshiped a 
triad of three divinities—Yahu, Anat-Yahu, and Ishim-Betel—for whose 
cult-images they even resumed taking up a collection after the destruction 
of their temple by the followers of the neighboring Khnum shrine. In order 
to salvage his anti-evolutionary perspective on Jewish monotheism, he 
needs to characterize the Judaism of Yeb as a late syncretism, but he never 
gets beyond assertions: “During the years of their detachment from the 
mainstream of Jewish life the Jews of Yeb absorbed something of the reli-
gious customs of their Aramaic neighbors. Their cultic practice was ‘new,’ 
late, of assimilatory tendency, an unimportant deviation; not ‘old,’ and not 
indicative of an earlier stage in the evolution of the religion of Israel. None-
theless, the Jews of Yeb were monotheists; their temple was a temple of 
                                                                                                                          
ble in a complete English translation: History of the Religion of Israel. Vol. IV: From the 
Babylonian Captivity to the End of Prophecy (New York, Jerusalem, Dallas: Ktav, 
1977). There is a summary of the remaining books translated, edited, and abridged by 
Moshe Greenberg, The Religion of Israel: From Its Beginnings to the Babylonian Exile 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). 
35  Foreword to 5th printing of the Hebrew edition of 1964, cited by Krapf, Kaufmann, 94; 
cf. Job Jindo, “Recontextualizing Kaufmann: His Empirical Conception of the Bible and 
its Significance in Jewish Intellectual History,” Journal of Jewish Thought and Philoso-
phy 19/2 (2011): 95–129, esp. 126f. 
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Yahu.”36 Yeb’s geographic isolation is the ideal precondition for conserva-
tion, not for forms of syncretism, which emerge in places where living cul-
tures interact. What is more, correspondence with Jerusalem shows that the 
Jews of Yeb did not want to be heretics but sought contact with the center. 
Kaufmann himself even attests to the zealous character for the Jews of Yeb, 
something hardly compatible with syncretism.  
Like most men of his time, Kaufmann had a blind eye for feminism. 
Thus, in connection with his argument about the Elephantine, one searches 
in vain for any reference to the work of Hedwig Anneler, who had earned 
her doctorate with Karl Marti in 1912. Among the few obligatory courses 
that Kaufmann would have taken with Marti during the spring semester of 
1915, there was a Semitic studies seminar on Aramaic papyri which cer-
tainly would have been primarily based on Anneler’s work.37 
6. Kaufmann and Benno Jacob (1862–1945) 
In many respects, the thrust of Kaufmann’s scholarship receives impressive 
confirmation from the monumental commentaries on Genesis and Exodus 
written independently of and parallel to Kaufmann’s work by Benno Jacob, 
rabbi in Göttingen and Dortmund. Like Kaufmann, Jacob sees the devel-
opmental theory of religious history as something that renders impossible a 
proper understanding of the scriptural text, because the evolutionist account 
always amounts to a Christian devaluation of Judaism. Jacob does recog-
nize that the Torah makes use of an international legal language that had 
existed for centuries, but one toward which the Torah maintained a stance 
of sovereign independence. “The Mosaic mishpatim, despite all parallels, 
did not contain a single sentence which can be proven as word-for-word 
borrowing from any other source.” Like Kaufmann, Jacob emphasizes the 
old age of the Israelite law. Comparison with ancient Oriental law makes it 
clear that law presented in the Torah was old on some points, that one 
should therefore not mock the view that it also contained a legacy of the 
patriarchs. Like Kaufmann, Jacob argued in terms of social history. Ac-
cording to him, Hammurabi, himself a major landowner and capitalist as 
king, wanted his law code to promote the culture of the country he ruled, a 
law he intended to implement by means of the state, meaning police and 
military. Compared to them, Moses did not have even the slightest of 
means to compel obedience. “His sole support lay in the appeal of God’s 
                                                     
36  Ibid., 530. 
37  On Anneler’s work and the lack of attention to it, see Judith Hélène Stadler and Ernst 
Axel Knauf, “Hedwig Anneler (1888–1969) und ihre Berner Dissertation: Zur Geschich-
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 YEHEZKEL KAUFMANN: THE BERN YEARS OF A GENIUS 57 
will and command, the self-dependence upon the morality of public opinion 
along with a popular sense of justice. Only religious and moral factors ex-
isted.” The legal passages preserved in the book of Exodus were not even 
intended as a law book, but more as religious-moral education. “They 
wished to inculcate a fear of God and respect for man and his basic rights” 
with the help of inalterable norms.38 
Unlike Kaufmann, Jacob dismisses multiple sources as an impossibility, 
even if he concedes that the author of Genesis, which he regarded as having 
originated from a single quill, used sources.39 Although aspects of Kauf-
mann’s views are based on Jewish schooling and rest upon detailed 
knowledge of a Talmudic education, he followed German exegetical re-
search positively, though he dated the Pentateuch’s sources very different-
ly. Consequently, he opened up the possibility of a debate that today, al-
most fifty years after his death, seems gradually to be getting underway 
even in German-speaking circles. 
7. Outlooks on the reception and topicality of Kaufmann 
On the foundation laid by Kaufmann, there was and will come to be more 
research done in Jerusalem, especially by Menachem Haran, Abraham 
Malamat, Israel Knohl, Sara Japhet, Nili Wazana, Baruch J. Schwartz, and 
in the United States by Jacob Milgrom and Benjamin Sommer, among oth-
ers.40 In German-speaking Europe, it was only in 1992 that Thomas Krapf’s 
dissertation cast light on Kaufmann’s achievement.41 In the meantime, the 
current scholarly discussion in Europe about the Torah’s Priestly writings 
has come to include a greater frequency of approaches contending with the 
analyses of the Kaufmann school.42 The discussion is leading to qualifica-
tions on both sides. Kaufmann’s anti-evolutionist approach was criticized 
even by his students and colleagues like Isac Leo Seeligmann, who experi-
                                                     
38  Benno Jacob, The Second Book of the Bible: Exodus (trans. Walter Jacob; Hoboken, 
NY: Ktav, 1992), 1072ff. 
39  Id., Das Buch Genesis (Berlin: Schocken, 1934; repr. Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 2000), 
10, 949ff. 
40  For an overview of the reception of Yehezkel Kaufmann among Jewish scholars see 
Ziony Zevit’s contribution to this volume. 
41  Thomas Krapf, Die Priesterschrift und die vorexilische Zeit. Yehezkel Kaufmanns ver-
nachlässigter Beitrag zur Geschichte der biblischen Religion (Orbis Biblicus et Orienta-
lis 119; Freiburg, Switzerland: Universitätsverlag and Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and 
Ruprecht, 1992). See also Thomas Staubli, Leviticus. Numeri (Neuer Stuttgarter Kom-
mentar zum Alten Testament 3; Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1996). 
42  For example, Christophe Nihan, From Priestly Torah to Pentateuch: A Study in the 
Composition of the Book of Leviticus (Forschungen zum Alten Testament II/25; Tübin-
gen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007). 
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enced his elder colleague43 as an interlocutor with incredibly broad com-
prehension, a wit all his own, and as a teacher who was mild-mannered 
toward his students. One could not, across the board, “deny the existence of 
any mythical elements in the faith of Israel. We should not equate whatever 
is contained in the Hebrew Bible with whatever was widespread in Israel—
after all, it is not as if the Bible lacks for remains of myth.”44 
On the other hand, it was important for Western exegesis to depart from 
the Wellhausen paradigm and appreciate that law and prophecy are closely 
related to each other and cannot be divided from each other for the sake of 
a clerical ideology in which prophecy is seen as original, vital, and old 
while the law is understood as a degenerated and younger product of 
prophecy. If Rainer Achenbach’s recent reading45 of the oldest extant He-
brew inscription, a writing exercise on a clay shard from the 10th century 
BCE discovered in 2008 at Khirbet Qeiyafah, proves correct—a reading 
whereby this text contains maxims that demand legal equality for slaves, 
widows, orphans, and strangers—then Kaufmann’s thesis about the old age 
of the laws will have acquired a strong objective foundation.  
The topicality of Kaufmann’s credo hardly needs to be stressed in light 
of growing religious fundamentalism in Israel and many other places in the 
world. For him there is no gap between (fundamentalist) religion and the 
(secular) nation. On the contrary: in the oldest writings of Judaism that we 
can still understand—according to Kaufmann these are the Priestly writings 
ascertainable from the Torah—critical thinking was already beginning to 
take shape toward the end of the second millennium BCE, a type of think-
ing that was handed down and developed further over several centuries in 
rabbinic Judaism. It does not pose a contradiction but is rather one of the 
foundations of modern scholarship and it should be continued in this spirit. 
8. Beyond the Bible 
There are two essays published in German during Kaufmann’s time in 
Bern46 in which he stands up for the view that Hebrew needs to be seen and 
                                                     
43  Isac Leo Seeligmann, “Professor Yehezkel Kaufmann,” in Yehezkel Kaufmann Jubilee 
Volume: Studies in Bible and Jewish Religion dedicated to Yehezkel Kaufmann on the 
Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday (ed. Menachem Haran; Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 
The Hebrew University, 1960), XII. 
44  Isac Leo Seeligmann, Gesammelte Studien zur Hebräischen Bibel (Forschungen zum 
Alten Testament 41; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 164, n. 7; see also the critical re-
marks on 198, n. 26 and 215, n. 54. 
45  Rainer Achenbach, “The Protection of Personae miserae in Ancient Israelite Law and 
Wisdom and in the Ostracon from Khirbet Qeiyafah,” Semitica 54 (2012): 93–125. 
46  Kaufmann, “Unsere ‘Friedensstifter’,” Jüdische Rundschau 19 (12 May, 1916): 151ff.; 
“Die hebräische Sprache und unsere nationale Zukunft,” Der Jude 1 (1916/17): 407–
418. 
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promoted as the national language of Jewry. He sees the dying out of He-
brew as a cultural language owing to assimilation as a major reason for 
Jewish loss of identity and—writing in quadrilingual Switzerland!—holds 
the view that a people can exist as a historical individual only thanks to 
language: “Without a common national language there is no organic inter-
action between the individual parts of society.”47 Foreign-language litera-
ture with Jewish content, which is so characteristic of Alexandrian Judaism, 
he characterizes as a “hallmark of national degeneration,” while he sees 
Western European Jewry in the condition of “a national petrification that 
comes quite close to death” and Yiddish as a jargon for satisfying lower 
spiritual needs, as a “vulgar and woman’s language.”48 Martin Buber, the 
editor of Der Jude, asked Kaufmann twice to abstain from this kind of po-
lemics. Kaufmann, however, remained unreasonable. Buber had no alterna-
tive text and was ultimately magnanimous enough to print the article un-
censored.49 
Here we encounter a Kaufmann who, outside his logical world of 
thought and outside the fence around the Torah with which he was as famil-
iar as with his vest pocket, is strangely lost, vulnerable, and probably for 
that reason aggressive; an east European Jew in western Europe who realiz-
es that even among local Jews he is regarded as a second-class person, that 
there is still a rich Hebrew culture alive in the world from which he comes, 
a culture he misses and for which the foreign-language “Science of Juda-
ism” is no substitute; a man, too, for whom women live in another linguis-
tic world, if not on another planet, who remained a bachelor during his 
entire lifetime, although he is said, according to the testimony of acquaint-
ances, to have deeply regretted this at the end of his life.50 
                                                     
47  “Hebräische Sprache,” 409. 
48  Ibid., 411. 
49  Krapf, Kaufmann, 51, with notes 139–144. Kaufmann’s opposition to Abraham Geiger 
and other exponents of the “Wissenschaft des Judentums” regarding Jewish identity and 
language, is discussed in Thomas Krapf, “Jüdische Identität und Neuhebräisch. Anmer-
kungen zu Yehezkel Kaufmanns Verhältnis zur Wissenschaft des Judentums”, Judaica 
49/2 (1993): 69-80. 
50  Thomas Krapf orally. 
Personal Views of Yehezkel Kaufmann*  
Moshe GREENBERG 
Perhaps it will be regarded as strange that I, whose contact with Professor 
Yehezkel Kaufmann for thirteen years was mostly through correspondence, 
have chosen to tell about my personal impressions of him. Didn’t many 
others sit in his very presence for those years and know him face to face? 
What, then, could be the special value of my testimony? I believe that the 
face of the man that he presented to me was different than what his ac-
quaintances in Israel knew, because the relations between us were devoid 
of those tensions that prevail among colleagues, or between a teacher and 
the student who is dependent on him, and in general among members of a 
small clique who see each other and are involved, sometimes not in the best 
way, in each other’s lives. My relation to Professor Kaufmann was simply 
the relation of an admirer toward one whom I appreciated as the greatest 
teacher of Bible in his generation. I saw him as one who added to biblical 
scholarship the intellectual lightning that had been missing from it since the 
generations of the founders, and restored to the Bible its eminence as a 
unique spiritual treasure. In the connection that I established with him, I 
was blessed as one who finds a clear spring after drinking from polluted 
waters. 
I first encountered Toledot ha-emunah ha-yisre’elit (History of the Isra-
elite Faith, 1937–1956, henceforth Toledot) when I was an undergraduate 
student at the University of Pennsylvania in the late 1940s. The more I read 
it, the more I was convinced that this work was a powerful new broom that 
swept the house of biblical studies clean of all the layers of grime that had 
collected in it, while filling it with new inspiring content. I appointed my-
self the apostle of the gospel according to Kaufmann, and my first objective 
was to convert the heart of my esteemed professor Ephraim Speiser to this 
objective. For my baccalaureate thesis I chose to survey the research on the 
history of the Israelite priesthood. I was sure that Kaufmann’s position—
which I presented at the end as refuting all the previous positions—would 
win my teacher’s approval. Whether he was convinced by my paper or not, 
he urged me to shorten it in order to submit it for publication in a scholarly 
journal. I shortened my presentation and submitted it for publication in the 
                                                     
*  Remarks delivered at an evening program organized by the (Israel) National Academy 
of Sciences, commemorating Yehezkel Kaufmann’s 101st birthday (17 Kislev 5751/ De-
cember 3–4, 1990). Translated from the Hebrew text in Mada‛ei Hayahadut § 31 (World 
Union of Jewish Studies, 1991), 81–85 by Leonard Levin. 
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Journal of Biblical Literature, but it was not accepted. I shortened it again 
and it was finally accepted in the Journal of the American Oriental Society 
under the title, “A New Approach to the History of the Israelite Priest-
hood.” Thus in 1950 the name Yehezkel Kaufmann appeared for the first 
time in the pages of an English-language scholarly journal. I took courage 
and sent a copy to my esteemed “rabbi” in Jerusalem, along with a letter in 
which I introduced myself to him. 
A photocopy of that same letter—along with photocopies of twenty-five 
additional letters that I sent to Kaufmann—came back to me recently 
thanks to Thomas Krapf, a German doctoral student who has been studying 
the responses of German scholars to Kaufmann’s teachings.1 The letters 
were found bundled in the Kaufmann archive in the National and Universi-
ty Library in Jerusalem. I have combined these letters that I sent to him 
over the course of thirteen years until his death in 1963, with twenty letters 
that Kaufmann wrote to me, from 1955 onward, which I have kept. I offer 
you here nuggets of that correspondence, which will shed light on the 
man’s character from my perspective. 
 
Here is how I introduced myself to him in my first letter (April 11, 1950): 
My dear and admired Sir and teacher: 
I am very honored to send you2 herewith a copy of an article that I wrote on 
your important scholarly work, Toledot ha-emunah ha-yisre’elit. Although I 
am only a college student, tender in years and wisdom, I have summoned up 
the courage to publish a survey of a topic taken from your researches. 
It is several years now that I have been reading your books with heartfelt 
pleasure and great enthusiasm. About five years ago I plunged into the 
depths of biblical scholarship and was almost drowning in the waves of for-
eign, hostile criticism when to my great happiness I encountered your books 
in my father’s house. From then until now I drink your words thirstily in the 
faith that they interpret the scriptures as closely as one can get to their plain 
sense, and capture their deeper meaning. 
This short survey is the essence of a longer article in which I reviewed the 
currently prevailing views concerning the history of the priesthood, and 
                                                     
1  Translator’s note: When these remarks were first delivered (in December 1990), Thomas 
Krapf had just published—or was about to publish—his book, Yehezkel Kaufmann: Ein 
Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg zur Theologie der Hebräischen Bibel (Berlin: Institut Kir-
che und Judentum, 1990). 
2  Translator’s note: Greenberg refers to Kaufmann in the third person throughout this 
letter: “to send my dear Sir an article on his scholarly work…from his researches…that I 
have been reading the books of my dear Sir…” etc. This sounds even more formal and 
pretentious in English than in Hebrew, so I have rendered it in the second person to con-
form to the way this letter would probably have been written had it been originally com-
posed in English. 
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compared them to your views. I offer you this composition of mine in joy 
and trepidation—joy, that I have been privileged to publicize your name and 
some of your teaching to a wide audience of readers in oriental antiquities 
who have not yet heard of them, and trepidation that I may have unwittingly 
misrepresented your views and not conveyed them with fidelity. I hope you 
will forgive me from such unwitting errors. 
In his response (reconstructed from the content of the next letter, as his 
letters to me prior to November 10, 1955 were lost), Kaufman expressed 
the wish that his book Toledot ha-emunah ha-yisre’elit should be translated 
into English—a suggestion on which I jumped. I honed my skills by trans-
lating his article on idolatry in the Bible (“The Bible and Mythological 
Polytheism,” Journal of Biblical Literature 70 [1951], 179–197) as well as 
his article “The Biblical Age” in Great Ages and Ideas of the Jewish People 
(New York: Modern Library, 1956), 3–92. In the meantime, I went about 
seeking a publisher who was ready to commit to the larger assignment. It 
became clear that the best proposal came from the University of Chicago 
Press: to undertake a one-volume English abridgement of the multi-volume 
Toledot ha-emunah ha-yisre’elit. 
A measure of Kaufmann’s compliance was revealed to me in his reac-
tion to the arrangement of royalties that I proposed to the University of 
Chicago Press (his letter of December 28, 1956): 
I rely on you concerning everything pertaining to arranging financial mat-
ters and formalities…. You need to worry first of all about yourself: that 
you shall receive compensation that will permit you to work comfortably. I 
can wait. In any case, what you did is done, and there is no need to change 
anything, if the change is not to your advantage. 
In the meantime, my oldest son was born, and Kaufmann blessed him with 
the traditional blessing, “May it be [God’s] will that you be privileged to 
raise him to Torah and good deeds, and that you will derive great satisfac-
tion from him.” I noticed his omission of the term “marriage canopy,”3 and 
I did not know if this was deliberate or not, until there arrived, seven years 
later (in his letter of June 7, 1962) his blessing on the birth of our third son, 
“May it be [God’s] will that you be privileged to raise the red-haired one 
with lovely eyes [a quote from my letter] to Torah and good deeds.” Then I 
knew that his formulation was deliberate, that this was the complete bless-
ing of a confirmed bachelor. 
I found that Kaufmann took easily to debate, and his arguments provid-
ed a glimpse of his outspoken personal positions. In the fall of 1956 ap-
peared the eighth volume of Toledot ha-emunah ha-yisre’elit. When I con-
gratulated him on the appearance of the volume I noted that I disagreed 
                                                     
3  Translator’s note: The traditional blessing recited at a Jewish circumcision reads: “As he 
has entered the covenant [of circumcision], so may he enter into Torah, the marriage 
canopy, and [a life of] good deeds.” 
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with his conclusion that the notion of vicarious suffering was not to be 
found in Isaiah chapter 53—a concept (as I reminded him) that even the 
rabbis affirmed, basing it on that prophecy. His answer opened a window 
into his conception of faith: 
I am sorry that you cannot agree with what I wrote concerning vicarious 
suffering. It is true that the idea is to be found among the rabbis. But isn’t 
this a Christian influence? In my view, the enthusiasm for this idea among 
Jews today is also the fruit of Christian influence. What is Jewish is the 
faith in justice and mercy. But the image of vicarious suffering is rooted in 
the image of the vengeful Greek Furies (the Erinyes) who demand satisfac-
tion. This is something fundamentally pagan. I cannot believe that an Israel-
ite prophet conceived of this idea. 
In 1959 his commentary on the book of Joshua was published. I expected 
and hoped that from now on he would return to finish his major work on 
the history of Israelite religion. When he announced to me that he was now 
engaged in a commentary on the book of Judges, I asked in protest: “If you 
abandon Toledot without finishing it, who can come after you to do it as 
you would have done?” Kaufmann answered me (in his letter of June 12, 
1960): 
I see that you, too, do not look kindly on my being occupied with a com-
mentary on these books. Your view is indeed the view of all my friends. But 
I cannot agree. I do not intend to write a commentary on all of the Former 
Prophets. But the case of Joshua and Judges is unique. These books tell 
about the beginning of the Israelite people, and their evidence is decisive al-
so regarding the question of the beginning of the Israelite religion. The pre-
vailing criticism labored with all its might to tear down these monuments. 
Here we have historical narratives from before the monarchy, and the criti-
cal view did not want to acknowledge this in any way, shape or form, be-
cause this would destroy its own edifice. On a complicated question such as 
this, one cannot achieve anything by means of a general explanation. One 
must deal with every chapter and every verse. In Eissfeldt’s critique of my 
book on Joshua, he was amazed that I do not say anything about Judges 3:2, 
and this is a major argument for him, and if I had written on this verse, there 
would have been objections based on other verses. There is need for a de-
tailed commentary, and I am only sorry that I do not have a translator for 
[my commentary to] Joshua. 
I did not take the hint that he offered in the last sentence. 
In 1960, the abridgement of Kaufmann’s Toledot that I had prepared 
was published.4 The work of this book took four years. After I had received 
Kaufmann’s agreement for the outline of the abridgement, he placed the 
                                                     
4  Translator’s note: Yehezkel Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel, from Its Beginnings to 
the Babylonian Exile, translated and abridged by Moshe Greenberg (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1960). 
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work in my hands and authorized me to do as I saw best in condensing the 
work, adapting the later portions to the earlier, and updating it. Only years 
later did I realize my own presumption in doing all this. I waited impatient-
ly for Kaufmann’s reaction, and when it arrived, my mind was set at ease, 
despite my foreboding of expected opposition (in his letter from August 7, 
1960): 
You have performed a great work, and done everything wisely, and are to 
be blessed for it all. I think that you are the only one who could do such a 
work. The luck of the book was such that you were aroused to translate it. 
Let us hope that this project will be crowned with success. It is understood 
that this book will encounter many prejudices that have been ingrained for 
centuries and more, within modern scholarship and before modern scholar-
ship. And nevertheless. 
A year and a half later, he summarized his reactions to the reviews and 
critiques that had appeared (in his letter from December 7, 1961): 
There is the positive and there is the negative. The arguments are the same 
arguments of criticism of the book. How is it possible that pagan Israel did 
not know paganism? The Christians are especially unable to make their 
peace with the view that Israel was not a sinful nation, a people so laden 
with iniquity, that they crucified Jesus and did not accept Christianity. And 
nevertheless. 
With completion of the work of the abridged edition I was free for other 
assignments. After focusing for about ten years on Kaufmann’s thought, I 
had to update myself on the state of current research. I was apprehensive 
about this especially with respect to methods such as Form Criticism and 
Tradition History, which Kaufmann had not considered at all, and on 
whose absence in the English version several critics had commented. My 
first study of them was in the writings of the epigones, the generation after 
[Hermann] Gunkel and [Hugo] Gressmann and I was not satisfied with 
them. Even the Scandinavians confused him and I expressed my bitterness 
to Kaufmann. As could be predicted, he supported my view while throwing 
barbs at some of his colleagues in Jerusalem: 
Your view concerning the doctrine from the north is absolutely correct. I 
spoke about this also with Professor [H. L.] Ginsberg and I said to him that 
it would be better if there were there [in the English volume] some section 
about this doctrine. This is a dead issue, but one must pay a price for fash-
ion. He did not agree and said that one need not be sorry about the lack of 
such a section. I am not sure. Even the people from Jerusalem stammer 
about “tradition” without being able to translate the German expression 
[Traditionsgeschichte] adequately. The word associates them with the latest 
research, and this frees them from anxiety. 
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In the summer of 1962 I read the essays of Robin G. Collingwood about 
“historical evidence” and “the historical imagination” (in his book The Idea 
of History)5 and I was impressed by the comparison of the historian with 
the detective, who relates to all the testimonies that he obtains with skepti-
cism (why did the witness say what he said?) and reconstructs the course of 
events while sifting through the testimonies, rejecting one and affirming 
another, with absolute sovereignty according to his own judgment. This 
approach appeared to me to be the opposite of Kaufmann’s, who conferred 
authority on testimonies and therefore tried to affirm them as much as pos-
sible and to link them into a continuous chain of narrative. The historian-
detective of Collingwood sets himself the objective of clarifying what ac-
tually happened, whereas the historian-interpreter of Kaufmann has the 
objective of fashioning a narrative that will affirm and conflate the maxi-
mum of words of the witnesses in a credible flow—in other words, what 
might have happened. I disclosed to Kaufmann the charm that Collingwood 
had for me. I was going to criticize Kaufmann’s position in a review of a 
volume of Scripta Hierosolymitana that included his essay on the narratives 
of the conquest and settlement. As preparation for writing the review I 
wanted to clarify for myself what was the correct approach to the testimony 
of the Bible. His answer to me hinted at the hubris of the historian who was 
ambitious to tie up all the threads (his letter of August 28, 1962): 
It is not entirely clear to me why Collingwood’s arguments made such a 
strong impression on you. These are old matters. There is perhaps some-
thing new in the extremism of his position. In the historical narrative there 
is a great measure of subjectivity. But Collingwood’s “detective” proposal 
is naïve. A historian cannot be a detective. And we know that in the judicial 
process they do their detective work and investigate and pass judgment—
and they fail. They acquit the guilty and convict the innocent. When we 
pass judgment on a scholarly matter, we do not have to solve all the general 
questions connected with it. We must put them in brackets. The question 
that I deal with in Scripta is an empirical historical question, if one may say 
so. The prevailing view is that the books of the Former Prophets were writ-
ten or took shape in a late period and that the Bible contains no authentic 
testimonies concerning ancient Israelite historical events. But in my article 
and in my commentary to Joshua, etc. I tried to show that this view is incor-
rect. The critic has fulfilled his obligation if he explains his arguments and 
expresses his views concerning them. 
The last sentence seemed to advise me that I need not defer my review and 
evaluation of his essay until I had decided the larger question of whose 
                                                     
5  Translator’s note: R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon, 1946). 
“Historical Evidence” and “The Historical Imagination” are the titles of chapters in the 
last section of the book. In these chapters, he also discusses the problem of evaluating 
historical testimony, and brings up the analogy of the detective solving a crime. 
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approach to historiography was more adequate, Kaufmann’s or Colling-
wood’s. 
In February, 1963 I informed Kaufmann of the intention of the Universi-
ty of Chicago Press to issue a new edition of my translation. In anticipation 
of the new edition I prepared a list of corrections, and I asked him if he 
wanted to add any corrections of his own. I told him also of the ripples that 
the new English translation of the Torah from the Jewish Publication Socie-
ty of America had generated. In my reading his answer from February 27, 
1963 I sensed the bodily and psychological distress caused by his illness. 
This letter was the last in the series of his letters to me, and it embodies 
well the human characteristics that I was privileged to come to know during 
our thirteen years of acquaintanceship through correspondence: 
Thank you for your letter. The update about the new edition of the English 
book is indeed good news. The corrections that you propose—send them to 
the publisher. I cannot come up with any, on account of the ailments that 
have plagued me. Right now, I am not able to do any serious studying, and 
this troubles me greatly. But I am confident in you, that your corrections 
will be fine and good.  
Recently I have recovered somewhat. But I still suffer from head fatigue, 
and this fatigue does not allow me to work. The eye doctor thinks that the 
fatigue comes from the eyes. He ordered me new eyeglasses. We shall see 
what happens. In the meantime, sustain me with pills, comfort me with vit-
amins. I have almost turned into a vitamin. 
Professor Ginsberg sent me a copy of the Torah in the new English transla-
tion. It is pleasant to read a chapter from the Bible in elegant modern Eng-
lish. I cannot yet read very much, but I enjoyed what I read. There will be 
criticism, especially in England. To them, no English can be finer than that 
of the King James Version. But one could expect criticism. The criticism of 
our traditionalists is not surprising either. 
I am happy that you are full of energy and working. It is not clear to me 
what bothers you with regard to Deuteronomy. Did you see Alt’s article on 
Deuteronomy (Kleine Schriften, Part 2)? And my critique of him (in Sefer 
Biram)?6  
My financial situation has improved in the meantime. Devir stopped their 
payments at the close of the previous fiscal year, because I owed them 200 
IL! Afterwards, it became clear that the directors of Devir and Mosad Bialik 
did not know that the payments had ceased. Afterwards they decided to 
publish a new edition of my books, but they did not bother to inform me. 
And so on and so on. 
                                                     
6  Translator’s note: The Festschrift for Arthur Biram, Ma’amarim b’ḥeker ha-Tanakh 
mugash likhvod A. Biram limelot lo shivim v-ḥamesh shana (Jerusalem: Kiryat Sefer, 
1956), 18–24. 
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I saw Professor [Ernst] Simon.7 He told me something of the antics 
(ḥokhmot) of Joel and Rafi.8 
Heartfelt blessings to you and all your family. 
Y. Kaufmann 
My letter to him for the new year 5724 (Fall, 1963) did not receive an an-
swer. 
 
                                                     
7  Translator’s note: Ernst Simon’s daughter Hanna was married to Moshe Greenberg’s 
brother Daniel; Hanna and Daniel were co-founders of Sudbury Valley School in Fram-
ingham, MA, so when Ernst traveled to the United States to visit his daughter and grand-
children he was able to meet the Greenberg family and give a report (Sources: Hebrew 
Wikipedia articles on Akiva Ernst Simon, Daniel Greenberg, Sudbury Valley School; 
personal reminiscences of Shalom Bronstein, Ed Farber, Stephan Parnes, Avram Kogen, 
and Dov Peretz Elkins. The eulogy by Ernst Simon’s son Uriel at Moshe Greenberg’s 
funeral can be found at http://mikrarevivim.blogspot.com/2010/05/blog-post_30.html). 
8  Translator’s note: This refers to Greenberg’s sons. 
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Is Kaufmann’s Toledot a “Jewish” Project?  
Empirical Research between Naturalism and Supernaturalism* 
Job Y. JINDO 
I would like to discuss Yehezkel Kaufman’s monumental study of biblical 
religion, Toledot ha-emunah ha-yisre’elit (A History of the Israelite Faith, 
1937–1956, henceforth Toledot),1 in reference to Spinoza, in order to ad-
dress one of Kaufmann’s most important—yet up to now broadly over-
looked—contributions to modern biblical scholarship: namely, his critical 
reflections on fundamental theoretical and theological assumptions.  
Kaufmann’s work has almost always been discussed in relation to Well-
hausen, as if Kaufmann’s sole objective were to offer a complete refutation 
of what may be termed “Christian” (or better yet, “Protestant”) biblical 
studies—which was seen as tainted with anti-Semitic biases, notably in 
Wellhausen’s work—and to present a corrective, or what one may call 
“Jewish” biblical scholarship. The biblicist Stephen Geller once noted: “It 
is truly meaningful only if Kaufmann is studied together with Wellhau-
sen.”2 True, Kaufmann vehemently criticized every Christian bias he identi-
fied in biblical studies; however, this is hardly the whole story.3 
                                                     
*  I thank Shraga Bar-On, Eli Rusyn, and Shmuel Sandberg for reading and commenting 
on earlier drafts of this essay. 
1  Only part of Toledot is available in English: The first three volumes, abridged and trans-
lated by Moshe Greenberg as The Religion of Israel: From Its Beginning to the Babylo-
nian Exile (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960); the fourth volume of To-
ledot, translated by C. W. Efroymson as History of the Religion of Israel. Vol. 4: From 
the Babylonian Captivity to the End of Prophecy (New York: Ktav, 1977). 
2  Stephen A. Geller, “Wellhausen and Kaufmann,” Midstream 31, no. 10 (1985): 39–48, 
esp. 39. See also David Lieber, “Yehezkel Kaufmann in Retrospect: In Tribute to Pro-
fessor H. L. Ginsberg,” Proceedings of the Rabbinical Assembly 48 (1986): 167–85; 
Menahem Haran, “Judaism and Bible in the World of Yehezkel Kaufmann” (in He-
brew), Jewish Studies 31 (1990–1991): 69–80 (an English translation of Haran’s essay 
by Lenny Levin is included in the present volume; see pp. 147-63); John H. Hayes, 
“Kaufmann, Yehezkel,” in Dictionary of Biblical Interpretation (ed. John H. Hayes; 
2 vols.; Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1999), 2:16–17.  
3  As Ziony Zevit notes: “Kaufmann’s work is not well known because it is densely writ-
ten in modern Hebrew and hence not accessible to most scholars in the academy. 
T. Krapf explains the lack of attention to Kaufmann by German-speaking scholars as 
due, in part, to the lack of any translation of his work into German. … Moshe Green-
berg’s masterful abridgement and English translation … was not widely studied in criti-
cal circles, and, where read, was quickly and improperly dismissed as a conservative 
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What is little considered in biblical studies is Kaufmann’s intellectual 
background, particularly that he pursued a PhD in philosophy at the Uni-
versity of Bern and voraciously read, then and thereafter, phenomenology, 
hermeneutics, and the methodology of human sciences and social studies.4 
Kaufmann never wrote about philosophy after completing his doctorate, 
with the exception of a short critical essay on Husserl’s phenomenology.5 
However, this was not because he lost interest in philosophy or found him-
self not sufficiently competent in the field. Kaufmann’s philosophical com-
petency was outstanding. Walter Benjamin, one of the great European intel-
lectuals of the 20th century, also completed his PhD around the same time 
under the same supervisor (Richard Herbertz). Benjamin was awarded his 
degree cum laude, whereas Kaufmann received his summa cum laude. For 
Kaufmann, however, philosophy was not an end in itself but a means to 
establish firm theoretical and analytical foundations for his lifework: a crit-
ical investigation into the history and essence of Jewish existence.  
The question I wish to consider is the following: How do we construe 
Kaufmann’s self-understanding of his project Toledot? Is Kaufmann’s To-
ledot, as commonly understood, intended to be a “Jewish” project? I would 
like to address this question by taking into account two generally underap-
preciated sections in Toledot, where he presents in-depth theoretical discus-
sions: one titled Bekivshona shel ha-yetzira ha-le’umit (The Secret of Col-
lective Creativity; henceforth Bekivshona)6 and the other being the ninth 
chapter of Toledot, conventionally referred to by the title of the first subsec-
tion Aḥdut ve-hafshata (Oneness and Incorporeality; henceforth Aḥdut).7 
                                                                                                                          
Jewish response to Wellhausianism” (Zevit, The Religions of Ancient Israel: A Synthesis 
of Parallactic Approaches [London and New York: Continuum, 2000], 45, n. 59). 
4  Kaufmann seems to have gained knowledge on his own more than from any of the 
instructors or courses he attended at Bern. As Emanuel Green writes: “It would seem 
that Kaufmann was not greatly influenced by any one teacher at Bern. It is natural that 
the systematic studies of the University affected the style and the philosophic method of 
his work, particularly the first part of Gola Ve-Nechar, but even there he remained an 
essentially self-educated man” (Green, “Universalism and Nationalism as Reflected in 
the Writings of Yehezkel Kaufmann with Special Emphasis on the Biblical Period,” 
[Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1968], 7).  
5  J. Kaufmann, “ Das τρίτος ἄνθρωπος-Argument gegen die Eidos-Lehre,” Kant-Studien 
25 (1920): 214–219.  
6  Kaufmann, Toledot, vol. 1, xxi–xliv. I render the term le’umi—usually translated as 
“national”—as “collective” because the English word “nation(al)” connotes the institu-
tional aspect of a social group and not the collective notion of the peoplehood, which 
this Hebrew term evokes. Others may render it literally as “The Secret of National Crea-
tivity,” as does Lenny Levin in his translation of Bekivshona included in this volume. 
7  Kaufmann, Toledot, vol. 1, 221–54. Others may render the title as “Unity and Abstrac-
tion,” or—as Lenny Levin puts it in the present volume—“Unity and Incorporeality.” I 
prefer to render it as “Oneness and Abstractness,” because the issue at stake is how to 
understand the quality of being one as in mono-theism—and not the state of being united 
or joined as a whole, which the word “unity” readily suggests. For the convention of re-
ferring to the whole discussion of Toledot’s ninth chapter, titled “The General Charac-
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While these discussions are, for whatever reason, not included in Moshe 
Greenberg’s English abridgment of Toledot, I regard them as crucial for 
understanding Kaufmann’s project. It is for this reason that translations of 
both these chapters are included in the present volume.8 
I contend that if we wish to appreciate the significance of Kaufmann’s 
project in general and philosophical reflections in particular, we should 
consider him in contrast to Spinoza, rather than Wellhausen (for Wellhau-
sen, as will be shown, is but an offshoot of Spinoza). What I wish to sug-
gest is not a direct causal linkage (as if Kaufmann considered Spinoza to be 
his implicit interlocutor) but rather a conceptual and paradigmatic compari-
son: a heuristic horizon that can elucidate very important yet neglected 
dimensions of Kaufmann’s Toledot.9 Let me begin with a few remarks on 
Spinoza. 
1. Preliminaries: Spinoza’s Philosophy of Immanence  
and Modern Biblical Scholarship 
Kaufmann fully accepts Spinoza’s critical approach to both the Bible and 
tradition: the method of biblical interpretation is no different from the gen-
eral method of empirical investigation; in order to understand the meaning 
of biblical literature, we must study its semantics (language), its pragmatics 
(Sitz im Leben), and the history of its formation and transmission (higher 
and lower criticism). Traditional Jewish or Christian biblical interpretation 
should not be accepted axiomatically; tradition, too, must be critically scru-
                                                                                                                          
teristics of the Israelite Belief” as Aḥdut ve-hafshata, which is actually the title of the 
first subsection (i.e., pp. 221–44), see, e.g., Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit, Idol-
atry (trans. Naomi Goldblum; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 36 
(they render the title as “Unity and Abstractness”) and 258, n. 28 (referring to “pp. 221–
54”). While some readers may find this convention confusing, I still find it appropriate 
and worth following it, for the phrase Aḥdut ve-hafshata “oneness and abstractness” apt-
ly captures the thrust of that chapter. 
8  See pp. 337–360 (Bekivshona) and pp. 283–317 (Aḥdut) in the present volume. 
9  Spinoza is mentioned only in Aḥdut (not in Bekivshona), 223 n. 2, 248. Some may argue 
that Kaufmann’s Aḥdut is better read in contrast to David Hume than to Spinoza (esp. 
Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and The Natural History of Religion; 
Kaufmann mentions Hume several times in Aḥdut). In contrast, I see Hume as respond-
ing to, or operating within, the intellectual tradition of the immanent revolution generat-
ed by Spinoza—Hume’s philosophy as a rival variety, or skeptical version, of Spinoza’s 
basic ideas. On Spinoza and Hume, see, e.g., Richard H. Popkin, “Hume and Spinoza,” 
Hume Studies 5, no. 2 (1979): 65–93; Wim Klever, “Hume Contra Spinoza?” Hume 
Studies 16, no. 2 (1990): 89–106; Wim Klever, “More about Hume’s Debate to Spino-
za,” Hume Studies 19, no. 1 (1993): 55–74.  
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tinized.10 Kaufmann objects to the immanent worldview and the conception 
of reality and divinity that underlies Spinoza’s biblical interpretation. 
Spinoza anticipated the age of modernity and secularization. He formu-
lated what Yirmiyahu Yovel calls a “philosophy of immanence”: a “convic-
tion that the natural world is all there is, and that human civilization in all 
its aspects—knowledge, ethics, law, political legitimacy, private and social 
emotions, true freedom, love of God, even salvation—is derived exclusive-
ly from this world and can be attained only within it.”11 This conviction 
precludes a priori the idea of transcendence, at least, from the horizon of 
being and cognition.12 If Spinoza indeed believed in God, his deity is the 
world itself. Further, given the absence of external doctrinal authority as the 
supreme arbiter of truth, this conviction regards human reason as the only 
available and legitimate matrix for epistemology and normativity.13  
This immanent revolution has profoundly affected major currents of 
modern thought. It has evolved into multiple varieties and rival models, be 
they deistic, atheistic, or agnostic, and influenced directly or indirectly 
great minds of the west, including Kant, Goethe, Hegel, Heine, Feuerbach, 
                                                     
10  Benedictus de Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise (ed. Jonathan I. Israel; trans. 
Michael Silverthorne; Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
esp. chap. 7. 
11  Yirmiyahu Yovel, The Other Within—the Marranos: Split Identity and Emerging Mo-
dernity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 335. See also his seminal 
work, Spinoza and Other Heretics (2 vols.; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1989). For Spinoza and his impact on modern Judaism, consider also Eliezer Schweid, 
A History of Modern Jewish Religious Philosophy (5 vols.; Leiden: Brill: 2011–), vol. 1, 
chap. 1; Joshua Parens, Maimonides and Spinoza: Their Conflicting Views of Human 
Nature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Daniel B. Schwartz, The First 
Modern Jew: Spinoza and the History of an Image (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2012). More generally on modernity and secularization, consider Charles Taylor’s 
A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
12  The immanent conviction may find transcendent questions rationally unanswerable; 
however, it does not necessarily make them meaningless. Rather, it may regard the idea 
of transcendence meaningful in serving immanent functions; hence, my phrasing “at 
least, from the horizon of being and cognition.” See Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics, 
vol. 2, 174–75, esp. 175: “critical philosophy [of immanence] re-directs the transcendent 
drive back into the actual world, where it serves an immanent function. In Kant this 
takes the form of the ‘regulative idea’; but seen more broadly, Nietzsche’s ideas of self-
overcoming and will to power also translate this notion of transcendence-within-
immanence, as does Heidegger’s existential analysis of man. Without overstepping his 
finitude, man surpasses himself into what he is not yet, that is, he projects himself into 
his realm of possibilities.” 
13  Spinoza was not the inventor of the philosophy of immanence; rather, he was the first 
thinker of modernity who gave a systematic and decisive expression to this idea. As 
Yovel puts it: “Spinoza was not the first philosopher of immanence; pre-Socratics, Epi-
cureans, and Stoics had preceded him in ancient times. But with Spinoza the idea of 
immanence, powerfully systematized, re-emerged after having been discredited and re-
pressed by the overpowering weight of medieval Christianity” (Yovel, Spinoza and Oth-
er Heretics, vol. 2, 167).  
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Marx, Nietzsche, Darwin, Freud, Einstein, and many others.14 Within this 
intellectual trajectory, critical disciplines of biblical studies are also ad-
vanced. 
The philosophy of immanence is a “conviction” predicated on a certain 
worldview. Therefore, biblical criticism that is conducted within this intel-
lectual tradition can be either critical or dogmatic. The latter will be the 
case if potential constraints within this way of thinking are overlooked. As 
we shall see, the heart of Kaufmann’s philosophical reflections lies in his 
rejection of a dogmatism that considers this conviction to be axiomatic. 
With that in mind, let us consider Kaufmann’s discussion regarding, first, 
common theological assumptions in Aḥdut and, then, common theoretical 
assumptions in Bekivshona. 
2. Oneness and Abstractness 
Kaufmann presents the discussion of Aḥdut at the beginning of the second 
book of Toledot, which concerns itself with the phenomenology of biblical 
religion.15 
In Aḥdut, Kaufmann contends that biblical monotheism does not involve 
sophisticated abstraction—that the biblical notion of divine “oneness” 
(aḥdut) is conceived of in terms of “exaltedness” (hasgavah) and not in 
terms of “abstractness” (hafshatah). The abstract conception of the biblical 
God as void of corporeality and personality—the notion that recurs in the 
history of biblical interpretation (that God has no image)—is ultimately of 
Greek origin. Indeed, biblical texts display no qualms about describing 
their deity in anthropomorphic terms. As Kaufmann sees it, their very use 
of such images and popular forms is a proof that this notion of divine one-
ness is attained through intuitive and popular modes of perception.16 
                                                     
14  See Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics, vol. 2, in which he discusses Spinoza’s impact 
on Kant, Hegel, Heine, Hess, Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. There is a com-
mon systematic context these thinkers all share with Spinoza, which is based on three 
premises: “(1) immanence is the only and overall horizon of being; (2) it is equally the 
only source of value and normativity; and (3) absorbing this recognition into one’s life is 
a prelude—and precondition—for whatever liberation (or emancipation) humans can at-
tain” (Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics, vol. 2, 170).  
15  Or, the “morphology” of biblical religion, as Kaufmann himself would put it. Kaufmann 
follows Wilhelm Dilthey and other thinkers who undertook a comparative approach to 
religion/culture in order to elucidate, typologically, different patterns or structures of (re-
ligious) life and experience. See Job Y. Jindo, “Recontextualizing Kaufmann: His Em-
pirical Conception of the Bible and its Significance in Jewish Intellectual History,” 
Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 19 (2011): 95–129. 
16  As has long been noted, biblical prohibitions against making an image of God have little 
to do with the negation of God’s corporeality, although conventionally it is assumed ex-
actly in that sense. In the biblical context, it is forbidden not because it is erroneous (that 
an infinite being cannot be represented in a finite object) but because it is inappropriate 
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What is unique in biblical monotheism, according to Kaufmann, is ra-
ther the absolute transcendence of divine will—that “God is supreme over 
all. There is no realm above or beside him to limit his absolute sovereignty. 
He is utterly distinct from, and other than, the world; he is subject to no 
laws, no compulsions, or powers that transcend him.”17 This sheer distinc-
tion between nature and divinity should not be confused with the notion of 
ontological separation that deems any interaction between God and the 
world problematic or logically impossible. The distinction at hand should 
rather be understood in terms of absolute freedom: that the monotheistic 
deity can freely act and engage in this world and human affairs with no 
restriction whatsoever of the primordial nature and its causality.18 
Kaufmann stresses that this idea of God’s unlimited will—which he re-
gards as fundamental to biblical religion—is conceivable independently of 
the notion of divine exclusivity. Concomitantly, he rejects a widely held 
assumption that biblical monotheism is an outcome of cultic exclusivism, a 
centuries-long polemic against idolatry.19 For Kaufmann, the case is the 
reverse both historically and conceptually: the cultic exclusivism of biblical 
religion is a historical and conceptual byproduct of the idea of God’s trans-
cendent will, and not vice versa. True, the doctrinal aspect of biblical reli-
gion emphasizes the idea of God’s exclusivity, namely, that YHWH alone 
must be worshiped (e.g., Exod 20:2; 23:13; Deut 4:35; 6:14; 13:3). Howev-
                                                                                                                          
(that any representation is unworthy of God and also inimical to substituting the subject 
for an object). What matters is not the false understanding of God’s nature but rather an 
inappropriate attitude towards God and the fear of substitution. See Halbertal and Mar-
galit, Idolatry, 37–66, esp. 45–48. Kaufmann understands those prohibitions differently. 
He sees in them an attempt to counter fetishism—namely, the notion that material ob-
jects can bear divine power. This notion undermines what he identifies as the fundamen-
tal idea of biblical monotheism for it blurs the basic distinction between nature and di-
vinity. See Kaufmann, Religion of Israel, 17–20, 135–38, 236–37. See also Yehezkel 
Kaufmann, “The Bible and Mythological Polytheism,” JBL 70 (1951): 179–97.  
17  Kaufmann, Religion of Israel, 60.  
18  Accordingly, God’s involvement in the terrestrial matters (including, e.g., the Christian 
idea of the virginal conception of Christ) does not compromise what Kaufmann identi-
fies as the distinctiveness of biblical monotheism, namely, the exaltedness and the abso-
lute freedom of divinity.  
19  For sophisticated explorations of this approach, consider, e.g., Stephen A. Geller, Sacred 
Enigmas: Literary Religion in the Hebrew Bible (New York/London: Routledge, 1996), 
chap. 9; Barbara Nevling Porter, ed., One God or Many? Concepts of Divinity in the An-
cient World ([Chebeague, ME]: Casco Bay Assyriological Institute, 2000); Mark S. 
Smith, The Origins of Biblical Monotheism: Israel’s Polytheistic Background and the 
Ugaritic Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), esp. part 3; Mark S. Smith, The 
Early History of God: Yahweh and the Other Deities in Ancient Israel (2d ed.; Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002); William G. Dever, Did God Have a Wife? Archaeology 
and Folk Religion in Ancient Israel (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005), esp. chap. 8; 
Othmar Keel, Die Geschichte Jerusalems und die Entstehung des Monotheismus (2 
vols.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007); James K. Hoffmeier, Akhenaten and 
the Origins of Monotheism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).  
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er, the idea of divine transcendence need not necessarily come to such an 
extreme conclusion. Insofar as the idea of God’s absolute freedom is not 
compromised, biblical monotheism can acknowledge the existence of other 
deities (e.g., “Who is like You among the gods, O YHWH” in Exod 15:11; 
cf. Duet 10:17; Mic 4:5; Ps 29:1–2; 95:3; 96:4–5; 97:9).20 In other words, 
for Kaufmann, what defines the essence of biblical monotheism is the qual-
itative (rather than the numerical) oneness of YHWH: the absolute suprem-
acy of YHWH as one and only.21 
This conception of divinity is radically different from pagan religions22 
that implicitly presume an “immanent” notion of divinity, where natural 
phenomena—such as the heaven, the earth, the sea, the sun, the wind, the 
mountains, and the rivers—are conceived of in terms of living persons, as 
personal deities.23 As Kaufmann sees it, the abstract conception of divine 
                                                     
20  In Kaufmann’s own words: “There is room in monotheism for the worship of lower 
divine beings—with the understanding that they belong to the suite of the One” (Reli-
gion of Israel, 137). Consider also Benjamin D. Sommer, The Bodies of God and the 
World of Ancient Israel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 145–74. For 
the distinction between the exclusivity of God and the transcendence of God, see Moshe 
Halbertal, “Monotheism and Violence,” Judaism and the Challenges of Modern Life 
(eds. Moshe Halbertal and Donniel Hartman; New York: Continuum, 2007), 105–13. In 
Kaufmann’s view, the idea of cultic exclusivism emerged at relatively late stages in the 
history of biblical religion: “[D]uring the pre-exilic period Israel was still moving from 
the basic monotheistic idea to its extreme cultic consequence” (Religion of Israel, 137). 
Kaufmann, thus, rejects the common conception of monotheism as inherently intolerant 
and violent. This common view, as is well known, goes as far back as to David Hume; 
see Hume, The Natural History of Religion (1757), sections 9 and 12. On Kaufmann and 
Hume, see n. 9 above. 
21  For more on this, see Jindo, “Recontextualizing Kaufmann,” 114–22. For Kaufmann, the 
very presence of mythological motifs and images in biblical literature need not be seen 
as a necessary contradiction to the idea of absolute transcendence: as long as the idea of 
God’s absolute will is not compromised, biblical monotheism can allow the use of such 
motifs and images. See Kaufmann, “The Bible and Mythological Polytheism,” esp. 181–
82. Note that the section heading of that article on page 181 should rather be rendered as 
“Positive and Negative Mythology [not: Idolatry]”; for the Hebrew original, see Kauf-
mann, From the Secret of Biblical Creativity (in Hebrew; ed. Menahem Haran; Tel 
Aviv: Dvir, 1966), 141. 
22  The word “pagan” or “paganism” in this essay is used as a non-tendentious umbrella 
term that designates polytheistic, animistic, and other non-biblical faiths and move-
ments. It is not intended to evoke pejorative connotations. As far as I can tell, while 
Kaufmann frequently uses this term (ילילא or תולילא) he never uses it in a derogatory 
sense. 
23  Put differently, according to Kaufmann, divine personality for the pagan mind is a mat-
ter of style—an accident of history—whereas for the biblical mind it is a matter of con-
tent—an essence of biblical religion; cf. Yochanan Muffs, “Biblical Anthropomor-
phism,” in The Personhood of God: Biblical Theology, Human Faith, and the Divine 
Image (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights, 2005), chap. 6. I am not suggesting that, accord-
ing to Kaufmann, every biblical anthropomorphic depiction is meant literally. For ex-
ample, Kaufmann will certainly take passages portraying God as a woman in labor (Isa 
42:14) or a potter crafting a clay pot (Isa 45:9; Jer 18:6) to be a metaphor (or more pre-
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oneness is a sophisticated version of this pagan worldview. Gradually, the 
pagan mindset not only unified its perception of divinity and reality but 
also demythologized it. What is left is nature with its impersonal laws of 
causality.24 In this respect, Spinoza’s pantheism, which understands God 
and nature as two names for the same reality that operates according to a 
causal system of necessity, is a peak of this gradual abstractness.25 
In short, we have here two different conceptions of divine oneness—
namely, pagan and biblical, immanent and transcendent, of abstractness or 
exaltedness—that involve radically different perceptions of reality. The 
abstract conception of divinity, though understood in terms of oneness, is 
fundamentally different from the oneness of the biblical God, who trans-
cends laws of causality and necessity. The two conceptions of divinity for-
ever remain worlds apart, each leading to a distinct perception and experi-
ence of the world and life.26  
It is therefore evident why Kaufmann begins his analysis of biblical re-
ligion with this discussion. Indeed, we may otherwise make a category 
error—understanding biblical religion through “pagan” categories.27 As I 
see it, there are three consequences that stem from this category mistake. 
First, the biblical God is abstracted into an impersonal force and thus be-
comes what Kaufmann calls “metadivine” or primordial causality. As a 
result, the theological distinction between paganism and biblical monothe-
ism vanishes.28 The biblical God becomes Spinozistic. Second, because of 
                                                                                                                          
cisely, to be a simile, for each case involves a grammatical particle “like”). In other 
words, Kaufmann seems to recognize a distinction between depiction and conception: 
while the depiction of the biblical God may involve stylistic anthropomorphisms, the 
biblical conception of divinity itself—the idea of God being an agent or “divine person-
ality”—is not a matter of style.  
24  This view is anticipated by Francis M. Cornford’s From Religion to Philosophy: A Study 
in the Origins of Western Speculation (London: E. Arnold, 1912), which explores reli-
gious-mythological antecedents of critical scientific thought in ancient Greece. Cornford 
thus stresses the essential continuity in cosmology and metaphysics between religion 
and philosophy in Greek culture. 
25  For more on this, see Halbertal and Margalit, Idolatry, chap. 3, esp. 68–73.  
26  See Jindo, “Recontextualizing Kaufmann,” 114–22. 
27  As Kaufmann himself puts it: “Yet, as if in stubborn defiance of the very nature of our 
evidence, biblical scholarship seeks to read it […] in the light of paganism!” (Kaufmann, 
The Religion of Israel, 4). 
28  According to Kaufmann, the notion of the “metadivine” realm is the essence of pagan-
ism: “The heart of the pagan idea, then, is the conception of a primordial, supradivine 
[= metadivine] realm which is the womb of all being, contains the roots and patterns of 
all nature, and out of which the gods themselves have emerged. The multitude of natural 
phenomena and with it the multitude of gods stem from the infinite fertility of the pri-
mordial sphere. Multiplicity is fundamental to paganism; it serves to symbolize its basic 
idea: the subjection of all, deity included, to a transcendent, primeval realm” (Yehezkel 
Kaufmann, “The Biblical Age,” in Great Ages and Ideas of the Jewish People [ed. Leo 
W. Schwartz; New York: Random House, 1956], 10). See also Kaufmann, Religion of 
Israel, 21–59, esp. 23 n.; Jindo, “Recontextualizing Kaufmann,” 114–15.  
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this abstract notion of divinity, we will misunderstand the general phenom-
enology of biblical religion—namely, its worldview, lived experience, and 
value systems, which, according to Kaufmann, are predicated on the notion 
of divine exaltedness. Third, we will suppose (wrongly) that the idea of 
monotheism can be achieved only after the human intellectual has suffi-
ciently advanced so that highly sophisticated and abstract concepts can be 
contemplated. We will thus assume the historical growth of rationality and 
deem biblical religion to be a result of the gradual refinement and abstrac-
tion of a pagan religion. In so doing, we will misconceive the theology, 
phenomenology, and history of biblical religion.  
As noted, modern biblical criticism is a discipline that developed within 
a particular intellectual tradition. If we are not aware of the hazard of ap-
plying premises and categories commonly shared in that tradition yet alien 
to biblical literature, we will misconstrue the conceptual universe of bibli-
cal religion and, worse yet, fail to recognize our category mistakes. The 
discussion of Aḥdut draws our attention exactly to this hazard, addressing 
how and how not to understand the most basic idea of biblical monotheism, 
namely, the oneness of its deity.  
Now I wish to turn to Kaufmann’s theoretical discussion in Bekivshona. 
3. The Secret of Collective Creativity  
Bekivshona is probably the single most important section in Toledot for 
understanding Kaufmann’s overall project and theoretical frameworks.29 In 
a way, it presents a concise digest of the concentrated theoretical discus-
sions he presented in his magisterial historical-sociological interpretation of 
Jewish history, Golah ve-nekhar (Exile and Alienation, 1929–1930; hence-
forth Golah).30  
In Bekivshona, Kaufmann seeks to determine appropriate and well-
founded theoretical foundations for analyzing general phenomena of cul-
tural creativity, be they by “Homer, Plato, Shakespeare, Goethe, Rem-
brandt, Beethoven, and others.”31 The discussion revolves around two is-
sues: an “infinite variety of cultural creative forms” ( ןיאה יוברה-תורוצ לש יפוס  
                                                     
29  Bekivshona, which now appears as the general introduction to Toledot, vol. 1, xxi–xliv, 
was originally published in 1941 as a reply to reviews by such scholars as Aaron Ka-
minka (1866–1950), Shlomo Goitein (1900–1985), and Ephraim Urbach (1912–1991) of 
the first volume of Toledot. Kaufmann himself later included this reply as the introduc-
tion to Toledot.  
30  See Golah, esp. 1:1–207. It is very likely that Kaufmann regarded Golah and Toledot as 
part of a single project—or, put differently, Toledot as an integral sequel to the discus-
sion of Golah. If so, it explains why Kaufmann did not originally articulate his theoreti-
cal framework at the beginning of Toledot; i.e., he assumed that the readers of Toledot 
had read Golah and were familiar with his theoretical frameworks.  
31  Kaufmann, Toledot, xxiii. 
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 הריציהתיתוברתה ) that we can see in all spheres of human life and the “crea-
tive potential of the human mind” (םדאה חור לש רצויה חכה) as an empirical 
category of historical experience.32 Kaufmann contends that theoretical 
frameworks that do not take into account these two phenomena are inade-
quate. 
When we look at the history of human culture, Kaufmann argues, we 
observe an infinite variety of creative forms in practically all spheres of 
human life, such as in the arts, language, law, or religion. Whether on the 
individual or collective level, this phenomenon, as well as its origin, cannot 
be explained by an artificial speculative scheme or material or social condi-
tions alone. To account for this phenomenon, Kaufmann insists that we 
must assume the creative potential of the human mind as an empirical cate-
gory of historical experience.33 
Note well: For Kaufmann, the creative potential of the human mind is 
not the sole factor for the infinite variety of cultural creative forms.34 It is 
                                                     
32  Kaufmann, Toledot, xxi and xxii respectively. Kaufmann uses the Hebrew term ruaḥ 
(spirit, mind) as masculine (and not as feminine, as usual) because he is using it, pre-
sumably, in the sense of the German word Geist (spirit, mind), which is masculine. 
33  Here, as I discussed elsewhere, Kaufmann seems to take his cue from Dilthey’s work; 
see Jindo, “Recontextualizing Kaufmann,” 106–10, 112–14. Like Dilthey, Kaufmann 
employs the term “mind” solely in the empirical sense and never in a metaphysical or 
mysterious sense, which, for him, has no real empirical existence. When Kaufmann 
predicates the existence of the creative spirit, he bases himself on disunity and diversity 
in cultural creative forms, and not, like Hegelian or romanticist thinkers, on the com-
monality of those forms; for more on this, see Bekivshona. Kaufmann thus distinguishes 
himself from Jewish thinkers of his period who use the term in a speculative Hegelian or 
romanticist sense (Aḥad Ha-‛Am included). See Jindo, “Recontextualizing Kaufmann,” 
104, n. 27.  
34  This is a crucial point that differentiates Kaufmann’s empirical research from Hegelian 
and romanticist accounts of cultural history (including Nachman Krochmal’s), as Kauf-
mann himself explains in Bekivshona. Kaufmann’s theoretical discussion in Bekivshona 
is very dense and, more often than not, seems to be ignored even by its academic read-
ers. Hence, even after the publication of Bekivshona—and inclusion into Toledot as the 
general introduction—Kaufmann’s use of the term “mind” is still occasionally miscon-
ceived as Hegelian; see, e.g., Benjamin Uffenheimer’s remarks in his essay, “Ben-
Gurion and the Bible” (in Hebrew), in Ben-Gurion and the Bible: The People and Its 
Land (ed. Mordechai Cogan; Beer Sheva: The Ben-Gurion University Press, 1989), 54–
69, esp. 60. 
 Consider also Lawrence Kaplan’s essay, included in this volume, which regards Kauf-
mann essentially as Krochmalian. I differ with Kaplan who thinks of Kaufmann as try-
ing to minimize “any possible resemblance between his views and Krochmal’s” by add-
ing a footnote in Toledot, 1:12. As I see it, that footnote is intended, rather, to clarify 
where—and not that—Kaufmann is different from Krochmal, so that readers will not 
misunderstand Kaufmann’s work at some crucial points. Krochmal’s work seems to 
manifest the inherent congruity between theory and theology that I discuss in the present 
article. Note also that Krochmal’s God, which is devoid of all personality, is, from a 
Kaufmannian viewpoint, not biblical but essentially Spinozistic (hence, of pagan origin). 
 Kaufmann’s objection to Hegelian and romanticist accounts of cultural history may be 
traced back, at least in part, to his former teacher, Simon Dubnow (1860–1941), who in-
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rather one of multiple, heterogeneous factors—material and nonmaterial, 
which in turn influence each other—along with contingent elements that 
involve in the creative variety at hand. Hence, stresses Kaufmann, the em-
pirical researcher must take this category into account. 
Kaufmann thereby criticizes two dominant approaches in modern histor-
ical and biblical studies, namely, dialectic idealism and empirical material-
ism. Dialectic idealism, exemplified in the work of both Hegel and Well-
hausen, seeks to explain the origin and history of a cultural phenomenon 
through a preconceived abstract paradigm, whereas empirical materialism, 
found in Marx and Durkheim, seeks to explain it through its physical and 
social settings. 
Kaufmann’s central criticism is the assumption of causality itself. Dia-
lectic idealism and empirical materialism concern themselves with the 
world as abstracted from sensory perception and structured by the category 
of causality, be it metaphysical or material. In this respect, they are both 
Spinozistic. Each displays a deterministic temperament and seeks to ex-
plain cultural creativities through general overarching principles of causali-
ty. Thus both approaches neglect or marginalize the creative potential of 
the human mind, be it individual or collective. For Kaufmann, any cultural, 
organic phenomenon with its own internal logic and principles—such as 
language, law, or religion—involves this creative potential on the collective 
level. True, empirical investigation cannot fully account for how it works, 
let alone the original insight that was sparked in great minds or the sponta-
neity thereof.35 Still, the human mind is a primary and fundamental catego-
ry in cultural creativity, a factor equally as important as any other moment 
or element—social or material. Indeed, to discount this category is to ig-
nore what constitutes defining characteristics of our humanness—that is, 
our diversity, spontaneity, and unpredictability. 
Accordingly, not only the categories commonly applied to the analysis 
of biblical religion but also the very modes of thought and assumptions that 
underlie major trends of biblical studies turn out to be Spinozistic (hence, 
of “pagan” origin). Understood thus, Wellhausen’s naturalistic approach—
which assumes biblical religion to be a result of an organic evolution of 
paganism or natural religion—is but an offshoot of Spinozistic intuitions.36 
                                                                                                                          
troduced Kaufmann to a sociological study of Jewish history at the Academy of Jewish 
and Oriental Studies in St. Petersburg. Note also that Dubnow rejected, inter alia, meta-
physical outlooks of Krochmal and other Jewish historians. Consider Laurence J. Silber-
stein, “Historical Sociology and Ideology: A Prolegomenon to Yehezkel Kaufmann’s 
‘Golah v’Nekhar,’” in Essays in Modern Jewish History: A Tribute to Ben Halpern 
(eds., Frances Malino and Phyllis Cohen Albert; Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson 
University Press, 1982), 173–95, esp. 182–83.  
35  See also Kaufmann, Golah, 1:22.  
36  For Wellhausen’s concept of progress and development, see Geller, “Wellhausen and 
Kaufmann,” esp. 42–43, and also Peter Slyomovics, “Y. Kaufmann’s Critique of 
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Granted a causal notion of cultural creativity, it is no wonder that the possi-
bility of seeing biblical monotheism as a new beginning in human history is 
excluded from the outset.37 
It comes as no surprise that Kaufmann addresses this subject in the gen-
eral introduction. He must make clear from the outset that biblical stud-
ies—and major trends of historicism more generally—have not devoted due 
attention to the originality of cultural creation: that a cultural creation can 
be original or revolutionary, as a result of the creative potential of the hu-
man mind, although its function may remain beyond the limits of empirical 
reason.38 Put differently, dialectic idealism and empirical materialism over-
look the finitude of human reason, thereby extending beyond its compe-
tence.39 Their rationalism is thus uncritical and dogmatic.40  
                                                                                                                          
J. Wellhausen: A Philosophical-historical Perspective” (in Hebrew), Zion 49 (1984): 61–
92. 
37  Caution: Kaufmann is not advocating a solitary notion of cultural creativity as some-
thing that can happen in a vacuum. The same holds true for the emergence of biblical re-
ligion. For him, startling resemblances that comparative scholars have identified be-
tween biblical and other ancient Near Eastern literature—such as in narrative, law, wis-
dom, prayer, ritual, and historiography—are only on the formal and not on the concep-
tual level. Indeed, to elucidate how biblical religion incorporated the literary and cultural 
conventions it inherited from their neighboring polytheistic cultures and transformed 
those conventions according to their own worldview, self-understanding, and value sys-
tems was one of Kaufmann’s major objectives in his Toledot.  
38  For more on this, see Jindo, “Recontextualizing Kaufmann,” esp. 112–14, 122–27. 
Consider also Benjamin Sommer, “Dating Pentateuchal Texts and the Perils of Pseudo-
Historicism,” in The Pentateuch: International Perspectives on Current Research (eds. 
Thomas Dozeman, Konrad Schmid and Baruch Schwartz; FAT 78; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2011), 85–108, especially his comments on biblical critics’ denial of the possi-
bility of originality on 96, and on reductionism and historicism on 101–8. 
39  Kaufmann elsewhere asserts that most advanced polytheistic systems display a tendency 
on the part of humans to be self-reliant and to believe especially in the competence of 
human reason. In this respect, the war of biblical religion with pagan idolatry was also a 
war against the self-reliant tendency and intellectual idolatry—the belief that intellectual 
knowledge could redeem humankind. This self-reliant tendency in paganism strikingly 
resonates with dialectic idealism and empirical materialism that overlook the finitude of 
human reason, whereas Kaufmann’s critique of empirical reason markedly resembles the 
monotheistic critique of human intellect. Note, however, that Kaufmann’s critique stems 
from his intellectual integrity rather than theological dogmatism. For more on this, see 
my article, “Recontextualizing Kaufmann,” 122–27.  
40  The still current view that biblical monotheism emerged as an Israelite response to the 
political events of the Sargonid period, especially, the ascendency of the Assyrian em-
pire, contends Kaufmann, does not account why monotheism emerged nowhere but in 
Israel, while other nations and individuals underwent the same or similar political and 
social upheavals. Among the recent works, see Baruch A. Levine, “Assyrian Ideology 
and Israelite Monotheism,” In Pursuit of Meaning: Collected Studies of Baruch A. Lev-
ine (ed. Andrew D. Gross; 2 vols.; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2011), 1:3–28. Con-
sider Benjamin Sommer’s article in the present volume, which addresses this issue at 
greater length.  
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Kaufmann’s critical discussions in Aḥdut and Bekivshona, then, are in-
herently related: the abstract notion of divinity (theology) and the causal 
notion of cultural creativity (theory) can go hand in hand. Indeed, once 
either is predicated, it becomes very difficult not to assume the other and, 
worse still, to recognize the analytical constraints of their immanent 
worldview. 
So what is the corrective alternative Kaufmann seeks to present? Is it a 
“Jewish” biblical criticism? I do not think so. 
4. “Jewish” Biblical Criticism? 
When Kaufmann published the first volume of Toledot, the distinguished 
scholar of rabbinic literature Ephraim E. Urbach (1912–91) and other Jew-
ish scholars criticized Kaufmann for not engaging in the issue of revela-
tion.41 Indeed, Kaufmann does not address that subject; furthermore, he 
consistently avoids any use of theological concepts in discussing the incep-
tion of biblical monotheism. Hence, for example, he employs a term such 
as “intuition” instead of “inspiration.” This way of writing, however, gave 
Urbach and other believing scholars the impression that Kaufmann main-
tains a supernaturalism while disguising it by the use of scholarly terms. In 
reply, Kaufmann wrote the essay, Bekivshona, which he later included in 
Toledot itself. There Kaufmann explicitly states his own analytical frame-
work.42 Kaufmann writes: 
The question of the formation of ancient Israelite culture—more specifically, of 
the Israelite faith—for the scholar who seeks to remain within the boundaries of 
appearance [i.e., the boundaries of empirical investigation] is a cultural-
historical question, and it must be discussed in the way phenomena of cultural 
creativity are generally discussed.43 
This shows what Urbach and other reviewers overlooked. Kaufmann’s 
approach is not Jewish but empirical. His project offers a critical analysis of 
biblical religion according to the general principles of empirical investiga-
tion that are applicable to any cultural phenomenon. It is thus inevitable 
that Kaufmann cannot—and indeed need not—address such a metaphysical 
notion as revelation or divine existence, for empirical reason cannot pene-
trate into what is behind realty.44  
                                                     
41  E. Urbach, “Neue Wege der Bibelwissenschaft,” Monatsschrift für Geschichte und 
Wissenschaft des Judentums 82 (1938): 1–22, esp. 3–4. 
42  For the inclusion of Bekivshona to Toledot, see notes 29 and 30 above.  
43  Kaufmann, Toledot, xxxii; my translation. 
44  Consider Kaufmann, Golah, 1:22; Kaufmann, “Biblical Age,” 14; Jindo, “Recontextual-
izing Kaufmann,” 122–27. 
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Accordingly, just as Kaufmann dismisses Wellhausen’s naturalism, he 
rejects Urbach’s supernaturalism. In other words, Kaufmann would reject 
Spinoza’s worldview, and certainly Wellhausen’s work, not because they 
are heretical or Christian but because they are uncritical and dogmatic. So, 
too, Kaufmann must reject Urbach’s supernaturalism even if it is Jewish 
because it is likewise uncritical and dogmatic: Urbach’s supernaturalism 
overlooks our epistemic limitations and thus risks invalidating the value of 
empirical research itself. True, Kaufmann may allow the use of rabbinic 
sources and traditional Jewish commentaries in biblical studies, but only if 
they are heuristically helpful and analytically illuminating, not because they 
are Jewish. Kaufmann thus accepts neither naturalism nor supernaturalism, 
and instead offers a critical approach that recognizes the limits of empirical 
reason—non-dogmatic rationalism.  
To be sure, Kaufmann’s work is not free of dogmatism. Suffice it to 
mention his (almost obsessive) notion of the people of Israel as monotheist 
from the earliest stages of the biblical period. But we are not addressing the 
end product of Kaufmann’s project. Instead, we are concerned with his 
understanding of his project and its potential contributions. In that respect, 
Toledot was not intended to promote a “Jewish” biblical criticism. 
5. Concluding Remarks  
The potential constraints of analytical assumptions, when taken for granted 
and not explicitly acknowledged, are at the heart of the issue. If we remain 
unaware of such premises, we may risk misconstruing the object of analysis 
and, worse yet, remain unaware of our misconstrual. Furthermore, we may 
not realize that our analysis rests on premises that cannot be proven, or on 
assumptions to which we may not even subscribe.45 
Biblical criticism can be either critical or dogmatic. In the age of mo-
dernity and secularization, an immanent approach to life and the world is 
generally and implicitly assumed. In such an age, Kaufmann’s work re-
mains vitally relevant. Although his philosophical reflections do not give us 
all the answers, they do force us to consider how to engage in biblical criti-
cism as a modern and secular enterprise. In this regard, attention to Spinoza 
can highlight an important yet neglected contribution of Kaufmann’s Tole-
dot. 
Should we conclude that Toledot is not meant to be a “Jewish” project? 
Yes and no. As we saw, Kaufmann was very strict in keeping his observa-
                                                     
45  Consider Edward L. Greenstein, Pragmatic Pedagogy of Bible (Initiative on Bridging 
Scholars and Pedagogy in Jewish Studies: Working Paper No. 2; Waltham, MA: Brand-
eis University Mandel Center for Studies in Jewish Education, 2006); Greenstein, Es-
says on Biblical Method and Translation (BJS 92; Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1989), 
esp. chaps. 3 and 4.  
 IS KAUFMANN’S TOLEDOT A “JEWISH” PROJECT? 85 
tional viewpoint empirical, not Jewish. This means that in terms of metho-
dology, Toledot was not meant to be Jewish at all. In terms of consequence, 
however, its objective was clearly Jewish and Zionist, and that is so, not 
only in terms of the substance of Toledot but also the language in which 
Kaufmann wrote it. 
Kaufmann wrote his major works, both Golah and Toledot, in modern 
Hebrew, not in German—the major language of biblical scholarship in his 
time, and the language in which he authored his doctoral dissertation and 
several articles.46 Further, he started to write them in Hebrew before the 
establishment of the State of Israel and before Hebrew was recognized an-
ywhere as an official language.47 Like many cultural Zionists of his day, 
Kaufmann considered the Hebrew language to be an essential part of the 
Jewish collective identity, which he and his fellow Zionists sought to re-
store. Moreover, for them, the revival of Hebrew, a language that ceased to 
be spoken for two millennia, was the most vital means of restoring Jewish 
collective life in their original homeland.48  
Accordingly, the fact that Kaufmann wrote in Hebrew suggests that he 
intended his works to be not only a Jewish but also a Zionist project.49 In-
                                                     
46  This is not to say that Kaufmann was not interested in publishing his works in German 
or other European languages. For example, he tried to publish translations of Golah in 
German, Yiddish, and English during his lifetime, but without success. See, e.g., 
Thomas Krapf, Yehezkel Kaufmann: Ein Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg zur Theologie der 
Hebräischen Bibel (Berlin: Institut Kirche und Judentum, 1990), 61. 
47  In 1914, Kaufmann published his first major article, which he wrote in Hebrew, entitled 
“The Judaism of Aḥad ha-Am,” in Hashiloaḥ 30 (1914): 249–71. The British Mandate 
recognized Hebrew, along with English and Arabic, as an official language of Palestine 
in 1922.  
48  No other language has ever been revived after such a long period in which it had no 
native speakers. Because more than three million people now speak Modern Hebrew as 
their native language (and six million more speak it on other levels), we may not readily 
appreciate the magnitude of this collective achievement, which is as remarkable as the 
establishment of the State of Israel. As is well known, even Theodor Herzl (1860–1904), 
the major advocate of Zionism, was unable to entertain the idea of Hebrew being the 
language of the Jewish State he envisioned. In his words: “We cannot converse with one 
another in Hebrew. Who amongst us has a sufficient acquaintance with Hebrew to ask 
for a railway ticket in that language! Such a thing cannot be done” (Herzl, The Jewish 
State [New York: Dover, 1988], 145; translated by Sylvie d’Avigdor from Der Juden-
staat [Vienna: M. Breitenstein, 1896]). In 1898, during his short visit to Palestine, Herzl 
met Eliezer Ben Yehuda (1858–1922), the driving force behind the revival of Hebrew. 
Herzl’s diaries describe that meeting as follows: “I also met a young fanatic who tried to 
convince me that what our movement needs is to adopt Hebrew as our national lan-
guage. It is, of course, ridiculous!” (Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, Fulfillment of Prophecy: the 
Life Story of Eliezer Ben-Yehuda 1858–1922 [Charleston, SC: Booksurge, 2008], 265). 
49  Kaufmann viewed language as a crucial factor that ensures the collective identity and 
solidarity of a people; see Kaufmann, Golah, vol. 2, 108–50. In this respect, it may not 
be off the mark if we assume three objectives in his act of writing on scholarly issues in 
Hebrew; namely, (1) to help revive the Hebrew language (by introducing scholarly and 
technical terms to the vocabulary of modern Hebrew); (2) to promote biblical and Jew-
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deed, Kaufmann himself had some serious misgivings regarding the whole 
idea of writing on academic issues in modern Hebrew, because his reader-
ship was undoubtedly limited and the language seemed deficient. In this 
regard, his former teacher H. N. Bialik wrote Kaufmann the following 
words of encouragement in January of 1927:  
Regardless, don’t get discouraged. As for your last sentence: “In short, I 
see, indeed there is neither reason nor competence to write on academic is-
sues in Hebrew,” I take it as a mere slip of the pen. .… “Competence,” as of 
now, perhaps there is indeed not, but “reason” there is, and there is and only 
in Hebrew. Writing about Hebrew academic issues in a foreign language is 
none other than feeding calves for dead pagan worship, and there is real 
apostasy in it. And trust me, you will not have a share among the apostates 
of our spirit.50 
In addition, Toledot was intended to have Jewish and Zionist significance 
in at least two other ways: formative and informative. Formative in that 
Toledot was a project of cultural recovery. Like other cultural Zionists, 
Kaufmann regarded the Bible as a starting point for forming the identify of 
modern Jewry. Elucidating its religion and literature provided a possible 
identitarian bedrock for Jewish people who were then returning to their 
homeland from all parts of the world after two millennia.51  
At the same time, Kaufmann’s project was also meant to be informative. 
Like many Jewish intellectuals of his day, Kaufmann was preoccupied by 
the question of Jewish survival, especially the nexus between religion and 
the collective identity of the Jewish people. He sought to investigate this 
                                                                                                                          
ish studies in Hebrew (by publishing his works as reference texts for studying the Bible 
and Jewish history in Hebrew); and (3) to renew the collective identity and solidarity of 
the Jewish people (by enabling modern Jews to engage in the study of their cultural her-
itage and history in Hebrew). 
50  Letters of Hayyim Nahman Bialik (ed. Fishel Lachower; 5 vols.; Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1937–
39), 3:167–68 (in Heb.). The original Hebrew reads:  
שאיתת לא תאז לכבו .ןורחאה ךקוספ תא" :רוצקב , עדמ ירבד בותכל תלוכי ןיאו םעט ןיא תמאבש ינא האור
תירבעב ",סומלוקה תטילפכ קר האור ינא" … .תלוכי "וא העש יפלןיא תמאב יל , לבא"םעט " קרו שיו שי
תירבעב .תיזעול ןושלב תירבע עדמ ירבד תביתכ ,התמ הרז הדובעל םילגע םוטפ אלא הניא , םושמ הב שיו
שממ דמש .ינחטבומו ,ונלש חורה ידמשמ ןיב ךקלח היהי אל התא יכ.  
51  Kaufmann’s Zionism was more complex than usually assumed. For him, while the 
territorial solution to the Jewish problem was inevitable, the establishment of the Jewish 
state in the land of Israel—was, though ideal, not indispensable. In his view, the pres-
ence of local Arabs, who have an equal historical right to the land, must be recognized; 
however, the land is too small for both peoples to dwell in. Hence, he maintained that 
the Jews should also establish for themselves another territory in one of the unpopulated 
places in the world (Golah, 2:467–75). He writes: “A land is necessary for the people of 
Israel, a new land. They should hold onto the land of Israel to the extent possible, but the 
solution to the problem of the exile must also be sought elsewhere and perhaps in other 
lands” (Golah, 2:471). Because of this view, Kaufmann was often regarded as “non-
Zionist” by his contemporaries; see Zalman Shazar, “Yehezkel Kaufmann of Blessed 
Memory” [in Hebrew], Ha-Do’ar 43, no. 4 (1963): 59–61, esp. 61. 
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subject according to the general principles of empirical analysis. It was 
especially in Toledot that Kaufmann explored the distinct nature of a mono-
theism that preserved the collective existence of the Jewish people as a 
distinct minority in exile for two millennia. Behind his life project was a 
missionary sense of intellectual responsibility and solidarity—to present a 
firm empirical basis informing his people as they determined their collec-
tive fate.52  
Toward the end of his life, Kaufmann expressed his sense of responsi-
bility and urgency as he remarked on the state of scholarship in Israel:53 
It also seems to me that the [Israeli] youth who study are not willing to offer 
a sacrifice onto the altar of biblical studies. I do not say, God forbid, that 
our public shows no interest in the Bible. On the contrary, there is great in-
terest in anything related to the Book of Books. Go out and see what a large 
crowd fills the conferences of the Society for Biblical Studies. In the sphere 
of scholarly literature, however, we are lagging behind compared to other 
peoples. Look, we still have no critical biblical commentary [in Hebrew] 
that meets contemporary demands and that supplies the needs of academic 
youth. So far, critical commentaries have appeared only for individual 
books. However, we still lack a new commentary on the entire Bible for the 
academic youth. Isn’t this a primary need?  
No one in Israel sacrifices himself in the tent of Torah,54 as one may do in 
other fields of research. It may be that material support is required: we do 
not encourage and support talented people by providing stipends—for not 
everyone can bear the command of “Satisfy your hunger with bread dipped 
                                                     
52  This objective is more explicit in Golah, in which Kaufmann explores if and how reli-
gion can still serve in modern times as an “iron wall” preserving, as in the past, the col-
lective identity of the Jews as a distinct people in exile. Religion, for Kaufmann, is not 
merely a matter of institutional organizations or theological doctrines but, rather, a cul-
tural system which involves a total attitude of thought, feeling, and aspiration toward the 
world and life. Kaufmann’s answer is decisive: religion alone can no longer assume this 
role in the modern era—especially in the face of a secularization that has begun to dom-
inate Jewish life as well as the rise of a modern nationalism (especially in Europe) that 
has intensified the alien status of the Jews and hostility toward Jewish existence itself. 
Henceforth, therefore, the only logical and feasible solution to the Jewish problem is the 
“national redemption” (vol. 1, 8), namely, “the acquisition and settlement of a national 
territory” (vol. 2, 264). In turn, for Kaufmann, this national solution was a prelude to 
Jewish renewal and cultural recovery. 
53  Avraham H. Elhanani, A Conversation with Authors (in Hebrew; Jerusalem: R. Mas, 
1960), 86–92. This interview was conducted most likely in 1960 or 1961, as it mentions 
the publication of Kaufmann’s commentary on Joshua (1959) and a near completion of 
his commentary on Judges (1962).  
54  Lit.: No one in Israel kills himself in the tent of Torah. Cf. b. Berakhot 63b: “From 
where do we learn that words of Torah are only retained by one who kills himself over 
it?”  
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in salt.”55 People study the Bible, love the Bible; however, they do not dedi-
cate their lives to biblical studies.56 
Kaufmann dedicated his total being to the establishment of empirical re-
search of the Bible and Jewish history in contemporary Hebrew. This was a 
task he could neither complete nor evade. As a Zionist, Kaufmann thereby 
sought to contribute to the creation of modern Israel and to the flourishing 
of Jewish culture. He was an “iron ingot” that knew only one imperative: 
Build.57 
                                                     
55  Lit. “Eat Bread with salt.” This statement is from m. Avot 6:4: “This is the way of Torah: 
Eat bread with salt, drink water in small measure, sleep on the ground, and live a life of 
privation while you toil in Torah.”  
56  Elhanani, A Conversation with Authors, 87–88. The original Hebrew reads:  
ארקמה עדמ חבזמ לע ןברק בירקהל ןכומ וניא דמולה רעונה םגש יל הארנ .רמוא יניא ,הלילח , ונרוביצ ןיאש
נתב ןינע הלגמ"ך ,הברדא ,םירפסה רפסל עגונה לכב בר ןינע שי . יסוניכ האלממ לודג להק הזיא הארו אצ
ארקמה רקחל הרבחה .רחא םימע תמועל םירגפמ ונא תיעדמה תורפסה חטשב םלואםי . הכ דע ונל ןיא האר
נתל יעדמ שוריפ"ימדקאה רעונה יכרצ קפסמהו ןמזה תושירדל יוארה ך . םייעדמ םישוריפ התע ועיפוה
םידדוב םירפסל ,נתל שדח שוריפ לבא"ונל ןיא ימדקאה רעונה ליבשב ולוכ ך .ינושאר ךרוצ והז אלהו.  
הרות לש הלהאב ומצע תיממ לארשימ םדא ןיא ,אז השוע אוהש םשכםירחא רקחמ יפנעב ת . השורדו ןכתי
תירמוח הרזע ;תוידנפיטס ןתמ ידי לע ןורשכה ילעב םיקזחמו םידדועמ ונא ןיא , לוכי דחא לכ אל ירהש
 לש וצב דומעל"לכאת חלמב תפ ,"נת םידמול"ך ,נת םיבהוא"ך ,נתה רקחמל םהייח םישידקמ םניא לבא"ך.  
57  I differ with Thomas Krapf who attributes Kaufmann’s secluded life solely to his per-
ceived antisocial and timid personality (including Kaufmann’s purchasing for his study 
the “most uncomfortable sofa” in a furniture store so that his visitors will not stay for 
long); see Krapf’s essay in this volume. True, Kaufmann was shy and an introvert, but 
that is half the picture. As evident from Kaufmann’s own remarks during the interview, 
the reason for his life of recluse has to do, more fundamentally, with his missionary 
sense of intellectual responsibility for his people. And in order to dedicate his time total-
ly to his life work, Kaufmann minimized time spent socializing with people. In this re-
spect, I concur with Moshe Greenberg who writes: “all of his [Kaufmann’s] life’s work 
is suffused with a devotion to his people” (“Kaufmann on the Bible: An Appreciation,” 
in Studies in the Bible and Jewish Thought [Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 
1995], 175–88, 175). While Krapf’s extensive research on Kaufmann is surely to be 
commended, a caution is in order, as his essay does not always make a clear distinction 
between research-interview data and inferences based on those data. For example, it is 
not clear whether Krapf’s depiction of Kaufmann regretting the way he spent his life and 
feeling it was “too late to undo his mistake” is factual or inferential, that is, if that is 
what Kaufmann actually said, or rather what Krapf, or one of his interviewees, inferred 
or speculated in light of factual data. For other biographical studies of Kaufmann, con-
sider Emanuel Green, “Universalism and Nationalism as Reflected in the Writings of 
Yehezkel Kaufmann with Special Emphasis on the Biblical Period” (PhD diss., New 
York University, 1968), 1–26, and Avinoam Barshai’s introductory essay in Yehezkel 
Kaufmann, Selected Writings on Jewish Nationality and Zionism (ed. Avinoam Barshai; 
[in Hebrew]; Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, 1995), 14–117. 
Yehezkel Kaufmann: Observations about his  
Major Ideas in the Past, Almost Present,  
and the Immediate Future 
Ziony ZEVIT 
Introduction 
On April 2, 1918, Charles C. Torrey delivered the presidential address be-
fore the American Oriental Society in New Haven, Connecticut. Half-way 
through his presentation, he shared the following ideas with those in the 
room: 
I think it will hardly be denied, by those who investigate, that the atmos-
phere of oriental studies in the last two or three decades has not been favor-
able to a profound and sympathetic interpretation [emphasis in original] of 
Orientals and their work. […] A great amount of new material has come to 
light, and scholarly research has made very important advances in many di-
rections; but the main tendency of the time has been to keep to the surface 
rather than to go deep. 
It has been a singularly barren time for Biblical interpretation of the first 
rank, for instance. The Old Testament scholarship of Europe, on which we 
were wont to rely, comes very near being negligible at present. Very few 
commentaries or other treatises of really large caliber have appeared in the 
present generation, and most of the output has been of distinctly poor quali-
ty. In particular, the German exegesis, which has led the way for all the rest, 
has been decidedly anti-Semitic, with the result which can be imagined, 
though it has hardly been understood. […] There has been a remarkable 
lack of such books as open a new door into the past, giving us a view which 
we feel to be true and know to be inspiring.1 
In the following pages, I suggest that had Yehezkel Kaufmann heard these 
remarks, he would have agreed whole-heartedly with Torrey’s criticisms 
and, moreover, would have considered his own work an adequate response 
to Torrey’s hint at what was required for the redemption of biblical scholar-
ship. Kaufmann’s comprehension of his audience, however, would have 
been much different than what Torrey had in mind when using the pronoun 
“we.” Kaufmann’s “we” would not have been a small auditorium filled by 
orientalists and bibliologists, but all of the Jewish people. Kaufmann was 
concerned with their history in all times and places and with the content of 
                                                     
1  C. C. Torrey, “The Outlook for American Oriental Studies: The Presidential Address for 
1918,” JAOS 38 (1918): 107–20. The citation is from p. 114. 
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their thought-world. In that context, what he felt to be true and knew to be 
inspiring most likely differed significantly from what Torrey thought. 
This understanding of Kaufmann informs the three somewhat related 
sets of observations that I present below: 1. some sources of Kaufmann’s 
central ideas in nineteenth and early twentieth century philosophy, histori-
ography, and nationalistic ideology, 2. the reception of his bibliological 
research by Jewish scholars in the twentieth and early twenty-first centu-
ries, and 3. three of Kaufmann’s ideas worth reconsidering for application 
in contemporary research on Israelite belief and religion. 
1. Some Sources of Kaufmann’s Major Ideas 
1.1. Immanuel Kant 
In the beginning was Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who completed his 
doctorate in 1755. Kant’s university studies included heavy doses of geog-
raphy, meteorology, and anthropology. Perhaps, because of his understand-
ing of natural sciences and their methodologies on the one hand, and his 
anthropology derived insights into the varieties of worlds of knowledge, 
Kant developed into a rationalist with a strong distaste for dogmatic beliefs. 
He came to understand the cosmos in terms of Newtonian physics and, in 
his dissertation, explained it without reference to God. After considering 
the material world that existed outside of and aside from humans, he con-
cluded that this external world was comprehensible to people only through 
a consciousness/mind that exists within them. In the course of undertaking 
to present his ideas and their implications appropriately, Kant spent much 
of his life restructuring philosophy from the vantage point of a reflective, 
critical, rational individual. In 1781 he published his major and most fa-
mous work, Critique of Pure Reason, a book that presented his ideas about 
how the external material world ascertained through senses was perceived 
in the conscious mind. In his own words, his book was an investigation of 
the “faculty of reason with reference to the cognition to which it strives to 
attain without the aid of experience.”2 
In this work, he concluded that from the point of view of Vernunft, his 
term for referring to what may be translated into English as “rational mind 
(or reason),” the actual material world experienced through the senses is 
fundamentally unknowable in and of itself. Our knowledge about it derives 
indirectly through our senses (or instruments that provide information for 
our senses) that provide information to the mind of each individual. The 
mind then agglomerates these bits of information, sorting and forming them 
                                                     
2  Citation from I. Kant, “Preface to the First Edition” in Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure 
Reason (trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn; New York: Willey Book, 1958), 15. 
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first into perceptions and then into conceptions. Certain types of concep-
tions are organized in our minds and give rise to our knowledge of matter, 
that is, scientific concepts. Different types of concepts are then gathered 
and organized in a manner enabling humans to understand the outside 
world.3 
There is, however, another world of reality about which we have 
knowledge whose roots are not in sensual perceptions. Kant describes how 
knowledge that does not come to us indirectly via our senses, and hence, in 
some manner, is already inherent in our minds, perceives and interprets that 
which is real but unconnected to the material world. Religious, ethical, and 
moral “truths” belong to this second category of things that people know 
and understand. It is this element in Kant’s philosophical inquiries that 
finds expression later in Kaufmann’s ideas about Israelite comprehensions 
of God and of monotheism. 
By distinguishing between the two types of reality on what may be con-
sidered empirical grounds, Kant provided a philosophical basis for what are 
commonly understood as the hard sciences. This compelled metaphysicians 
to rethink the implications of realities known only through imagination.4 
One implication of this line of thought is that religious truth-claims can-
not be proven by theoretical reasoning based on experiences with or in the 
material world because such claims do not enter our minds through our 
senses. Consequently, certain religious truths cannot be overturned by phi-
losophy and certainly not by the physical sciences that deal only with ob-
servable, measurable phenomena. 
Convinced that his insight provided an Archimedean point from which 
certain realities could be observed objectively, Kant sounded a clarion call 
for intellectual emancipation in the Preface to the first edition of Critique of 
Pure Reason: “Our age is the age of criticism to which everything must be 
subjected. Religion through its sacredness and legislation through its au-
thority are regarded by many as exempt from it. If exempted, however, they 
become subject to suspicion and cannot claim […] the respect that reason 
grants only to that which has stood the test of a free and public examina-
tion.” The call, however, was a tad muffled because it was sounded at the 
end of the first footnote.5  
                                                     
3  Kant’s philosophical conclusion has been buttressed by biologists working the field of 
parasitology. See D. Parrochia and P. Neuville, Towards a General Theory of Classifi-
cations (Basel: Basel Springer, 2013), 2. Parrochia and Neuville explain concepts as 
units of thought that have limits in that they extend only so far as to cover all objects to 
which the concept applies. The content of a concept consists of all the attributes of the 
objects (p. 33). This semantic definition, useful for classification theory, also works for 
their above-mentioned description of how parasites know what is good for them. 
4  Parrochia and Neuville, Towards a General Theory, 42–46. 
5  Kant, Preface, 15 n. 1. I have altered Meiklejohn’s translation somewhat for the sake of 
clarity. 
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In 1797, Kant published Metaphysics of Ethics. He argues in this work 
that reason is the authority for morality. For acts to be “moral” they must 
flow from a sense of duty that reason dictates and from an act of will, a 
conscious determination, to do good or to do right. Actions that begin with 
adherence to the dictates of external law or social convention are not moral 
because they are other-directed. He contends that “good” flows only from 
the will of autonomous individuals, those who think and reason for them-
selves. A moral act derives from the “categorical imperative” of the mind to 
which humans respond as if their actions, were they performed universally, 
would enhance all human life and existence. Consequently, religious truth-
claims cannot be proven by abstract notions of morality.6 
Kant was a heavy stone in the placid pool of premodern philosophy, 
helping to undermine the medieval synthesis of philosophy and theology 
that had evolved in Europe over a millennium. Ripples of his work moved 
through dynamically evolving western European thought, influencing it and 
changing the way we talk about certain ideas permanently.7 As a member 
of the interbellum Jewish intelligentsia and as a student of philosophy in a 
German speaking country, Kaufmann was familiar with Kant's work and 
with the writings of those who developed certain aspects of his thought. 
1.2. Disciplines in Tandem during the Nineteenth Century 
Kant’s philosophy rose in popularity at the same time that other intellectual 
changes were occurring in the West. These changes began to define the 
parameters of an emerging cultural consciousness referred to today as “mo-
dernity” that claims to possess an objective understanding of reality. 
Critical historiography as taught in Ranke’s Berlin seminars during the 
first quarter of the nineteenth century, spread from Berlin across Europe 
and was established in both North and South America by the 1850s. In 
Protestant departments of Theology, scholars combined higher criticism— 
a discipline that had evolved in Classical Studies—with the new historical 
approach in their study of Bible. A generation after Kant’s death, Biblical 
Criticism was seeding ideas in theological discourses that led to contentious 
theological disagreements in both Christian and (later) Jewish discourses, 
                                                     
6  In Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason, published in 1793 before Metaphysics of 
Ethics, Kant softened his position so as to appease state authorities and not incur the ire 
of church authorities who discerned some discomforting implications in Critique. In this 
book, he argued that the role of religion and of churches is not to compel morality or to 
judge what is or is not ethical after the fact, but rather to influence the inner-directed be-
havior of humans. Authentic religious organizations, he argued, are self-organized 
groups of people uniting to advance true morality. Consequently, scripture has value on-
ly when serving the same end. By themselves, neither scripture nor dogma can deter-
mine for people what is or is not an ethical act. 
7  This sentence is overstated because selected medieval ideas and metaphors remain vital 
and viable in many streams of Judaism and Christianity. 
 YEHEZKEL KAUFMANN: OBSERVATIONS ABOUT HIS MAJOR IDEAS 93 
many of which remain unresolved in the first decades of the twenty-first 
century.8 Kaufmann would begin his life-long engagement with biblical 
criticism in the early decades of the twentieth century by which time the 
Jewish intelligentsia had become aware of biblical criticism and its implica-
tions for challenging the historical validity of traditional narratives about 
the origin of biblical literature and Jewish religious thought. 
Paralleling these developments, and to some extent reacting against 
them, was the emergence and development of Romanticism ca. 1815–1870 
that gave rise to spiritualistic and mystical movements in art, literature, and 
religion as well as to nationalistic aspirations expressed in the rise of ver-
nacular literatures, education focused on local, ethnic cultures, and activist 
political movements among suppressed ethnic groups in Eastern and West-
ern Europe. The rediscovery of the “I” within the collective led to the re-
discovery of a unique “us” by distinctive groups, including Jews, within 
large political units such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the British Em-
pire, Greater Russia, and the Ottoman Empire. These developments enabled 
each group to query about and rediscover its unique Volksgeist. 
German speaking and reading Jews began to integrate Kant’s philoso-
phy into Jewish thought only during the waning decade of the nineteenth 
century, continuing into the twentieth.9 Simultaneously, other ideas were 
fermenting in the minds of Jewish intellectuals: Jewish Reform argued that 
Judaism was a deracinated religion with implicit creeds. It was in conflict 
with a slowly developing enlightened Orthodoxy that competed with an ill-
defined anti-modernist traditionalist Judaism. These movements, in turn, 
were all in tension with the rising tide of Jewish national self-awareness 
among recently secularized Jews. Cultural Zionism advanced its vague 
vision of a Jewish cultural homeland, while Political Zionism countered 
this with its more concrete vision of a Jewish national homeland.10 Kauf-
mann engaged both types of Zionist movements, disparaging the former 
and joining the latter. 
These currents of thought paralleled renewed interest in the use of He-
brew as a language for modern communication, curiosity about the history 
of the Hebrew language and its literatures from the Mishnaic period 
through the Renaissance, and concern about the “scientific” history of the 
Jewish people. All such intellectual movements were nurtured by the emer-
gence of folklore, anthropology, Comparative Religion, historical linguis-
                                                     
8  Ziony Zevit, “Dating Torah documents: From Wellhausen to Polak,” in Discourse, 
Dialogue and Debate in the Bible: Essays in Honour of Frank H. Polak (ed. Athalya 
Brenner-Idan; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2014), 258–60, 269, 274–88. 
9  I develop this topic at greater length in a work in progress on the topic of Jewish Biblical 
Theology. 
10  These centripetal ideologies were all in conflict with centrifugal ideologies such as 
Cosmopolitanism and Socialism that promoted the elimination of ethnic, religious, and 
political borders and the homogenization of humanity (understood in terms of the en-
lightened, urban elites of England, France, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland). 
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tics, and psychology (as a branch of philosophy) as scholarly disciplines. 
Concurrently, knowledge about and debates concerning historical-critical 
biblical studies were moving out from Christian seminaries into broad pub-
lic awareness and debate. 
1.3. First Came Kant; Then Came Hermann Cohen 
Hermann Cohen (1842–1918) rose to prominence as a Neo-Kantian philoso-
pher and was appointed professor in philosophy at the University of Mar-
burg in 1876. (The term “Neo-Kantian” refers to philosophers and some-
times to historians and scientists who adapted Kantian issues, themes, and 
terminology to topics of their choosing.) His invitation to Marburg and his 
subsequent career thereafter were based on his application of Kantian 
thought to ethics. By the time of his retirement in 1912, Cohen’s work was 
acclaimed by Christian philosophers and theologians.11 
After leaving Marburg for Berlin in 1912, Cohen taught at the 
Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums until his death. It was only 
during his Berlin period, that he turned his full attention to Judaism and its 
relationship to the philosophical conclusions that he had reached in his 
earlier, acclaimed publications on reason and ethics.12 The major work from 
this last period of his life was Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des 
Judentums. Based on his lectures at the Hochschule, it was published post-
humously in 1919. This was translated into English more than fifty years 
later as Religion of Reason: Out of the Sources of Judaism.13 Ideas in this 
book influenced Kaufmann’s thinking. 
Cohen’s title was determined by Kant’s understanding of what charac-
terized a religion of reason and by Kant’s estimation that Judaism could not 
be reconciled with it. As Kant had put it bluntly, “The euthanasia of Juda-
ism is the pure moral religion freed from ancient statutory teachings…”14 
Kant held that the law of Judaism created a polity, a nation, not a religion, 
because a religion of reason could entail only uncoerced ethical behavior, 
not behavior that was commanded. By Kant’s definition of morality, Jews 
who obeyed mitsvot, commandments, as interpreted by the Rabbis, were 
immoral.15 
                                                     
11  While at Marburg, Cohen most likely met the distinguished historian of early Islam, 
Julius Wellhausen who taught there from 1885–1892 before moving on to Göttingen. 
12  Willi Goetschel, The Discipline of Philosophy and the Invention of Modern Jewish 
Thought (New York: Fordham University Press, 20013), 60–66. 
13  H. Cohen, Religion of Reason: Out of the Sources of Judaism (trans. S. Kaplan; New 
York: Frederick Ungar, 1972). 
14  Cited from M. Mack, German Idealism and the Jew: The Inner Anti-Semitism of Philos-
ophy and the Jewish Responses (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2003), 35. 
15  R. Munk, “Mendelssohn and Kant on Judaism,” Jewish Studies Quarterly 13 (2006): 
216–17. N. Rotenstreich presents a pithy summary of Kant on this point in his Jews and 
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Cohen cited broadly from classical Jewish sources to illustrate that the 
idea of a unique God and of an ethical humanity as understood by Kant, 
originates in Jewish thought. He advanced this important idea in chapter 8, 
“The Discovery of Man and Fellowman,” of Religion of Reason. A key 
verse that he used to illustrate this was Leviticus 19:18: “… you shall love 
rēʿaka as yourself.” Although rēaʿ refers to a fellow Israelite in Leviticus 
19:18, and is therefore usually translated “your fellow,” it refers to Egyp-
tian neighbors or acquaintances in Exodus 11:2. Cohen argued from Exo-
dus to Leviticus that this word always referred to fellow-human beings, an 
understanding tolerable in most of its biblical occurrences. The sentiment 
of Leviticus 19:18 is repeated almost verbatim in Leviticus 19: 34 using the 
word gēr, stranger, extending the moral principle of loving others to every-
body who may have been considered excluded by the first verse.16 In Co-
hen’s argument, Leviticus 19:18 can be considered the original articulation 
of Kant’s idea of the categorical imperative. From this interpretation, taught 
by many nowadays as a truism, much followed.17 
For Cohen, the Neo-Kantian, the concept of God’s uniqueness doesn’t 
refer to God’s existence as perceived through sense perception or learned 
through revelation, rather, it is an idea whose existence establishes morali-
ty, harmony and ethics in all that exists. The anti-mystical Cohen explained 
that God’s revelation to man is not a revealing of himself, but of his will 
with respect to how humans ought to behave to each other. Three important 
corollaries emerge when this idea is applied to biblical sources. The first is 
that the Bible must be engaged philosophically and viewed as expressing a 
universal philosophy in its own language and its own way.18 The second is 
that Jewish people are the teachers through which humanity can be ethical-
ly improved universally; the third is that religion, absorbed in ethics, is the 
vehicle through which this improvement occurs.19  
Cohen advanced a Jewish religious philosophy based on refined Kantian 
thought combined with Jewish ideas that distinguished itself from medieval 
                                                                                                                          
German Philosophy: The Polemics of Emancipation (New York: Schocken Books, 
1984), 3–5. 
16  Cohen, Religion of Reason, 127–28. Whether or not this idea is supported by contempo-
rary philology is questionable. 
17  P. Mendes-Flohr, Love, Accusative and Dative: Reflections on Leviticus 19:18 (The 
B. G. Rudolph Lectures in Judaic Studies, New Series, Lecture 4; Syracuse, NY: Syra-
cuse University Press, 2007), 7–8. 
18  D. H. Weiss, Paradox and the Prophets: Hermann Cohen and the Indirect Communica-
tion of Religion (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4. 
19  S. Kaplan, “Translator’s Introduction,” pp. xii–xv in Cohen, Religion of Reason, and 
L. Strauss, “Introductory Essay,” pp. xxiii–xxvi, xxviii–xxix in H. Cohen, Religion of 
Reason; S. Ooko, “Mishnato ha-datit shel Hermann Cohen” (in Hebrew; “The Religious 
Teachings of Hermann Cohen”), in: H. Cohen, Dat ha-tevunah mimeqorot ha-yehadut 
(Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1971), 9–18. See Cohen, Religion of Reason, 236–95. 
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philosophical theology.20 In his first chapter, “Die Einzigkeit Gottes” trans-
lated as “God’s Uniqueness,” he justified his preference for emphasizing 
the incomparable uniqueness of the divine rather than his oneness. For him, 
“Monotheism is not the thought of one man, but of the whole Jewish na-
tional spirit unfolding in the creation and development of this thought 
which impregnates the entire thinking of the people.”21 
In his second chapter, “Der Bilderdienst,” translated as “Image Wor-
ship,” Cohen argues that the distinction between worship of the unique God 
and various other deities is not limited to number alone: “[I]t becomes 
prominent in the distinction between an unseen idea and a perceptible im-
age.” Cohen could not imagine that a monotheistic mind could conceive of 
an image of the divine: “[P]rophetic monotheism is necessarily opposed to, 
necessarily contradicts art.”22 
Unlike the medievalists, Cohen sought philosophical justification for be-
liefs and practices using reason as his intellectual touchstone, not revelation 
rationalized. Additionally, he connected his Jewish religion of reason with 
ethics understood as a universal religious phenomenon, and he focused on 
actual moral, not metaphysical issues.23 For Cohen, the Bible and Judaism 
were instantiations of Kant’s universal vision.24  
His comprehension of the role of reason (and of the rule of reason) in 
comprehending Judaism from its very beginnings affected the thought of 
many prominent Jewish thinkers who came of age in the first two decades 
of the twentieth century. After Cohen, came Leo Baeck, Martin Buber, 
Franz Rosenzweig, Mordecai Kaplan, others, and Yehezkel Kaufmann.25  
1.4. Yehezkel Kaufmann 
The appropriations from Cohen made by Yehezkel Kaufmann (1889–1963) 
are what concern us here.26 In what follows, I focus mainly on his claims 
                                                     
20  D. Adelmann, “Ursprüngliche Differenz I: Über Gott in der Philosophie nach den Quel-
len des Judentums bei Hermann Cohen,” in id., “Reinige dein Denken”: Über den jüdi-
schen Hintergrund der Philosophie von Hermann Cohen (Würzburg: Königshausen & 
Neumann, 2010), 250–68. See also 277–94.  
21  Cohen, Religion of Reason, 36. See also 36–44. 
22  Cohen, Religion of Reason, 51–53. 
23  J. Melber, Hermann Cohen’s Philosophy of Judaism (New York: Jonathan David Pub-
lisher, 1968), xiii–xiv. Melber’s very readable and well-organized book provides a con-
venient ingress to Cohen’s thought. For a critical evaluation of Cohen, see W. Kluback, 
The Legacy of Hermann Cohen (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1968), 1–41. 
24  Goetschel, The Discipline of Philosophy, 62. 
25  Each of the named individuals appropriated selected ideas from Cohen for different 
audiences in different settings. This is addressed in the above-mentioned work in pro-
gress on Jewish Biblical Theology. 
26  Peter Slymovics addresses what appears to be Kaufmann’s partial appropriation of 
Cohen’s ideas about history in: “Y. Kaufmann’s Critique of J. Wellhausen: A Philo-
sophical-Historical Perspective” (in Hebrew), Zion 49 (1984): 72–79. 
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about monotheism, a topic that can be broached through different disci-
plines: bibliology, history of religions, theology, and philosophy. Kauf-
mann, trained formally as a philosopher at the University of Bern, wrote a 
dissertation on Neo-Kantian philosophy in 1918,27 and published a short 
article on Husserl’s Phenomenology in Kant-Studien 25 (1920): 44–49. 
These two publications constitute the total of his formal contributions to 
philosophy as an academic discipline. 
After 1920, Kaufmann dedicated himself to (1) exploring the defining 
characteristics of the habits of mind that found expression in the culture of 
his own people in the past and present and (2) publishing articles in various 
popular venues about the debated national, cultural, and political issues of 
the day. The best known of his “publitsistika” publications were collected 
and published in 1936 under the title Beḥebley Hazeman (In the Birth-
Pangs of the Time). This book cemented his status as a formidable public 
intellectual in Mandatory Palestine.28 His ability to construct tight, almost 
forensic, arguments buttressed by different types of data is apparent in 
much of his public writing. Often, the flashy rhetoric of public debate pene-
trated the prose of Kaufmann’s later biblical research, especially when he 
expressed his dismissive, salty disdain for the ideas of “Wellhausen and his 
school.”29 
Although biblicists tend to consider Kaufmann one of their own, wheth-
er or not they agree with him, his work is easier to understand when he is 
viewed as a social and intellectual historian with a philosophical bent. Un-
like Christian biblicists of his day, Kaufmann did not come to the field 
through formal training in dogmatics, systematic theology, or theological 
exegesis.30 These were (and still are) all foreign to traditional Jewish educa-
tion even at advanced levels. Although he had attended lectures in biblical 
studies while at Bern, he was essentially an autodidact who read himself 
into historically oriented biblical studies and other fields as well. 
Kaufmann was very much interested in and wrote about the practical 
political thought of Marxists, Socialists, Democrats, and Anti-Semites as 
they related directly or tangentially to Jews and the Zionist project as he 
interpreted it. For him, these ideas were not theoretical. Kaufmann saw 
them determining the shape of Europe after World War I and understood 
                                                     
27  See pp. 51–53 in this volume. 
28  Y. Kaufmann, In the Pangs of the Time: A Collection of Researches, and Articles About 
Questions of the Present (in Hebrew; Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1936).  
29  This may have been purposeful in that it personified a host of interrelated ideas and 
made it easier to caricature them on the one hand and to invest them with a negative va-
lence on the other. On this topic, see G. Cappelli, “Modulating Attitudes via Adverbs: 
A Cognitive-Pragmatic Approach to the Lexicalisation of Epistemological Evaluation,” 
in: Studies in the Semantics of Lexical Combinatory Patterns (ed. M. Bertuccelli Papi; 
Pisa: Plus Pisa University Press, 2005), 214–20. See p. 118 below. 
30  Thomas Krapf, Yehezkel Kaufmann: Ein Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg zur Theologie der 
Hebräischen Bibel (Berlin: Institut Kirche und Judentum, 1990), 27–66. 
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that they could influence the future of the emerging Jewish polity in Pales-
tine.31 He understood also that very different sets of ideas had dynamically 
forged the history and thought of ancient Israelite polities in the Levant 
three millennia earlier. 
Job Jindo writes that Kaufmann was interested primarily in philosophy 
as a means to establish firm theoretical and analytical foundations for his 
lifework, namely, a critical investigation into the history and essence of 
Jewish existence.32 Joseph Turner emphasizes that Kaufmann’s overlying 
interest was in understanding the nature of Jewish ethnicity and in tracing 
its sources backs to their origin.33 Both are correct. I understand Kauf-
mann’s history of Israel’s belief—’emunah, not dat, religion—as an eight 
book footnote to key chapters, particularly chapter 3, 5, 6, in his first major 
book: Golah ve-nekhar (Exile and Alienation: An Historical-Sociological 
Study Concerning the Fate of the Jewish People from Antiquity to the 
Modern Period; in Hebrew; Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1929–1930; henceforth Golah).  
Golah was intended to unravel and describe the secret of the perpetual 
“Jewishness” of the Jewish people throughout their history.34 He argued 
that their secret was an uncompromising “monotheism” conceived as an 
inherently ethical, moral system of beliefs, that is, ideas and intuitions, put 
into practice. This book established his reputation as a philosophical histo-
rian in Mandatory Palestine alongside his reputation as a public intellectual. 
In Toledot ha-emunah ha-yisre’elit miymey qedem ‛ad sof bayit sheniy (The 
History of Israelite Belief from Early Antiquity to the End of the Second 
Temple [8 books in 4 volumes; 1937–57]; henceforth Toledot) he under-
took to provide a rock-solid foundation for the conclusions of Golah by 
tracing monotheism back to the very beginning of Jewish history.35 
                                                     
31  See Y. Kaufmann, Between Paths: Chapters Researching National Thought (in Hebrew; 
Haifa: The Hebrew Reali School, 1944); Selected Writings on Jewish Nationality and 
Zionism, edited with an introduction by Avinoam Barshai (in Hebrew; Jerusalem: Bialik 
Institute, 1995). 
32  J. Y. Jindo, “Revisiting Kaufmann: Fundamental Problems in Modern Biblical Scholar-
ship,” Journal of the Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions 3 (2007) 41–42, 45, 
57–65. I thank Peter Machinist for bringing this study to my attention. See also, J. Y. Jindo, 
“Concepts of Scripture in Yehezkel Kaufmann,” in: Jewish Conceptions of Scripture 
(ed. Benjamin D. Sommer; New York: New York University Press, 2012), 232–33. 
33  Joseph Turner, “The Notion of Jewish Ethnicity in Yehezkel Kaufmann’s Golah 
VeNekhar,” Modern Judaism 28 (2008): 257–83. 
34  Tzvi Vislovsky, “Sefer HaDor: On Concluding the Book of Yehezkel Kaufmann, Golah 
VeNekhar” (in Hebrew), Moznaim 20 (1932): 8–11, see p. 9 and Moznaim 21 (1932): 
11–13. 
35  My English translation of the title differs from the more common one. Hebrew emunah 
in his title refers to faith/belief/Glaube. Kaufmann’s project is about describing the con-
tents, explicit and implicit, of this belief and defending his descriptions. This is a some-
what narrower field of investigation than “religion.” I recently proposed the following 
definition for Israelite religion: “Israelite religion consists of the varied, symbolic ex-
pressions and appropriate responses, by families, unrelated groups, and individuals, to 
each other and to the deities and powers known to be of major and minor practical rele-
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When writing Toledot, Kaufmann undertook to collect and collate all 
relevant data that supported his argument; and, what is more important, he 
had to explain away all contradictory data and major contradictory argu-
ments of which he was aware. He had to organize his facts into useful cate-
gories that could demonstrate the uniqueness of Israel’s core beliefs from 
the very beginning of Israel’s self-awareness as a people and explain how 
these beliefs came to expression in the daily life of Israelites as described in 
the Hebrew bible. Toledot is the fruit of Kaufmann’s dedication to this en-
cyclopedic undertaking. 
Moshe Greenberg, in the first paragraph of his 1960 article, “Postulates 
of Biblical Criminal Law,” wrote the following: “Among the chief merits 
of Professor Kaufmann’s work must be counted the tremendous impetus it 
has given to the study of the postulates of biblical thought.”36 I agree with 
Greenberg’s description of Kaufmann’s contribution but only when applied 
to Golah. My reason is that by the time that Kaufmann came to apply the 
postulate that monotheism lies at the beginning of Israelite history, the pos-
tulate had become an axiom. In Toledot, he no longer suggested that Israel-
ite monotheism must have existed as a matter of logical deduction from 
texts or of reasonable inference from the implications of texts and historical 
experiences. Kaufman came to consider it an a priori, so powerful that it 
sufficed to explain away contradictory evidence, particularly all that is im-
plied from narratives about idolatry and polytheism. He no longer con-
structed arguments leading to a conclusion that monotheism lies at the be-
ginning of Israelite religion, but explained why such an assumption must be 
correct.37 Chapter 6 of Golah, “Israelite Belief and Polytheism,” became 
the foundation stone on which Kaufmann constructed Toledot. 
In advancing the assertion of “monotheism ex nihilo,” Kaufmann reject-
ed “the principle of sufficient reason.” This principle holds that everything 
that exists has a cause and every true statement has a cause. The principle 
underlies almost all scientific thinking and is fundamental to historiosophy 
and all manners of evolutionary thought. Kaufmann’s dissertation—which I 
have not seen—addressed problems with this principle. In ignoring it, 
Kaufmann implies that “monotheism” just happened, randomly, for no 
particular reason, to ancient Israel. It emerged as a product of the commu-
nal mind.  
                                                                                                                          
vance for them within their worldview.” See, “The Textual and Social Embeddedness of 
Israelite Family Religion: Who Were the Players? Where Were the Stages” in Family 
and Household Religion: Toward a Syunthesis of Old Testament Studies, Archaeology 
Epigraphy, and Cultural Studies (eds. R. Albertz, B. A. Nakhai, S. M. Olyan, and 
R. Schmitt; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2014), 290. 
36  In The Yehezkel Kaufmann Jubilee Volume: Studies in Bible and Jewish Religion Dedi-
cated to Yehezkel Kaufmann on His 70th Birthday (ed. M. Haran; Jerusalem: The He-
brew University, 1950), 5. 
37  See G. Randolph Mayes, “Beware the Convincing Explanation,” Think 10 (28) (Summer 
2011): 17–19. 
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Zalman Shazar, former president of Israel, criticized Kaufmann’s con-
ceptualization of the absolutely non-evolutionary origin of Israelite mono-
theism by comparing it to the way that naive Jews understand “In the be-
ginning God created.” Something new came into existence where nothing 
had existed before.38 Possibly Kaufmann decided on this ambiguous tactic 
in order to avoid addressing biblical claims concerning revelation per se. 
By not treating the topic in any detail, he blunted criticism of his ideas from 
a theological perspective.39 
He clearly was not bothered by the problem raised by his idea of mono-
theism ex nihilo. Emanuel Green suggests that Kaufmann believed that 
certain great individuals, or social-political forces, or ideas are sui generis. 
They can be viewed within a context of a big picture of developments and 
movements, but they themselves are beyond historical explanation. They 
lack causative precedents in human affairs, but once present, they become 
causative precedents for ensuing developments.40 
Kaufmann’s insightful notion that the unique national/ethnic character 
and culture of ancient Israel and of Judaism through the ages until the mod-
ern period was typified by an uncompromising monotheistic worldview 
unable to comprehend polytheism or any form of compromised monothe-
ism may have a second source, even earlier than Cohen, in the writings of 
Moses Hess (1812–1875). 
Hess, a popular Jewish philosopher and historian, is considered one of 
the founders of Socialist Labor Zionism. In his Rome and Jerusalem 
(1862), a classical Zionist text, Hess argued that the commitment of the 
Jewish people to their unique religion had preserved them in their diaspo-
ras, and that Judaism has both national and universal significance. Alt-
hough neither a systematic thinker nor a theologian, Hess also argued that 
biblical ideas about God who revealed himself in the human heart were 
identical with then current scientific thought about the common nature of 
humanity.41 This notion is linked also to ideas of Abraham Geiger about the 
                                                     
38  Z. Shazar, “Yehezkel Kaufmann z"l” (in Hebrew), Davar, November 15, 1964, p. 12. 
39  Here, the ideas of Cohen in his chapter on “Revelation” would not have helped him 
since Cohen referred to biblical notions of myth, a category of literature (and thought) 
whose presence in the Bible Kaufmann denied. See Religion of Reason, 79–84. Kauf-
mann’s acceptance of historical literary criticism implicitly read the different versions of 
Sinai stories as being narratives about rather than descriptions of revelation. Conse-
quently, he may have considered “revelation” a literary theme or motif rather than a his-
torical event. This is not clear, however, since the topic is avoided in Toledot Ha’emuna. 
40  E. Green, “Universalism and Nationalism as Reflected in the Writings of Yehezkel 
Kaufmann with Special Emphasis on the Biblical Period” (PhD diss., New York Univer-
sity, 1968), 24–25 with a citation from Golah, vol. I, 22. 
41  J. Heller, Moses Hess (London: Jewish Agency Department for Education and Culture, 
[no year of publication provided]) 24–29; S. Lundgren, Moses Hess on Religion, Juda-
ism and the Bible (Abo, Finland: Abo Academis Förlag, 1992), 90–95, 116–20, 
J. Shechter, The Land of Israel: Its Theological Dimensions (Lanham/Boulder/New 
York: University Press of America, 2010), 102–3. Shechter (95–107) provides thumb-
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rise of unique monotheism among Israelites. Geiger, a biblical scholar, was 
also the founder of the Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums 
where Hermann Cohen taught.42 
Unlike Hess and Geiger, Kaufmann provided a thick description for the 
context of this notion. He linked it, inter alia, to the sociology of Max We-
ber (1854–1920), who had advanced a compelling view of religion as lying 
at the core of a civilization and from whose writings the concept of “reli-
gious civilizations” became widespread.43 For Kaufmann, the monotheistic 
belief lay at the core of Israelite and Jewish civilization and sufficed to 
explain why Judaism and, thereby, Jews maintained their national identity. 
It is sometimes hard to discover who influenced Kaufmann. Job Jindo 
observes that Kaufmann did not footnote the sources with which he agreed, 
at least not thoroughly.44 Possibly, he may have absorbed and assimilated 
the ideas of others into his own thinking without being completely aware of 
their origin. Some of his critics, a few of whom are mentioned below, 
thought less benignly about this tendency in his writings than do I. Those 
                                                                                                                          
nail sketches of the best known Zionist theoreticians and their thoughts about the history 
of Jews in their exile and on their future return to the Land of Israel. An anthology of 
key sections from their major writings that address themes similar to those on which 
Kaufmann wrote is that of A. Hertzberg, The Zionist Idea (New York: Miridian Press, 
1960). 
42  See David Ellenson, “A Zionist Reading of Abraham Geiger and His Biblical Scholar-
ship,” in Making a Difference: Essays on the Bible and Judaism in Honor of Tamara 
Cohn Eskenazi (eds. D. J. A. Clines, K. H. Richards, and J. L. Wright; Sheffield: Shef-
field Phoenix Press, 2012), 130 with additional references there. 
43  Y. Kaufmann, Golah ve-nekhar (4 vols.; Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1929–1932), vol. 1, 30, 110–
11, 152, 168–69. This is the first book in which Kaufmann articulated this idea. The no-
tion of the monotheistic core was then carried over, more or less intact, to his studies of 
Israelite religion. On this, see Z. Zevit, Religions of Ancient Israel: A Synthesis of Paral-
lactic Approaches (London: Continuum, 2001), 44–45 and literature cited there. For the 
connection with Cohen (that strikes me as rather obvious), see H. Cohen, Religion of 
Reason, 20–23; 35–58 for his understanding of God, monotheism, and prophetic com-
prehensions of idolatry; and 361–66 in his chapter “The Law” which combines philoso-
phy, history, sociology, and political theory. (Kaufmann obviously must be considered 
in opposition to Cohen’s characterization of nascent Zionism as a “mistake.”) This is 
developed further by E. Schweid, “Between a Scholar and a Philosophical Exegete” (in 
Hebrew), in: Massu’ot: Studies in Kabbalistic Literature and Jewish Philosophy in 
Memory of Prof. Ephraim Gottlieb (eds. M. Oron and A. Goldreich; Jerusalem: Mosad 
Bialik, 1994), 414–28. See also Jindo, “Revisiting Kaufmann,” 45, 68 n. 1, 69 n. 2, 75 n. 
61; and “Concepts of Scripture,” 233, where he refers to Wilhelm Dilthey’s influence on 
Kaufmann’s conception of the Bible as lived experience expressed in literature. 
 Shemaryahu Talmon compares Weber’s approach to that of Kaufmann and implies 
clearly that a much closer connection exists than what is suggested by Kaufmann’s ref-
erences. See S. Talmon, “The Teachings of Yehezkel Kaufmann in Biblical Research” 
(in Hebrew), in: An Evening of Conversation about the Teachings of Prof. Y. Kaufmann 
Concerning Biblical Research (eds. A. Biran, B. Uffenheimer, and S. Talmon; Haifa: 
University Institute of Haifa/Municipal Department of Education and Culture, 1964), 
19–20. 
44  J. Jindo, “Recontextualizing Kaufmann,” 109, notes 44, 46; see also 104, n. 27. 
102 ZIONY ZEVIT  
with whom he disagreed, however, were cited until their ideas were finally 
dismissed. 
Another factor influencing his thinking may have been the popularity of 
race theory among Jewish scholars in the early twentieth century, including 
Zionist theoreticians, in that it combined genealogy, ethnology, ideology, 
the study of oral traditions, as well as history and sociology.45 (Take note, 
however, that the term “race” in nineteenth- and twentieth-century anthro-
pological parlance referred not only to biological connectedness, but also to 
cultural practices and habits of mind. People could and did speak about the 
French race, British race, and so on. So races could be characterized as 
intelligent, inquisitive, generous, kind, peaceful, compromising, spiritual, 
and open, or stupid, close-minded, greedy, militaristic, aggressive, and 
mean-spirited. Terminology based on the word “ethnos” began to replace 
that based on “race” after World War II through the 1960s as “politically 
correct” terminology became de rigueur in American academic institu-
tions.)46 
1.5. Kaufmann’s Major and Minor General Ideas about Biblical Belief 
(1) Kaufmann’s argument for a pristine monotheism taught by Moses at the 
very beginning of Israelite religion is influenced by Cohen’s demonstration 
that Kant’s categorical imperative is already found in the Bible. The con-
ception of divinity that provided this imperative is unattested by any an-
cient civilization or ancient philosophical system. The deity is 100% self-
sufficient and independent of all natural forces and substance. He is the 
source of all and creator of all (vol. I, book 2, pp. 447–48). Kaufmann con-
tends that the idea of monotheism in Israel cannot be explained by evolu-
tion. Under the rubric “The Essential Idea of Israelite Monotheism,” Kauf-
mann writes: “That idea was born out of a new religious feeling, a spark of 
belief in God that gave rise the idea of a divine will, superior and control-
ling.” He refers to the idea as “voluntaristic,” that is, autonomous, emerging 
from the rational thought of an individual, thinking human, and denies that 
it is inherent in ideas about divinity” (vol. I, book 1, p. 244 bottom). More-
over, Kaufmann writes that it was Moses “who first thought through and 
conceptualized the idea of monotheism” and spread it among the tribes 
(vol. II, book 1, pp. 41–42). 
                                                     
45  See M. Geller, “Zionism, Race, and the Great Zionist Racialist Novel,” AJS Perspectives 
(Fall, 2007): 12–14; E. Slavet, “Sigmund Freud’s Racial Theory of Jewishness,” AJS 
Perpsectives (Fall, 2007): 16–18. 
46  Traces of this still exist in the genres Polish Jokes, Italian Jokes, Jewish Jokes, etc., and 
in all manner of ethnic humor not delimited by the unstated rules of political correctness 
operative in contemporary Western culture. Certainly since the 1960s words such as 
“race, racist, racism” have an extremely negative valence. 
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Both Benjamin Uffenheimer, a scholar known primarily for the philo-
sophical bent of his work on prophecy and the history of exegesis, and 
Menahem Haran, a scholar known primarily for his work on the history of 
Israelite cult and religion, observe that Kaufmann’s ideas about monotheis-
tic belief are similar to those of Cohen. Haran writes: “In his definition of 
monotheism, Kaufmann comes close to the neo-Kantian philosopher from 
Marburg, Hermann Cohen, in the first chapters of…Religion der Vernunft 
aus der Quellen des Judentums…one can find somewhat similar statements 
(some seeds of Kaufmann’s system of comprehending Judaism are already 
recognizable in one of his publications from 1914).” Here, Haran implies 
that the relationship between the two is more typological than genetic.47 
Uffenheimer writes more bluntly: “The influence of Hermann Cohen on 
Kaufmann’s project is absolute. However, among the many researchers and 
thinkers with which Kaufmann debates, there is no mention of Cohen.” 
Uffenheimer goes on to argue that it was Cohen’s thinking that influenced 
the young Kaufmann’s general worldview vis-à-vis Judaism and that it 
provides the background for Kaufmann’s distinctions between polytheism 
and monotheism.48 
Uffenheimer’s position is supported by Eliezer Schweid’s short study, 
“Between a Scholar and a Philosophical Exegete of the Bible.” Through a 
presentation of case studies, Schweid illustrates how Kaufmann regularly 
developed and expanded themes or key ideas addressed philosophically by 
Cohen who provided but limited discussions of the biblical texts that he 
used to support his analyses. Kaufmann, using collections of interpreted 
texts, treated the philosophically analyzed themes as implicitly underlying 
the texts. Thereby, he presented a very strong case that the themes were 
dynamically inherent in the belief system of ancient Israel.49 
                                                     
47  Haran, Temples and Temple Worship, 7 n. 8. See similar remarks in Haran’s article in 
this volume. Haran’s tone in the citation seems apologetic. He refers to “somewhat simi-
lar statements” in 1914. Cohen’s book, completed in 1918, was published in 1919, a 
year after his death; but the contents of the book were subjects of public lectures in 
1913–1914. In addition, Cohen published on some of the topics that later appeared in his 
lectures even before his move to Berlin. See, Eva Jospe, “Introduction” in Reason and 
Hope: Selections from the Jewish Writings of Hermann Cohen (ed. E. Jospe; Cincinnati: 
Hebrew Union College Press, 1993), 17–18 and a very partial list of Cohen’s bibliog-
raphy on pp. 227–29. 
48  B. Uffenheimer, “Yehezkel Kaufmann, the Philosophical Historian of Israelite Belief” 
(in Hebrew), in: An Evening of Conversation about the Teachings of Prof. Y. Kaufmann 
Concerning Biblical Research (eds. A. Biran, B. Uffenheimer, and S. Talmon; Haifa: 
University Institute of Haifa/ Municipal Dept. of Education and Culture, 1964), 12–14. 
Uffenheimer goes on to criticize Kaufmann’s refusal to acknowledge the presence of 
monotheistic mythology in biblical literature (pp. 14–16). In fact, there is sufficient nar-
rative material in the Bible for a partial biography of the deity (Jack Miles, God: A Biog-
raphy [New York: Vintage Books], 1996).  
49  Schweid, “Between a Scholar,” 414–18. 
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(2) No mythology surrounds God. He is not born; he does not die; he is not 
sexed; he is not part of the natural world. (This is very different from many 
known ancient Near Eastern stories about gods.)50 
(3) Israelite Religion was exoteric. The bible reflects common, public, 
shared knowledge. Moreover, all teaching is official and authoritative. 
Priests are the public educators. 
(4) Israelite monotheism could not comprehend idolatry or magic. At best, 
idols and various forms of polytheistic worship were treated as fetishes, 
things used in rituals that were not associated with any meaningful mythol-
ogy or theology.51 
(5) P is pre-exilic. Kaufmann argues this on the grounds that P’s legislation 
in Num 18: 21–32 assigns tithe collection and management to the Levites, a 
group with no political power or theoretical authority during the exilic and 
post-exilic periods.52 
(6) P predates D. Kaufmann’s position vis-à-vis Pentateuchal documents is 
pre-Grafian. He argues this on the grounds that nowhere does P imply cen-
tralization. This idea was current by the end of the nineteenth century 
among conservative, Protestant biblicists who did accept some form of a 
documentary hypothesis, but not that of Wellhausen. Among these were 
Franz Delitzsch and August Dillman.53 
(7) P’s movable Tabernacle that could be set up anywhere convenient is 
symbolic of the bamot set up throughout the country. P’s torah describes 
ritual practices at these shrines that existed before Josiah’s reform based on 
D. 
(8) All of the Pentateuch is pre-exilic as is most of the historiography in 
Joshua–2 Kings. There was no thorough reworking of this material in the 
post-exilic period. 
Kaufmann’s first and second points that monotheism is a unique intuition 
that passes from Moses to the people imply that there is no revelation per 
se, and no divine will. Although not developed anywhere in his writings, 
                                                     
50  Kaufmann’s tightly tailored definition of mythology suited his purpose, but is mislead-
ing as critics pointed out. See below. In the Bible, God talks with people, makes himself 
visible to them, engages in battle and the like, much like other ancient Near Eastern dei-
ties. 
51  See Cohen’s chapter “Image Worship,” in Religion of Reason, 50–58.  
52  Kaufmann, Toledot, vol. I, 143–59; Religion, 189–92. 
53  T. C. Vriezen and A. S. van der Woude, Ancient Israelite and Early Jewish Literature 
(Leiden: Brill, 2005), 150. Dillmann divided Genesis, in his 1882 commentary, into 
sources A = Priestly, B = Elohist, C = Jahwist, and R(edactor) (https://archive.org/stream/ 
genesiscritical00unkngoog#page/n20/mode/2up [viewed April 5, 2014]). 
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Kaufmann’s Moses, the first of the prophet-teachers, is a Neo-Kantian in 
the manner of Hermann Cohen; sometimes, he is even Kantian. 
2. Kaufmann’s Reception by Jewish Scholars54 
2.1. First Appreciations of Toledot, Volume I 
 
Kaufmann’s work was reviewed as it came out piecemeal. First, I present 
below some appreciations of Volume 1: 
A review by Shelomo Dov Goitein, “Yehezkel Koifman as a Researcher of 
Tanakh,” published in Davar on September 1, 1938, pp. 5–6, describes 
Kaufmann as well known to readers of newspapers and an important public 
intellectual. In his book he “destroys one by one the commonly accepted 
lies found among the preconceptions of mada‛ hamiqra’, Bibelwissen-
schaft.” The review goes on to note that Kaufmann is able to bring to his 
research all relevant wisdom and insights found in the traditional Jewish 
texts.55 
Ya‛aqov David Avramaski, reviewed vol. 1 in Haaretz, September 27, 
1938, and characterized Kaufmann’s work as philosophically relevant. He 
wrote that the book “attracts, is filled with information and is presented 
properly because he is not only a researcher, but also a writer able to pre-
sent facts and opinions.” Avramaski observed that in the book “not all ar-
                                                     
54  In composing the following sections, I drew on statements, references, and the like in 
sources available in the Kaufmann archives at the National Library of Israel, from books 
where I thought or recalled references to Kaufmann should be found, and from some 
serendipitous discoveries made while working on other projects. For the time being, I 
think that what I have found is representative of attitudes toward Kaufmann’s ideas 
since no evidence to the contrary was presented in the discussion that followed my oral 
presentation. My list may be supplemented by working back through the bibliographies 
in Job Jindo’s publications accessible via the Academia website: 
 https://nyu.academia.edu/JobJindo (viewed July 7, 2017). 
55  Goitein is best known for his research on early Islam, the Jews in Yemen, and the Geni-
zah documents. He also authored, in modern Hebrew, one book on biblical literature qua 
literature and a second on how to teach biblical texts to children of various ages. These 
reflect his recognition of the importance of teaching the Bible as literature and as a vehi-
cle for inculcating values. The books reflect his interests in these topics from the time 
that he taught secondary school and then, years later, when he served as a senior inspec-
tor of educational institutions in Mandatory Palestine. When Goitein first arrived in Pal-
estine, he taught at the Reali School in Haifa during the years 1923–28. His last year 
there, was Kaufmann’s first year.  
 Goitein’s last sentiment in his review was echoed in a full-page obituary, published 
years later in Yediot, October 18, 1963, p. 8, by Menahem Brosh. Brosh referred to To-
ledot as a work that “shook the foundations of biblical critics from the school of Well-
hausen and established the teachings of Judaism, its thought, and comprehension of di-
vine unity on solid, scientific foundations.” 
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guments are complete and some are forced but the author is only in the 
middle of his work and the second volume will undoubtedly resolve such 
matters.” 
People familiar with historical-critical scholarship were less kind. The most 
trenchant and critical reviews of books 1–3 of Toledot that I have seen were 
published by Reuven Zeligman in Bustnai 9:26 (October 20, 1937): 22–25; 
10:6 (June 1, 1938): 24–27; 10:24 (October 6, 1938): 23–26.56 The first two 
of Zeligman’s three reviews begins with praise for Kaufmann as a creative 
thinker, the originality and importance of Kaufmann’s project, and the 
depth and intensity of his research. In his review of book 1, Zeligman 
praises Kaufmann’s arguments for a pre-exilic P. He goes on, however, to 
reject Kaufmann’s claim that Israelite religion lacked myth, an argument 
that he attributes to Hermann Cohen. He goes on to write “Just as I cannot 
understand Hermann Cohen, I cannot understand the author who follows in 
his footsteps.”57 Zeligman’s critique focuses on the fact that Cohen por-
trayed Israelite religion as “a type of ethical social system. […] The proph-
ets he turned into liberal rabbis educated in the teachings of Kant, and the 
deity YHWH, the zealous one, into a god who was fair, polite, and a vege-
tarian.” 
Zeligman considers Kaufmann’s description of polytheism clear but 
finds his description of Israelite belief less so. He does not reject Kauf-
mann’s ideas about monotheism entirely but argues that his claim about 
how monotheism came to be in Israel does not amount to proof. To drive 
this point home, he argues that if Kaufmann’s claim about the origin of the 
idea of monotheism is true, then it must follow that the idea of polytheism 
must have originated similarly. Zeligman’s point in advancing his reductio 
ad absurdum is that since the second proposition is commonly held to be 
false, the first one must be false also. Zeligman also objects to Kaufmann’s 
frequent recourse to terms or concepts such as “primal intuition, folk reli-
gion,” and “fetishes” that he left vague and undefined. 
In his second and third reviews of books 2 and 3 respectively, Zeligman 
takes issue with Kaufmann’s repeated argument that “the Bible does not 
know the worship of symbolic idols” by drawing attention to Exod 20:3-5, 
                                                     
56  Bustnai was a magazine focused on general culture as well as practical aspects of and 
new developments in farming. Since its target audience consisted of independent farm-
ers and members of collectives, I doubt that Zeligman’s reviews were widely circulated. 
Reuben Zeligman (1875–1943) was a public intellectual in pre-state Israel who wrote on 
literary, philosophical, and political themes for a number of newspapers and magazines. 
Zeligman studied at the universities of Bern and Geneva around 1900, earning a doctor-
ate at the latter institution. See D. Tidhar, ed., Encyclopedia of the Yishuv and Its Build-
ers (in Hebrew; Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Rishonim, 1957), 8:3087–88. I thank Prof. Joseph 
Heller of the Hebrew University for directing me to this publication. 
57  Zeligman’s complaint about Cohen’s lack of clarity, a feature recognized by others, is 
addressed in Weiss, Paradox and the Prophets, 6–11. 
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and to the expression pesiley eloheyhem in Deut 4:16, 7:25, and 12:3 that 
distinguish clearly between elohim, deities, and pesel, sculpted image that 
are symbolic representations. 
Zeligman characterizes book 3, in his third review, as a summary of 
Kaufmann’s research and as “a type of philosophy of history,” but one that 
fails every time the author “tries to generalize his conclusions and establish 
them on a philosophical foundation.” Zeligman appears to have lost pa-
tience with Kaufmann for not correcting errors of the earlier volumes and 
ignoring criticisms raised in reviews. He cites examples of internal contra-
dictions where Kaufmann cites evidence in one place that contradicts his 
general statements elsewhere. Near the beginning of this review Zeligman 
writes that “the book before us […] is filled with sophistries that will attract 
the average Jew […] but will distance every person who is responsible 
philosophically and scientifically.” He closes the review writing that “the 
book before us attests like a thousand witnesses to the measure of misrepre-
sented facts and internal contradictions that even a thoughtful, scientific 
researcher such as Yehezkel Kaufmann can present when he constructs ‘a 
city and a tower’ [an allusion to the Tower of Babel story—ZZ] on a priori 
judgments and assumptions with no grounding in practical reality or 
healthy logic.”58 
Raphael Patai, an ethnographer and anthropologist, reviewed books 1–3 in 
Haolam 11 (1940): 625-27; and vol. 2 book 1 in Haolam 40 (1942): 7–8. 
Pattai attacks Kaufmann on details of fact, on counter-historical assump-
tions about the mythologies of others, and on his idea that monotheism is 
taken for granted in all literary creations of Israel from the beginning. More 
significant, however, is his critique that Kaufmann cherry picked the verses 
that he used as proof-texts while ignoring the fact that the verses were often 
composed in different times so that their literary and historical contexts 
differ. 
Similar faults were pointed out more than a decade later by Shmuel Av-
ramski, a historian of ancient Israel, in his review of Kaufmann’s mono-
graph on the conquest of the land in Davar on July 1, 1955. Avramski men-
tions that in order to support a twelfth-century BCE date for the composi-
tion of the books of Joshua and Judges and a thirteenth-century date for the 
events that they portray, Kaufmann ignored the Merneptah stele as well as 
the results of archaeology in Israel that, in the 1950s, was thought to sup-
port a twelfth-eleventh century BCE conquest. Avramski remarks that in 
order to support a very early date for these two books, Kaufmann brushed 
aside evidence for Deuteronomy’s influence on their phraseology. 
                                                     
58  Kaufmann responded to one point in Zeligman’s third review briefly in an essay pub-
lished in 1941, reprinted as the “Introduction” to the Dvir edition of Toledot that I cite in 
this article. See vol. 1, “Introduction,” xxxv and the footnote reference 2.  
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2.2. Gauging Receptivity Through Contemporary Torah Commentaries 
The significance of Kaufmann to recent Jewish thought in general may be 
gauged by surveying how his ideas are accepted and used in relatively re-
cent Torah translation-commentaries directed to different audiences: 
(1) non-denominational commentaries directed to the Jewish community in 
general; (2) commentaries directed specifically to the perceived needs of 
Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Jews respectively during synagogue 
services, and (3) in the Jewish Study Bible published by Oxford University 
Press that is directed to sophisticated Jewish and Christian readers and to 
the academy in general. 
There are three reasons for conducting this survey: (1) The Torah is the 
most read and studied of all biblical books among Jews. It is generally con-
sidered the most important book of the Bible and the constitutional basis of 
Judaism. Consequently, I assume that individual commentators would in-
clude the best and most relevant information in a form accessible to lay-
men. (2) The translation-commentaries examined were all marketed heavily 
either to general Jewish audiences or to congregations by denomination. 
Therefore, they are barometers reflecting the types of knowledge that con-
gregants (or their rabbis and representatives on synagogue boards) wanted 
to have and felt should be included in such a volume. Finally, (3) the com-
mentaries differ significantly in their handling of information and insights 
drawn from relevant traditional Jewish sources and from general biblical 
studies and in the amount of space given to each. In view of this, these 
commentaries provide a way of determining the presence and significance 
of such research in contemporary Jewish thought as it is filtered in the 
scholar’s study and distilled for the pew, or in the case of the Jewish Study 
Bible, for the classroom. 
2.3. Jewish Publication Society, Nondenominational Commentaries 
The Jewish Publication Society published five full-length commentaries, 
one on each part of the Torah.59 All were authored by scholars of note who, 
although closely associated with the Jewish Theological Seminary of 
America where Kaufmann was lionized, taught at major secular universi-
ties. The authors wrote introductions, used footnotes sparingly in their 
commentaries, and composed excurses appended to the book in which they 
                                                     
59  N. M. Sarna, The JPS Torah Commentary: Genesis (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publica-
tion Society, 1989); idem, The JPS Torah Commentary: Exodus (Philadelphia: The Jew-
ish Publication Society, 1991); B. A. Levine, The JPS Torah Commentary: Leviticus 
(Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1989); J. Milgrom, The JPS Torah Com-
mentary: Numbers (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1990); J. H. Tigay, The 
JPS Torah Commentary: Deuteronomy (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 
1996). 
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treated topics of their choice concisely, but in detail. How does Kaufmann 
fare in these commentaries? 
Genesis, 1989: Nahum Sarna lists Kaufmann’s Toledot in the general biblio-
graphy for Gen 34 (p. 367), refers to Greenberg’s translation of Kaufmann 
in the bibliography for excursus 10 on “Angelology” (p. 412), and to 
Kaufmann’s monograph The Biblical Account of the Conquest of Palestine 
in the bibliography for excursus 15 on “The Land of the Philistines” 
(p. 413). Nowhere does Sarna refer to Kaufmann’s central ideas. 
Exodus, 1991: Sarna does not refer to Kaufmann in this commentary.60 
Leviticus, 1989: In this commentary, Baruch Levine refers only to Kauf-
mann’s argument that Ezekiel quotes P and not that P quotes Ezekiel (p. 
xxix of the Introduction). Levine leaves Kaufmann out because he, Levine, 
did not accept any of Kaufmann’s major ideas, something apparent from 
his other writings about the phenomenology of cult in Israelite religion.61 
Numbers, 1990: Jacob Milgrom refers to Kaufmann a few times in his 
commentary, something to be expected because throughout his work on the 
cultic ritual, Milgrom assumed the general correctness of Kaufmann‘s ideas 
about Israelite monotheism. In this commentary, Kaufmann‘s ideas are 
integral to some of the excurses: ancient polytheists feared impurity as de-
monic or as derived from a meta-divine realm that could affect their gods 
(Excursus 49, p. 447); in all polytheistic systems gods are not sovereign but 
emerge from a metadivine realm (Excursus 50, p. 452); Israelite priests 
performed rituals in silence so as to avoid the appearance of magic that 
                                                     
60  It is possible that Sarna minimized mention of Kaufmann consciously in these books just 
as he had in his Understanding Genesis (1967), and Exploring Exodus: The Heritage of 
Biblical Israel (1986). Sarna wanted his books to be read by religious liberals and con-
servatives of all stripes; he may have left out anything and anybody that his imagined 
conservative readers might find offensive, particularly if they added nothing substantive 
to what Sarna wished to convey. Given the strong link between the JPS and Jewish The-
ological Seminary, it may have been more difficult for him to leave Kaufmann out com-
pletely from his two JPS commentaries. 
61  B. Levine, In Pursuit of Meaning: Collected Studies of Baruch A. Levine, Volume 1: 
Religion (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2011), 215–384. In his JPS commentary, Lev-
ine refuted Kaufmann’s notions about the relationship between P and Ezekiel and that P 
preceded D (pp. xxviii–xxx) by citing H. L. Ginsberg, who was a major supporter of 
Kaufmann’s general conclusions. Ginsberg’s enthusiasm at that time is revealed in the 
following statement: “I am convinced that Kaufmann is absolutely right in all of his ma-
jor theses about the [ideas and dating of the—ZZ] Pentateuch and earlier prophets. […] I 
also believe Kaufmann to be right in most of his original interpretations of the genesis 
and pre-exilic history of Israel (including his early dating of Psalms, Proverbs, Ruth, 
and, probably, Job)”; Ginsberg, “New Trends in Biblical Criticism: The Broader Histor-
ical Criticism,” Commentary (September, 1950): 283. Ginsberg also predicted that “the 
regnant hypotheses of the year 1970 [twenty years after his article’s publication] will 
surely stand incomparably closer to those of Kaufmann than to those which he combats” 
(p. 284). Time has proven that Ginsberg was a great scholar but a poor prophet. 
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combined words with gestures (Excursus 50, p. 454); Israelite prophets 
were not averse to citing non-Israelite compositions (Excursus 54, p. 462). 
Milgrom also makes a casual reference to a remark by Kaufmann in his 
Joshua commentary bearing on the history of Reuben in Transjordan (Ex-
cursus 70, p. 495). 
Deuteronomy, 1996: Jeffrey Tigay mentions Kaufmann’s idea about the 
Tabernacle as a symbol of the bamot (Intro, p. xx, note 57). He refers to 
Kaufmann’s observations on God’s hardening Pharaoh’s heart (p. 32, note 
50), on the status of licit and illicit images (p. 49, note 56), on fetishistic 
images (p. 53 note 86), on loving the ger (p. 108, note 59), on a problem in 
historical geography (p. 117, note 47), on the endowments of clergy 
(p. 169, note 2), on prophecy (p. 172, note 21), on asylum cities (p. 179, 
note 21), and on the exclusion of Moabites (p. 211 note 33 and in Excursus 
21, notes 1, 9). 
Of these five scholars, Tigay appears to be the one who read Kaufmann 
most closely and integrated him constructively into his thinking about both 
major and minor points in his Deuteronomy commentary. 
2.4. Jewish Denominational Commentaries 
Orthodox: The most popular and de rigueur translation-commentary used 
in American Orthodox congregations today is commonly referred to as the 
ArtScroll Chumash. Its editor, Nosson Scherman writes that “The new 
translation in this volume attempts to render the text as our Sages under-
stood it. Where there are differing interpretations, we follow Rashi, the 
‘Father of Commentators,’ because the study of Chumash has been synony-
mous with Chumash-Rashi for nine centuries.”62 Needless to say, Kauf-
mann is not mentioned. 
Conservative: Congregations associated with the Conservative Movement 
in American Judaism have adopted the Etz Hayyim Torah and Commen-
tary, 2001. Its main, peshat commentary on each book is actually abridged 
from the five full, book-length, commentaries published as The Jewish 
Publication Society Torah Commentary between 1989 and 1996 discussed 
above. Etz Hayyim’s approach to the Torah is characterized by David 
Lieber, editor of the volume, as “reverential” but “not apologetic.” It does 
not attempt to justify all of the statements in the Torah or demonstrate that 
they conform to our view of scientific truth.” Lieber emphasizes that the 
commentary uses archaeology, philology and anthropology because “we 
                                                     
62  N. Scherman, ed., The Torah: Haftaros and Five Megillos With A Commentary Anthol-
ogized From the Rabbinic Writings (New York: Mesorah Publications, 1999). In addi-
tion to being called the “ArtScroll Chumash” after the series in which it is published, it 
is known also as the “Stone Chumash” after the benefactor who supported the project. 
The citations are from pp. xiv and xv. 
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see our people in the flow of time, in history, participating with the civiliza-
tions around them, yet with their very own perspective.”63  
To the extent that theological principles are discussed, Lieber describes 
the volume as representative of Conservative Judaism that is based on Rab-
binic Judaism but differs from the latter in recognizing the Torah as “the 
product of generations of inspired prophets, priests, and teachers, beginning 
with the Time of Moses but not reaching its present form until the postexil-
ic age, in the 6th or 5th centuries B. C. E.” Furthermore, Lieber writes that 
“the Torah is viewed by us, in the words of Harold Kushner, as ‘God’s first 
word, not God’s last.’”64 
A comparison of the original commentaries in the JPS series and their 
abridged form in Etz Hayyim indicates that none of the historical-critical 
insights of the original commentaries made it into Etz Hayyim, consequent-
ly, neither did Kaufmann. 
Of the forty-one essays by different authors appended to Etz Hayyim, 
very few are concerned with issues that might have warranted mention of 
Kaufmann. I identify only three discussions where authors may have con-
sidered his ideas relevant and mentioned him by name: one each on Noah 
v. Gilgamesh, on the idea of evolving revelation, and on the development 
of monotheism.65  
Reform: In sharp contrast to the aforementioned commentaries, The Torah: 
A Modern Commentary, used in synagogues associated with the Reform 
Movement, presents the historical-critical approach and its theological im-
plications in the “General Introduction to the Torah,” written by W. Gunther 
Plaut, the volume’s editor. Plaut writes: “[T]his commentary proceeds from 
the assumption that the Torah is a book which had its origin in the hearts 
and minds of the Jewish people.” He acknowledges that many deny what he 
calls “this basic assumption,” and provides a fair, thumbnail description, 
without polemicizing, of the notion “that the Torah is the ‘word of God’ 
given (by direct inspiration or in some other way) by God to Moses.” He, 
however, states that his commentary proceeds on the premise that humans 
authored the text.66 
                                                     
63  D. Lieber, Etz Hayyim Torah and Commentary (New York: The Rabbinical Assembly 
and the United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, 2001), xix–xx. Lieber’s “we” refers 
to individuals allying themselves with mainline views of the Conservative Movement. 
64  Lieber, Etz Hayyim, xxi. 
65  Lieber, Etz Hayyim, 1346–47, 1393. When I drew the attention of David Leiber to the 
absence of historical-critical information in the "critical" part of this commentary, he 
expressed surprise. He was even more surprised by the lack of attention to historical-
critical matters and to the thought of Kaufmann in the many essays that form a substan-
tial part of Etz Hayyim. Lieber held Kaufmann’s work in high regard and considered it a 
major contribution to critical scholarship. See his warm appreciation in D. Lieber, 
“Yehezkel Kaufmann’s Contribution to Biblical Scholarship,” Journal of Jewish Educa-
tion 34 (1964): 254–61. 
66  W. Gunther Plaut, The Torah: A Modern Commentary (ed. David E. Stein; rev. ed.; New 
York: Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 2005), xxxvii. 
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Plaut assumes the general validity of the Graf-Wellhausen hypothesis 
but tempers its conclusions about the post-exilic dating of P with insights 
from Kaufmann. Plaut concludes that the composition and redaction of the 
Torah extended from 950 through 450 BCE.67 
Greenberg’s translation-abridgement of Kaufmann is cited with refer-
ence to Abraham’s intuition of monotheism in a homiletic discussion of 
Gen 12 (p. 103, note 44), on the name Beth El, Gen 28:19 (p. 196 note 2), 
and finally in a homiletic comment that the Patriarchs had glimpses of 
God’s essence but Moses brings it into full view when he reveals the name 
YHWH (p. 394, note 16 [a footnote reference within footnote 2]).  
2.5. A Nondenominational Academic Commentary 
The Jewish Study Bible, 2003, is unlike the aforementioned commentaries 
in that it is intended for use in higher education and in homes, not syna-
gogues. As such, it owes its allegiance to the academy and its standards, not 
to any particular branch of Judaism. Additionally, commentators were di-
rected to write academically responsible and appropriate short commen-
taries on the book that they were assigned that would be useful to all stu-
dents of the Bible. Perforce, this necessitated including the historical-
critical approach to the Torah with its implications for understanding and 
interpreting other books. 68 
The “Jewishness” of this volume is reflected in that commentators, fol-
lowing editorial instructions, emphasized the Hebrew (and not a recon-
structed form of the) text, paid extra attention to passages that have influ-
enced post-biblical and modern Jewish practices, and drew attention to 
passages or stories relevant to public discourse in contemporary Jewish 
communities. Its major expression, however, lies in the fact that commenta-
tors took cognizance of and drew from traditional Jewish interpreters, par-
ticularly those who were philologically sophisticated and literarily alert, 
“thereby placing themselves in the larger context of Jewish exegesis.”69 
Where is Kaufmann to be found in The Jewish Study Bible? 
In his “Introduction to Leviticus,” Baruch Schwartz considers P “the 
product of learned scribes of the Jerusalemite priesthood of the last centu-
                                                     
67  Plaut, The Torah, xl–xlii. 
68  I include this volume because The Jewish Study Bible (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003) has become popular among some Jews as their preferred translation-
commentary for the weekly Torah portion when they study it at home. Those that 
brought this information to my attention, for the first time in 2008–9, were both college 
students and adults who attend services regularly at Orthodox and Conservative syna-
gogues, and almost all were introduced to the volume in college or continuing education 
courses. 
69  A. Berlin and M. Z. Brettler, “Introduction: What is ‘The Jewish Study Bible’?” in Jewish 
Study Bible, x. In the spirit of full disclosure, I mention that I contributed the critical 
notes bearing on 1 and 2 Kings to this volume. 
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ries of the Judean kingdom.” By implication, he sees H as having originat-
ed during the same period since both were combined before the exile of 
586.70 This particular dating reflects Kaufmann’s positions about pre-exilic 
P combined with Schwartz’ own research over many years. Kaufmann, 
however, is not mentioned by name. 
He is mentioned by name in S. David Sperling’s essay, “Modern Jewish 
Interpretation,” at the end of the bible. Sperling provides a thumbnail 
sketch of Kaufmann’s views about Wellhausen’s conclusions, of Kauf-
mann’s own documentary hypothesis, and his ideas about monotheism. 
Sperling mentions him again when describing Menahem Haran’s work on 
cult and the dating of P.71 
In an essay, “The Bible in Israeli Life,” Uri Simon, a major proponent of 
reading the Bible as fine literature, comments with some disdain on the 
Hebrew Encyclopaedia Miqrait, one of the best such scholarly undertak-
ings of this genre. He complains: “[T]he editors’ understanding of peshat 
was so one-sided that the ancient authors would probably have been 
amazed at the extraordinary emphasis on realia, archaeology, and the world 
of the ancient Near East, and the utter neglect of theological, ideological, 
and literary aspects (as evident, for example, in the almost complete disre-
gard for the writing of the Israeli scholars Yehezkel Kaufmann and Martin 
Buber).”72 
In a fine essay on “The Religion of the Bible,” Stephen Geller mentions 
Kaufmann alongside Albright as one of many scholars who argued that 
archaeology was continuous with the textual portrayal of the contents of 
Israelite religion.73 As the essay unfolds, it is clear that Geller does not 
accept Kaufmann’s positions on monotheism, fetishism, mythology, or his 
ideas about the lack of change in the content of Israelite religion. 
On the basis of this admittedly brief and incomplete survey, I extrapo-
late—with only a small amount of trepidation—that the miniscule number 
of references and allusions to Kaufmann’s publications or ideas in the 
works that I examined indicates that most contemporary Jewish scholars 
consider much of his work irrelevant to their own, even when they write on 
topics that he addressed.74 There is, perhaps, one field in bibliology where 
his ideas remain potent. 
                                                     
70  Jewish Study Bible, 205. 
71  Jewish Study Bible, 1913–14, 1916. 
72  Jewish Study Bible, 1994. 
73  Jewish Study Bible, 2027. 
74  In the animated discussion that followed my oral presentation at the University of Bern 
on June 10, 2014, my interlocutors, who believe that Kaufmann’s influence and im-
portance is much broader and pervasive than I concluded, faulted the narrowness of my 
survey and, more significantly, observed that I was drawing a large conclusion based on 
silence. They were and are correct with regard to the narrowness of my survey. At that 
time, however, they were unable to suggest the name of a major scholar or a publication 
that was a strong proponent of Kaufmann’s work or theorizing that I had not mentioned. 
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2.6. Kaufmann in Jewish Theological Scholarship 
The discussions involving Kaufmann that I have found may be divided into 
two: those in which Kaufmann’s ideas are addressed seriously and present-
ed as relevant to the topic under investigation; and those in which his ideas 
are mentioned succinctly or alluded to, and then dismissed. The three 
scholars in whose work I find Kaufmann engaged as a discussion partner 
are Yohanan Muffs, Jon Levenson, and Benjamin Sommer. All write on 
theologically focused topics. 
Yohanan Muffs embraces some of Kaufmann’s insights but combines them 
artfully with insights from Abraham Joshua Heschel and traditional homi-
letic midrash in a poetic book: The Personhood of God, 2005. For example, 
he concludes a brief discussion, “Law and Ritual in Mesopotamia and in 
Israel,” as follows: “[T]o paraphrase Kaufmann, sacrifice is not needed by 
God but is given to man as a gift, a way for him to enjoy a modicum of 
divine intimacy. To overstate the case: in Mesopotamia, ritual is a divine 
need, law a human one. In Israel, law is a divine need, ritual a human 
one.”75 
Elsewhere, Muffs, in a discussion of “Power, Love and Justice: The 
Positive Expressions of the Divine Will,” refers to Kaufmann as “the meta-
physician of divine power,” observing that Kaufmann illustrated that in 
Israelite conception there is no metadivine realm; hence, God cannot be 
restrained by it in any way. Nothing in the cosmos restrains God so that he 
has absolute power. Muffs observes that Kaufmann did not ask why the 
biblical God was just or why he loved humanity; but, Muffs argues, extend-
ing Kaufmann’s ideas, that without power there could be no love or no 
justice.76 
His book includes a small chapter, “Family and Nation: Two Versions 
of National Formation,” in which he compares JE and P stories about the 
emergence of Israel as a unique ethnos and the revelation of the name 
YHWH. In this chapter, Muffs reconciles differences between the two nar-
ratives on the basis of Kaufmann’s ideas about the formation of the Israelite 
people in the pre-conquest period so that he can derive normative theologi-
cal insights.77 The result is characteristically up-beat Muffsian theology. 
But for Muffs to write such theology, it was necessary to draw Kaufmann’s 
                                                                                                                          
I countered with a query: Why would scholars who believe Kaufmann irrelevant bother 
to refer to him, if only to refute him? Their response was that to some extent Kauf-
mann’s ideas have become so embedded in the DNA of scholarship that they are taken 
for granted. The veracity of this response remains to be demonstrated. 
75  Y. Muffs, The Personhood of God: Biblical Theology, Human Faith and the Divine 
Image (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights Publishing, 2005), 38–39. 
76  Muffs, Personhood, pp. 83–85, and 89–94. In this particular chapter, he combines in-
sights from A. J. Heschel, Y. Kaufmann, and E. A. Speiser, but the dominant flavor of 
the chapter is Heschel. 
77  Muffs, Personhood, 45–51. 
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writings into theological discussions of the type that Kaufmann studiously 
avoided. 
Jon D. Levenson, in Creation and the Persistence of Evil, 1988, refers to 
Kaufmann as “one of the greatest of Jewish biblical scholars of modern 
times” and explains that what he, Levenson, refers to as the “mastery” of 
YHWH over the cosmos is what Kaufmann referred to as the “basic idea of 
Israelite religion.” At the beginning of his book, he disagrees with Kauf-
mann over the interpretation of Ps 82 and contends against Kaufmann that 
God’s absolute sovereignty is not an absolute given in the Hebrew Bible: 
“[I]t lacks the solidity and fixity that Kaufmann tried to assign to it.”78  
Throughout this book, Levenson engages Kaufmann, now agreeing and 
now disagreeing with him. Levenson argues that Kaufmann’s ideas emerge 
fully only in those parts of the Bible that are expressions of the covenantal 
relationship, in P from the sixth century BCE and in second and third Isai-
ah.79 
Benjamin D. Sommer refers to Kaufmann over twenty times in his The 
Bodies of God and the World of Ancient Israel, 2009. In chapter 1 of this 
book, Sommer writes: “[Y]ehezkel Kaufman, the greatest and most influen-
tial Jewish biblical scholar of modern times, describes the Hebrew Bible’s 
conception of God as at once spiritual and anthropomorphic: the Biblical 
God, Kaufman maintains, has a form but not material substance.” Sommer 
then goes on to qualify Kaufmann’s claim and illustrate that it is only par-
tially correct.80 In an Appendix, “Monotheism and Polytheism in Ancient 
Israel,” he places Kaufmann’s core ideas, corrected, modified, but still rec-
ognizable, at the center of his own evolving ideas. This appendix functions 
as an efficient introduction to Kaufmann’s idea of Israelite monotheism, his 
rejection of “henotheism” as a descriptor of Israelite religion, and to Kauf-
mann’s understanding of Israel’s conception of God.81 Sommer, like Muffs 
and Levenson, assumes that some of Kaufmann’s views remain an im-
portant part of the contemporary discourse about biblical thought. 
Other scholars made less use of Kaufmann though they mentioned him. 
H. L. Ginsberg refers to Kaufmann as one whose work anticipated many of 
the conclusions reached by European and American scholars in the 1960s: 
disillusionment with Wellhausen and a methodology that kept discovering 
redactors; and an interest in ancient Near Eastern mythology and its influ-
ence, or lack thereof, on Israelite religion. Ginsberg also suggested that the 
                                                     
78  J. D. Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil: The Jewish Drama of Divine 
Omnipotence (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1988), 4, 6–10, 47. 
79  Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil, 120–27, 131–39. 
80  B. D. Sommer, The Bodies of God and the World of Ancient Israel (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 2. 
81  Sommer, Bodies of God, 165–71. 
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trend in new scholarship was moving in a direction that would eventually 
intersect with Kaufmann’s positions on the early date of P and of JE, as 
well as on his notion that Deuteronomy was not written under the influence 
of prophets. He writes that Kaufmann cannot be considered a Jewish con-
servative, but a competent biblicist who, using scientific methods inde-
pendently, removed the intellectual shame from historical biblical studies 
by correcting what had gone wrong in the nineteenth century.82 
Moshe Greenberg, in the “Acknowledgments” section of the first volume 
of his incomplete commentary to Ezekiel, 1983, thanks Kaufmann who 
“embodied a passionate commitment to grand ideas, combining the philos-
opher’s power of analysis and generalization with the attention to detail of 
the philological exegete.” Greenberg acknowledges that Kaufmann’s re-
marks on Ezekiel in Toledot (vol. III, 483-526 or Religion, 426-46) fill his 
commentary.83 And indeed, that is the case. 
Menahem Haran, a student of Kaufmann, presupposes the pre-exilic dating 
of P because data from P accord best with other data bearing on the history 
of priests, Levites, and the development of the history of Israelite religion. 
In his Temples and Temple Service in Ancient Israel, he argues, however, 
contra Kaufmann, that P in the Pentateuch was the inspiration or catalyst 
for the cultic reform of Hezekiah, a reform that did not last. He dismisses 
Kaufmann’s comprehension of P’s tabernacle as symbolic of the bamot. In 
fact, I cannot find any mention of Kaufmann or his work on such key issues 
when Haran treats them other than in a note in the Prologue. He writes: 
“[K]aufmann argues that P preceded D, but his reasoning here, for the most 
part is unconvincing. […] In dating P, I am prepared […] to concur with 
Kaufmann’s view not more than in some degree, and not exactly for his 
own reasons.”84  
Israel Knohl, a student of Greenberg, writes in The Sanctuary of Silence, 
1995, that Kaufmann was the first to point to the unique phenomenon of the 
silence of the Priestly cult, which he adeptly entitled “the Sanctuary of Si-
lence” (in Toledot, vol. II, 476–77). Knohl, however, rejects Kaufmann’s 
                                                     
82  “Yehezkel Kaufmann as a Biblical Scholar” (in Hebrew), Bitzaron 49 (1963): 88–93, 
see pp. 91–93. In a similar vein, Shemaryahu Talmon sees Kaufmann’s main contribu-
tions in his opposition to the excesses of German scholarship, in his pre-exilic dating of 
P, and with many question marks, his axiom of an unchanging, ever-present, Israelite 
monotheism. His criticisms reject Kaufmann’s a priori rejection of foreign influences on 
Israelite religious thought and behavior, his avoidance of any methodology that incorpo-
rated change and adaptation to new situations, and his mocking dismissals of ideas with 
which he did not agree. “The Teachings of Yehezkel Kaufmann in Biblical Research” 
(in Hebrew), Ha-universitah, 1966, 26–30. 
83  M. Greenberg, Ezekiel 1–20 (AB, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1983), ix. 
84  M. Haran, Temples and Temple Service in Ancient Israel: an Inquiry into Biblical Cult 
Phenomena and the Historical Setting of the Priestly School (Winona Lake, IN: 
Eisenbrauns, 1985 [originally, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977]), 7 n. 8; p. 11 n. 12. 
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explanation that the silence expresses a rejection of polytheistic magical 
functions and mythological explanations for cult. He writes politely, 
“I believe that this explanation is not sustained by criticism.” Knohl then 
goes on to qualify the “silence” in the sanctuary, distinguishing between 
what priests did and what others did. According to P, priests performed in 
silence—as Ps 65:2 states, leka dummiyah tehillah, for your benefit, silence 
is praise—while others might pray, recite psalms, and sing.85  
In his discussion of Priestly Torah’s attitude to popular religion and its 
institutions, Knohl again begins with Kaufmann’s idea about the image of 
God in popular worship, and then qualifies Kaufmann’s idea about the ho-
mogeneity of ideas in ancient Israel, by pointing to conflicting notions in 
Priestly Torah and popular conceptions.86 Essentially, Knohl argues that 
Kaufmann overstated his case and that the textual evidence is best ex-
plained by the historical development of ideas.87  
Richard Elliot Friedman writes extensively on the documentary hypothesis. 
In Who Wrote the Bible? Friedman mentions Kaufmann in one footnote on 
a trivial matter of whether or not passages in Numbers containing the ex-
pression “babies will become prey” (Num 14:3, 31) that occurs in Deut 
1:39 also should be assigned to P.88 In an earlier book, however, Friedman 
summarized Kaufmann’s views on pre-exilic P and its relationship to D, 
supplementing them with supporting data from more recent research.89 
I conclude this survey with comments made about Kaufmann in his pres-
ence before he died and with comments from an obituary. Both writers 
knew him well professionally. 
Isaac Leo Seeligmann, wrote a “Preface” for the Yehezkel Kaufmann Jubi-
lee Volume, 1960.90 In it, Seeligmann observes that even before writing 
Golah, Kaufmann had worked out and published his critique against the 
hypotheses of Wellhausen and Kuenen (p. x). After listing the major ideas 
of Toledot and pointing out that Kaufmann went to great pains to prove 
every point that he made in detail, Seeligmann muses: “And still, there is 
place to ask, will all of Kaufmann’s conclusions withstand criticism?”  
                                                     
85  I. Knohl, The Sanctuary of Silence: The Priestly Torah and the Holiness School (Phila-
delphia: Fortress, 1995), 148–49. 
86  Knohl, Sanctuary of Silence, 157–74. 
87  Knohl presents his own, contra-Kaufmannian understanding of Israelite faith in Biblical 
Belief: The Borders of Biblical Revolution (in Hebrew; Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2007). 
88  R. E. Friedman, Who Wrote the Bible? (New York: Harper & Row, 1987) 273 n. 7.  
89  R. E. Friedman, The Exile and Biblical Narrative (HSM 22; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 
1981), 45, and see pp. 68–69 for a more extensive discussion of the “babies will become 
prey” passages mentioned in the preceding note. 
90  “Preface” in Yehezkel Kaufmann Jubilee Volume: Studies in Bible and Jewish Religion 
Dedicated to Yehezkel Kaufmann on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday (ed. 
M. Haran; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1960). 
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Seeligmann observes that Kaufmann expressed great confidence in the 
objective correctness of his conclusions; but then he comments that even 
one who does not share all of Kaufmann’s certainties will appreciate the 
majesty of his undertaking, will accept many of his ideas, and will be influ-
enced by him (p. xi). 
A close reading of Seeligmann’s “Preface” reveals that Seeligmann prais-
es the man more than the work, and the effort more than the achievement.  
Benjamin Mazar published an obituary in Haaretz on January 17, 1964 
(p. 11): “It should be said that even one not willing to accept the teachings 
of Kaufmann as a whole, or one who rejects in some measure his funda-
mental assumption, or one who distances himself from his various other 
assumptions such as the antiquity of Leviticus, his views about the patri-
archs, his description of the conquest of the land, and even his evaluation of 
the prophets, will find in his monumental book a full treasure of brilliant 
ideas.” 
Reading what is writ large between the lines, Mazar declares that Kauf-
mann’s conclusions, in Mazar’s terminology “assumptions,” concerning 
topics about which Mazar, a leading archaeologist and historian of ancient 
Israel knows something, were incorrect. He leaves little of importance to be 
evaluated positively among the remaining “brilliant ideas.” 
The generally poor reception of Kaufmann’s work among Jewish biblicists 
since the 1960s despite Greenberg’s translation-abridgement undertaken to 
“spread the word” is understandable. Kaufmann’s project, consisting of 
Golah and Toledot, was conceived in the 1920s, and executed piecemeal 
over many decades beginning in the twenties. It began by fighting Well-
hausen—a stand-in for all who employed higher-critical methods to reach 
conclusions which Kaufmann intuited were incorrect—passionately when 
such a fight was still of interest to some; but it continued long after main-
stream biblical scholarship had reached a consensus that higher critical 
methodology was valid even when different scholars reached different con-
clusions about the revealed sources. Kaufmann remained uninterested in 
and largely uninformed by developments in the bibliology after World War 
II in both Europe and the United States. As a result, Toledot did not engage 
in any meaningful manner with new developments in archeology, history, 
and historiography regularly reported in the Bulletin of the American 
Schools for Oriental Research, The Biblical Archaeologist, and The Jour-
nal of Biblical Literature, as well as in Hebrew publications including 
newspapers.91 Simply put, Kaufmann’s work, besides various faults that its 
                                                     
91  The fact that it was written in Hebrew and, thereby, directed primarily, if not exclusive-
ly, to a Jewish audience, suggests to me that Kaufmann intended his work to be accessi-
ble to a sophisticated, popular audience. He did not intend to direct it to critical scholars 
in and out of the university, nor did he write regularly for professional journals in Euro-
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early critics mentioned in reviews, appeared to be, and was indeed, old 
fashioned. It is not, however, irrelevant. 
3. Three Ideas Worth Reconsidering 
Despite their convoluted origins and despite problems inherent in the way 
they were presented originally, some of Kaufmann’s ideas are worth recon-
sidering in the light of recent developments in biblical studies and other 
fields and of ongoing discussions in ancient Near Eastern religion.92 
3.1. Pre-exilic P 
Kaufmann’s major argument for pre-exilic P is his rhetorical question: who 
in the powerful priesthood of the Second Temple period would have as-
signed control over the major tithe, ten per-cent of gross national produce 
to powerless Levites and why would he have done so? Since the common-
sense answer to his question is that nobody would have done so, the impli-
cation of the answer is that P must have come into existence when Levites 
were a powerful class politically and economically, during the First Temple 
period. This common-sense answer has never been refuted by researchers 
who date P to the post-exilic period. But, Kaufmann’s question, answer, 
and its implication do not constitute a proof that his claim about the dating 
of P’s composition is correct. 
In recent decades, however, linguistic evidence evaluated with the 
standard methodologies employed in Historical Linguistics has established 
the veracity of Kaufmann’s position.93 In so far as the linguistic arguments 
are absolutely unrelated to the literary, ideological, and historical argu-
ments advanced by Kaufmann, they can be said to provide external, inde-
pendent, objective corroboration for his dating. This raises the intriguing 
question bearing on how and why P evolved in its pre-exilic context and 
what it meant.94 
                                                                                                                          
pean languages engaging in the ongoing, scholarly discourse of the nineteen forties and 
fifties. 
92  See essays published in B. N. Porter, ed., What Is a God? Anthropomorphic and Non-
Anthropomorphic Aspects of Deity in Ancient Mesopotamia (Winona Lake, IN: The 
Casco Bay Assyriological Institute, 2009); B. Pongratz-Leisten, ed., Reconsidering the 
Concept of Revolutionary Monotheism (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2011). 
93  See essays in C. Miller-Naudé and Z. Zevit, eds., Diachrony in Biblical Hebrew 
(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2012) and the rich bibliography that they provide. 
94  See preliminary suggestions on legislation bearing on the place of worship that is de-
nominated “pre-P” and “pre-D” in Z. Zevit, “The Textual and Social Embeddedness of 
Israelite Family Religion” in Family and Household Religion: Toward a Synthesis of 
Old Testament Studies, Archaeology, Epigraphy, and Cultural Studies (eds. R. Albertz, 
B. A. Nakhai, S. M. Olyan, R. Schmitt; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2014), 304–9. 
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3.2. The rapid dissemination of the idea of ex nihilo monotheism  
Kaufmann’s ex-nihilo monotheism argument can be supported, not proven, 
employing a concept from evolutionary biology: punctuated equilibrium. 
Historians prefer gradualist explanations and are most comfortable talking 
about the slow evolution and incubation of ideas; occasionally, however, 
new, innovative ideas do occasionally come, as if in a flash, to the mind of 
a single individual and spread widely through his efforts within that per-
son’s lifetime. History provides many examples in the areas of religion, 
politics, science, and even the humanities: Islam, Protestantism (in its Lu-
theran, Zwinglian, and Calvinist formulations), Hasidism, National Social-
ism, Einstein’s theory of special relativity, and even Wellhausen’s formula-
tion of the documentary hypothesis. 
In so far as Kaufmann’s judgment about the spread of monotheism in Is-
rael within a single generation and its deep-rootedness in the Israelite psy-
che thereafter is paralleled, his general contention cannot be deemed im-
possible on the grounds that it is unparalleled. The question is only whether 
his claim can be demonstrated to be true, or in more Popperian formulation, 
whether it can be falsified. 
Such a demonstration, however, must first contend with a significant 
semantic problem. In contemporary History of Religions and Bibliology, 
“monotheism” is problematic in that there is no consensus as to what exact-
ly it refers. Historians of religion apply it to different religions and to a 
variety of elements within them. In biblical research it has become a type of 
buzz-word with a fuzzy range of meanings pertaining to singleness, unity, 
uniqueness, YHWH-aloneness, and authoritative dominance. Researchers 
define it using some mix of these semantic elements in ad hoc ways so that 
monotheism can mean whatever a particular author wants it to mean.95 
Kaufmann used “monotheism” with a sense that had become popular in the 
late eighteenth-early nineteenth century, to refer to what was considered the 
most evolved, progressive form of religious belief, in contrast to what was 
considered the lowest form, fetishism. Some better definition and demarca-
tion of the nature of monotheism is desiderated before the implications of 
Kaufmann’s position in some recast formulation can be proposed for twen-
ty-first century applications. 
3.3. Wide-spread monotheism 
Kaufmann’s contention that all of Israel was monotheistic, in the sense that 
all Israel worshipped a single deity, is contradicted by many biblical texts 
and is not supported by historical and archaeological research.96 It is prefer-
able to argue, following Christine Hayes in lecture 2 of her online Yale 
                                                     
95  A.-J. Herbener, “On the Term ‘Monotheism’,” Numen 60 (2013): 617, 619, 626. 
96  Zevit, Religions of Ancient Israel, chapters 3, 5, 6, 7. 
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course, Introduction to the Old Testament, that what Kaufmann posited for 
all of Israel throughout the Iron Age was true only for some of Israel.97 She 
suggests that in biblical texts, it is discernable primarily in the writings of 
those who framed, presented, and issued qualitative judgments about Isra-
el’s cultic behavior during the Iron Age.98 This allows that Kaufmann was 
partially correct but overly aggressive when generalizing from the limited 
data that he used, when dismissing contradictory texts, and when ignoring 
contradictory conclusions of scholars who worked with different types of 
data. 
Hayes’ thoughtful insight combined with new ideas about the im-
portance of ancient scribalism in the production of literature now in the 
Bible suggests that Kaufmann’s ideas, corrected and refined—tweaked, if 
you will—have an important role to play in twenty-first century studies of 
Israelite religion in general, not only Israelite belief.99 And, if contemporary 
scholars choose to reject his ideas on grounds that they consider solid, they 
are obligated to refute them vigorously and robustly. 
Reconsidered in the light of new developments in bibliology, some key 
ideas in Kaufmann’s Toledot, completed more than fifty years ago, may 
still have the power to—here I paraphrase Charles C. Torrey whom I cited 
in the first page of this study—open a new door into the past by providing 
insights that, if not true, then at least, are helpful for new research. The 
ideas, however, require an investment of thought-equity and reworking by 
new scholars freed from old orthodoxies. 
                                                     
97  Cf. the article of Israel Knohl in this volume. 
98  Christine Hayes, “Introduction to the Old Testament—Lecture 2. The Hebrew Bible in 
Its Ancient Near Eastern Setting: Biblical Religion in Context.” Online at https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=wRPqtGywkCw&index=2&list=PLh9mgdi4rNeyuvTEbD-
Ei0JdMUujXfyWi (viewed April 21, 2017). Hayes’ position, even in the course of her 
oral presentation in Lecture 2 but also in other lectures within the series, is more nu-
anced than my simple presentation suggests. See also, Christine Hayes, Introduction to 
the Bible (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2015), 15–26. 
99  W. M. Schniedewind, How the Bible Became A Book: The Textualization of Ancient 
Israel (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 35–138; D. M. Carr, Writ-
ing on the Tablet of the Heart: Origins of Scripture and Literature (New York/Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 111–73; K. van der Toorn, Scribal Culture and the 
Making of the Hebrew Bible (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 75–
108.  
 Yehezkel Kaufmann, R. Nachman Krochmal,  
and the “Anxiety of Influence” 
Lawrence KAPLAN 
Moreh Nevukhe ha-Zeman (Guide of the Perplexed of the Time) [hence-
forth: MNZ], the massive and exceptionally wide-ranging, posthumously 
published and unfinished magnum opus of the leader of the Galician Jewish 
enlightenment (Haskalah), Nachman Krochmal (1785–1840), is a major 
contribution to both modern Jewish thought and Wissenschaft des Juden-
tums.1 Indeed, in its combination of philosophical speculation and historical 
investigation the work is unique.  
While MNZ was neglected in Jewish Enlightenment circles in Western 
Europe, the work exerted a major, if often unacknowledged, influence in 
Eastern Europe among the proponents of both the Haskalah and the Jewish 
National revival; there it was lauded as a modern classic. Solomon 
Schechter, in his sensitively and vigorously written study of Krochmal,2 
famously “assert[s] with the utmost confidence that there is scarcely a sin-
gle page in Krochmal’s book that did not afterwards give birth to some 
essay or monograph or even elaborate treatise, though their authors were 
not always very careful about mentioning the source of their inspiration.” 
But if many authors “were not always very careful” about acknowledging 
Krochmal’s influence on their work, what are we to make of an outstanding 
thinker and scholar who explicitly and at length goes out of his way to, if 
not deny, at the very least minimize such influence? 
In “Le-ḥeker toledot ha-emunah ha-yisre’elit”3 (“On the Study of the 
History of the Israelite Faith”), the first chapter of his great multi-volume 
work of biblical scholarship Toledot ha-emunah ha-yisre’elit (A History of 
the Israelite Faith, 1937–1956, henceforth Toledot), Yehezkel Kaufmann 
has, as one would expect, standard, generally very brief footnotes referring 
either to biblical texts or to the critical German biblical scholarship of his 
                                                     
1  Moreh Nebukhe ha-Zeman, edited and with an Introduction (“She‛arim le-emunah 
tzerufah” [“Gates to the Refined Faith”]) by Yehoyada Amir (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2010) 
(originally published posthumously by Leopold Zunz in Lemberg in 1851). (Page num-
bers in parentheses in the text refer to this edition of MNZ.) 
2  Solomon Schechter, “Nachman Krochmal and the ‘Perplexities of the Time’,” in Studies 
in Judaism: First Series (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1896), 46–72. The 
quotation is from p. 67. 
3  Yehezkel Kaufmann, Toledot ha-emunah ha-yisre’elit (Tel Aviv: Bialik and Dvir, 
1967), 1:1–22. The three books of this volume first appeared separately in 1937. 
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day.4 Suddenly, at the very conclusion of the four page section of this chap-
ter entitled “Ha-hitgalut ha-rishonit shel emunat ha-aḥdut” (“The Original 
Appearance of the Monotheistic Faith”), the key section where Kaufmann 
sets forth the fundamental theses of his entire work,5 he inserts a very 
lengthy, actually one-page-long footnote, completely out of proportion in 
terms of length to any of the other footnotes in the chapter.6 In it Kaufmann 
explains that while in a certain respect his views resemble those of 
Krochmal’s MNZ, “precisely on account of that similarity it would perhaps 
be proper to take note of certain fundamental differences.” He thereupon 
proceeds for another 28 lines to elaborate on those “fundamental differ-
ences.” It would seem that whatever initial hesitations Kaufmann may have 
had in writing this note—“it would perhaps be proper to take note”—he 
successfully overcame them. No “perhaps” about it! If I might rather crude-
ly paraphrase the import of this note: Kaufmann here, at the beginning of 
Toledot, which, unlike almost all the critical biblical scholarship of his day, 
was written in Hebrew and not in German, addressed his Hebrew readers, 
many of whom were familiar with MNZ, and adjured them: “Don’t confuse 
me with Krochmal!” 
This paper will consist primarily of a close reading and interrogation of 
that extended note. I will, however, also draw upon Kaufmann’s unfortu-
nately little known essay “Le-birur torato shel R. Nachman Krochmal” 
(“Towards a Clarification of the Teaching of R. Nachman Krochmal”)7 in 
order to supplement the rather brief descriptions of Krochmal’s views con-
tained in the note. Negatively, I shall argue that two of the supposed “fun-
damental differences” allegedly distinguishing him from Krochmal, to 
which Kaufmann points in his note, stem from his simply misreading cer-
tain of Krochmal’s most fundamental views. Flowing from that negative 
argument, I shall conclude positively that Kaufmann was far closer to 
                                                     
4  There are a total of twentytwo notes. 
5  Kaufmann, Toledot, 1:9–12. 
6  Kaufmann, Toledot, 1:12–13, n. 12. 
7  “Le-birur torato shel R. Nachman Krochmal,” Likuttei Ranak (A Krochmal Anthology; 
ed. Yehezkel Kaufmann; Haifa: Beit Sefer Reali, 1950), 5–20. It would appear that the 
fact that this essay appeared as the introduction to an anthology of Krochmal’s writings 
that was part of a series of high school texts (Sifrei mofet le-batei sefer) has been re-
sponsible for its having been overlooked by all Krochmal scholars. To my knowledge, it 
has never been cited in any scholarly article on Krochmal’s thought, and it also is not 
listed in Amir’s “Selected Bibliography” appended to his Carmel edition of MNZ (41–
44). This is unfortunate. While the article is of a popular nature, not surprising given its 
high school audience, it is a serious and thoughtful essay—students of the Reali High 
School were quite clearly a very sophisticated lot—and, as everything written by Kauf-
mann, is deserving of attention. Moreover, it is the only place where Kaufmann devotes 
sustained attention to Krochmal’s thought. In his essays and his great work Golah ve-
nekhar (Exile and Alienation, 1929–1930; henceforth Golah) we find only scattered ref-
erences to and comments on Krochmal’s writings. 
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Krochmal than he would have us believe.8 My conclusions raise the ques-
tion as to why Kaufmann felt it necessary to minimize the resemblance 
between his views and Krochmal’s, which question I will attempt to answer 
towards the end of this essay, if necessarily somewhat speculatively. 
In this section of this chapter, Kaufmann sets forth the fundamental the-
ses of his entire work. First he denies, contrary to the prevalent biblical 
scholarship of his day, that biblical monotheism was the product of a strug-
gle with paganism and the end result of a gradual evolutionary develop-
ment. Rather, biblical religion from the very outset was monotheistic and 
non-mythological. At the root of biblical religion was a revolutionary idea, 
a fundamental idea rooted in a popular national culture, the idea of a single, 
unique, non-mythological God. This idea was not philosophical and ab-
stract in nature; certainly biblical religion had no idea of God’s incorporeal-
ity. Rather it was a product of a vision, a fundamental intuition, which took 
its shape through the human creative spirit (ruaḥ) that manifests itself both 
on an individual and a collective level. Israelite religion thus was the origi-
nal creation of the people of Israel.  
According to Kaufmann, there was a gradual evolutionary development 
in the biblical period, but it was not a development from paganism to 
monotheism, but an evolutionary development within monotheism itself. 
This monotheistic idea shaped all the other aspects of the people’s life and 
its creativity and fashioned for itself symbols in legend, law, prophecy, 
historiography, and ritual. Indeed, even many post-biblical phenomena, 
such as religious conversion, late Jewish Apocalyptic, and personal reward 
and punishment, were created against the background of and were the un-
folding of the potentialities contained within this basic and primal idea—
ha-idea ha-rishonit—of the non-mythical God.  
  
Let us now turn to Kaufmann’s footnote.  
 
First Kaufmann, as indicated above, notes that his view resembles Kroch-
mal’s in a certain respect. 
R. Nachman Krochmal (in Moreh nevukhe ha-zeman), following in the 
wake of Hegel, understood the development of the Israelite faith as an or-
ganic development of a cultural-metaphysical idea. In this respect his teach-
ing resembles the view presented here. But precisely on account of that sim-
ilarity it would perhaps be proper to take note of certain fundamental differ-
ences. 
By linking Krochmal to Hegel, Kaufmann already prepares the ground for 
dismissing his views as cultural-metaphysical, as opposed to cultural-
empirical. Without denying Hegel’s influence on Krochmal, we should note 
                                                     
8  See, however, my essay’s conclusion, where I discuss certain differences between 
Krochmal and Kaufmann that Kaufmann does not refer to in his note. 
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that the latter’s views regarding the organic development of human culture 
as deriving from or an expression of “spirit” are equally indebted to such 
non-metaphysical thinkers as Lessing, Herder, and Vico.9 
Kaufmann then enumerates three “fundamental differences.” First: 
Krochmal’s teaching is a Hegelian philosophical midrash on the Jewish tra-
dition, which he accepts (particularly with regard to all that pertains to the 
era of the Torah and the prophets) in the form it is found in the historical 
tradition in all its details, even, at times not refraining from grafting on to it 
aggadot of the Sages. His midrash thus completely lacks any historical-
critical foundation. 
Note again the implicitly dismissive reference to Hegel, which will become 
a leitmotif in this footnote. With respect to the criticism itself, it is on the 
whole well taken, and one should grant that, at least for the early phases of 
biblical history, Krochmal’s retelling of that history in chapter 8 of MNZ 
sticks fairly close to the biblical account. But, even here, Krochmal’s ac-
count is not as traditionalist as Kaufmann would have it. Scholars have 
pointed to hints of Pentateuchal criticism in MNZ.10 Building on this schol-
arship, I hope to show elsewhere that Krochmal hinted that the Torah is a 
composite, post-Mosaic work, edited in its present form in the period of the 
early kingship, and reflecting the views of different schools, particularly the 
schools of priests, Levites, and prophets founded by Samuel the prophet.11  
 
                                                     
9  See Jay Harris, Nachman Krochmal: Guiding the Perplexed of the Modern Age (New 
York and London: New York University Press, 1991), 125: “A scholarly dispute has 
arisen as to which of various thinkers—Lessing, Herder, Vico, or Hegel—was the pri-
mary influence on Krochmal’s approach [to history]… [But] the fact that competent 
scholars can find elements of all these thinkers in Krochmal’s work suggests that… 
Krochmal was not overly interested in resolving the distinctions among these thinkers, 
but rather in pursuing a response to their common elements.” Note, though that in Go-
lah, 1:167, n. 2, Kaufmann groups Krochmal together with Lessing and Herder, among 
other thinkers. 
10  See Menahem Diman, “Rimzei bikkoret ha-torah be-sifro shel Ranak” (“Hints of Penta-
teuchal Criticism in Krochmal’s Book”), Tarbiz 18 (1947): 59–61. Both Avraham 
Greenbaum and Harris reject Diman’s claim, but they do not address any of his main ar-
guments, which I, for one, find convincing. See Greenbaum, “Bikkoret ha-miqra be-
mishnat Ranak: ‛iyyunim” (“Studies in Biblical Criticism in Krochmal’s Thought”) in 
Hagut u-ma‛aseh: sefer zikkaron le-Shimon Rawidowicz (Thought and Deed: Memorial 
Volume for Simon Rawidowicz; eds. Avraham Greenbaum and Alfred Ivry; Haifa: Hai-
fa University Press, 1983), 101–5; and Harris, Nachman Krochmal, 196, n. 24. 
11  While this, of course, is not the place to present my arguments, which I will develop in 
considerable detail in a future article, let me briefly say that they are based on 
Krochmal’s description in chapter 8 of the activity of Samuel the prophet, particularly 
his establishing schools of priests, Levites, and prophets (MNZ, 45–46), his comparison 
in chapter 9 of Ezra’s activity to that of Samuel (in explicit contrast with the rabbinic 
comparison of Ezra and Moses) (MNZ, 56), and his long note in chapter 13 linking cer-
tain passages in the Pentateuch with certain First Temple groups, groups strikingly simi-
lar to the schools established by Samuel (MNZ, 192, n.**).  
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My argument, granted, is speculative, but one thing is clear: In chapter 8 
Krochmal speaks only in the most general terms about God giving the Isra-
elites when they left Egypt “righteous and comprehensive laws and stat-
utes” (ḥukkim u-mishpatim tzadikim ve-kollelim)—note the addition of the 
word kollelim “comprehensive” to the biblical phrase—and does not refer 
to God’s giving the Torah as we have it to Moses.12 Indeed, as is the case 
with the Passover Haggadah, Moses is barely mentioned in this chapter. In 
this respect, we may even say that Krochmal’s account of early Israelite 
history is more “critical” than Kaufmann’s, which following the biblical 
account accords a central role to Moses in the founding of the Israelite reli-
gion.13 Still, of all of Kaufmann’s criticisms of Krochmal in this footnote, 
this is the best grounded. 
Let us proceed to the second difference. Kaufmann continues: 
Aside from this, his midrash contains the same amalgam of historical scholar-
ship and metaphysical dogmatics that typifies the Hegelian school. Accord-
ing to Krochmal, the Hegelian idea of the “absolute spirit” appeared to Isra-
el in its early history in all its conceptual-philosophical abstraction. The var-
ious corporeal symbols found in the Bible all refer to this ideal; they serve 
as a “sign” (ot) for this spirit. There was never any development with regard 
to how this spirit was understood. One can speak of development only with 
regard to its political social activity. In truth, as we will see later on, the 
fundamental idea arose in Israel not as an abstract concept, in its full philo-
sophical perfection, but as an intuitive vision, the same way as the begin-
nings of any original culture arise. In any event, there is no expression in 
this fundamental Israelite idea of any notion of “absolute spirit.”  
Kaufmann makes the same point in “Le-Birur torato shel R. Nachman 
Krochmal.” He writes there of “the crystallization [according to Krochmal] 
within the monotheistic faith of the recognition of the spirit in its universal 
essence and as abstracted from anything corporeal,” as contrasted with “the 
pagan peoples [who] did not grasp the divine spirit in its true abstract and 
universal essence.” 14 
This criticism, in my view, misses the mark. Contrary to Kaufmann’s 
assertion in his note that “[a]ccording to Krochmal, the Hegelian idea of the 
                                                     
12  It should be noted, however, that at the beginning of chapter 13 Krochmal presents a 
much more traditional picture. 
13  Of course, in his assertion that biblical monotheism began with Moses, Kaufmann takes 
a more critical position than does Krochmal who traces it back to the Patriarchs. 
14  “Le-birur torato shel R. Nachman Krochmal,” 18. A bit later on (18–19) Kaufmann, 
apparently referring the end of Chapter 7 of MNZ, more carefully states that for 
Krochmal the “Jewish people attained to the cognition of the spirit in its true being, the 
cognition of the ‘absolute spirit,’ the God of the world, the source of all spiritual exist-
ence, the infinite spirit which cannot be apprehended by imagination or sense and cannot 
be corporeally represented by any image or form.” Of course, this is true, but Kaufmann 
leaves out the critical element that this cognition on the part of the Jewish people, to 
begin with, took the form of an imaginative intuitive vision. 
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‘absolute spirit’ appeared to Israel in its early history in all its conceptual-
philosophical abstraction,” and to his similar assertion in “Le-Birur torato 
shel R. Nachman Krochmal” that for Krochmal the monotheistic faith of 
the Bible recognized “the spirit in its universal essence and as abstracted 
from anything corporeal,” Krochmal consistently emphasizes that the Torah 
conceives of the ruḥani ha-muḥlat, absolute spirit, in terms of tziyyurei 
teḥilat ha-maḥshavah, representations of incipient thought (a term bor-
rowed from that great classic of medieval Jewish rationalist philosophy 
Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed15), or as Vorstellung, representations, 
as opposed to maḥshevot ha-sekhel, intellectual conceptual categories or 
Begriffe (the German terms are Krochmal’s).16 Or, again, he contrasts emu-
nah ha-toriyyit, Torahitic faith, with ḥokhmat ha-emunah, the wisdom of 
faith.17 As Yehoyada Amir emphasizes, one must distinguish between the 
“absolute spirit,” in itself, in its unchanging “true abstract and universal 
essence,” and the Jewish people’s understanding of “absolute spirit,” which 
is progressive, and which, to begin with, takes the form of imaginative rep-
resentation.18 
Kaufmann’s criticism here would seem to be much more appropriately 
directed against Maimonides, as opposed to Krochmal. For Maimonides, 
the Torah’s intellectual level constitutes its inner meaning, and the prophets 
were, indeed, philosophers who conceived of God in abstract philosophical 
terms, but who, in their prophetic visions as recorded in Scripture, translat-
ed their intellectual understanding into popular imaginative categories in an 
attempt to make that abstract understanding accessible to the entire people. 
For Maimonides, this is the import of the rabbinic statement, “The Torah 
speaks in the language of the sons of man,” “the language of the sons of 
man,” meaning, for Maimonides “in accordance with the imagination of the 
multitude.”19 In this respect, the highest truth, in Maimonides’ view, was 
                                                     
15  Guide 1:26 and 46. 
16  See MNZ, chap. 2, 12; chap. 6, 30–32. 
17  See MNZ, chap. 16, 272–74.  
18  Amir, “She‛arim le-emunah tzerufah,” MNZ, 37–38 (of his Introduction) Similarly, 
Julius Guttmann, Philosophies of Judaism: The History of Jewish Philosophy from Bib-
lical Times to Franz Rosenzweig (trans. David Silverman; New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1964), 322, emphasizes that for Krochmal “the truth, present in Judaism from 
its inception, develops to ever greater levels of clarity and higher forms of conceptual 
thought.” 
19  Guide 1:26, cf. 1:33, 46. Strikingly, Kaufmann in “Le-birur torato shel R. Nachman 
Krochmal,” 7, states that for Krochmal the reason “the emunah ha-toriyyit, the Torahitic 
faith (the religion that was given through prophetic revelation) expressed its truths not in 
abstract concepts but in concrete poetic images” was because “it was intended for the 
entire people.” Kaufmann appears to be suggesting that, according to Krochmal, the 
prophets themselves grasped the truth in form of abstract concepts, but they translated 
these “abstract concepts” into “concrete poetic images” in an attempt to present them to 
“the entire people.” This is a very fine formulation of Maimonides’ view—but not of 
Krochmal’s! Thus Guttmann, Philosophies of Judaism, 327, as if he had Kaufmann’s 
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always known, and history plays a role only in its dissemination. Moreover, 
Maimonides states in the Mishneh Torah that the Torah explicitly (“mefor-
ash”) teaches the doctrine of God’s incorporeality.20 For Maimonides, then, 
to translate the contents of the Torah from the level of imagination to that 
of intellect is to recover the original hidden form of the Torah’s truth, the 
truth, we may say, as it existed in the mind of the prophets. 
For Krochmal, however—and here his view of the relationship between 
religion and philosophy does indeed resemble Hegel’s—religion and phi-
losophy may have the same truth for their content, but religion, in 
Krochmal’s case specifically the Torah, conceives of that content, as stated 
above, in imaginative, representational categories, while philosophy trans-
lates that content into rational, conceptual categories. The prophets, for 
Krochmal, then, were not philosophers, but attained knowledge of the truth 
in an intuitive, immediate fashion that might be properly termed revelation, 
and the translation of Scripture into philosophical terms is not, contra Mai-
monides, a recovery of the original hidden form of the Torah’s truth, but 
rather a genuine translation of the Torah’s content from its original imagi-
native form into a new form that takes place over the course of history The 
emergence of the Jewish faith in all its conceptual purity and richness is 
then a historical process, one that, for Krochmal, has still not been complet-
ed.21 To be sure, Krochmal in the historical chapters of MNZ often subtly 
weaves biblical phrases into his account and then proceeds to restate that 
representational biblical language in “pure” conceptual terms. But this is 
his own translation; he never claimed nor believed that the prophets them-
selves attained this level of conceptual thought.22 
Allow me here a point of personal privilege. A number of years ago, 
I wrote an article on MNZ for the Enzyklopädie jüdischer Geschichte und 
Kultur.23 At the time I wrote it, Kaufmann was the furthest thing from my 
mind, and I hadn’t looked at Toledot in years. I wrote there what I just 
wrote in the immediately above paragraph, namely that “the prophets, for 
Krochmal, were not philosophers, but attained knowledge of the truth in an 
                                                                                                                          
formulation in mind, correctly warns that Krochmal’s “statement…that Scripture con-
tains all the insights of philosophy means only that they are there potentially—if we 
cleanse scriptural doctrines of their dross of representation and change them into their 
pure conceptual form, and if deduce from them all the conclusions that thought can de-
rive.” Exactly!  
20  Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 1:8. 
21  See Amir, “She‛arim le-emunah tzerufah,” MNZ, 37–39 (of his introduction). 
22  For a particularly incisive analysis of the fundamental differences between Maimonides 
and Krochmal regarding the relationship between the teachings of the prophets and the 
truths of philosophy, see Eliezer Schweid, A History of Jewish Thought in Modern 
Times (in Hebrew; Jerusalem: Keter, 1977), 196–98.  
23  Lawrence Kaplan, “More Nevukhe ha-Zeman,” Enzyklopädie jüdischer Geschichte und 
Kultur (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler), Vol. 4, 231–35. 
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intuitive, immediate fashion that might be properly termed revelation.”24 It 
was only when I began my research for this paper, and once again returned 
to Kaufmann, that I was struck by the verbal similarity between what 
I wrote about Krochmal in my encyclopedia article and Kaufmann’s de-
scription of the primal idea of the Bible as an “intuitive vision.” Of course, 
I must add that Kaufmann, insofar as he remains strictly on an empirical 
level, is properly agnostic as to whether we can view this “intuitive vision,” 
as deriving from a transcendent source.25  
We continue with the third and last difference:  
Aside from this, Krochmal seeks to derive from this idea the entire history 
of Israel, basing himself on the Hegelian assumption that both the natural 
                                                     
24  Kaplan, “More Nevukhe ha-Zeman,” 233. I am citing from the original English version 
of the essay, which was translated into German. 
25  Kaufmann touches upon the issue as to whether one may view this “intuitive vision,” as 
deriving from a transcendent source in his responses to criticisms of the first volume of 
Toledot upon its appearance in 1937. In his essay “Be-kivshonah shel ha-yetzirah ha-
le’umit” (“The Secret of National Creativity”) (originally published in Moznaim 13 
[1941]: 237–51, and republished as the Introduction to the 1967 edition of Toledot [see 
above, n. 3], 21–44 [Hebrew pagination]; and in his posthumously edited collection of 
essays, Mi-kivshonah shel ha-yetzirah ha-mikrait [On the Secret of Biblical Creativity; 
Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1966], 11–33), Kaufmann insists that the concepts he utilized in the first 
volume of Toledot to explain the origins of Israelite monotheism, namely, “the creative 
human spirit, the power of creation of an ethnic group or the creative spirit of a nation, 
the power of the objective spirit to create a stylistic imprint, the power of the idea in the 
sphere of the objective spirit to shape the image of cultural values and to fashion its 
symbols—all [these concepts] are definitely historical-empirical matters” (21: page ref-
erences are to Mi-kivshonah shel ha-yetzirah ha-mikrait). In response to criticisms lev-
eled against him by S. D. Goitein and E. E. Urbach that his claim that the biblical mono-
theistic faith was “the product of the creative spirit of the people of Israel” is, in truth, a 
crypto-appeal to the miraculous or to revelation (26), Kaufmann reiterates his claim that 
the idea of a people’s creative spirit is strictly historical-empirical, and further notes that 
“everything that I have said concerning the creative spirit of the people of the Israelite 
nation is set within this general theory concerning the creative spirit of all human beings 
and all nations on earth” (27). He does, however, admit that this particular result of the 
creative spirit of the people of Israel, namely, biblical monotheism, was, in terms of its 
content, unique, and differed radically from all the multifarious forms of pagan creativi-
ty. He, therefore, concludes: “With regard to the form, one can say that in the last analy-
sis this creation [biblical monotheism] as well is nothing more than a new unique crea-
tion of the human spirit. But with respect to content, this is not so. We may therefore as-
sume here a unique act of providence. But with this we have already left the realm of 
empirical history and entered the realm of faith” (28). In his essay, “Bikkoret le-
bikkoret” (“A Critique of a Critique”) (originally published as “‛Inyenei mikra” [Bibli-
cal Issues] in Moznaim 15 [1943]: 32–37; and republished in Mi-kivshonah shel ha-
yetzirah ha-mikrait, 281–90), in response to the claim of Aharon Kaminka that “the bib-
lical faith was born from intellectual inquiry into the nature of things and from historical 
experience” (288), Kaufmann defends and reiterates his view that biblical faith “was not 
a form of intellectual-conceptual knowledge, but rather was visionary and intuitive” 
(290). This leads directly to the essay’s striking conclusion. “However this intuitive per-
ception is in no way inferior to intellectual understanding. And perhaps it transcends it?” 
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and historical world is only an embodiment of the Idea. A metaphysical en-
tity here inserts itself into history. The law of the embodiment of the Idea 
attains the status of a law that by itself serves to lay out the path to history. 
And, side by side with this law, “divine governance” is also active in com-
bining these events together into an intellectual plan. And all this activity 
forms a closed system within the framework of the three-fold development 
of the organism in its three eras—growth, maturity, and decline. There is no 
place for any of these concepts in the viewpoint expressed [in our text]. The 
activity of the fundamental Israelite idea did not serve as a metaphysical 
source of Israelite history nor did its embodiment serve as a law of that his-
tory. The idea was only one causal factor, to be sure a fundamental and pri-
mal causal factor, in Israelite history, whose course was also determined by 
a number of other causal factors…. Certainly the history of the people and 
the history of the religion of Israel were not subject to some threefold sche-
ma. The development of the idea was “organic” only in the sense that its 
manifestations were all bound up with a single primal root, that they all, as 
it were, grew out of single primal intuition.  
This criticism, unlike the previous one, is not without merit. Certainly, 
Krochmal’s artificial three-fold historical scheme of organic growth, ma-
turity, and decline—in the case of the Jewish people thrice repeated!—
forces his account of Jewish history into a Procrustean bed.26 Here Kauf-
mann’s criticisms of “Krochmal’s artificial three-fold historical scheme of 
organic growth, maturity, and decline” reminds one of his justified criti-
cisms of the various artificial schemes of cultural and spiritual development 
proffered by Montesquieu, Hegel, and others.  
Nevertheless, Kaufmann’s overall understanding of Krochmal here is 
reductive. Kaufmann sees Krochmal as just being a speculative metaphysi-
cian and philosopher of history, in whose view ha-ruḥani ha-muḥlat is 
some metaphysical entity that just inserted itself into the history of the Jew-
ish people and determined all its subsequent history. Kaufmann misses the 
fact that Krochmal is operating on two levels. He is not just a speculative 
metaphysician and philosopher of history, but also or rather first a cultural 
historian, for whom, like Kaufmann, ideas play a key role in a people’s 
history, not in some transcendent metaphysical sense, but because they are 
believed in by that people, and are embedded and embodied in that people’s 
institutions, symbols, and the like, that is, in its culture.  
                                                     
26  It should be noted that this three-fold scheme of organic growth, maturity, and decline 
was, as Harris notes, “very much a commonplace in modern historical thought.” See 
Harris, Nachman Krochmal, 125. In addition to Krochmal’s finding support for this 
threefold scheme in the writings of Vico, Herder and Hegel (above, n. 9), he may have 
been influenced as well by Mendelssohn’s very elaborate presentation of this scheme in 
the Bi’ur, at the very end of his commentary on Exodus. A careful comparison of Men-
delssohn’s presentation there and Krochmal’s presentation in chapter 7 of MNZ remains 
a scholarly desideratum.  
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Let us look at chapter 6 of MNZ, “Ha-siman ha-ruḥani ve-ha-ot (The 
Spiritual Symbol and the Sign),” where Krochmal refers to speech (30–31). 
We can view speech, Krochmal says, as operating on four levels. First, 
speech is just comprised of sound waves, a purely mechanical process. 
Second, it is perceived both by men and animals as sound, kol, a type of 
sensation. Third, in the human sphere it becomes speech in the strict sense, 
serving human beings as a meaningful form of expression and communica-
tion, a means of expression and communication that can take place not just 
by speaking, but by writing, sign language, musical and visual communica-
tion, and the like. Here we have culture as a product of the human spirit. At 
this point, however, the question arises: Whence derives this culture-
making activity of the human spirit? Here Krochmal, following Hegel, 
spirals to the fourth level of speech and answers that from a higher specula-
tive standpoint the human spirit’s ability to create culture should be invert-
ed and seen as spirit’s expressing itself through human creativity. 
We see the same progression at work in chapter 7, “Goyyim ve-elohav” 
(The Nations and their Gods), where we can almost say that Krochmal in 
the chapter’s beginning functions as a cultural anthropologist (34–35). So-
cieties, Krochmal states, develop from primitive beginnings and gradually 
reach, by means of division of labor, a level of material wealth and suffi-
ciency. They then develop social and legal institutions, as well as ideas of 
justice, beauty, ethics honor, and love. There follows literature, art, music, 
and, finally, religious beliefs. Note that nothing is said about the truth of 
these beliefs, of the reality of the god or gods believed in by a particular 
people. All this is the product of the people’s creative spirit. The sum total 
of the cultural products of the people’s creativity, of their spiritual treasure, 
Krochmal goes on to state, is called by contemporary scholars ruaḥ ha-
umah, “the spirit of the people.”  
However, Krochmal goes on to say (35–36), the same social and cultur-
al processes responsible for a society’s growth and its flourishing contain 
within themselves the seed of decline. Luxury leads to decadence, the ac-
cumulation of wealth leads to class divisions, to the oppression of the poor 
by the rich, and the like. There thus emerge four destructive forces which 
lead to the decline and disintegration of society: pleasure, pride, power, and 
superstition. Here we have, expressed in cultural and sociological terms, the 
origins of the biological-organic, three-fold scheme of historical develop-
ment.27 The point is not whether we agree with Krochmal’s analysis, but 
that for him this is an immanent historical development.  
Krochmal then observes that Scripture in its representational fashion re-
fers to the spirit of the people as the god of the people or its guardian angel 
                                                     
27  I understand this triadic developmental scheme as being, at one and the same time, both 
biological-organic and social-cultural. Note that in chapter 7 of MNZ, 35–36, Krochmal 
emphasizes the social-cultural aspect, while at the beginning of chapter 8, 40–42, he 
emphasizes the biological-organic aspect. 
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(37). But it is clear that what we have here is a personification and projec-
tion of a human social and cultural phenomenon. Only at this point does 
Krochmal make his speculative turn and state that from a speculative view-
point we should view the sum total of the cultural creativity of a particular 
people, in all its unique and special character, as partial spirit that achieves 
self-expression through them. But this speculative assertion is made only 
after Krochmal has done his cultural work. 
 There is no contradiction, then, between, Krochmal, on the one hand, 
arguing that we should treat the historical realm as independent and auton-
omous, developing in accordance with its own immanent processes, while 
on the other hand, maintaining that we should see the multiple forms of 
cultural creativity arising in the course of the history of the nations as mani-
festations of supernal metaphysical spiritual principles. Any apparent con-
tradiction arises from a failure to take into account the two different levels 
on which Krochmal is conducting his discussion and their dialectical rela-
tionship to one another. That is, Krochmal, qua cultural historian, contends, 
that, to begin with, we should treat the historical realm as independent and 
autonomous, developing in accordance with own immanent processes. On-
ly afterward does he, qua speculative philosopher, maintain that we should 
rise to a higher level and see the multiple forms of cultural creativity arising 
in the course of the history of the nations, those forms of cultural creativity 
which directly and immanently give rise to developments in the historical 
realm, as manifestations of supernal, metaphysical spiritual principles. 28 
If we, then, focus on Krochmal the cultural historian, is his view so dif-
ferent from Kaufmann’s? Job Jindo in his important essay, “Recontextual-
izing Kaufmann: His Empirical Concept of the Bible and its Significance in 
Jewish Intellectual History,” describes Kaufmann’s view of ruaḥ thus:  
                                                     
28  I am offering here a way understanding the relationship between Krochmal’s appeal to 
metaphysical principles found primarily in chapter 6 of MNZ and his immanent cultural-
historical analyses found in chapters 7–10. Some scholars, for example, Natan Roten-
streich, argue that Krochmal’s appeal to metaphysical principles does not sit well with 
his use of immanent cultural-historical analyses, resulting in a dualism in his historical 
account that he never seeks to resolve. See N. Rotenstreich, Jewish Thought in Modern 
Times (in Hebrew; 2 vols.; Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1956), 1:55–56. On the other hand, 
Guttmann, Philosophies of Judaism, 447, n. 68, rejects the presence of any such dual-
ism, arguing that we should not, as does Rotenstreich, identify the spirits of the nations 
of the world and the spirit of the Jewish people with specific metaphysical principles 
and absolute spirit, respectively, but rather view them as their manifestations. Whether 
this entirely resolves this dualism may be doubted, as Guttmann himself seems to be 
aware. For further discussion, see Moshe Schwarcz, “The Status of the Problem of Jew-
ish Historiosophy in the Teachings of N. Krochmal and F. Rosenzweig,” in Language, 
Myth, Art (in Hebrew; Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1967), 204–7. My claim is that this problem 
has arisen only because scholars neglected to take into account the two different levels 
on which Krochmal was conducting his discussion and their dialectical relationship to 
one another.  
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Kaufmann developed an abiding interest in the riddle of Jewish survival, 
which, for his entire life, he sought to investigate according to the general 
principles of empirical analysis. For that reason, while Kaufmann espoused 
the notion of the Bible as a product of the ruaḥ le’umi of ancient Israel, he 
insisted on using the term ruaḥ (spirit or mind; cf. Geist in German) only in 
the empirical sense and not in a speculative Hegelian or romanticist sense 
(cf. Volksgeist), which was how the term was usually used among Jewish 
thinkers of this period.29 
Jindo explains: 
Kaufmann is an “empiricist,” but, at the same time, not an empirical “mate-
rialist.” In other words, he thinks that we cannot explain cultural creativity 
by material conditions alone and that we must take into account a category 
of ruaḥ, which, for him, is a primal and fundamental factor in cultural crea-
tivity, a factor equally as important as any other moment or element, be that 
material or social. According to Kaufmann, the efficacy and function of 
ruaḥ involve many qualities: “imagination, ingenious intuition, inventive 
capacity, ability to perceive and observe, capacity for abstraction and ap-
prehension of the essence and relationship among concepts and ideas, medi-
tation, ethical assessment in and of itself, capacity for articulation and sym-
bolization, and the ability to influence others.” And to give an empirical 
grounding to this category, Kaufmann introduces a cultural phenomenon 
that he calls an “infinite variety of cultural creative forms.” 
When we look at the history of human culture, Kaufmann argues, we ob-
serve an infinite variety of creative forms, in practically all spheres of hu-
man life, such as in the arts, language, law, or religion—be they on the indi-
vidual or collective level or in an everyday setting or otherwise—and this 
phenomenon, as well as its origin, cannot be explained by material or social 
conditions alone. To account for this phenomenon, Kaufmann insists that 
we must assume the creative efficacy of ruaḥ as an empirical category of 
historical experience.30  
Jindo argues at length that Kaufmann’s views are similar to those of Wil-
helm Dilthey,31 but, in light of my discussion above, I believe it is fair to 
                                                     
29  Jindo, “Recontextualizing Kaufmann: His Empirical Concept of the Bible and its Signifi-
cance in Jewish Intellectual History,” JJTP 19.2 (2011): 104. 
30  Jindo, “Recontextualizing Kaufmann,” 112–13. 
31  Jindo, “Recontextualizing Kaufmann,” 106–13. Jindo concedes that “Kaufmann was an 
independent thinker who voraciously read and studied history, philosophy, and sociolo-
gy, and it does little justice to him if we attribute the foundations of his theoretical 
framework to any one scholar, even to Dilthey. Peculiarly, furthermore, Kaufmann no-
where makes mention of Dilthey in his work” (109; italics added). “Nonetheless,” he 
immediately maintains, “Dilthey’s influence on Kaufmann’s work is apparent, and 
Dilthey’s project of cultural studies indeed enables us to better understand Kaufmann’s 
conception of the Bible” (109; italics added).  
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conclude that they are strikingly close to that of Krochmal, the cultural 
historian, as well.  
Perhaps one might wish to defend Kaufmann’s critique of Krochmal by 
arguing that the mode of procedure I have ascribed to Krochmal, moving 
from cultural history to speculative metaphysics, holds true only for the 
history and destiny of the nations of the world; however, the history of 
Israel, for Krochmal, is an exception to that rule, and there indeed 
Krochmal maintains, as Kaufmann claims, that the ruḥani ha-muḥlat just 
inserted itself at some point into Jewish history, determining all the peo-
ple’s subsequent destiny. I think this is to misunderstand Krochmal, al-
though we perhaps ought to forgive Kaufmann for this misunderstanding, 
since Krochmal here, perhaps deliberately, left himself open to it. 
Thus, as I noted, Krochmal in chapter 7 of MNZ, “Goyyim ve-elohav 
(The Nations and their Gods),” in describing the patterns of cultural devel-
opment and the processes of growth, maturity, and decline of the nations of 
the world first functions as a cultural historian, maintaining that Scripture’s 
description of the spirit of a people as the god of the people or its guardian 
angel is just a personification and projection of a human social and cultural 
phenomenon. Only afterwards does he make his speculative turn and state 
that from a speculative viewpoint we should view the sum total of the cul-
tural creativity of a particular people, in all its unique and special character, 
as partial spirit achieving self-expression through them. Yet, when he turns 
in the chapter from the “gods” or “guardian angels” to the God of Israel, he 
begins with the dramatic speculative assertion that its God, to whom it 
owes unique destiny, is the Creator of all, God as absolute spirit: 
The prophet has proclaimed: “Not like these [the ‘gods’ or ‘guardian an-
gels’ of the nations of the world] is the portion of Jacob; for He is the Crea-
tor of all and Israel is the tribe of His inheritance, the Lord of Hosts is His 
name” (Jer. 10:16), that is to say that He is the Absolute Spirit, and there is 
none other beside Him [Who is] the source of all spiritual entities and en-
compassing them all (MNZ, 37-38).  
I believe, however, that a close examination of the continuation of Kroch-
mal’s discussion in that chapter will indicate that though Krochmal’s be-
ginning his discussion of Israel’s unique destiny with this dramatic asser-
tion is certainly rhetorically stirring, in truth, the claim that the Jewish peo-
ple is the allotted portion of the Absolute Spirit refers (to begin with) not to 
a metaphysical claim, but to the people’s empirically verifiable, special 
religious awareness of the one true God, as that awareness empirically 
manifested itself throughout its history.  
Thus we should note that though Krochmal asserts that Jacob’s portion 
is “‘the Creator of all … the Lord of Hosts is His name,’ that is to say that 
He is the Absolute Spirit, and there is none other beside Him [Who is] the 
source of all spiritual entities and encompassing them all,” he does not as-
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sert anywhere in the chapter, contra Kaufmann, that “a metaphysical entity 
here inserts itself into history.” True, Krochmal writes of the “divine gov-
ernance” that “planned…to choose the source whence we were hewn, 
namely, the holy patriarchs” (38). Note though that at the chapter’s start 
Krochmal begins his description of the patterns of cultural development 
and the processes of growth, maturity, and decline of the nations of the 
world by similarly writing about the “plan of the divine governance not to 
scatter the human species as completely separated individuals… but to 
combine it into small and large groups” (34). It should be clear that the 
“plan of the divine governance” referred to at the chapter’s beginning oper-
ates through purely naturalistic social and anthropological processes. Why 
should we assume that the divine governance that chose “the source 
whence we were hewn” operated in different fashion?32 Finally, Krochmal 
in writing of the “divine wisdom that guided and perfected the affairs” of 
the Jewish people in order to ensure that it become “a kingdom of priests, 
that is, the teacher of the absolute Torahitic faith to the entire human spe-
cies” describes that perfection as consisting in the people’s awareness that 
with “every action of our people and with every exalted and beneficent 
spirit that is made manifest and comes to light in our midst we should know 
in our hearts and acknowledge with our mouths that the living God is in our 
midst and all this derives from His hand, that is, that they are all rooted in 
Him and emanate from His spirit that encompasses all spiritual manifesta-
tions” (38). Krochmal goes on to write “And this is the secret or, in our 
terms, this is the rational conception of the phrases ‘and I will dwell in their 
midst’ (Exod. 25:8), ‘For I am with you’ (Jer. 42:11), ‘And My spirit 
abides in your midst’ (Hag. 2:5). And this is the secret of the term 
‘Shekhinah’ and of the phrase ‘the Shekhinah (divine Presence) rests on 
Israel’” (38). 
A number of observations should be made regarding this last extended 
quote. First, note how the Jewish people’s task as “a kingdom of priests” is 
to teach “the entire human species” the “absolute Torahitic faith,” that is, 
religious truths in their imaginative representational form, not “the wisdom 
of faith,” that is, religious truths in their rational, conceptual form. Second, 
note how the people’s perfection consists in their own religious awareness 
of their relationship with God. Note, as well, how that religious awareness 
                                                     
32  Kaufmann in Golah, 1:167, n. 2, in one of his few extended comments about Krochmal 
in the book, argues that Krochmal’s appeal in MNZ, chapter 7, to a “natural order” gov-
erning the affairs of Jewish history “does not diminish from the image of divine provi-
dence” guiding the people’s history in teleological fashion. It should be noted, however, 
that Krochmal refers here to divine governance (hanhagah), and not divine providence 
(hashgaḥah). Governance has a more impersonal and naturalistic ring than providence. 
Moreover, this same divine governance that guides the affairs of Jewish history also op-
erates in an impersonal, naturalistic fashion to ensure the emergence and development of 
all human societies. Kaufmann, here, like elsewhere, as I have sought to show, fails to 
distinguish between the two levels of Krochmal’s analysis. 
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itself is expressed first in imaginative representational form, “that the living 
God is in our midst and all this derives from His hand,” and then in ration-
al, conceptual form, “that they [spiritual qualities] are all rooted in Him and 
emanate from His spirit that encompasses all spiritual manifestations.” 
Most important, it is this religious awareness, whether expressed in imagi-
native representational form or in rational, conceptual form, which is the 
rational meaning of the biblical and rabbinic claim that the Shekhinah, the 
divine Presence, dwells within the midst of the Jewish people. 
 
Thus, the presence of God as absolute spirit among the Jewish people re-
fers, to begin with, to the people’s monotheistic belief, to their belief in one 
God, Creator and Ruler of the heaven and earth, though, as stated earlier, 
they conceived of that God in representational, non-abstract, non-
conceptual terms, and to their further belief, and this is critical, that all their 
actions and spiritual goods and attainments derived from His presence 
among them. That is the starting point: the belief of the people, as an em-
pirical phenomenon, deriving from the people’s spirit. Only then does 
Krochmal make his speculative turn and state that from a speculative view-
point we should view these very beliefs as Absolute Spirit’s attaining self-
expression and self-knowledge through the Jewish people. The parallels 
between his procedure here and his procedure with respect to the history of 
nations of the world are evident. The bottom line, then, is that with regard 
to the history of Israel Krochmal makes the same move from cultural histo-
ry to speculative metaphysics as he does with regard to the history of na-
tions of the world. 
As for Kaufmann’s extreme claim that, for Krochmal, not only did the 
ruḥani ha-muḥlat as a “metaphysical entity … insert … itself into history,” 
but it determined the Jewish people’s entire subsequent history, while this 
essay is not the place to undertake an examination of Krochmal’s detailed 
account of the first two cycles of Jewish history in MNZ, chapters 8–10, 
I believe that such an examination will easily suffice to show the claim’s 
falsity.33 Indeed, its falsity is so evident that I assume that Kaufmann did 
not mean that for Krochmal the ruḥani ha-muḥlat’s presence among the 
Jewish people literally determined all its subsequent history in all its de-
tails, but rather that it was responsible for its being an am ‛olam, an eternal 
people. That is, for Krochmal, while the nations of the world, went through 
periods of growth, maturity and flourishing, and decline, never to rise 
again, the Jewish people also went through this same cycle of growth, ma-
turity and flourishing, and decline, but then, unlike the nations of the world, 
                                                     
33  Note, for example, the great weight that Krochmal ascribes in chapter 8, 47, to contin-
gent social and political factors (the jealousy of the tribes, the continued existence of the 
high places, etc.) in accounting for the decline of the Jewish people after the death of 
Solomon, whose reign constituted the high point of the people’s development during the 
first cycle of its existence. 
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thanks to the presence of absolute spirit among them, they did not disap-
pear from the stage of history, but began the cycle again. Surely here, so I 
believe Kaufmann thought, Krochmal must have discerned a transcendent 
element inserting itself into the Jewish people’s history and guaranteeing 
their eternity.  
That this indeed is Kaufmann’s view emerges from his discussion in 
“Le-Birur Torato shel R. Nachman Krochmal.” There he modifies the claim 
made in his note, and argues that while Krochmal explains the course of 
events within each individual cycle of Jewish history in terms of immanent 
processes, whether historical-cultural or biological-organic, with regard to 
the transition from cycle to cycle, to the rise after the fall, there, by con-
trast, Krochmal appeals in speculative fashion to the operations of the pres-
ence of the absolute spirit among them and not to inner immanent causa-
tion.34 
But even this modified claim must be rejected.  
True, from a speculative standpoint, the eternity of the Jews is seen as 
resulting from absolute spirit’s need to attain complete self-expression, but 
from an historical vantage point—and in chapters 8–10 Krochmal is first 
and foremost an historian—the process of the constant renewal of the Jew-
ish people is explained by Krochmal in immanent terms, whereby it was 
the Jews’ ardent monotheistic faith (not a “metaphysical entity [that] in-
sert[ed] itself into history”) that endowed them with the strength to perse-
vere under the most arduous circumstances.35 Indeed, Krochmal seeks to 
                                                     
34  “Le-Birur Torato shel R. Nachman Krochmal,” 19. “And this was the secret of the Jew-
ish people’s fate. It was saved from the laws of extinction [to which all other nations are 
subject] on account of the infinite ‘absolute spirit’ that was embodied in it. It is as eter-
nal as the eternal spirit that manifested itself in its life. To the extent that the nation was 
an organic ‘body,’ it was subject to the law of organic development. In its midst, as well, 
the destructive forces that wreak destruction on a people were engendered, and, there-
fore, it as well was not spared destruction. But its destruction was just earthly-political, 
‘bodily’; however, its spiritual force continued to endure in its midst.” A similar ap-
proach is espoused by Rotenstreich, “Gilgulehah shel maḥzoriyyut” (“Cyclical Trans-
formations”), Sefer Dov Sadan (eds. S. Werses, N. Rotenstreich, and H. Shmeruk; Tel 
Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing House, 1977), 307–8.  
35  Thus Harris, Nachman Krochmal, 75–76, affirms that for Krochmal, “the knowledge of 
God as absolute spirit…was a center piece of Jewish self-awareness through the ages 
…Jews have carried with them a unique conception of God; …this unique conception of 
God is a product of a particular national consciousness; …this particular national con-
sciousness has crucial historical implications.” Later on in his book (127), Harris spells 
out what these crucial historical implications are and how they flow from the Jewish 
people’s “particular national consciousness.” He writes, “While Israel [for Krochmal] is 
subject to the ineluctable decay that completes the cycle [of growth, maturity, and de-
cline], it is not subject to the demise that ensues because of its consciousness of God’s 
absolute being…Israel, then, will not disappear, but begin the process anew. It is im-
portant to point out that in this picture the absolute being is not described as the active 
force ensuring Israel’s survival; rather the people, having been brought to the awareness 
of the unity of all existence in God, are capable of weathering circumstances, such as ex-
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show that the seeds of renewal of a new cycle were already to be found in 
the period of decline of the previous one.36 There can be no greater proof 
that for Krochmal the transition from cycle to cycle, the rise after the fall, 
can and should be explained in terms of immanent historical processes, first 
and foremost in terms of the people’s indomitable monotheistic faith as em-
bodied in their cultural national life.37  
To return to Kaufmann: Kaufmann began his great socio-historical 
work, Golah ve-nekhar (Exile and Alienation, 1929–1930) with the ques-
tion of why the historical destiny of the Jewish people differed from that of 
all the other ancient peoples of the world,38 or, to translate this question into 
Krochmalian terms, how was it that the Jewish people, alone among all the 
other ancient peoples of the world, was an ‛Am ‛Olam. The answer Kauf-
mann gave there, with great learning and insight, an answer that he already 
gave in his first major article, published in 1914 at the age of twenty-four, 
                                                                                                                          
ile, that other cultures, due to their incomplete spirituality, are not.” Similarly, Amir, 
“She‛arim le-emunah tzerufah,” MNZ, 35–36 (of his Introduction), emphasizes that, for 
Krochmal, the factors that enabled the Jewish people to weather the destruction of the 
first Temple and the subsequent exile and renew their existence were their monotheistic 
belief, “the quality and intensity of their faith,” and “the activity of their poets and 
prophets,” with their words of consolation and, even more important, hope. Again, it is 
almost as if Harris and Amir are directing their remarks against Kaufmann. 
36  I hope to show this in a future article. 
37  If I might elaborate upon this point in somewhat technical philosophical language: From 
an historical vantage point, that of verstand, the (partial) spirit manifested in the history 
of one of the nations of the world refers to the sum total of its cultural creativity—a 
creativity usually expressed most strongly in one area: beauty, law, and the like—while 
the connection between the Jewish people and absolute spirit refers to their monotheistic 
faith. From a speculative standpoint, however, that of vernunft, the matter is reversed, 
and a particular nation’s cultural creativity and the Jewish people’s monotheistic faith 
should be viewed as the means whereby spirit, whether partial or absolute, attains self-
expression and self-awareness. However the matter be viewed, the attachment of the na-
tions of the world to partial spirits connected to matter results in their being subjected to 
the organismic-biological “laws” of history, whereby each nation undergoes a cycle of 
growth, maturity, and decline and annihilation, though the products of its cultural crea-
tivity, on account of their spiritual nature, are never lost, but incorporated into man-
kind’s general spiritual patrimony. On the other hand, the attachment of the Jewish peo-
ple to absolute spirit guarantees that, although it too is subject to the historical “law” of 
growth, maturity, and decline, after the completion of its initial cycle, rather than disap-
pearing, it will renew itself, to begin yet another cycle. In this respect, the Jewish peo-
ple, though not exempt from history, are an ‛am olam, an eternal people. Again, from an 
immanent historical-cultural viewpoint, the people’s “eternity,” their ability to renew 
themselves after each period of decline, derives from the Jews’ ardent monotheistic faith 
that endowed them with the strength to persevere under the most arduous circumstanc-
es—indeed, as I have noted, the seeds of renewal of a new cycle are already to be found 
in the period of decline of the previous one—while from a speculative standpoint, the 
eternity of the Jews is seen as resulting from absolute spirit’s need to attain complete 
self-expression. 
38  Golah, “Preface,” 1:5. 
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“The Judaism of Aḥad Ha-‛Am,”39 was that it was neither some presumed 
will to live, nor was it material factors, nor was it anti-Semitism, that pre-
served the Jewish people as a distinct minority among the nations of the 
world in exile; it was their monotheistic faith. If we focus on Krochmal, the 
cultural historian, and not on Krochmal, the speculative metaphysician, one 
must ask: is this so different from Kaufmann’s view? 
In sum: Kaufmann, in the footnote I have examined, in order to differen-
tiate himself from Krochmal points to the latter’s un-critical historical 
views regarding biblical history, to his supposed assertion that the Bible 
conceives of God in abstract philosophical terms, and to what Kaufmann 
conceives as his speculative Hegelian view that history is determined by a 
metaphysical idea. With respect to Kaufmann’s first criticism, as I have 
indicated, it has a good deal of merit, though I have also argued that 
Krochmal was not as uncritical as Kaufmann would have it. With respect to 
Kaufmann’s second criticism, it is, I have argued, simply wrong. With re-
gard to his third and perhaps major criticism, I have argued that Kaufmann 
could level it only by focusing on Krochmal the speculative metaphysician, 
and ignoring Krochmal the cultural historian. Indeed, I find it hard to un-
derstand how Kaufmann, who was such a perceptive observer, could have 
gone so wrong on this point.  
Perhaps precisely because he was so close to Krochmal, he was afraid of 
being tainted by association with the latter’s speculative Hegelian flights, 
and almost felt compelled to minimize any possible influence Krochmal 
may have had on his thought. In the period when Kaufmann wrote there 
could be no greater “sin” for a historian or sociologist than being branded a 
Hegelian. Perhaps, as well, Kaufmann’s strategy in this note is a variant of 
an unfortunate general polemical tendency in his writings, often remarked 
upon. As David Berger observes, “The argument in virtually all his works 
is structured dialectically and builds through a critique of earlier views. In 
this context, references to thinkers and scholars who anticipated important 
points in Kaufmann’s position are structurally inconvenient, and he suc-
cumbed to the temptation to leave them out.”40 Krochmal’s views were 
                                                     
39  “The Judaism of Aḥad Ha-‛Am” (in Hebrew), Ha-Shiloaḥ 30 (1914): 249–71. For a 
thorough analysis of Kaufmann’s critique of Aḥad Ha-‛Am, as expressed in that essay 
and in in many of Kaufmann’s subsequent articles and books, see Avinoam Barshai, 
“Kaufmann Against Aḥad Ha-‛Am” (in Hebrew), Yehezkel Kaufmann: Mivḥar Ketavim 
Le’umiyyim (edited with an introduction by Avinoam Barshai; Jerusalem: World Zionist 
Organization, 1995), 60–96. On pp. 140–73 of the volume, Barshai presents selections 
from two of Kaufmann’s works criticizing Aḥad Ha-‛Am. 
40  David Berger, “Religion, Nationalism, and Historiography: Yehezkel Kaufmann’s Ac-
count of Jesus and Early Christianity,” in Persecution, Polemic, and Dialogue: Essays in 
Jewish-Christian Relations (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2010), 309. Other scholars 
who have leveled a similar criticism against Kaufmann are Stephen Geller, Jon Leven-
son, and Laurence Silberstein. For references, see Berger, “Religion, Nationalism, and 
Historiography,” 308–9, notes 43–46.  
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apparently too well known to the readers of Toledot for Kaufmann to ig-
nore them entirely. But a few sharp polemical thrusts against Krochmal 
could suffice (so Kaufmann may have thought to himself) to ensure that 
readers would not confuse the two’s views.  
All this is not to deny that there are “fundamental differences” between 
Kaufmann and Krochmal—though not the ones mentioned in the note! 
Thus, while for both Kaufmann and Krochmal the biblical monotheistic 
idea is best understood as a product of a primal intuitive vision, they sharp-
ly differ as the contents of this vision. For Kaufmann it is an intuitive non-
mythological vision of a God whose will is transcendent and all-supreme, 
not subject to fate or a meta-divine realm. Flowing from this, for Kauf-
mann, as is well known, there is an abyss separating biblical religion from 
paganism. For Krochmal, by contrast, the biblical vision is an intuitive 
vision of God as the source and sustainer of all existence. It follows from 
Krochmal’s view, as is also well known, that the divide between pagan 
religions as religions of limited partial spirit and biblical religion as the 
religion of unlimited, all-encompassing spirit is not a total one. This differ-
ence between the two thinkers, in turn, may have influenced their differing 
views regarding the nature of the internal, organic, evolutionary develop-
ment of Judaism. For Kaufmann the development primarily consisted in the 
emergence of new religious ideas, while for Krochmal it primarily consist-
ed of, to cite Guttmann, “the truth, present in Judaism from its inception, 
develop[ing] to ever greater levels of clarity and higher forms of conceptual 
thought.”41 It appears that, for Kaufmann, the primal biblical intuitive vi-
sion of God’s personal transcendent and all-supreme will does not lend 
itself—or, at least, does not easily lend itself—to philosophical abstrac-
tion.42 For Krochmal, to the contrary, the intuitive biblical vision of God as 
the source and sustainer of all existence almost appears to call for philo-
sophic clarification and conceptualization.43 
Another important difference between Kaufmann and Krochmal, re-
ferred to by Kaufmann himself, is the way in which they understand the 
operation of “the spirit of the people” (ruaḥ ha-umah). For Krochmal na-
tional or collective spirit expresses itself primarily in the commonality of 
cultural creative forms, while for Kaufmann it expresses itself primarily in 
the multiplicity and diversity of those forms.44 To cite Kaufmann:  
We say that there is a national spirit not because we distinguish a single im-
press in each national culture, a single unified “essence” embodied in all its 
values and events in all periods of its history, but because we distinguish in 
                                                     
41  See above, n. 19 for this citation. 
42  See Kaufmann’s important remarks on the difficulty biblical religion had in absorbing 
the philosophical idea of an abstract God in “Ha-ra‛ayon ha-penimi shel ha-aḥdut ha-
yisraelit” (“The Inner Idea of Israelite Monotheism”), Toledot, 1:252–54. 
43  I hope to elaborate on this in a future article. 
44  I owe this observation to Job Jindo. 
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human culture generally a variety of styles against an ethnic background. 
“National spirit”…has the basic meaning of national creative power. If a 
nation were to create a new cultural style in every generation, this would be 
even more reason to say it was richly endowed with a national creative 
spirit. 
The doctrine of “national spirit” or “spirit of the people” that was prevalent 
from Montesquieu through Hegel and his disciples was arrived at from con-
sidering the phenomenon of unity of cultural style and out of an exaggerated 
generalization of that unity. In this current of thought, the expression “spir-
it” has a secondary meaning of common “essence,” “idea,” internal impress, 
and uniform direction. Montesquieu showed that there is a “spirit” in the 
laws of each nation, that is to say, a uniform essential impress that is con-
gruent with the spirit of its form of government. He similarly showed that 
there is a congruence of “spirit” between a nation’s political-legal regime, 
on the one hand, and its religion, its educational methods, its mores, its eco-
nomic enterprises, and so forth, on the other. This insight into the unitary 
character of a national culture and its way of life became a fundamental 
principle in the method of Hegel and his disciples. This method not only as-
serts that every sphere in a national culture (religion, law, art, etc.) is in-
formed by the same impress, but it maintains (by extending Montesquieu’s 
basic idea) that all the domains of a national culture are intertwined with 
each other—to wit: they all embody a single spiritual essence. In other 
words, the unity of a national cultural style exists not only within each cul-
tural domain but across all domains. This is because each national culture 
has a single spiritual root—a single “idea,” finding symbolic expression in 
all cultural values…. The harmony between the music of a given nation and 
its architecture, its laws, its burial customs, and the like are not perceptible 
to the senses. We can conceive of such a unity only to the extent that we 
conceive all the values of the culture as symbols of a fundamental idea or 
notion (as a “sign of the spiritual,” in the language of Nachman Krochmal). 
We can call this approach “symbolic ideationalism.”45 
While Kaufmann mentions Krochmal only in passing at the end this pas-
sage, the criticism expressed in it certainly applies to the latter’s view “that 
in each nation one spiritual attribute predominates, while the others are 
integrated into it and determined by it” (37).  
Yet, we should not exaggerate the difference between Kaufmann and 
Krochmal on this point. Thus Kaufmannn admits that “symbolic ideational-
ism…is not spun out of thin air” (19). As he explains:  
It is a fact that national cultures possess unity of imprint and style, although 
it is not comprehensive and absolute. An ethnic culture is not a hodgepodge 
of evanescent forms, but it tends toward fixity, toward continuity of “tradi-
tion.” Wherever there is no foreign influence, nations tend to perpetuate a 
tradition of cultural style for many generations. Also, an ethnic culture tends 
                                                     
45 “Be-kivshonah shel ha-yetzirah ha-le’umit,” 16–17. 
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to exhibit unity not only within one domain but also to a certain extent 
across domains, of the kind that Montesquieu asserts. There is a harmony of 
spirit in the life and culture of a nation. A despotic government does not go 
along with liberal education. An ascetic religion is not compatible with gay, 
sensual art. A military character is not paired well with a commercial spirit. 
Free social development is not possible in the atmosphere and “spirit” of a 
caste system such as that of India. One could give other examples. Moreo-
ver, certain cultural phenomena are amenable to explanation along the lines 
of symbolic ideationalism. Not all cultural values are the garb of an “idea,” 
and in any case they are not the garb of a single idea. But some cultural val-
ues are elucidated on the basis of this secret.46  
Kaufmann goes on to say that religion is the prime example where cultural 
values serve as “the garb of a single idea.” 
Religion, together with everything that is created under its aegis, is an idea-
tional creation. Legend, ritual, and poetry give it symbolic expression. Since 
in antiquity almost all elements of culture were grounded in religion, they 
received its ideational thrust. Religion created its symbols in architecture, 
sculpture, drawing, dance, and song. Dress, decoration, and social customs 
have a symbolic element. Law, morality, the state, family, and linguistic ex-
pression are all ideational expressions. Not in the sense that in these areas 
the idea is always the first cause but rather that in these spheres an idea—
from whatever source—is apt to serve as a paradigm for shaping an image 
or formulating a symbol.47 
If religion in general, for Kaufmann, shapes “almost all elements of cul-
ture,” how much more so does religion’s shaping power, in his view, hold 
true for the monotheistic faith of Biblical Israel. As we saw earlier, the 
monotheistic idea, for Kaufmann, shaped all the other aspects of the Jewish 
people’s life and its creativity, and fashioned for itself symbols in legend, 
law, prophecy, historiography, and ritual. 
Is this, then, so different from Krochmal’s view of the role of the mono-
theistic idea in shaping all the other spiritual gifts and attributes possessed 
by the Jewish people over the course of their history? Thus Krochmal, in a 
passage part of which I cited before, in writing of the “divine wisdom that 
guided and perfected the affairs” of the Jewish people in order to ensure 
that it become “a kingdom of priests, that is the teacher of the absolute To-
rahitic faith to the entire human species” states that the divine wisdom 
“worked powerfully with it [the people] until all the spiritual attributes and 
qualities would become manifest and take shape within it integrated with 
each other in a balanced fashion, both in manner and form, with all of them 
[these spiritual attributes] attached to God, may He be blessed, and relying 
on Him for their truth.”  
                                                     
46  “Be-kivshonah,” 20.  
47  “Be-kivshonah,” 20.  
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Precisely because Kaufmann realizes that “symbolic ideationalism is not 
spun out of thin air,” and that often a particular society’s cultural values are 
“the garb of a single idea,” especially of a religious idea, though symbolic 
ideationalism overgeneralizes this phenomenon, incorrectly declaring it to 
be to be a universal law, he emphasizes that his main disagreement with 
symbolic ideationalism is over how to understand the “unity of formal 
stamp and ideational content” possessed by national cultures in those cases 
where it does possess such unity. Symbolic ideationalism, declares Kauf-
mann, finds the root of this unity “in a common hidden ‘essence’ embodied 
in all values and all times” (20). But, Kaufmann objects, “such an assump-
tion has no empirical basis” (20). Rather, Kaufmann maintains:  
On the basis of empirical observation of cultural history, we must say this: 
the unified character of a culture develops from the power to exert influence 
latent in a creation once it has ventured forth from the sanctum of the crea-
tor’s spirit and become embodied in values, in “objectified spirit.” That em-
bodied creation possesses the power to shape images and to chart a path. 
A society’s culture is not a series of evanescent creations of the moment. 
A group preserves its values and imparts them from generation to genera-
tion. It is subject to the power of its values and is attached to them. Every 
original manifestation of spirit that influences the society and makes an im-
pression on its life is apt to be preserved and transmitted, to influence com-
ing generations, and to shape them in its image and its likeness. Language, 
religion, art, customs, and laws are a treasury of permanent cultural values, 
of “objectified spirit” imparted from generation to generation. A society 
imparts it to individuals, for better or worse. These values establish a model 
and type. The creative powers in each generation are embodied willy-nilly 
in the framework of a legacy. It is thus possible to say that a great creation 
fertilizes the spirit and begets its like. Thus a “style” develops. Furthermore, 
values influence each other across domains. This influence also comes to 
fruition in the revealed world of “objective spirit.” In a society whose life is 
absolutely dominated by religion, religion has the power to exercise deci-
sive ideational influence on cultural creation—on art, ethics, the state, and 
the like. The political regime also has a great power to influence the stamp 
of the culture. Furthermore, the culture as “objective spirit” combines with 
those factors that determine the character of the nation. Great personalities 
and great works shape the “spirit” of the nation, guiding its life into a cer-
tain track. And a continuity of the character that flows from the culture also 
fosters the continuity of the culture.48 
Kaufmann sums up the difference between his view and symbolic ideation-
alism’s regarding how to account for the unified character of a culture thus: 
Absolute spirit as a universal power, the “national spirit” as the manifesta-
tion of a single “idea” or principle, the flickering of a unified soul finding 
                                                     
48  “Be-kivshonah,” 20–21. 
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embodiment in a cultural body—all these are metaphysical conceptions, 
which do not arise from historical experience. But the creative human spirit, 
the power of creation of an ethnic group or the creative spirit of a nation, 
the power of objective spirit to create a stylistic imprint, the power of the 
idea in the sphere of objective spirit to shape the image of cultural values 
and fashion its symbols—all these are definitely empirical historical mat-
ters.49 
But does Krochmal, as Kaufmann suggests, find the root of the unity pos-
sessed by a culture “in a common hidden essence embodied in all values 
and all times,” in such metaphysical conceptions as “absolute spirit as a 
universal power, the ‘national spirit’ as the manifestation of a single ‘idea’ 
or principle, the flickering of a unified soul finding embodiment in a cultur-
al body”? Not if we focus on Krochmal, the cultural historian. 
As we saw, Krochmal, in writing (qua cultural historian) of the pat-
terns of cultural development of the nations of the world, accounts for the 
“unity of imprint and style” that the cultures of those nations possess by 
claiming “that in each nation one spiritual attribute predominates, while 
the others are integrated into it and determined by it.” But, as we also 
saw, the spiritual attributes possessed by a nation are the product of that 
nation’s creative spirit. The unity found in national cultures, then, does not, 
for Krochmal, flow from “a common hidden ‘essence’ embodied in all 
values and all times,” from “a unified soul finding embodiment in a cul-
tural body,” but, as Kaufmann himself maintains, develops precisely 
“from the power to exert influence latent in a creation once it has ven-
tured forth from the sanctum of the creator’s spirit and become embodied 
in values, in ‘objectified spirit,’” from “the power of the idea in the 
sphere of objective spirit to shape the image of cultural values and fashion 
its symbols.” 
Again, one might wish to argue that while Krochmal accounts for the 
“unity of imprint and style” possessed by the cultures of the nations of the 
world by appealing to “the power to exert influence latent in a creation 
once it has ventured forth from the sanctum of the creator’s spirit and be-
come embodied in values,” he, nevertheless, accounts for the “unity of 
formal stamp and ideational content” possessed by Israelite culture by in-
deed appealing to a metaphysical conception, namely, “absolute spirit as a 
universal power,” and that here, indeed, the Israelite “national spirit” is “the 
manifestation of a single ‘idea’ or principle.” And, in support of this con-
tention, one might point to the very passage I cited earlier where Krochmal 
states that the divine wisdom “worked powerfully with it [the people] until 
all the spiritual attributes and qualities would become manifest and take 
shape within it integrated with each other in a balanced fashion, both in 
manner and form, with all of them [these spiritual attributes] attached to 
                                                     
49  “Be-kivshonah,” 21. 
 KAUFMANN, KROCHMAL, AND THE “ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE” 145 
God, may He be blessed, and relying on Him for their truth” (38). Do we 
not have here the assertion that “God, may He be blessed,” that is, “abso-
lute spirit as a universal power,” is responsible for the unified nature of 
Israelite culture?  
But, again, we have to see how Krochmal translates speculative, theo-
logical language into the language of collective cultural awareness. And 
here it is time to put together the entire passage, the two parts of which I 
have cited separately, where Krochmal writes of the “divine wisdom that 
guided and perfected the affairs” of the Jewish people in order to ensure 
that it become “a kingdom of priests, that is the teacher of the absolute To-
rahitic faith to the entire human species.”  
It [the divine wisdom] worked powerfully with it [the people] until all the 
spiritual attributes and qualities would become manifest and take shape 
within it integrated with each other in a balanced fashion, both in manner 
and form, with all of them [these spiritual attributes] attached to God, may 
He be blessed, and relying on Him for their truth; that it to say, that with 
every action of our people and with every exalted and beneficent spirit that 
is made manifest and comes to light in our midst we should know in our 
hearts and acknowledge with our mouths that the living God is in our midst 
and all this derives from His hand, that is, that they are all rooted in Him 
and emanate from His spirit that encompasses all spiritual manifestations. 
(38) 
While in the passage’s first part, Krochmal, indeed, attributes the unified 
nature of Israelite culture to a metaphysical cause, namely to all the spiritu-
al attributes that over the course of time would become manifest in the life 
of the Jewish people being “attached to God, may He be blessed, and rely-
ing on Him for their truth,” in its second part he explains that by that he 
means that the unified nature of Israelite culture derives not so much from 
the spiritual attributes that over the course of time would become manifest 
in the life of the Jewish people being “attached to God,” but from the Jew-
ish people’s internal knowledge and outward acknowledgment that these 
spiritual attributes “are all rooted in [God] and emanate from His spirit” 
While Krochmal’s language here is certainly not a conceptually sophisti-
cated as that of Kaufmann’s and also has a much more pious ring, is he not, 
like Kaufmann, affirming here “the power of the idea in the sphere of ob-
jective spirit to shape the image of cultural values and fashion its sym-
bols”? 
All this is not to deny the differences existing between Krochmal and 
Kaufmann. Still, to conclude: With respect to Kaufmann’s assertions that a 
people’s cultural activity is a product of their spirit, that cultural and spir-
itual and not material factors are the main determinants of a people’s desti-
ny, and, coming to Jewish history, that the unified nature of the Jewish 
people’s culture and that their special historical path and destiny were  
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owing to their religious belief, their monotheistic faith, granted Kaufmann 
was not a Hegelian, but he was a Krochmalian.50  
                                                     
50  I would like to thank Job Jindo for his many incisive observations and suggestions, 
which contributed greatly to improving this essay. In particular, his trenchant criticisms 
of the essay’s original version forced me to significantly revise it, at times modifying my 
theses, at times expanding upon and seeking to strengthen them. While I am certain that 
Jindo will still take issue with some (many?) of my claims, I hope he will agree that this 
final version of my essay is better than the original one, and—perhaps—goes part of the 
way to meeting his objections.  
  
Judaism and Bible in the Worldview of  
Yehezkel Kaufmann* 
Menahem HARAN 
1 
During his lifetime, especially in the last period of his life, Professor 
Yehezkel Kaufmann was known as a recluse, a vegetarian, abstaining from 
any form of entertainment. He would leave his apartment only rarely; and if 
he left, sometimes he would not leave before a certain hour of the evening, 
and sometimes only at night. Even presentations arranged in his honor did 
not interest him. Nevertheless, his eyes observed everything, everywhere, 
all the time, and at the right moment he could become a brilliant conversa-
tionalist. He imposed abstention on himself not because he did not appreci-
ate the taste of good things. He did so because he tried with all his energies 
to increase and intensify his literary and scholarly activity. One could say 
without exaggeration that this was the greatest project of its kind in Jewish 
thought in the twentieth century. It is possible and also proper to say this, 
even though today it is already clear that some of the assumptions—central 
and peripheral—embedded in Kaufmann’s project have not been corrobo-
rated. 
Kaufmann’s project encompassed two central topics—Judaism and Bi-
ble. In conversation he would say that our people had endowed mankind 
with two creations of genius, namely the Jewish religion and the Bible. 
These two accordingly became also the focus points of his activity. Yaha-
dut** is here intended in both its meanings—the Jewish collective group 
(the secret of whose historical destiny demands an explanation) and the 
cultural, intellectual, and religious content that has maintained this group. 
As for Bible, he meant primarily defining the unique character of biblical 
                                                     
* This article—translated from the original Hebrew publication Mada‛ei Ha-yahadut 31 
(World Union of Jewish Studies, 1991): 69–80 by Lenny Levin—is an expansion of re-
marks delivered in an evening program organized by the (Israel) National Academy of 
Sciences, commemorating Yehezkel Kaufmann’s 101st birthday (17 Kislev 5751/  
December 3–4, 1990). Kaufmann was born on 24 Kislev 5650, which was December 4, 
1889 by the older Russian “Julian” calendar, and December 17 by the Gregorian calen-
dar. But Kaufmann cared little for the change and on various occasions gave December 
4 as his birth date even after the calendar change. But for the most part he preferred the 
Hebrew date. See Thomas Krapf, Yehezkel Kaufmann: Ein Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg 
zur Theologie der Hebräischen Bibel (Berlin: Institut Kirche und Judentum, 1990), 16. 
**  Translator’s note: Hebrew yahadut (like German Judentum) has the dual meaning of 
“Judaism” and “Jewry,” and can mean either the one or the other, or both, depending on 
context. 
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faith. In Kaufmann’s mental world, these two topics are interwoven, be-
cause one cannot understand the historical destiny of Jewry without a cor-
rect definition of the substance of biblical religion, whereas a correct ex-
planation of the character of biblical religion leads inevitably to a full un-
derstanding of the history of Jewry and Judaism. It follows that according 
to his method the biblical period contains the answer to all the “questions 
and perplexities” of the destiny of the Jewish collectivity.1 It follows that 
Kaufmann’s life project was a single one, but divided into two parts. In-
deed, all the assumptions and conclusions connected with his biblical re-
search were already subsumed in his first great work, Exile and Alienation 
(Tel Aviv, 5689–5690/1929–1930). He labored for about twenty years on 
this first work, and it took him about thirty years to produce the four vol-
umes of History of the Religion of the Bible (Tel Aviv 5697–5716 / 1937–
1956). But in the last analysis, all this comprised a single life project, con-
tinuous and extended. 
In his student years, before he started the plan of his scholarly project, 
Kaufmann immersed himself in Jewish knowledge in every form from eve-
ry period. In Odessa he studied in the yeshiva of Rav Tzair (Chaim Tcher-
nowitz, 1871–1949), and in St. Petersburg he availed himself of the aca-
demic courses in Jewish and oriental studies under the auspices of Baron 
David Günzberg. In addition, it appears that he studied a good deal on his 
own. During World War I he studied philosophy, Bible and Semitic lan-
guages at the University of Bern. His doctoral dissertation there dealt with 
the question of sufficient reason according to Kant; it was published in 
Berlin in 1920. During the same year he published a short critical essay on 
Husserl.2 He never published again on purely theoretical topics, but at its 
core his thinking was always rooted in philosophy. From the perspective of 
 
                                                     
1  The expression “questions and perplexities” is taken from the writings of Aḥad Ha-‛Am, 
who was of the opinion that the biblical period (as he expressed in the introduction to 
the first edition of At the Crossroads) was “the original period in which the spirit of our 
people was fashioned and developed in its own special way, and which holds the true 
key to the solution of all the ‘questions and perplexities.’” (The quotation marks around 
“questions and perplexities” were in Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s original text.) Thanks to Aḥad Ha-
‛Am’s nationalist influence, an aspiration arose in his circle to launch a modern scholar-
ly study of the Bible in the Hebrew language. But the results were quite meager (if one 
does not count in this context the scientific study of the Bible composed by Abraham 
Kahane, in which one can find no overt trace of the nationalist ideas of the period). Par-
adoxically, it was Kaufmann who assumed responsibility for the aspiration that had mo-
tivated Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s circle and fulfilled it in large measure, even though his theoreti-
cal orientation was diametrically opposed to that of Aḥad Ha-‛Am. Compare what I 
wrote about this in Moznaim 23 (5726/1966): 238–39, 24 (5727/1967): 54–55. 
2  Jehezkel Kaufmann, Eine Abhandlung über den zureichendend Grund—Erster Teil: Der 
Logische Grund (Berlin: Emil Ebering, 1920); idem, “Das τρίτος ἄνθρωπος-Argument 
gegen die Eidos-Lehre,” Kant-Studien 25 (1920): 214–19. The second portion of his 
doctoral dissertation was to have appeared afterward but was not published. 
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the twenty-seven years after his death it appears to me that historiosophic 
illumination is the strongest aspect of his thought. It is possible today to 
challenge his assumptions and conclusions in various areas of understand-
ing the historical destiny of Jewry and the study of the Bible, but his histo-
riosophic orientation remains in place. Furthermore, if some of his assump-
tions and conclusions had been formulated a bit more flexibly and a bit less 
definitively, they might be more defensible. 
There are scholars whose systems seem to take shape independently, 
without our being able to say what was the external impulse that aroused 
them to take the position that they took. And there are scholars who need an 
external challenge in the form of a hypothetical phantom with whom they 
can wrestle. As far as we can tell, Kaufmann was of the second kind. In 
each of the two major areas of his work there were personalities who were 
viewed as authorities, and he took issue with their assumptions and criti-
cized them. These were Aḥad Ha-‛Am (Asher Zvi Hirsch Ginsberg, 1856–
1927) in his conception of the substance of Jewish history and Julius Well-
hausen (1844–1918) in the scholarly study of the Bible. It is impossible to 
know which came first, whether his critique of their authoritative methods 
generated his views, or his own fundamental insights led him to take a posi-
tion against theirs. Perhaps it is even out of place to raise a question like 
this. But the fact remains that his conception was diametrically opposed to 
theirs. Therefore, in order to consider the special significance of Kauf-
mann’s approach, it is best to present it in counterpoint to the positions that 
he opposed, which were dominant in their time and whose stamp can be 
recognized to the present time. We should say at the outset that Kaufmann 
had the better of the debate in both cases. He was absolutely right in his 
critique and penetrating refutation of their assumptions, even if it appears 
that he exaggerated slightly in the formulation of his position and in the 
course of the debate became inflexible in his stands. As we said, it is quite 
possible to state his positions with more flexibility and to tone down the 
obstinacy of his arguments. Doing so could even strengthen his overall 
thesis. 
2 
Let us begin by defining Yahadut in the two senses we have mentioned, the 
social-collective (Jewry) and the cultural-spiritual (Judaism). In the back-
ground of Kaufmann’s conception was the theoretical method of Aḥad Ha-
‛Am, which underlay Jewish nationalist discourse in the early twentieth 
century and served as a basis (whether directly or indirectly) of public edu-
cation for six or seven decades in the schools of Eretz Israel. The essence of 
the method, in short, was the fiat that Jewry is fundamentally a national 
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entity (in Hebrew, the term ‛am*** is generally used, which has the same 
sense as the German Volk), but that the Jewish people is not situated in a 
normal state. The “garbs” and “instruments” of the “national spirit” of this 
collectivity have withered and do not permit of a full national existence. 
The national language is not spoken by all parts of the nation, and most of 
the nation does not yet dwell in its land. As a result of this, the creative 
powers of this collectivity have atrophied, but the “drive for national sur-
vival” stands guard to preserve this people in its uniqueness. The “drive for 
natural survival” created alternate instruments for preservation of the na-
tion, and the primary of these is the Jewish religion, which includes the 
Torah and the regimen of mitzvot. According to Aḥad Ha-‛Am, the “drive 
for national survival” operates on the “lower level of the psyche,” under the 
threshold of consciousness, and is therefore in the category of an uncon-
scious instinct.3 
In truth, this is the hardest and most surprising point in the method of 
Aḥad Ha-‛Am, that he takes the desire for natural survival to be an instinct, 
and a collective one at that. Thus one must derive from his method the sur-
prising conclusion that such a primal human phenomenon as faith in the 
metaphysical—in the absolute, in God—is nothing more than a means to 
maintain something else, something relative, something that is only a con-
sequence of historical circumstances and can come into being and disap-
pear in the course of history. It is no surprise that this theory found its crit-
ics even within the nationalist camp. But the greatest and most vociferous 
opponent was Kaufmann. His critique of Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s thought surprised 
the Hebrew readers in one of his youthful pieces, when Kaufmann was a 
prodigy of 24 years old. That article contained many of the fundamental 
                                                     
***  Translator’s note: The most exact English translation of the term ‛am is “people” (singu-
lar noun, with the emphasis on familial-ethnic cohesion as opposed to political or territo-
rial definition). However, this term is confusing in many contexts (as “people” is also 
used as the plural of “person”), and so ‛am is here rendered alternately “people” or “na-
tion” for greater readability. As the term ‛am is used often in the Bible to refer to Israel, 
it can also have the connotation of a sacred religious community, and Kaufmann himself 
employs the term extensively. Thus the point at issue between Kaufmann and Aḥad Ha-
‛Am is not whether Jewry should be conceived as an ‛am—on this they are agreed—but 
whether ‛am itself should be construed in a secular-national or a religious sense. To 
complicate matters further, Kaufmann and Aḥad Ha-‛Am agreed in construing the mod-
ern Jewish renaissance as having a primary spiritual-cultural character (whether secular 
or religious), as opposed to the “political Zionists” such as Leon Pinsker, Theodore 
Herzl, Max Nordau, and Ze’ev Jabotinsky, for whom political objectives (including a 
Jewish state) were primary from the start. 
3  The words in quotation marks are Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s. For a summary of Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s 
nationalist outlook, see inter alia Kaufmann, “The Principles of Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s 
Thought,” Hatekufa 24 (5688/1928): 421–39 [in Hebrew]; id., Ben netivot—perakim 
beḥeker ha-maḥshavah ha-le’umit (Haifa: Reali School, 5704/1944), 61–91; M. Turtel, 
Bisus ha-leumit be-kitvei Aḥad Ha-‛Am (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 5702/1942); 
and Eliezer Schweid, “Aḥad Ha-‛Am,” in EncJud 2:443–47; and see below, n. 5. 
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ideas of his major works.4 Afterward, his criticism grew deeper, sharper, 
and more penetrating.5 
In response to Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s line of thinking, the explanation that 
Kaufmann gave to the secret of existence of the Jewish group under condi-
tions of “exile and alienation” was far more realistic and rooted in the con-
ditions of historical existence. It contains no trace of the mystification of 
the “drive for national existence.” In his view, the group existence of Jewry 
is “normal” in the sense that every national group that was thrown into 
similar conditions would undergo the same historical process. It is a general 
rule that every national group that is displaced from its land into another 
environment, into another society, starts to undergo cultural and social as-
similation until it disappears. When the Jewish group was uprooted from its 
land (including portions of it, in their geographical wanderings at later 
stages), the same process occurred. But in the special case of Judaism, the 
process did not reach completion, and the collective entity did not disap-
pear. The reason for this was the fact that in every place the process was 
halted by a religious barrier. Individuals or groups could pass through the 
barrier of religion in one form or another, but the general rule was that in 
large communities religious change does not occur unless motivated by a 
positive spiritual attraction, and this did not happen. 
The Jewish religion was able to serve as a protective shield to protect 
the Jewish group, because this religion was universal in substance and it 
could survive in any locale. If the potential embodied in this religion had 
been fully realized and the religion had embraced entire nations and large 
communities under its aegis, then the Jewish people would have disap-
peared. The national symbols connected with biblical Israel and rooted in 
the Jewish religion would not have served to prevent the spread of the reli-
gion, for the same symbols had been absorbed in Christianity as well. Even 
though in various times and places Judaism allowed religious conversion 
into Judaism, nevertheless for certain historical reasons the Jewish religion 
did not spread appreciably beyond the bounds of the Jewish group. Individ-
uals were absorbed by conversion at various times and places, but not in 
sufficient numbers to dilute the character of the group. There was thus pre-
served behind the protective wall of the Jewish religion—universal in sub-
                                                     
4  Yehezkel Kaufmann, “Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s Judaism” (in Hebrew), Hashiloaḥ 30 (5674/ 
1914): 249–71. 
5  See especially Yehezkel Kaufmann, Golah ve-Nekhar (2 vols.; Tel Aviv: Devir, 1954–
1961), 1:190–207, 2:348–59, 367–85 (plus additional index references). Compare n. 3 
above. Kaufmann’s critique includes the second stage in the development of Aḥad Ha-
‛Am’s theory of nationalism, the stage in which Aḥad Ha-‛Am was attracted to the idea 
that the existence of the Jewish people exemplifies a unique ethical ideal, which distin-
guishes Judaism from Christianity (and also, according to this assumption, from all other 
nations on earth), namely attachment to the idea of absolute justice. According to Aḥad 
Ha-‛Am, after the full national renaissance in Eretz Israel, this ideal will be renewed 
(and not necessarily in religious form). 
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stance—a separate, peculiar tribe, connected by an umbilical cord to the 
Israelite people of the biblical period, and in effect its continuation. 
3 
There is no doubt that Kaufmann was right in seeing the Jewish religion as 
a protective wall for the survival of the Jewish people under conditions of 
exile and alienation, while emphasizing the universal character of this reli-
gion and denying absolutely the idea that Jewry’s survival was due to a 
drive for national survival, even if one tried to compare it to an unconscious 
instinct. Still, I think it would have been better if he had been more flexible 
and tentative in some of his assumptions. The protective wall of Jewish 
religion was not always and everywhere impassible. This applied not only 
to physical annihilation, which at certain times and places was decreed on 
portions of this group, and from which religious faith could not save them. 
Even under conditions of relative prosperity, when the physical security of 
the group was well enough assured, many of its members were drawn off, 
and portions of the people disappeared, or nearly so.6 It is better to say that 
the Jewish religion was a primary factor for preserving this group, but not 
absolutely or exclusively. If the Jewish religion had been an nearly abso-
lutely powerful factor, the Jewish community would have increased by now 
to hundreds of millions in size, if not more. There is no doubt that side by 
side with the Jewish religion as a protective wall for group survival there 
also operated the fact that in every age and in every situation the center of 
gravity of Jewish existence moved to another geographic region, and Jew-
ish communities could always establish themselves in regions of economic 
and cultural prosperity. 
                                                     
6  The Greek-speaking Jewry of Egypt, for example, faded and disappeared before the end 
of Roman rule. On the story of the demise of this diaspora, see Victor Tcherikover, Hel-
lenistic Civilization and the Jews (trans. S. Applebaum; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication 
Society, 1959), especially 382–92. “Whatever the sword did not consume was nibbled 
away by assimilation” (ibid., 366). See also id., Ha-yehudim be-Mitzrayim bitekufat ha-
hellenistit ha-romit le’or ha-papyrologia (Jerusalem: Magnes, 5723/1963), 206–08. The 
Hebrew papyri that appear in Egypt from the second century BCE onward are apparent-
ly a sign of a community of Jewish population from Eretz Israel and not necessarily a 
national revival among Egyptian Jewry. As a result of cultural and social assimilation, 
the Jewish community in central- and western-European Jewry in the second half of the 
eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century was eaten alive, despite 
religious difference. A similar outcome resulted from the conversions of Jews in Poland 
in the mid-eighteenth century; see Maier Balaban, Letoledot ha-Tenu’ah ha-Frankit (Tel 
Aviv: Devir, 5694/1934), 1:80–81, 89, 92–93). Were it not for the increase enjoyed by 
the Jewish community in Italy toward the end of the Middle Ages, as a result of immi-
gration of Jews from Germany and Spain, it is possible that this community would not 
have survived (see below). 
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Let us not forget that at the beginning of the Middle Ages, from the 
ninth century onward, when the character of Ashkenazic Jewry in northern 
France and the Rhine valley had been established and it started to spread 
out from there, it comprised a small percentage of all the Jews in the world. 
From the eleventh century until the expulsion from Spain, Sephardic Jews 
comprised not less than half of all Jewry, and they were the most active part 
of it.7 From the seventeenth century onward, after Sephardic Jews had been 
scattered to various countries, their relative numbers diminished. By the 
outbreak of World War II, Ashkenazic Jews comprised ninety percent of 
world Jewry. By contrast, the eastern Jewish communities who had never 
passed through Europe, such as the Jews of the Caucasus, Persia and the 
other countries of south-central Asia, Yemen, etc. never became a major 
proportion of world Jewry. Jews of the Mediterranean coasts, from north-
central Africa to Turkey and Greece, yielded to Sephardic influence or 
became Sephardic by virtue of the wave of immigration that reached them 
from the Spanish exiles. Correspondingly, the waves of Jewish immigration 
from Germany to northern Italy, especially in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, and from Spain to the Papal States,8 did not suffice to make it a 
major community, even though they reinforced the Jewish community in 
Italy and comprised a new stratum in it. The numbers of world Jewry only 
grew to the size of several millions at the end of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. One may therefore say that behind the protective wall 
of religion, Jewish existence wavered between the danger of perpetual dim-
inution and the chance of occasional expansion (a growth that occurred 
especially in modern times). 
Moreover, Kaufmann was surely right that one cannot explain Jewish 
existence only on the basis of the drive for national survival. Even behind 
the protective shield of the Jewish religion, one certainly cannot describe 
this drive as implanted “in the lower level of the psyche.” Nevertheless, one 
may concede that within the Jewish group there operated also genuine na-
tional motivations that are not simply a function of the religious factor. 
Nature knows of borderline phenomena that do not fit neatly into existing 
categories (such as creatures on the border line between plant and animal, 
or individuals on the border between male and female), or that unite oppo-
site qualities within themselves. Surely the definition of a people or nation 
(‛am, Volk), in its typical manifestation, is not a good fit for the Jewish 
group in its condition of exile and alienation. But it also does not fit the 
definition of a religious community according to the usual paradigm. And 
even though it does not conform to the paradigm either of nation or of reli-
gious community in their usual forms (or maybe it partakes of both), this 
does not negate the fact that in the course of the generations this group 
                                                     
7  Compare: Cecil Roth, “Sephardim,” in EncJud 14:1171. 
8  On these migrations, see for instance Attilio Milano, “Italy,” in EncJud 9:1122, 1124. 
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manifested striking unity and a sufficient measure of cohesion to render it a 
singular body with its own history (it is possible that Kaufmann might 
agree to this formulation). 
And if despite the basic universal character of the Jewish religion, which 
cannot be disputed, the religion did not spread much beyond the bounds of 
the Jewish collectivity, it appears that there is no need to explain this fact 
exclusively by appealing to external historical circumstances, and it is bet-
ter to seek the cause also in the qualified aversion that this religion dis-
played to accepting converts. Even though Judaism intermittently allowed 
itself to exercise religious conversion and occasionally pursued it actively 
(in fact, being the first to create this religious institution in the period of the 
Hasmoneans), nevertheless, for the most part conversion in Judaism stood 
under the sign of hesitation and restraint. Most of the Eastern Christian 
churches (Nestorian, Jacobite, Maronite, Chaldean, and others) practice no 
religious conversion at all, and their churches are simultaneously religious 
communities and quasi-national groups. Moreover, Jewish sects that origi-
nated in the East (Samaritans and Karaites) do not recognize religious con-
version at all. In this respect, Judaism overall constitutes a hybrid of a mis-
sionary religion with an “eastern” element that seeks to refrain from per-
forming religious conversion. The Talmudic rabbis gave us sayings on both 
sides of the issue, some in praise of conversion and others disparaging it. 
On the one hand they said, “The Holy and Blessed One exiled Israel among 
the nations for the sole purpose of attracting converts to join them” (b. Pes. 
87b); “The Holy and Blessed One said, ‘The names of converts are as dear 
to me as wine libations poured on the altar’ (Num. Rab. 8:1); “A gentile 
who converts to Judaism and studies Torah is like the High Priest” (ibid. 
13:15; compare Tanḥ. Vayakhel 8). On the other hand, they were able to 
say, “Proselytes are as unpleasant to Israel as a scab” (b. Yev. 47b and 
elsewhere); “The proselytes who left Egypt with Moses were the ones who 
made the Golden Calf and said, ‘These are your gods, O Israel’” (Exod. 
Rab. 42:6); “Don’t trust a proselyte for twenty-four generations, because he 
keeps his yeast” (that is, he retains his evil tendencies; Yal. Shim‛oni on 
Ruth § 601).9  
All these things and their like are aggadic lore. The halakha, in princi-
ple, did not make entry of foreigners into the congregation of Israel impos-
sible and certainly did not close the door in the face of one “who receives 
the yoke of the Holy and Blessed One in love and reverence and converts 
for the sake of Heaven” (ibid.). But the aggada gave explicit expression to 
an attitude of ambivalence toward conversion, an attitude that from the 
outset had the potential of encouraging or discouraging it. It is likely that 
just as in certain periods the tendency to encourage it predominated (the 
                                                     
9  Compare this to the texts and interpretations cited, for example, in Bernard J. Bamberg-
er, Proselytism in the Talmudic Period (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press), 149–
173. His evaluation appears too apologetic to me. 
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Hasmoneans in the days of John Hyrcanus and Alexander Jannai, the late 
Roman imperial period, the Khazars, conversion activities in North Africa 
and Arabia), so, too, there were periods when the tendency to discourage 
predominated. And in any case, it was sufficient for the discouraging ten-
dency to be manifest in successive periods, or at any rate the ambivalence 
that characterized the attitude toward conversion, in order to ensure that 
Judaism would not expand much beyond the bounds of the Jewish group, 
and that this collectivity would be preserved as a special, separate social 
entity. 
4 
According to Kaufmann’s conception, one cannot understand the destiny of 
the Jewish collectivity in its state of exile and alienation unless we say that 
before the destruction of the First Temple the core substance of monothe-
ism and universalism was already deeply rooted in the Israelite religion. 
Here Kaufmann’s thought on the historic destiny of Jewry becomes joined 
to his distinctive conception of biblical scholarship, and here he is especial-
ly critical of the tendency in biblical studies that is called the “Wellhausen 
school.” This school was based on the assumption that was proposed sever-
al decades before Wellhausen by the scholar Vatke whose name is scarcely 
remembered today.10 According to this assumption, one can explain the 
stages of development of biblical faith in conformity to Hegel’s principles 
of dialectical philosophy, that every phenomenon in intellectual-spiritual 
history is rooted in a prior phenomenon and developed out of the phenome-
non that preceded it. In keeping with this method, the monotheistic 
worldview developed out of a preceding idolatrous worldview. Israelite 
religion itself did not possess a monotheistic faith, neither in its inception 
nor until the end of the period of the First Temple. In the second half of the 
First Temple period, the classical prophets preached on behalf of monothe-
ism, but this was still a conception of ethical monotheism (not cosmic 
monotheism), that is to say, a belief that the God of Israel demanded from 
the individual and from the national group behavior in accord with princi-
ples of justice and morality, and that God judged them according to these 
principles. In the same period this was still the idea of individuals and not 
                                                     
10  Wilhelm Vatke, Die biblische Theologie wissenschaftlich dargestellt: Die Religion des 
Alten Testaments nach den kanonischen Büchern entwickelt (vol. 1; Berlin: Bethge, 
1835). Wellhausen himself acknowledged that he received “the most and the best” (“das 
meiste und das beste”) from Vatke. See Julius Wellhausen, Prolegomena to the History of 
Ancient Israel (trans. J. Sutherland Black and Allan Menzies; Edinburgh: A. & C. Black, 
1885), 13. As to the question of the connection between Hegel’s philosophical-historical 
principles and Vatke’s work, see especially Lothar Perlitt, Vatke und Wellhausen 
(BZAW 94; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1965), 31–57, 93–104. 
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the legacy of the entire national collective. The tendency to monotheistic 
belief increased with the destruction of the Samaritan kingdom, and after 
the destruction of Jerusalem the entire people was converted to this faith. 
That is to say, monotheistic belief is in the last analysis a product of pagan-
ism, which existed first, whereas the dominance of monotheism over the 
Israelite collective was the result of the destructions of Samaria and Jerusa-
lem. 
These, in short, are Kaufmann’s principal answers to the assumptions of 
the Wellhausen school. First of all, he emphasizes that nowhere do we find 
a case of an idolatrous worldview developing into monotheism, or that the 
destruction of a national group would change its faith into a monotheistic 
one. Furthermore, classical prophecy proposed the idea of the primacy of 
ethics but did not change the basic character of Israelite faith. The prophetic 
movement appeared on the basis of the assumptions of the popular faith, 
and the prophets expressed their demands in the name of the God of that 
same popular faith. It follows that classical prophecy was not a factor for 
transforming the Israelite religion into a monotheistic faith. Furthermore, 
Kaufmann asserted that monotheistic faith was in no way a development 
out of paganism, and it is likely that in this respect he is speaking as a neo-
Kantian. According to his method, monotheism is an absolutely different 
worldview than the pagan worldview. It is self-enclosed and did not flow 
from any prior developmental stage. This conception came in a flash in the 
consciousness of the first prophet-emissary (Moses) and in this sense it is 
even impossible to explain how it came about. In the last analysis, every 
spark of a new creation is inexplicable. One can describe the tangible his-
torical circumstances that existed at that time. But one cannot explain the 
primal flash of lightning, mysterious and creative, at the foundation of the 
new conception. 
The definition that Kaufmann gives for monotheism is not arithmetical 
in its essence. According to his view, the difference between paganism and 
monotheism is not just in the number of gods, but it is the difference be-
tween a mythological worldview and a non-mythological one. A mytholog-
ical worldview assumes the existence of a primal world order that has a 
framework of cosmic laws to which even the gods are bound, and so the 
gods are subject to changes and life-events (such as birth, death, love, hate, 
weakness, empowerment) and it is possible to tell “myths” about them, that 
is to say, tales of events in the divine sphere, whereas a non-mythological 
worldview believes in a god who is absolutely sovereign, not bound to any 
law, and whose will is the source of all becoming and all reality. This defi-
nition of monotheism as non-mythological is close to the definition that 
Hermann Cohen gave in his old age in his book Religion of Reason Out of 
the Sources of Judaism, which was published posthumously in 1919. Nev-
ertheless, I do not believe that there was any direct dependency of Kauf-
mann on this neo-Kantian philosopher from Marburg. If there were such a 
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dependency, Kaufmann would have had no compunction about declaring so 
explicitly. Indeed, they do not use similar terminology, and in all Cohen’s 
explications of this matter he never uses the terms “mythological” or “non-
mythological.” We mentioned above (§ 2) that Kaufmann’s basic ideas are 
implicit in his youthful dissertation that was published five or six years 
before the appearance of Cohen’s book.11 It follows that the two came to 
similar thoughts independently of each other, or that something in the Zeit-
geist came to expression in their writings. At most, it is possible that an 
idea that appeared in Hermann Cohen’s writings reinforced an idea that had 
already found its place in Kaufmann’s thought. 
5 
Kaufmann’s general historiosophical view seeks to find support on several 
assumptions or conclusions connected to the problems of literary and his-
torical research of the Bible. Such problems include: the redaction of liter-
ary corpora (especially the Deuteronomic corpus, including the historical 
books) and the dating of the sources comprising these corpora; the fidelity 
of the testimonies embedded in the sources; the process of settlement of the 
Israelites in the land and the historical relation between Israel and the Ca-
naanite factor; the historical relation between Israelite religion and the 
mythological religions that existed in the surrounding countries. I have no 
doubt that with regard to a certain part of these problems it is possible and 
even proper to arrive at conclusions different from Kaufmann’s—but this 
does not entail rejecting his historisophic outlook in its entirety. On the 
contrary—a more flexible, tentative, and different formulation of the liter-
ary and historical facts is apt to provide support to the overall historiosoph-
ic outlook. We will spend time on some examples, but only in summary 
fashion. 
It was Kaufmann’s assumption that Israel comprised a separate arena of 
national creativity, self-enclosed, and entirely monotheistic. According to 
his argument, the Bible does not recognize the pagan-mythological concep-
tion at all. For this purpose, Kaufmann was forced to adopt a prior assump-
tion—that during the biblical period there was no symbiosis of two ethnic 
elements, the Israelite and the Canaanite. Modern biblical research deter-
                                                     
11  Hermann Cohen, Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism (trans. Simon 
Kaplan; 2nd ed.; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995). The German original appeared in 1919. 
As we said, Kaufmann spent the years of World War I in Bern, Switzerland. He spent 
the next year in Lausanne. From the beginning of 1920 he dwelt in Berlin. It follows that 
Kaufmann’s and Cohen’s paths never crossed. But there could have been some point of 
contact in the air, so to speak. For the definition that Cohen gave to monotheism, see 
Cohen, Religion, 35–49. On Kaufmann’s independence of Cohen (in connection with 
the polemic against Aḥad Ha-‛Am), see also Krapf, Yehezkel Kaufmann, 43–44. 
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mines that the Hebrew tribes that arrived from the wilderness mingled with 
the population of the Land of Canaan, and from this mixture was formed 
the new national entity of Israel. (Most recently, even more radical views 
have been advanced on this issue, for instance that no nomad factor entered 
the land from outside, and that the national transformation was based on a 
“peasants’ revolt.”) The demand to wipe out the Canaanites, expressed in 
the Bible, is explained as a projection of national sentiments that appeared 
in certain ideological circles in a period after the settlement, and it is as-
sumed that they contain no reliable expression of the process of settlement 
itself. It is Kaufmann’s position that the biblical narrative regarding the 
conquest is correct in its essentials. Even though it is suffused with vio-
lence and has no idealistic elements, it harbors the historic truth that a short 
time after the conquest the Canaanite factor in the land had been entirely—
or almost entirely—eliminated. 
But what shall we do, when in addition to the archeological findings, 
which are not always reconcilable with the biblical tradition concerning the 
conquest, we find explicit testimony in the Bible itself, that after the wave 
of conquest there remained Canaanite enclaves in various parts of the land? 
These enclaves are compiled from lists of cities, including large and central 
cities such as Gezer, Beth Shean, Taanach, Megiddo, Akko, and Jerusalem 
(Josh 15:63, 16:10, 17:11–12; Judg 1:21, 27–33). Concerning other tribes, 
whose landholds were found in the margins of the Israelite settlement bor-
ders, the text even says that they dwelt “in the midst of the Canaanites” 
(Judg 1:32–33). An appreciable portion of the cities mentioned became 
Israelite only in the period of the united kingdom.12 On the other hand, a 
key central city such as Shechem is not mentioned at all in the narratives of 
the conquest, and there is no doubt that it was not included in the first wave 
of conquest, because according to the Bible this city was destroyed only in 
the days of Abimelech (Judg 9:45), and at that time it still had Canaanite 
inhabitants (9:28, and compare 9:27: “They came to their gods’ house”). 
This is nicely confirmed by the archeological excavations in Shechem, 
which attest to its continuity of settlement from the fifteenth century BCE 
to around 1100, when the city was destroyed and was not rebuilt until the 
tenth century BCE, that is to say, in the period of the unified monarchy.13 If 
                                                     
12  The phrasing, “And it came to pass, when the Israelites became strong,” in connection 
with the Canaanite enclave in Manasseh (Josh 17:13; Judg 1:28) refers without a doubt 
to the period of the United Kingdom, when the enclave became tributary (but see 
Y. Kaufmann, Sefer Yehoshua (Jerusalem: Qiryat Sefer, 5719/1959), 205; Sefer Shofetim 
(Jerusalem: Qiryat Sefer, 5722/1962), 86). Similarly, Jerusalem and Gezer became Isra-
elite cities only in the period of David (2 Sam 5:6–9) and Solomon (1 Kgs 9:15–17). For 
the turning of “all the people remaining of the Amorites” into tributary laborers in Solo-
mon’s time, we have corroborating testimony in 1 Kgs 9:20–21. 
13  See what I wrote in my article, “The periods of Shechem,” Tziyon 38 (1973): 16–24. 
Even Kaufmann (Sefer Shofetim, 207; cf. 10–11) was forced to admit the existence of 
“an impoverished remnant” of Canaanites in Shechem (and see my article, 19 n. 43). 
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these considerations are not sufficient, let us also recall the testimony of the 
language of the Israelite tribes, which is identical in all respects with the 
Canaanite language (or at the very least is a Canaanite dialect), so that the 
prophet explicitly calls it “the speech of Canaan” (Isa 19:18).14 One should 
not imagine that the Israelite tribes adopted the Canaanite language before 
settling in the land. 
We are forced to conclude that Israel of the biblical period was com-
posed of the symbiosis of two ethnic elements. One of them, which arrived 
from outside, provided the new people with its religious faith, impassioned 
and zealous (which, with certain changes of form, would eventually turn 
into the religion of a collective that was scattered across the whole world, 
and in the course of time would be transformed into two additional reli-
gions). The second element bequeathed to the new people its language and 
material culture. Examples of similar phenomena are not lacking in various 
places and times. Sometimes the conqueror gives its language to the con-
quered, and sometimes it receives the language of the conquered but pro-
vides them with a new national identity (or even is absorbed into the con-
quered people without leaving a trace of its original culture). It is certainly 
possible for the conqueror to impart a new religious faith to the conquered. 
All these possibilities are decided by combinations of varying factors, dic-
tated by the size of the contending bodies (the conquerors and the con-
quered), their spiritual and physical vitality, and the strength of their deter-
mination—until a new equilibrium is established. But there is nothing in 
the confrontation that occurred in the course of the conquest of the land that 
would rule out the assumption that the religious faith of the conquerors, 
known to us now in its biblical formulation, was originally remote from 
any mythological worldview. 
6 
In order to prove that there was no symbiosis of two ethnic factors in the 
background of Israel’s appearance, Kaufmann was forced to accept the 
testimony of the books of Joshua and Judges on the matter of the conquest 
of the land in a simplistic fashion verging on fundamentalism. It is no acci-
dent that he rushed to write his commentaries on Joshua and Judges before 
he managed to complete his composition of his History of the Israelite Re-
ligion (and the composition remained incomplete). Kaufmann boxed him-
self in with extreme assumptions with regard to the composition and redac-
                                                     
14  In two places (2 Kgs 18:26, 28 = Isa 36:11, 13; Neh 13:24) it is called yehudit—the 
“language of Judah.” Apparently the reference is to the local dialect. The appellation 
“Hebrew” is given to it only in Greek sources from the end of the Second Temple period 
(introduction to the Greek translation of Ben Sira: Josephus A.J. 1, Introd.:2 and 1:2; 
Rev 9:1, 16:16) and in rabbinic texts (m. Yad. 4:5; y. Meg. 1:11 [71b]). 
160 MENAHEM HARAN 
 
tion of these books (and also of the Book of Samuel), and it is impossible to 
accept his assumptions from a literary and historical standpoint. His posi-
tion forces him, first of all, to argue that there is no connection of author-
ship among the four historical books comprising the “Early Prophets,” that 
each of them is a complete and independent literary work, and that they 
were each composed at a different time. Indeed, the Deuteronomist style 
that is abundant in these books is not in itself proof of a late date. As long 
as this style does not include the demand for centralizing the ritual, says 
Kaufmann, it is early and its earliest strata are rooted in the period before 
the judges. (But in Kings, which contains the demand for centralizing the 
ritual, the style itself is very late.) The beginning of the priestly style, which 
comes in large chunks in Joshua, takes us back to the beginning of Israelite 
history. These arguments open the way for Kaufmann to arrive at the 
strange conclusion that the Book of Joshua, the canonical book before us 
now, is “very close [Kaufmann’s emphasis] to the events that it narrates” 
and “was necessarily put together at the start of the period of the judges 
[that means, immediately after the conquest].” Similarly the framework of 
the Book of Judges is “very close to the period of the judges,” whereas the 
sources for the book “have their origin in the actual period of the judges.”15 
Thus we find that Kaufmann turned his back on one of the fundamental 
findings of modern biblical scholarship, namely, the finding that the histor-
ical writings [Joshua through Kings—the “Early Prophets”] are not separate 
works but a continuous composition that was edited by the Deuteronomist’s 
pen. What follows from this is that the time of the redaction of the compo-
sition could not have been earlier than the last event mentioned in it, which 
is the liberation of Jehoiachin from his prison in the thirty-seventh year of 
his exile (2 Kings 25:27, that is to say, 561 BCE). But the sources of the 
composition surely preceded this date, and the first of these dates back to 
the beginning of the Israelite monarchy (and possibly part of it prior to 
then). But given that at the time of the redaction of the composition it was 
impossible to include it all on a single scroll, they divided it into secondary 
sections, each of which had its own closed thematic circle, according to the 
rule that was observed in the ancient world (and in fact even in more recent 
times). The continuity that runs through this composition from beginning to 
end was already pointed out by Spinoza, in his characteristic manner, in 
chapter 8 of his Theological-Political Treatise, and full, energetic expres-
sion of this view was given around 190 years ago by Wilhelm De Wette 
(1780–1849) in his youthful work, Dissertatio critica-exegetica. From that 
time onward, this finding has not been refuted, despite the cumulative ef-
forts and broadening of biblical studies and the major transformations that 
                                                     
15  See Kaufmann, Sefer Yehoshua, 59–61, 79–80. (On p. 79 he says that in the hands of the 
author of the Book of Joshua—who operated, as we said, at the beginning of the period 
of the judges—was “an early Deuteronomic literature [emphasis mine] that included al-
so laws, and he cited excerpts from it.”) See also Sefer Shofetim 33, 50. 
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have occurred in it over the years.16 It would have been better for Kauf-
mann to follow the critical path and to agree with the assumptions that had 
already been given sufficient philological evidence. Even so, his historio-
sophic building would have been able to stand sturdily, and as we said—it 
would even have been stronger without relying on a support that was un-
reasonable from the start. 
Kaufmann’s prior assumptions—that Israel was a closed sphere without 
any knowledge of a mythological world view, and that at the background of 
Israel’s appearance there was no symbiosis of two ethnic elements—were 
connected with an additional assumption, that Israel had no religious syn-
cretism. For the phenomenon of religious syncretism in Israel, which the 
Bible opposed, of course, one can apparently find hints in the Bible, even 
though Kaufmann tended to dismiss most of these hints.17 Regarding the 
dismissal of many of those hints an interlocutor could quibble and raise 
questions even from the outset. But at the time that Kaufmann argued his 
case on this matter it was difficult to predict that after a certain time the 
inscriptions of Kuntillet ‛Ajrud would come to light, among which are not 
only expressions of blessing associated with the Tetragrammaton alongside 
the name of Baal, but also the astonishing combination “YHWH (…) and 
his Asherah.” Not only that, but this combination itself would later be clari-
fied by the inscription that was discovered at Khirbet el-Qôm, west of Heb-
ron, that is to say, in the innermost region of the kingdom of Judah.18 The 
discovery in Kuntillet ‛Ajrud recalls the emendation to Hosea 14:9 that 
                                                     
16  Concerning all this, see my article: “Some of the Problems of the Composition of the 
Book of Kings and the Books of the Early Prophets,” Tarbiz 37 (1968): 1–14. On the 
need to divide the Deuteronomic corpus into secondary parts and the closed thematic 
circles in each of them, see my article, “The Size of Biblical Books and the Scope of the 
Books of the Torah and Early Prophets,” Tarbiz 53 (1984): 346–52. 
17  See Kaufmann, Toledot ha-Emunah ha-Yisre’elit (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: Bialik and 
Devir, 1937-1056), 1:421–2, 591–3, 661–81; 2:221–38, 267–8; 3:95–7, 115–7, 382–91, 
etc. Kaufmann admits that there existed public rituals to Baal and Asherah in the days of 
Ahab and Jezebel (1 Kgs 16:32–33; 18:19–40, etc.), in the days of Athaliah (2 Kgs 
11:18), and the introduction of the statue of Asherah into the Jerusalem Temple in the 
days of Manasseh (2 Kgs 21:3, 7–8, etc.). But he emphasizes that these rituals were es-
tablished for political reasons and had no popular basis. But it is reasonable that the roy-
al endorsement given to these rituals could only increase their importance and not di-
minish it. 
18  See André Lemaire, “Les Inscriptions de Khirbet El-Qôm et l’Ashérah de Yhwh,” RB 84 
(1977): 597–603. For other readings of the inscription in its entirety, see the reviews of 
Ziony Zevit, “The Khirbet el-Qôm Inscription Mentioning a Goddess,” BASOR 255 
(1984): 39–47, and Saul Olyan, Asherah and the Cult of Yahweh in Israel (Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1988). Khirbet el-Qôm has been identified with the biblical Makkedah. 
On the inscription of Kuntillet ‛Ajrud, see Ze’ev Meshel, Kutillet ‛Ajrud (Israel Muse-
um, catalog #175; Jerusalem: Israel Museum, 5738/1978); and the review of studies by 
Olyan, Asherah, 25–33. It has been suggested that the form asherato with the third-
person inflection could not signify the goddess herself but only the ritual object, the tree 
(which could symbolize the goddess), and this objection has substance. 
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Wellhausen suggested a century ago—an emendation that at its time ap-
peared strange but in the light of the inscription appears to be quite reason-
able. In place of ani ‛aniti va-ashurenu (“I answer and I look upon him”), 
which is a senseless sentence,**** Wellhausen suggested the reading “I am 
his Anat and his Asherah.” According to this, the words are spoken as a 
polemic from YHWH’s mouth, and “only a prophet of the stature of Hosea 
could permit himself to put such words in YHWH’s mouth.”19 On the other 
hand, the idolatrous or syncretistic character of the religion of the Jews of 
Elephantine is far from certain, as some scholars have already demonstrat-
ed.20 Kaufmann took a fine position regarding the Jews of Elephantine and 
emphasized that the Jews of Elephantine “consider themselves to be wor-
shippers of YHWH (i.e., Yahu) and only to Him do they build a temple.”21 
In any case, it is true also on this issue of religious syncretism that 
Kaufmann would had done better to soften his stance and to make it more 
flexible, without having to retract his overall historiosophical outlook. For 
it is impossible to deny that Gnostic elements, and even outright mytholog-
ical elements, succeeded in the course of history in finding a foothold in 
Christianity and also in Judaism. In spite of this, these religions did not 
cease being monotheistic in their primary embodiment and by their own 
definition. It is not impossible, therefore, that on the margins of Israelite 
religion of the biblical period “wild growths” could find a place, without 
penetrating into the Bible and without uprooting the overall non-mytho-
logical character of the religion. 
                                                     
**** Translator’s note: i.e., senseless in the context. The verse reads: Ephraim mah li od 
ba’atzabim [ani ‛aniti va’ashurenu] ani kivrosh ra’anan mimmeni peryekha nimtza 
(Ephraim: What have I to do with idols? [disputed phrase] I am like an evergreen cy-
press. From me comes your fruit.) 
19  Wellhausen’s emendation was accepted by Eissfeldt (and the quotation is from his 
words) and other scholars. See Julius Wellhausen, Kleine Propheten übersetzt und er-
klärt (Berlin: Reimer, 1892) ad loc.; Otto Eissfeldt, Kleine Schriften (Tübingen: Mohr, 
1973), 5:10; and compare Moshe Weinfeld, Shnaton 4 (1980): 280–2. 
20  Weinfeld is not of this opinion (ibid. 281). But Anat-Yahu, in whose name Menahem 
ben Shalom swears (CAP 44, line 3) and whom Weinfeld mentions, was conceived ap-
parently as a specific embodiment of Yahu and served in household ritual. The impres-
sion of Anat in the lives of Elephantine Jews was meager, and her name does not appear 
as an element in personal names. As for the offering to Anat-Beth-El (CAP 22, line 
125), it was apparently not included among the offerings to Yahu, the God of the Jews 
of Elephantine, as Moshe David (Umberto) Cassuto demonstrated in Sifrut Miqrait ve-
sifrut kena‛anit (Jerusalem: Magnes, 5732/1972), 1:279–86. For a general summary of 
the religion of the Jews of Elephantine, with reservations about defining it as syncretis-
tic, see Bezalel Porten, Archives from Elephantine (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Universi-
ty of California Press, 1968), 173–279. 
21  Kaufmann, Toledot, 1:681. Cassuto, Sifrut, 1:279, blamed him unjustly for accepting the 
“prevailing view” that the religion of the Elephantine Jews was idolatrous. 
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One of the sages of the Middle Ages said: “The essence of every thing 
in the world is its center.”22 Kaufmann did not recognize the existence of 
the peripheries, but the definitions that he gave for the phenomena of the 
center, or the center of the phenomena, were quite correct and captured the 
heart of the phenomena. 
                                                     
22  Kitvei Rabbenu Bahya [ben Asher ibn Halawa] (ed. Chaim Dov Chavel; Jerusalem, 
5730/1970), Kad ha-Kemaḥ, Shavu’ot, 404. 
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Kaufmann and the Bible  
  
  
The Rise, Decline, and Renewal  
of the Biblical Revolution 
Israel KNOHL 
1 
The predominantly accepted view among biblical scholars posits that Isra-
elite religion developed in a linear fashion, from polytheism to monothe-
ism. This was a gradual shift from the belief in many gods, to the belief in 
one God, Yahweh, and the complete negation of the existence of all other 
deities. 
According to this view, the first stage of this process was the polytheis-
tic stage in which Yahweh was one of a family of Canaanite gods. Accord-
ing to scholarship, this stage is reflected in the version of Moses’ Song as 
found in the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Septuagint. On the basis of this ver-
sion of Deut 32:8–9, scholars contend that Yahweh was one of the sons of 
Elohim, or in other words one the children of El or Elyon.1 A similar argu-
ment is based on Psalm 82.2 This polytheistic stage is corroborated, accord-
ing to many scholars, by the inscriptions found in Khirbet el-Qom and 
Kuntillet Ajrud, where the expression, “For Yahweh and his Asherah” 
(התרשאלו הוהיל), is recorded.3 According to these scholars this is evidence 
that the goddess Asherah was considered to be Yahweh’s consort. 
The next stage in the development of Israelite religion is monolatry. It is 
at this point, as the theory goes, that Israelites were required to worship 
Yahweh exclusively. This requirement, however, did not preclude the ex-
istence of other gods. An expression of this monolatry is evident, for exam-
ple, in the Song on the Sea, in the expression, “Who is like you among the 
gods, O Yahweh” (Exod 15:11). This verse and others like it (e.g., Pss 
77:14; 89:7) do not deny the existence of other gods; they simply elevate 
Yahweh above other gods. This monolatrous view is also reflected, per-
haps, in the second of the Ten Commandments, in the injunction: “You 
                                                     
1 See, for instance, Mark S. Smith, The Origins of Biblical Monotheism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 48–49. 
2 See Smith, Origins of Biblical Monotheism, 48–49, and the recent discussion of Peter 
Machinist, “How Gods Die, Biblically and Otherwise,” in Reconsidering the Concept of 
Revolutionary Monotheism (ed. Beate Pongratz-Leisten; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 
2011), 189–240. 
3  See, Smith, Origins of Biblical Monotheism, 73–74. 
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shall have no gods but me” (Exod 20:2). In this case as well, there is no 
abnegation of other deities, just a prohibition against their worship.4 
Scholars who accept this paradigm of linear development argue that the 
standard-bearers of this monolatrous exclusivity were the prophets of the 
ninth century B.C.E, such as Elijah, Elisha, and their followers in later pe-
riods, such as Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Jeremiah.5 However, the majority 
of the Israelites did not accept this command to worship Yahweh exclusive-
ly and continued to worship other gods in addition to Yahweh. 
The third and final stage according to this paradigm of linear progres-
sion is complete monotheism. This stage is reflected primarily in the 
prophecies of Deutero-Isaiah. At this point in time the existence of all gods 
is repudiated, except for Yahweh: “I am first, and I am last, and there is no 
god except for me” (Isa 44:6), “I am Yahweh and there is no god but 
me…for there is none but me, I am Yahweh and there is none other” (Isa 
45:5-6). In this view, Israelite religion reaches its peak at the end of the 
Babylonian period, after a long period of development.  
This paradigm suggests that before the Babylonian exile most Israelites 
still accepted polytheism in some form. But following the crisis of exile 
and destruction, many of those who were displaced to Babylon decided to 
divest themselves of idolatry. Only during the Babylonian exile did the 
Israelite majority become monotheistic. 
2 
Yehezkel Kaufmann was critical of two aspects of this theory of linear 
progression: 
1. The definition of what constituted Israelite monotheism. 
2. The notion of the gradual development of Israelite religion. 
Kaufmann objected to seeing the issue of many gods as opposed to one god 
as the defining the main aspect of biblical monotheism. Thus, for example 
regarding Freud’s book, Moses and Monotheism he makes the following 
claim: “The prevalent premise is that the central aspect of monotheism is 
the belief in one god. But in truth monotheism is not an arithmetic concept, 
and the number of gods is not the governing principle. Oneness is only one 
aspect of the essence of monotheism, the crux being a belief in one god 
who does not represent any natural power, and that no power of nature 
                                                     
4  See William H. C. Propp, Exodus (2 vols.; AB; New York: Doubleday, 1999–2006), 
2:167.  
5  This is the “Yhwh-alone” party according to Morton Smith’s Palestine Parties and 
Politics That Shaped the Old Testament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971). 
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governs him.”6 This excerpt accords with Kaufmann’s definition of biblical 
belief in his book, The Religion of Israel: “The basic idea of Israelite reli-
gion is that God is supreme over all. There is no realm above or beside him 
to limit his absolute sovereignty. He is utterly distinct from, and other than, 
the world.”7 It is through this lens that Kaufmann explicates the principles 
of polytheism, which he views as absent from the Bible. 
He argues that there is no theogony in the Bible. There is no account of 
God’s coming into being through any material medium and there is no ac-
count of God being born. Moreover, the myths of the Bible do not include 
some of the central motifs of polytheistic legends. God has no family histo-
ry. God has no father, no brother, and no son rooted in reality or conceived 
through God’s seed. God does not die or procreate. He is not lustful and 
does not have sexual relations, nor does he have any sexually conceived 
offspring.8 
In other words, Kaufmann dismisses the prevalent view which sees the 
shift from many gods to one god as the central axis of the development of 
biblical religion. According to him this aspect of monotheism is secondary. 
The central aspect of the biblical belief system is not the belief in the one-
ness of the divinity, but rather the existence of a supreme divinity divorced 
from nature and natural laws.  
The second facet of Kaufmann’s disagreement with the accepted views 
on the development of biblical religion is the idea of progression. Namely, 
at the center of the accepted paradigm is a linear development in many 
stages. According to Kaufmann, Moses was the first prophet who con-
ceived of the basic idea of biblical religion and the first to teach it to the 
Israelites.9 In Moses’ time the Israelite tribes were in the midst of a reli-
gious struggle between monotheistic ideas and the polytheistic practices 
that had been the norm beforehand. The battle for supremacy was decided 
quickly and Moses’ monotheism won out. This lightning victory is parallel, 
according to Kaufmann, to Muhammad’s victory against the idolatrous 
tribes of the Arabian Peninsula.10  
According to Kaufmann this religious revolution occurred at the very 
dawn of Israelite history and ultimately led to the elimination of polytheism 
in Israel. Based on this view, Kaufmann casts doubt on the historical evi-
dence the books of Judges and Kings offer concerning idolatrous practices 
during the period of Judges and during the monarchy.11 Polytheism at that 
                                                     
6  See Yehezkel Kaufmann, Mi-Kivshona Shel Ha-Yetzirah Ha-Mikrait (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 
1966), 254 (Hebrew, my translation). See also Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel (trans. 
and abridged by Moshe Greenberg; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 226–27. 
7  Kaufmann, Religion of Israel, 60. 
8  Kaufmann, Religion of Israel, 67–72.  
9  Kaufmann, Religion of Israel, 223–31. 
10  Kaufmann, Religion of Israel, 231 n. 8. 
11  Kaufmann, Religion of Israel, 138–47, 260–61. 
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time was a fringe phenomenon, according to him, and was practiced by a 
small minority of Israelites. The exception to this was the reign of Ahab, 
who, under the influence of his wife Jezebel of Sidon, made the worship of 
Baal the state religion.12  
This view led Kaufmann to the conclusion that the book of Hosea was 
composed by two prophets.13 The first three chapters of this book were 
composed, according to him, by a prophet who lived during the reigns of 
Ahab and his son Yehoram. It is for this reason that the chapters speak of 
the people worshipping Baal, a practice that was prevalent at that time. 
One may, therefore, summarize Kaufmann’s position as a rejection of 
the paradigm of linear progression in many stages. He claims that the cen-
tral idea of Israelite religion appeared fully developed at the very beginning 
of Israelite history. Moses, according to him, was the innovator of this revo-
lutionary idea, and it was in Moses’ day that the popular revolution oc-
curred and that idolatry was eliminated in Israel. Since the peak of this 
belief-system occurred at the beginning of Israelite history, it did not de-
velop in later generations, and there was no process of substantial devel-
opment, but rather a one-time revolution. 
3 
Which is the case? Did Israelite monotheism develop through a revolution 
at the dawn of Israelite history as Kaufmann argued, or did it follow a line-
ar progression? I suggest that Kaufmann’s claim should be accepted or 
rejected based on empirical evidence. 
According to archaeological evidence, about 300 new villages of modest 
size were built in the mountains of central Canaan over a period of two 
hundred years, between 1200 and 1000 BCE. Most archaeologists agree 
that these settlements were built by the first Israelites or proto-Israelites. In 
the past hundred years extensive archaeological surveys and digs14 of these 
settlements were undertaken, and as several scholars have pointed out, the 
evidence from this period, Iron I, or the period of the Judges is quite sur-
prising: In all of the Israelite settlements of the Iron I period, in the moun-
tains, almost no anthropomorphic statues or figurines were found.15 
                                                     
12  Kaufmann, Religion of Israel, 140–41. 
13  Kaufmann, Religion of Israel, 368–77. 
14  About 10% of these settlements were excavated. 
15  See William G. Dever, “Material Remains and the Cult of Ancient Israel,” in The Word 
of the Lord Shall Go Forth: Essays in Honor of David Noel Freedman (eds. Carol L. 
Meyers and Michael O’Connor; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1983), 571–87, esp. 
574, 583; Ronald S. Hendel, “The Social Origins of the Aniconic Tradition in Early Is-
rael,” CBQ 50 (1988): 367; Theodore J. Lewis, “Divine Images: Aniconism in Ancient 
Israel,” JAOS 118 (1998): 36–53, esp. 42–43. 
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To the best of my knowledge there are only two possible exceptional 
cases: (1) An anthropomorphic head of a broken clay figurine which was 
found in Iron I, Israelite Dan16; (2) An anthropomorphic bronze statuette 
which was found within a metal objects hoard under the floor of an Israelite 
cult room in the Israelite settlement at Hazor.17 But even this evidence is 
inconclusive, since there are scholars who claim that in reality the Hazor 
bronze figurine should be attributed to an earlier non-Israelite period, 
namely the Late Bronze period.18 Thus, Christoph Uehlinger argues that 
“The Hazor figurine apparently represented no more to his last owner than 
just its metal value and recycling potential.”19 In a recent discussion, based 
on further excavations in the site, Doron Ben-Ami argues against the possi-
bility that the bronze figurine and the other metal objects were put as foun-
dation deposits before the establishment of the first Israelite cult room at 
Area B.20 
There is also scant evidence of zoomorphic figurines and statues in the 
Israelite settlement of this period. The main finding is a bull figurine, un-
earthed by Amihai Mazar in the area of Manasseh.21 In this case, however, 
the bull could be seen as the platform upon which the god stands.22 
One must emphasize that the absence of anthropomorphic icons from Is-
raelite sites in the central mountains in the period of the Judges, or Iron I, is 
                                                     
16  Avraham Biran, “Tel Dan—Five Years Later,” Biblical Archaeologist 42 (1980): 168–
82, esp. 178–179; Biran, Biblical Dan (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1994), 
142. There are several cases where schematic and non-schematic human faces were en-
graved on jar-handles; see Israel Finkelstein, The Archaeology of the Israelite Settlement 
(Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1988), 286–89. However, such handles engrav-
ings are clearly different from independent idols.  
17  This figurine which was found in a jug which was deposited under the floor of a cult 
room in the 11th century Israelite village at Hazor, see Ora Negbi, “The Metal Figu-
rines,” in Hazor III–IV (ed. Amnon Ben-Tor; Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 
1989), 353–62. On the identity and character of this figurine see Gösta W. Ahlström, 
“An Israelite God Figurine, Once More,” VT 25 (1975): 106–9; Othmar Keel and Chris-
toph Uehlinger, Gods, Goddesses, and Images of God in Ancient Israel (trans. Thomas 
H. Trapp; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), 118.  
18  See Dever, “Material Remains,” 583 n. 12; Lewis, “Divine Images,” 43. On the other 
hand, the entire Hazor cult room was dated by Ziony Zevit to the 10th century; see The 
Religions of Ancient Israel: A Synthesis of Parallactic Approaches (London: Continu-
um, 2001), 205. If this dating is accurate, this figurine might not be relevant to our dis-
cussion of Iron I praxis. 
19  Christoph Uehlinger, “Anthropomorphic Cult Statuary in Iron Age Palestine and the 
Search for Yahweh’s Cult Images,” in The Image and the Book: Iconic Cults, Ani-
conism, and the Rise of Book Religion in Israel and the Ancient Near East (ed. Karel 
van der Toorn; Leuven: Peeters, 1997), 92–155, esp. 104.  
20  Doron Ben-Ami, “Early Iron Age Cult Places—New Evidence from Tel Hazor,” Tel 
Aviv 33 (2006): 121–33, 127.  
21  On the bull see Amihai Mazar, Archaeology of the Land of the Bible (ABRL; New 
York: Doubleday, 1990), 350–352; Keel and Uehlinger, Gods, Goddesses, 118–20. 
22  See, Ronald S. Hendel, “Aniconism and Anthropomorphism in Ancient Israel,” in The 
Image and the Book, 205–228, esp. 218 and n. 47.  
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at odds with the archaeological finds from the previous period, the Late 
Bronze period. Many anthropomorphic figurines and statuettes were found 
in this area.23 The above evidence is also at odds with the archaeological 
findings from other areas in Canaan from Iron I, inhabited by Canaanites 
and Philistines. In the latter areas, archaeological surveys located many 
anthropomorphic statues and figurines.24 
This archaeological evidence corroborates Kaufmann’s claim that the 
monotheistic revolution which banned idols occurred at the beginning of 
Israelite history and that it is for this reason that we do not find almost any 
statues or figurines of gods and goddesses in Israelite settlements from the 
period of the Judges. 
It is possible of course that there were some exceptional cases where 
people represent the figure of Yahweh in statue or figurine. This is explicit-
ly said in the account of Judg 17:3–4 about Micah. According to the end of 
this story, this statue was taken by the people of the tribe of Dan and was 
worshiped later in the city of Dan (Judg 18:29–31). It might be significant 
that the only clear evidence for an anthropomorphic figurine in an Israelite 
settlement of the Iron I age comes from Dan!25 
The Israelites of that period, according to the archaeological evidence, 
did not represent God with anthropomorphic statues. If one adopts the ter-
minology suggested by Mettinger,26 one may say that the Israelite belief of 
that time was one of programmatic aniconism.  
As was argued convincingly by Doron Ben-Ami, the accumulative evi-
dence brings to the conclusion that the dominant and central item of the 
early Israelite places was a single aniconic Massebah stone.27 It is reasona-
ble to assume that the single aniconic Massebah stone was a symbol of the 
presence of the single God of the early Israelites—Yahweh. 
As I mentioned above, the first Israelites built about 300 new villages. 
Israel Finkelstein noted in a recent monograph that only one of these set-
tlements shows any signs of public construction.28 The buildings he refers 
to are the large storehouses for food in Shiloh, which may indicate that 
Shiloh was an important cultic center, at least regionally. According to 
Finkelstein, the absence of public buildings in the other settlements is evi-
dence that the Israelite villages of that period were not organized under any 
political or national structure. One cannot attribute, therefore, the absence 
of the anthropomorphic idols to any central authority, of which there is no 
                                                     
23  See Keel and Uehlinger, Gods, Goddesses, 272–4: Lewis, “Divine Images,” 42. 
24  See Mazar, Archaeology of the Land of the Bible, 323–26, 357; Keel and Uehlinger, 
Gods, Goddesses, 120–24.  
25  See, Biran, “Tel Dan.”  
26  Tryggve N. D. Mettinger, No Graven Image? Israelite Aniconism in its Ancient Near 
Eastern Context (ConBOT 42; Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1995). 
27  Ben-Ami, Early Iron Age, 129–132.  
28  Israel Finkelstein, The Forgotten Kingdom: The Archaeology and History of North-
ern Israel (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2013), 26. 
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evidence at the time. It seems likely, therefore, that the collective rejection 
of idolatry in the Israelite villages of that period was achieved prior to the 
actual settlement of Israelite tribes in the area. 
I submit that one may offer additional archaeological corroboration for 
this claim: The city of Hazor was, as is well known, the largest city in Ca-
naan during the Late Bronze period. According to archaeological evidence 
Hazor was destroyed and burnt down during the second half of the thir-
teenth century BCE.29 I share Amnon Ben-Tor’s opinion30 that the only 
viable candidate for the destruction of Hazor at that time were the Israelites. 
The conquerors of Hazor defaced and seriously mutilated the icons that 
had been erected in the city. Ben-Tor, who wrote an article summarizing 
this phenomenon, describes this systematic mutilation of anthropomorphic 
statues.31 
As I mentioned above, the destruction of Hazor occurred in the second 
half of the thirteenth century BCE. As is well known, this is the same peri-
od that Pharaoh Merneptah offers the first written evidence of the existence 
of the Israelites in Canaan. As it is well known, in his victory stela he 
boasts of his war against the Israelites of that time during his campaign in 
Canaan, which took place around 1210 BCE. The destruction of Hazor by 
the Israelites accords, therefore, with the information from Merneptah’s 
monument about their presence at the area at this time. 
                                                     
29  See Kenneth A. Kitchen, “An Egyptian Inscribed Fragment from Late Bronze Hazor,” 
IEJ 53 (2003): 20–28; Amnon Ben-Tor, “Who Destroyed Canaanite Hazor?” BAR 39 
(2013): 31. 
30 See Ben-Tor, “Who Destroyed Canaanite Hazor?” 32–33; Ben-Tor, “The Fall of the 
Canaanite Hazor—The ‘Who’ and ‘When’ Questions,” in Mediterranean Peoples in 
Transition: Thirteenth to Early Tenth Centuries BCE (eds. Seymour Gitin et al.; Jerusa-
lem: Israel Exploration Society, 1998), 456–67. Sharon Zukerman has suggested the 
Hazor was burnt by the poor local population against the ruling classes (Zukerman, 
“Anatomy of Destruction: Crisis Architecture, Termination Rituals and the Fall of Ca-
naanite Hazor,” Journal of Mediterranean Archeology 20 [2007]: 1–31). However, as 
was pointed out by Na’aman and Ben-Tor, there are serious problems in Zukerman’s 
theory. See Ben-Tor, “Who Destroyed,” 33; Nadav Na’aman, “Hazor in the Fourteenth-
Thirteenth Centuries BCE, in the Light of Historical and Archaeological Research,”  
Eretz-Israel 30 (Amnon Ben-Tor Volume; Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 2011), 
333–41, esp. 336–37. Na’aman himself (339–41) relates the conquest to nomadic ele-
ments in the area but objects to seeing them as Israelites or proto-Israelites. In my view 
the similarity of the systematic aniconism represented both by Hazor’s conquerors (see 
below) and by the Israelites in the villages of the Iron I period, supports Ben-Tor’s view 
that the city was conquered by the early Israelites.  
31  See Amnon Ben-Tor, “The Sad Fate of Statues and the Mutilated Statues of Hazor,” in 
Confronting the Past: Archaeological and Historical Essays on Ancient Israel in Honor 
of William G. Dever (eds. Seymour Gitin et al.; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2006), 
3–16. 
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Only a small number of the 300 aforementioned settlements were estab-
lished prior to 1200 BCE.32 The conquest and the destruction of Hazor took 
place, therefore, at the beginning of the Israelite settlement process in Ca-
naan. The systematic mutilation of icons at Hazor is evidence that the Isra-
elites were ideologically against idolatry from the very beginning.33 
The virtual absence of anthropomorphic figurines and statuettes from Is-
raelite settlements of the Iron I period and the systematic mutilation of 
icons at Hazor corroborate Kaufmann’s claim that the religious revolution 
rejecting idolatry was adopted by the majority of the early Israelite popu-
lace. It is therefore also likely that Kaufmann is justified in his opinion that 
the historical veracity of the biblical sources that claim that the Israelites 
were idolatrous during the period of Judges is doubtful. It stands to reason 
that these statements should be attributed to a redactional layer added to the 
book during a late period. This layer wanted to depict the period of Judges 
as negative and anarchic: “In those days there was no king in Israel, and 
every man did as he wished” (Judg 18:1; 19:1; 21:25). 
I accept Theodore Lewis’ contention that programmatic aniconism was 
very rare phenomenon in the ancient Near East.34 The sole example outside 
of Israel comes from Egypt in the mid-14th century BCE, under the domin-
ion of Akhenaten. The question about possible impact of Akhenaten on 
biblical religion is outside of the scope of this study. 
4 
Though I accept Kaufmann’s claims regarding the religious revolution at 
the dawn of Israelite history and the absence of idolatry during the period 
of the Judges, I disagree with him regarding the monarchic period. 
As Othmar Keel and Ronald Hendel have noted there is an apparent 
connection between opposition to idols and opposition to the monarchy.35 
Hendel suggests that since in Canaanite religion the king was sometimes 
depicted as sitting on a throne on top of cherubs, the Israelites left the 
throne empty. In polytheistic cultures the similar anthropomorphic repre-
sentation of gods and kings expresses the divinity of the monarchs. 
                                                     
32  See Finkelstein, Archeology, 315–321, and Avraham Faust, Israel’s Ethnogenesis: 
Settlement, Interaction, Expansion and Resistance (London: Equinox, 2006), 159–69. 
33  I think that the Israelites of Iron Age I were a heterogenic group combined of various 
elements, some of them local, others outsiders. As was noted by Faust, Israel’s Ethno-
genesis, 172–74, most scholars agree that some of the proto-Israelites came from outside 
of Canaan.  
34  Lewis, “Divine Images,” 50. 
35  Othmar Keel, Jahwe-Visionen und Siegelkunst: Eine neue Deutung der Majestätsschil-
derungen in Jes 6, Ez 1 und 10 und Sach 4 (Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1977) 
39–40; Hendel, “Social Origins,” 365–82. 
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W. W. Hallo and Hendel argued that Israelite aniconism reflects an opposi-
tion to monarchy and to the elevation of the king to divine status.36 
In my opinion, the deeper connection between the opposition to the 
monarchy and to the negation of iconic representation of the God of Israel 
derives from the basic idea of biblical religion as presented by Kaufmann. 
Monarchic ideology in the ancient Near East represented the king as a di-
vine figure, who was sometimes referred to as the “son of God.”37 This 
ideology is in direct contrast to the central idea of biblical religion, namely 
the complete disconnection between God and the natural world, and be-
tween God and the world of humans. How then could a human monarch be 
described as a divine being and as the son of God? Does this not fly in the 
face of the complete disconnect between God and the biological realities of 
birth and procreation? 
In my view, the desire to elevate God above nature and its laws and 
above human beings led the first Israelites, living in the period of the Judges, 
to reject the monarchy and monarchic ideology prevalent in most of ancient 
Near Eastern society with its tendency to elevate kings to divine or semi-
divine status. This desire to elevate God and distinguish between what was 
divine and what was human is also the reason why the Israelites refrained 
from depicting God in the form of an anthropomorphic icon. Similarly, the 
first Israelites rejected the popular idea of a family of gods, which was ac-
cepted by most ancient Near Eastern societies. It is for this reason that no 
evidence of worship of a goddess was ever found in the Israelite settle-
ments of Iron I, be it Asherah, Anat, or Ashtoret. 
This principled rejection of the monarchy did not, however, exist forev-
er. It is likely that because of the military pressure exerted by the Philis-
tines, the Israelites decided to appoint a monarch who could save them 
from their enemies. The foundation of the monarchy in Saul’s time, at the 
end of the 11th century BCE, was the beginning of a fundamental shift in 
Israelite culture. The founding of the monarchy was a “ticket of admission” 
to the family of nations. Following the foundation of the monarchy the 
phenomenon of diplomatic marriages with neighboring polities became 
prevalent. This was common practice in the ancient Near East going back 
hundreds of years. We read of David’s marriage to Maacah the daughter of 
the King Geshur, Solomon’s marriage to Pharaoh’s daughter, and Ahab’s 
                                                     
36  William W. Hallo, “Texts, Statues and the Cult of the Divine King,” in Congress Vol-
ume: Jerusalem 1986 (ed. John A. Emerton; VTSup 40; Leiden: Brill, 1988), 54–65; 
Hendel, “Aniconism and Anthropomorphism,” 225–28.  
37 The basic discussion is by Henri Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods: A Study of Ancient 
Near Eastern Religion as the Integration of Society and Nature (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1948). As was pointed out by Frankfort, there is difference here between 
the Egyptians who elevated the Pharaohs to complete divine status and the situation in 
Mesopotamia where the king was described as being created in the divine image but was 
not perceived as a deity.  
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marriage to Jezebel the daughter of the king of Sidon.38 These foreign prin-
cesses had a major role in introducing idolatry to Israel and Judea.39 The 
establishment of the monarchy in Israel and Judah led to the adoption of 
almost all the monarchic ideology prevalent in the ancient Near East at the 
time. Some psalms relate to the king as a divine figure or the son of God. 40  
Just as the foundation of the monarchy led do the inclusion of Judah and 
Israel among the family of nations as reflected in political marriages and 
the adoption of the idea that the king has a divine status as God’s son, so 
too were the Israelites influenced by the religious cult of surrounding na-
tions. This is reflected in the findings from the monarchic period, which 
include many anthropomorphic icons. Usually these icons are of female 
figures, and scholars are unsure of their exact significance. The connection 
with the Canaanite Goddess Asherah seems reasonable.41  
I concurred above with Kaufmann that the statements regarding idolatry 
in Israel during the period of the Judges are not historical. However, I disa-
gree with Kaufmann regarding his appraisal of the monarchic period, and I 
argue that the biblical accounts and the prophetic castigation against idola-
trous practices during the monarchic period should be taken at face value, 
as a reflection of historical reality. My disagreement with Kaufmann is 
based upon archaeological evidence from the monarchic period delineated 
above. As I argued in my book, Biblical Beliefs,42 the attempts by Kauf-
mann and subsequently Ginsberg to divide the book of Hosea between two 
authors is unconvincing.43 The entire book was written by one prophet who 
                                                     
38  See Ps 45:10–16, as well. 
39  This was already noted by Kaufmann in his book Gola ve-Nekhar (2 vols.: Tel Aviv: 
Dvir, 1929), 265 (Heb.).  
40  See Sigmund Mowinckel, The Psalms in Israel’s Worship (2 vols.; Oxford: Blackwell, 
1962), 1:50–60. As was noted by Mowinckel (ibid., 59), the main difference between Is-
rael and the nations in this realm is with regard to the worship of the king as a divine be-
ing, which was not adopted by the Israelites. 
41  See Raz Kletter, Judean Pillar-Figurines and the Archaeology of Asherah (Oxford: 
Tempus Reparatum, 1996). On the northern types, see, Kletter, Judean Pillar-Figurines, 
40–48. See also Karel van der Toorn, “Israelite Figurines: A View from the Texts,” in Sa-
cred Time, Sacred Space: Archaeology and the Religion of Israel (ed. Barry M. Gittlen; 
Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2002), 56–61. However, I agree that even in this period 
there was a taboo against the representation of Yahweh in anthropomorphic image in the 
Temple. See Nadav Na’aman, “No Anthropomorphic Graven Image,” UF 31 (1999): 
391–415; Tryggve N. D. Mettinger, “A Conversation with My Critics: Cultic Image or 
Aniconism in the First Temple,” in Essays on Ancient Israel in Its Near Eastern Con-
text: A Tribute to Nadav Na’aman (eds. Yaira Amit et al.; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 
2006), 273–96. In a few cases, however, such as at the newly surveyed site at Motza, 
near Jerusalem, male idols were also discovered. 
42  Israel Knohl, Biblical Beliefs: The Borders of the Biblical Revolution (Jerusalem: Mag-
nes, 2007), 57–61 (Heb.).  
43  H. L. Ginsberg, “Studies in Hosea 1–3,” in Yehezkel Kaufmann Jubilee Volume (ed. 
Menahem Haran; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1960), 50–69; Ginsberg, “Hosea,” EncJud 8 
(1971): 1010–24. 
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lived in the eighth century BCE in the Northern Kingdom. The book of 
Hosea consistently reflects a reality in which Baal worship was not con-
fined only to the days of Ahab and Jezebel but was prevalent many years 
afterwards. 
The worship of Canaanite deities during the monarchic period did not 
lead to a wholesale abandonment of the worship of Yahweh. Instead a syn-
cretism was created which sought to adopt Yahweh into the family of Ca-
naanite gods. The inscriptions “to Yahweh and his Asherah,” which I men-
tioned above, are evidence of this tendency for syncretism. A similar ten-
dency is reflected in the Judean king Menasseh’s placement of the Asherah 
in the temple in Jerusalem (2 Kings 21:7). 
In sum: Archaeological findings are evidence that idolatry was eliminat-
ed in ancient Israel prior to the Israelite settlement of Canaan and that this 
revolutionary ban was in force throughout the entire period of Judges. This 
revolution, however, did not survive during the monarchy. Understandably, 
there were leaders and movements which sought to preserve the zealous 
fire of this revolution, and these leaders and movements often held anti-
monarchic views as well. In this context one may point to Elijah and Hosea 
in the north. A similar northern circle is possibly responsible for the early 
kernel of the book of Deuteronomy.44 
5 
The conquest of the Northern Israelite kingdom and the subsequent exile of 
many of its inhabitants by the Assyrians in 720 BCE, followed by the de-
struction of Jerusalem and the Babylonian exile about 150 years later, 
marked the end of the monarchic period in Israel. 
Most of the Israelite refugees disappeared in the great population trans-
fers engineered by the Assyrians and their memory is lost. Some remnant 
of monarchic Israelite culture may be found in the Israelite settlement in 
Yeb (Elephantine). Here, we once again find the religious syncretism which 
we discussed above. Yahweh was worshipped but the God of Bethel was 
also revered. Like their monarchic predecessors, the Israelite settlers in 
Elephantine looked for a female spouse to Yahweh. They probably under-
stood the Canaanite goddess Anat to be Yahweh’s consort.45 
Amid the exiled Judean populace, however, a further revolution took 
place. The trauma of the destruction of Jerusalem and the exile led to the 
abandonment of idolatrous practices. The loftiest formulation of these be-
liefs was articulated by Deutero-Isaiah who lived at this time. This prophet 
                                                     
44  On the possible northern roots of Deuteronomy, see Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy 1–
11 (AB; New York: Doubleday, 1991), 44–57.  
45  See John Day, Yahweh and the Gods and Goddesses of Canaan (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 2002), 142–44. 
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sharply castigated idol worship and expressed the monotheistic claims in 
absolute terms.46 Deutero-Isaiah also rejected any hopes for a renewal of 
the Davidic monarchy. This rejection is expressed in Deutero-Isaiah’s 
promise to the entire people to grant them: “David’s eternal grace” (Isa 
55:3).47 Indeed Deutero-Isaiah gave the titles “Messiah” and “Shepherd” to 
the Persian ruler Cyrus (Isa 44:28–45:1). 
However, unlike some of the Egyptian writings of this period who gave 
the Persian rulers divine titles and status, Deutero-Isaiah refrained from 
doing so.48 In his eyes no one can be compared to YHWH: “To whom will 
you compare God and what image shall you accord Him…to whom shall 
you compare me and to whom am I equal, says the Holy One” (Isa 40:18, 
25). 
One may therefore claim that when the monarchy and monarchic views 
died out in Israel during the Persian period, the anti-iconic revolution was 
revived and refined.49 
6 
At the beginning of this study, I contrasted the idea that Israelite religion 
developed linearly in many stages with Kaufmann’s idea of a sudden popu-
lar revolution, which occurred in Moses’ time and which led to a complete 
rejection of idolatry. 
As I articulated above, I disagree with both these paradigms. As op-
posed to Kaufmann, I do not think that a single revolution in Moses’ time 
completely eradicated idolatry, but rather this eradication was a process of 
many years. In contrast with the idea of progression, I suggest that this 
process was not linear, but rather a lengthy dialectical process: first a rise in 
the Judges period, then a decline in the monarchic era, then a new rise and 
refinement at the time of the Babylonian exile. 
Appendix: Onomasticon and Idolatry 
Jeffrey Tigay published his monograph You Shall Have No Other Gods in 
1986.50 His major claim is based on the very high percentage of personal 
                                                     
46  See Smith, Origins, 179–94.  
47  See Brevard S. Childs, Isaiah (Louisville KY: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 434–37. 
48  See Lisbeth S. Fried, “Cyrus the Messiah? The Historical Background to Isaiah 45:1,” 
HTR 95 (2002): 373–93. 
49  On the possible reflection the revival of the anti-iconic revolution in the material culture 
of “Yehud” in the Persian period, see the recent discussions in Christian Frevel, 
Katharine Pyschny, and Izak Cornelius (eds.), A “Religious Revolution” in Yehûd? The 
Material Culture of the Persian Period as a Test Case (OBO 267; Fribourg: Academic 
Press and Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014).  
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names containing a reference to the name YHWH in the 8th–7th centuries 
BCE This high percentage is reflected both in the biblical sources about 
this period and in the archeological findings dated to this time. Hence, 
Tigay argues that the majority of ancient Israelites in this time were wor-
shipers of YHWH. Tigay’s findings and arguments were discussed and 
elaborated by other scholars.51 
Tigay’s work seems to contradict one of the major claims of my study: 
while I see the time of the monarchy (1000–600 BCE) as a period of idola-
try and decline of monotheism, Tigay claims that at least in the second half 
of this period, idolatry was marginal in Israel and Judah. However, in my 
view, Tigay himself supplies the argument against the validity of his find-
ings to our problem. On page 17 of his book he writes the following: 
Onomastic habits change slowly, and the process is not necessarily expedit-
ed by religious revolutions, even zealous ones. Christians—both laity and 
clergy—did not begin to abandon pagan theophoric names earnestly until 
late in the fourth century. Before that, as A. Harnack put it, “Here was the 
primitive church exterminating every vestige of polytheism in her midst, ta-
booing pagan mythology as devilish .[…] and yet freely employing pagan 
names which had hitherto been in vogue!” “The martyrs perished because 
they declined to sacrifice to the gods whose names they bore!”52 It may be 
assumed that a certain percentage of pagan theophoric names survived in Is-
rael, too, simply out of inertia without their users acknowledging the deities 
they mention. 
Tigay continues and adds the following significant point: 
On the other hand, the high percentage of Yahwistic names does not neces-
sarily point to an equal percentage of monotheists or monolatrists. Even 
polytheists could give some or all their children Yahwistic names if Yah-
weh was one of the gods they worshiped. Ahab (and perhaps Jezebel) had 
sons named Ahaziah and J(eh)horam, and Athaliah may have been his 
daughter; Athaliah’s son was also named Ahaziah (1 Kg. 22:40; 2 Kg. 3:1; 
8:18, 26). 
In my view Tigay’s recognition—that “the high percentage of Yahwistic 
names does not necessarily point to an equal percentage of monotheists or 
                                                                                                                          
50  J. H. Tigay, You Shall Have No Other Gods: Israelite Religion in the Light of Hebrew 
Inscriptions (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1986), 17. 
51  See especially the recent discussions and elaborations by Seth L. Sanders, “When the 
Personal Became Political: An Onomastic Perspective on the Rise of Yah-
wism,” Hebrew Bible and Ancient Israel 4 (2015): 59–86, and Alexander Rofé, “Text 
and Context: The Textual Elimination of the Names of Gods and Its Literary, Adminis-
trative, and Legal Context,” in From Author to Copyist: Essays on the Composition, Re-
daction, and Transmission of the Hebrew Bible in Honor of Zipi Talshir (ed. Cana 
Werman; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2015), 63–79. 
52  Adolf von A. Harnack, The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three 
Centuries (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), 422–430. 
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monolatrists. Even polytheists could give some or all their children Yah-
wistic names if Yahweh was one of the gods they worshiped”—actually 
undermines the entire claim of his book. As Tigay righty notes, the major 
supporters of the Baal worship in the 8th century BCE, Ahab in Israel and 
Athaliah in Judah, gave their children Yahwistic names. This is great proof 
that the findings about the very high percentage of personal names contain-
ing a reference to the name YHWH in the 8th–7th centuries BCE cannot 
prove that the people who gave these names to their children did not wor-
ship other gods beside YHWH. 
The “Song of Deborah” is probably the best example of a literary work 
from the time of the Judges.53 As was noted by scholars, YHWH is the only 
divine name used by the author of the song for the God of Israel.54  This is 
evidence for the centrality of this divine name at this period. The continu-
ous centrality of this name in the Israelite population in the following peri-
od of the monarchy should be taken as evidence for the conservative char-
acter of the onomasticon, which, as was noted by Tigay, can be seen in 
other cultures.  
The archaeological findings of anthropomorphic icons and figurines in 
the Israelite and Judean settlements in the time of the monarchy together 
with the inscriptions that mention YHWH and Asherah are more relevant to 
our issue. These artifacts prove that unlike in the period of the Judges 
(Iron 1), in the time of the monarchy (Iron 2) many people did not kept the 
commandment: “You shall have no other gods.” 
                                                     
53  On the consensus among most scholar about the dating of this song to the period of the 
Judges see Charles. L. Echols, “Tell Me, O Muse”: The Song of Deborah (Judges 5) in 
the Light of Heroic Poetry (New York and London: T&T Clark, 2008), 44–63. I have 
argued in a recent study that the major part of the song is from the period of the Judges 
with some later editorial addition. The blaming of Israel in idolatry in Judges 5:8 be-
longs in my view to the editorial layer; see Israel Knohl, “The Original Version of Deb-
orah’s Song and Its Numerical Structure,” Vetus Testamentum 66 (2016): 45–65. 
54  See Echols, “Tell Me, O Muse,” 28, and the references to previous scholars in n. 84 
there. 
  
The Legacy of Yehezkel Kaufmann’s  
Commentaries to Joshua and Judges 
Nili WAZANA 
Introduction 
Yehezkel Kaufmann’s scholarly odyssey was initially stimulated by an 
historical-sociological question: he set out to explain the riddle of the peo-
ple of Israel, its unique history and long term existence among the nations. 
This is reflected in the expanded title of his first book Gola ve-nekhar: “Ex-
ile and Alien Lands: Socio-Historical Research on the Question of the Fate 
of the Nation of Israel from Antiquity to the Present,” published in Tel 
Aviv in 1929–1930.1 His answer to the riddle of Israel’s persistence 
throughout the ages was theological—Israel’s unique religious beliefs kept 
the people of Israel’s identity apart from their neighbors.2 The historical-
sociological question led him then to a study of the theology of biblical 
Israel, which he made public in his monumental four volume work Toledot 
ha-emunah ha-yisreʼelit (The Religion of Israel, from Its Beginnings to the 
Babylonian Exile), published in Hebrew between 1937 and 1956.3 When 
investigating the foundations of biblical theology, in particular monotheism 
which he termed דוחייה תנומא, Kaufmann accepted the premises of the his-
torical-critical school that the text was a complex human creation, and  
                                                     
1  Published by Dvir Publishing House. Original title in Hebrew: רכנו הלוג: ירוטסיה רקחמ-
הזה ןמזה דעו םדק ימימ לארשי םע לש ולרוג תלאשב יגולויצוס. My English translation of the title 
follows Thomas M. Krapf, “Yehezkel Kaufmann’s Attitude to Wissenschaft des Juden-
tums,” Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish Studies 11 (1993): 73. Peter 
Slyomovics claims that the motivation behind the historical research was Herzlian and 
secular-nationalistic in viewing practical Zionism as the only solution to the Jewish situ-
ation. See his Yitzhak Julius Guttmann and Yehezkel Kaufmann: The Relationship of 
Thought and Research (PhD diss., The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1980), 128–129 
(in Hebrew).  
2  This inquiry is very much a product of Zeitgeist at a time when new socialist and Zionist 
ideologies swept over intellectual European Jews. For a summary of the main ideas of 
the book, see Thomas Krapf, Yehezkel Kaufmann: Ein Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg zur 
Theologie der Hebräischen Bibel (Studien zu Kirche und Israel 11; Berlin: Institut Kir-
che und Judentum, 1990), 123–133. 
3  Toledot ha-emunah ha-yisreʼelit (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute and Tel Aviv: Dvir Publish-
ing House, 1937–1956). Moshe Greenberg published an abridged translation of volumes 
I–III, entitled The Religion of Israel by Yehezkel Kaufmann (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1960). C. W. Efroymson translated parts of vol. IV under the title, The Babylo-
nian Captivity and Deutero-Isaiah (New York: Union of American Hebrew Congrega-
tions, 1970). 
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accordingly rejected the concept of divine origin of the monotheistic belief. 
Yet he stressed the uniqueness of the Israelite faith reflected in the Bible 
and was unwilling to view it as a product which developed over time from 
pagan roots. This monotheistic idea was further grounded by him in what 
he understood as a unique national phenomenon, embedded in the early 
stages of the existence of Israel.4 Monotheism in his opinion sprang ex ni-
hilo and intuitively, contemporaneously with the appearance of Israel. It 
later developed culturally, but the idea of monotheism was a revolution 
rather than an evolution.5 
It was his conviction that the idea of monotheism was unique and gener-
ated only once that drew him back to historical-political issues. In particu-
lar, his theological view that there never was syncretism or even substantial 
contact between Israelite and Canaanite religions led him to investigate 
anew the conquest of the land. Kaufmann admitted his purpose in writing 
the commentaries to the books of Joshua and Judges in a letter to Moshe 
Greenberg from 12 June, 1960: “I do not plan to comment on all the For-
mer Prophets, but the case of Joshua and Judges is special: these books 
relate the beginnings of the people of Israel, and their testimony is decisive 
also for the beginnings of the religion of Israel” (emphasis in original).6 
Even more definite are Kaufmann’s opening words to his commentary on 
the book of Joshua, presenting the question with which he was struggling, 
and indicating the answer to be proposed: 
The question of the (historical) trustworthiness of the book of Joshua is of 
substantial value not only for the study of the actual political history of an-
cient Israel, but also for the study of the history of the religion of Israel.7 
According to prevalent scholarly opinion the tribes of Israel did not enter 
                                                     
4  Yehezkel Kaufmann, “The Bible and Mythological Polytheism,” JBL 70 (1951): 179–
197, in particular pp. 196–197. For his concept of scripture see Job Y. Jindo, “Concepts 
of Scripture in Yehezkel Kaufmann,” in Jewish Concepts of Scripture: A Comparative 
Introduction (ed. Benjamin D. Sommer; New York: New York University Press, 2012), 
230–246. 
5  See Peter Slyomovics, “Y. Kaufmann’s Critique of J. Wellhausen: A Philosophical-
Historical Perspective,” Zion 49/1 (1984): 61–92, especially p. 79 (in Hebrew). 
6  Quoted by Greenberg in his preface to the reissue of Y. Kaufmann, The Biblical Account 
of the Conquest of Canaan (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1985), 10. Note that Moshe Greenberg 
changed the charged word “Palestine,” which referred to the geographical entity, from 
the original 1953 English title to “Canaan” in his 1985 reissue without explanation. The 
English monograph was translated from a Hebrew manuscript by M. Dagut, and the He-
brew version was published two years later (1955 by Bialik Institute and Dvir) under the 
title ha-sippur ha-mikra’i ‛al kibush ha-aretz (“The Biblical Account of the Conquest of 
the Land”), with no specification of the name of the articulated land. This is in line with 
the fact that the biblical promissory texts themselves often tend to avoid naming the 
land, calling it “this land” (see Nili Wazana, All the Boundaries of the Land [Winona 
Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2013], 85–96). 
7  The Hebrew original here is toledot ha-emuna ha-yisreʼelit as the title of his famous 
work. The word ha-emuna is emphasized in the original. 
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the land as one people united in a religious monotheistic covenant… Mono-
theism was first created only in the latter period of prophecy. There was no 
religious contradiction between the Israelite tribes and Canaanites, and the 
Canaanites were not proscribed for religious reasons. On the contrary, the 
tribes settled within the Canaanites, merging with them, accepting their Baal 
worship. A syncretized religion, Israelite-Canaanite, of YHWH-Baal was 
created, and until many later generations there was no rejection of this reli-
gion. The book of Joshua absolutely contradicts this reconstruction of the 
beginning of Israel. It speaks of a national conquest of the land, of one 
monotheistic people led by a prophet, of proscription of the Canaanites for 
the purpose of purging the land from paganism, of Israelite faithfulness to 
God all the days of Joshua. If the book of Joshua is reliable, the prevalent 
scholarly opinion is not true.8 
Kaufmann’s theological reconstruction, evident here, thus motivated him to 
write three books related to the subject of the conquest of the land in the 
last decade of his life. Each of them and the three collectively continue to 
develop the ideas signalled so far. 
In 1953 he published a monograph (vii + 98 pages) in English entitled 
The Biblical Account of the Conquest of Palestine, in which he claimed that 
the book of Joshua was composed “by a recorder of events at the beginning 
of the period of Judges, at the time of Dan’s migration to the north”.9 Al-
though “clothed in legends from the first,” it was nonetheless historically 
reliable in terms of the success of the conquest, preserving “the iron 
framework of the actual events”. His theological point of departure is evi-
dent here too, when he claims that the tribes succeeded in overcoming the 
technical-military superior Canaanite forces which possessed cavalry and 
chariots, thanks to their unity, which had established itself in “the religio-
national covenant of the tribes made between them in the wilderness”.10 
Naturally, “the Tribes’ greatest advantage lay in the spirit with which they 
were fired, the new faith for which they fought”.11 The same faith that un-
derlies the unique history of contemporary Israel was the motivating force 
responsible for the historical success of the conquest of the land. Besides 
this monograph Kaufmann returned to the subject in two key commen-
taries, which are in fact specifically dedicated to prove the validity of his 
ideological point of departure. In 1959 he published the commentary on 
                                                     
8  Yehezkel Kaufmann, The Book of Joshua (Jerusalem: Kiryat Sepher, 1959), v (in He-
brew). This and the following quotes from his commentaries to Joshua and Judges are 
my translations from the original Hebrew. 
9  Yehezkel Kaufmann, The Biblical Account of the Conquest of Palestine (Jerusalem: 
Magnes, 1953). This quote and the next two are from p. 97. The references in this paper 
relate to the page numbers of the original 1953 edition. 
10  Ibid., 91. 
11  Ibid., 93, emphasis in original. 
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Joshua, to which he added in 1962 the commentary on Judges.12 He had 
dealt with the entire biblical corpus in his extensive four-volume History of 
the Religion of Israel, yet Joshua and Judges were the only two biblical 
books to which he dedicated a commentary. Both commentaries enable 
Kaufmann to develop interpretations which further support his view by 
validating the historicity of the conquest. When the text does not seem to 
support Kaufmann’s ideological position, the thrust of the interpretation is 
to iron out the differences. Serving his predetermined conception of the 
history of Israel’s religion, they are therefore not all-encompassing studies, 
but commentaries in service of an agenda, which he fully acknowledged: 
“The commentary will focus on discussing the book of Joshua as an histor-
ical document and literary creation”.13 In line with his general interest in 
the history of the period, his concentration on the literary aspects of the 
books is secondary as well, in service of his theological purpose. The intro-
duction to the Hebrew edition of the monograph The Biblical Story of the 
Conquest of the Land in 1955 opens with an explicit charge against the 
scientific literary-critical methods. They are responsible for the historical-
theological “chaotic” consequences: “The tendency of biblical research to 
turn the books of the Bible into a chaos of broken pieces and fragments 
ש לש והובו והותלםיסיסרו םירב( ), the tendency to ruin the biblical monuments 
by insignificant criticism and insipid eisegesis ( המ לש תרוקב-תונשרדו ךכב  
הלפת) had the most severe consequences on the study of the history of the 
beginning of Israel”.14 Kaufmann does not object to criticism as such and 
he makes use of it, but he rejects the scholars’ application of rules of “Latin 
composition” on the biblical text if it does not seem “consistent”. He op-
poses the easy use of “scissors and paste” methods in order to “emend” the 
text and avoid repetitions, contradictions, derangements of sequence etc. 
supposedly created by second- and third-hand “redactors” and “expanders,” 
“most of whom were complete fools and botchers.”15 Hence, for Kauf-
mann, both the historical investigations of the period of the conquest and 
the literary analysis of the compositions depicting it (Joshua and Judges) 
are harnessed to serve his theological chariot.  
Kaufmann’s insistence on the total separation of Israelite religion from 
any Canaanite influence is nowadays refuted by archaeological and textual 
findings. At the time, the general scholarly world was exposed to his ideas 
on the theology of Israel only in 1960, when Moshe Greenberg published 
the abridged translation of Kaufmann’s “History of the Religion of Israel”. 
His English booklet, The Biblical Account of the Conquest of Palestine 
                                                     
12  For the commentary on Joshua see above, n. 8; for Judges: Yehezkel Kaufmann, The 
Book of Judges (in Hebrew; Jerusalem: Kiryat Sepher, 1962).  
13  Joshua (above, n. 8), v. 
14  Biblical Account, 1 (see above, n. 6).  
15  Biblical Account, 2–3. See also John Bright, Early Israel in Recent History Writing 
(Chicago: Allenson, 1956), 57.  
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published in 1953, was in fact his first publication accessible to the general 
academic world, and it met severe criticism even when published. He was 
charged with “making facts fit theories,” yet noted also for the “really acute 
character of his criticism in a number of places. Many of his points are well 
taken and should not be overlooked.”16 Similarly, Harold H. Rowley recog-
nized that “he makes many shrewd observations on detailed points.”17  
Despite their inherent bias, Kaufmann’s commentaries to the books of 
Joshua and Judges reflect his genius in many aspects. He made some valu-
able contributions for the interpretation of Joshua and Judges which did not 
go unnoticed by later commentators. Published in Hebrew, their circulation 
was restricted, yet their impact on Israeli scholarship was actually substan-
tial. Paradoxically, his lasting contributions are to be found in places other 
than those related to his rigid theological agenda or his predisposed histori-
cal reconstruction. In the following I would like to demonstrate his impact 
in two cases. The first is his interpretation of inconsistencies in the se-
quence of the story of the spies, in Joshua chapter 2; the other is his expla-
nation of the differences between the “major” and “minor” judges in the 
book of Judges. As I hope to show, his most significant impact in this area 
does not lie in the details of his interpretations to this verse or that, but in 
his overall exegetical attitude to biblical prose underlying his commen-
taries. 
As noted by Moshe Greenberg in his 1985 introduction to the renewed 
printing of The Biblical Account of the Conquest of Palestine, “Kaufmann’s 
distaste for speculation on the tradition-history of the literature in question 
put him outside of the circle of western discussants.”18 It will be here fur-
ther argued that Kaufmann utilized a literary approach before it became 
popular, preferring to regard biblical stories as a unity, “working with com-
plexes of material as a whole.”19 When confronted with contradictions, 
repetitions, and inconsistencies, he related to them as literary devices rather 
than as witnesses to an editorial process. Thus, in his introduction to the 
commentary of Joshua chapter 2 Kaufmann says: “The story is uniform and 
built well, if in the elliptical style of biblical prose requiring from the reader 
(or the hearer) to complete what has not been said”.20 In his introduction to 
                                                     
16  Quoted from the book review of Cuthbert A. Simpson, JTS N.S. 6 (1955): 258. This 
criticism was ignored by Greenberg who noted three other reviews (Harold H. Rowley, 
BO 11 [1954]: 227–228; G. Ernest Wright, JBL 75 [1956]: 154–155; and John Bright 
[above, n. 15], pp. 56–78) claiming that “Western scholars received Kaufmann’s mono-
graph with respect but demurred at his conclusions” (Greenberg in the preface to the re-
issue [see above, n. 6], p. 11). When relating to criticism of Kaufmann’s polemic style, 
Greenberg (in the preface, ibid., 12) mentioned also John L. McKenzie, CBQ 17 (1955): 
95–97. 
17  Rowley (above, n. 16), 228. 
18  Greenberg (above, n. 6), 11, in the preface. 
19  Quoted from the review of Wright (above, n. 16), 155. 
20  Joshua (above, n. 8), 94. 
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the book in general Kaufmann defined the literary phenomenon which he 
termed “the elliptical character of the biblical narrative” in the following 
words:  
A special feature of the biblical story is its elliptical character. Some motifs 
appear first and are dropped later, some missing at first, to appear later. The 
story’s parts complement each other, and the author relies on the imagina-
tion and sense of the hearer or reader. That is why the biblical story entails 
“surprises”. It creates an appearance of a complicated and complex story.21  
He rejected the common critical solution to logical inconsistencies apparent 
in the chapter, which involved dividing the story to sub-units and editorial 
additions “piled together carelessly and inattentively”.22 Complications and 
inconsistencies are but appearances, “surprises” to be explained by the exe-
getical reasoning of the reader. It is this interpretive approach, rather than 
his all-encompassing ideological approach to the books of Joshua and 
Judges, which I believe had a long-lasting impact on research and is here to 
stay. 
1. The story of the spies in Jericho (Joshua chapter 2) 
This story presents difficulties in the narrative sequence, “surprises” in 
Kaufmann’s language. I shall focus on two such inconsistencies.  
1.1. Rahab’s meeting with the king’s men 
The first case is verses 1–8, which depict the beginning of the mission of 
the spies; in particular Rahab’s meeting with the king’s messengers. The 
text seems like a straightforward story, revealing the events in their chrono-
logical sequence. First the spies come to the house of Rahab and lie there 
(verse 1). The king of Jericho is informed of their mission. The Hebrew 
uses here the niphal form רַמֵאָיַּו, but the story does not reveal how he re-
ceived this information or from whom. He then sends messengers to Rahab 
(verse 2). The messengers order Rahab in verse 3: ךילא םיאבה םישנאה יאיצוה 
ךתיבל ואב רשא, literally “bring out23 the men who came to you, and/or to 
your house”. Then the story describes how the woman “took” חקתו the two 
men and “hid them” (using the singular ונפצתו, whether this is a scribal 
mistake for the plural, םנפצתו, or should be understood as “she hid each one 
of them”; verse 4a). After noting her hiding the men the story resumes Ra-
hab’s conversation with the messengers. She tells them that the people had 
                                                     
21  Ibid., 74, emphasis in original. 
22  “...הבשחמ רסוחבו תונלשרב םירבד בובגו”: ibid., 94. 
23  Translated “produce” by NJPS, and “surrender” by Robert B. Boling, Joshua (AB; 
Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1982).  
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already left as the gate, most probably the city’s gate, was closing, suggest-
ing they should chase them (4b–5). The story next returns to her act of hid-
ing them in verse 6. It then goes back to reporting how the king’s men 
leave town in pursuit of the allegedly runaway spies in the direction of the 
Jordan, closing the gate after them (7), and then takes up again the scene at 
Rahab’s house, detailing the meeting of the spies and Rahab on the roof (8). 
Within these eight verses there are two notes regarding Rahab’s hiding 
the spies. The first comes in verse 4a, between the king’s messengers’ de-
mand of her to surrender them and her answer to them, cleverly sending 
them on a wild goose chase. The second comes in verse 6 after her answer, 
and before the notice of the chase according to her recommendation. Ac-
cordingly, the inner logic of the story begs the question: how should we 
reconstruct the sequence of events? When did Rahab hide the spies in rela-
tion to her encounter with the king’s men? Was it before they came, during 
their meeting or after they left? When determining the chain of events we 
should also find out why the author chose to create this ambiguous picture. 
Why mention the act of hiding twice in verses 4a and 6, assuming she only 
hid them once? Kaufmann duly notes that the first mention of the hiding in 
v. 4a appears redundant in view of v. 6.24 
A related issue is determining where the encounter took place. If the 
spies are already in hiding, the king’s men could be standing inside her 
establishment, dangerously close to the men who might have even over-
heard them. But if the hiding took place during or after her discussion with 
the king’s men, the spies were ignorant of the looming danger; they were 
not in hiding, and Rahab and the messengers must have been standing out-
side her house. The reconstruction of the time and place of Rahab’s dia-
logue with the king’s men is intertwined with the issue of the involvement 
of Rahab, the only character granted a name in the story besides Joshua: if 
she had hidden them in advance, how did she know they were in danger? 
Was she perhaps guilty of manipulating the entire chain of events, maybe 
even the one to notify the king of their existence? No doubt, if we were to 
write a script based on the story, all those questions need to be answered. 
Yet the elliptical nature of biblical prose as Kaufmann rightly noted, leaves 
many possibilities open.  
One way to solve the issue is to remove the first “redundant” notice of 
the hiding in verse 4a, which interrupts her talk with the messengers.25 
However, there is no textual basis for this deletion or evidence that it was a 
later insertion. In order to explain this interfering note, scholars suggest that 
                                                     
24  Joshua (above, n. 8), 94, in his introduction to the chapter. 
25  Volkmar Fritz, Das Buch Josua (HAT; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr Siebeck, 1994), 33, 
wrote: “4a ist ein Nachtrag, der ausdrücklich feststellt, daß Rahab die Männer versteckt 
hat. Die Bemerkung wurde ungeschickt in das Gespräch eingefügt und ist für den Ver-
lauf der Erzählung überflüssig, da die Tat Rahabs eigentlich darin besteht, daß sie die 
Männer nicht ausliefert, indem sie ihre Anwesenheit bestreitet.” 
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the sequence must be understood differently than the mere order of men-
tioned actions. A common solution is that Rahab hid the spies before the 
demand to surrender them. As Rösel states: “The order of the biblical ac-
count does not reflect that she must have hidden the men before the mes-
sengers arrived and a dialog with them took place”.26 The scene here should 
then be reconstructed thus, in the words of another commentator: “In vv. 3–
5 Rahab converses with the king’s delegation, while the spies are in hid-
ing”.27 Both mentions of the act of hiding are accordingly out of sequence; 
both should be interpreted as pluperfect in meaning.28 This solution was al-
ready suggested by the medieval commentator Radak (Rabbi David Kimhi, 
1160–1235). Radak refers also to the place where the dialogue with the 
king’s men took place, placing the encounter explicitly inside the house. 
The timing of the hiding and the place of the conversation are indeed con-
nected: if the king’s messengers entered Rahab’s house as he assumes, 
hiding the spies on the roof had to take place before the encounter.29  
In opposition to Radak, Kaufmann places the scene outside Rahab’s 
house. This he says in relation to the demand in verse 3, םישנאה יאיצוה, 
which he understands literally “bring out the men,” saying: “the messengers 
are standing outside demanding Rahab to go in and bring the spies out to 
them” (v. 3).30 Rahab and the king’s men are according to his script stand-
ing outside her door. Rahab hears the king’s order, learning from the men 
about the spies’ identity and mission. Unlike other commentators, Kauf-
mann suggests that Rahab hid the men during her encounter with the king’s 
men, in his comment to verse 4: “And the woman took—not before the mes-
sengers arrived (Radak and others). Rahab finds out only now that the peo-
ple were Israelite spies, and immediately decides to save them. She enters 
her house as if to surrender them, but she hurries them to the roof and hides 
them.”31 
                                                     
26  Hartmut N. Rösel, Joshua (Historical Commentary on the Old Testament; Leuven: 
Peeters, 2011), 48. 
27  Richard D. Nelson, Joshua (OTL; Westminster: John Knox, 1997), 40. 
28  Boling’s (above, n. 23) translation to 2:4 is: “had taken and hidden.”  
29  Fritz (above, n. 25, p. 37, n. 4b.5), who deletes verse 4a as a later addition and holds that 
the conversation took place prior to the hiding, still claims that the king’s messengers 
were inside the house and so has to assume they were in another part of it. 
30  The only commentator who suggested similarly that the scene took place outside and 
that she hid the men during her encounter is August Dillmann, Die Bücher Numeri, Deu-
teronomium und Josua (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1886), 446: “Die Aufforderung geschah von 
aussen, da das Haus verschlossen war… V. 4. Raḥab versteckt sofort die Männer (V. 6) 
u. erklärt den Boten des Königs… V. 6. Sie aber hatte auf das platte Dach … gebracht.” 
Dilmann, however, is not mentioned in Kaufmann’s bibliography to Joshua. Radak is 
the explicit commentator to whom Kaufmann reacts in regards to where Rahab and the 
king’s messengers are standing and conducting this dialogue. 
31  Kaufmann emphasizes her ignorance also in his comment to the words “and they lay 
there” in verse 1: “the entire story is based on the assumption that at that time there was 
no one else there. When the king’s messengers came, they had already lain down to 
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In this case, his reconstruction follows the order related by the story. 
This however, leads to another question regarding the inner logic of the 
story: assuming she went in the house as if to surrender the men to the mes-
sengers, Kaufmann then must explain her words to the messengers upon 
her return to them, outside: “at dark, when the gate was about to be closed, 
the men left; and I don’t know where the men went” (v. 5). Kaufmann can-
not interpret her words as a fake admission that she knew they had already 
left her house, for that would contradict his explanation that she was igno-
rant of their mission and had entered her house only after hearing the mes-
sengers’ demand to surrender the spies pretending to bring them out. He 
suggests that her words mean: “I did not know they had not come back,” a 
typical example of his supplementing the elliptical text required in the light 
of the context.32 The second mention of the hiding in v. 6, “but she had 
taken them up to the roof and hidden them” is then a repetition. Kaufmann 
refers to the literary logic of this repetitive mention of the hiding: “in verse 
4 the hiding was told in a brief sentence, to emphasize the hurry and sud-
denness. And here the author completes the details: they really had not left 
at all, but she had hidden them on the roof.” The first mention of the hiding 
comes therefore in his reconstruction in the right chronological order, but 
the author had to cut it short for literary effect, reflecting the urgency of the 
act itself. Once the king’s men had left, the story can return to the details of 
the act: she had hidden them on the roof, among the stalks of flax.  
Kaufmann’s reconstruction accords well with the word order in verse 6: 
הגגה םתלעה איהו waw + subject + QATAL which often denotes Biblical He-
brew pluperfect,33 as opposed to the description of the same event in v. 4 by 
WAYYIQTOL forms ונפצתו םישנאה ינש תא השאה חקתו.34 The setting of the 
scene outside of Rahab’s house corresponds to the wording of the demand 
to surrender the spies: יצוהאי , literally “bring out of the house.” One may 
also add that his reconstruction brings to mind another famous biblical sce-
ne, of the Sodomites standing outside the house of Lot, explicitly before the 
door which he shuts behind him. The Sodomites demand that Lot bring out 
the men to them ( רֶשֲׁא םיִָשׁנֲאָה ֵהיַּא-םָֹתא הָעְֵדנְו וּניֵלֵא םֵאיִצוֹה הְָליָלַּה ךָיֶלֵא וּאָבּ , Gen 
19:5; cf. also Judg 19:22). This seems like an intentional literary allusion.35 
                                                                                                                          
sleep. That proves that Rahab did not know who they were and did not hide them until 
the messengers came” (p. 94). 
32  Joshua (above, n. 8), p. 95, commentary to v. 5. 
33  Compare םיפרתה תא החקל לחרו “and Rachel had taken the household gods” (Gen 31:34). 
See Jan Joosten, The Verbal System of Biblical Hebrew (Jerusalem Biblical Studies 10; 
Jerusalem: Simor, 2012), 132–133. 
34  I thank Benjamin Sommer for this insight. For Jan Joosten, however, Jos 2:4 is a kind of 
pluperfect WAYYIQTOL, illustrating retrospection which must be inferred from the 
context and is not marked syntactically. Accordingly he translates: “but the woman had 
taken the two men and hidden them” (emphasis in original, Joosten, ibid., pp. 171–172). 
35  For common literary motifs connecting the two stories, as well as the story of the con-
cubine at Gibeah (Judg 19), see Weston Fields, Sodom and Gomorrah: History and Mo-
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Shmuel Aḥituv in his 1995 Hebrew commentary to Joshua published in 
the influential series Mikra le-Yisraʼel sides with most of Kaufmann’s re-
construction but differs on the question of the sequence of events.36 He is 
not convinced that the hiding took place during the dialogue with the king’s 
messengers. He also thinks that this leaves the question of the double men-
tion of the hiding unanswered: “It is hard to imagine that Rahab left the 
king’s messengers, letting them wait while she hides the spies, and only 
then returned to them to tell them that the spies had left her house. And if 
so, why does the author repeat the act of hiding (v. 6)?” 
For this reason Aḥituv does not time the hiding during the encounter, 
but immediately following it.37 According to Aḥituv, the second mention of 
the hiding is indicative of the correct sequence of events, while the first, in 
verse 4, is ahead of time. Like Kaufmann he too rejects the possibility of 
her hiding them in advance, for like Kaufmann he too deduces that Rahab 
did not suspect they were spies until she heard about it from the king’s 
men. Before this discovery they seemed to her “like two innocent by-
passers, who came to her house to sleep.”38 She had accordingly no reason 
to hide them prior to the coming of the king’s men. It seems that Aḥituv, 
like Kaufmann, is reluctant to ascribe to Rahab manipulative motives, 
which could be attributed to her if she had hidden the men in advance. One 
may reason that Rahab is not necessarily guilty of jeopardizing the mission, 
thereby guaranteeing her and her family’s survival, even were she to hide 
the spies in advance. Many commentators have indeed tried to clear Rahab 
of suspicion in that case, as for example Radak, who writes: “she had al-
ready taken them and hidden them before the king’s messengers entered her 
home, when she sensed that the king found out” (emphasis mine). Marten 
Woudstra too claims that she had hidden them in advance, saying: “this 
explains more easily why the king’s messengers did not show suspicion. 
The woman may have sensed possible danger, and she took measures ac-
cordingly” (emphasis mine).39 But one wonders in that case how this mys-
terious intuitive knowledge reached Rahab, and whether this would have 
cleared her of suspicion in, say, a court of law. Kaufmann’s and Aḥituv’s 
emphasis on Rahab’s ignorance regarding the visitors’ true identity prior to 
the coming of the king’s envoys is in line with her words to the king’s men: 
“I did not know” (verse 4), so her lie to them is based on half-truths, as a 
good lie should. It also completely vindicates her of any suspicion of ma-
                                                                                                                          
tif in Biblical Narrative (JSOTSup 231; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), esp. 
48–53, 61–64.  
36  Shmuel Aḥituv, Joshua (Mikra le-Yisraʼel; Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1995). 
37  Joshua (above, n. 36), 82. 
38  Ibid., 83, commentary to v. 3. 
39  Marten H. Woudstra, The Book of Joshua (NIBCOT; Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans 1981), 70.  
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nipulating the situation.40 Stressing her ignorance leads to a rejection of the 
possibility that she had hidden them in advance. Why would she hide two 
innocent passers-by who came to her house to sleep? In that case, she either 
hid them during the visit (as per Kaufmann) or after they left (Aḥituv). 
Aḥituv also refers to the literary relationship between the two mentions 
of the hiding, in line with Kaufmann’s explanation: the second mention (in 
his view reflecting the correct sequence) is a detailed explication of the act: 
“What seems like contradiction is the author’s way of returning to and de-
tailing matters he mentioned briefly at first.”41 He also refers to where the 
scene took place, locating it like Kaufmann outside the house but does it 
when commenting on verse 4 (and not to the words: “bring out” in verse 3): 
“The exchange of words between Rahab and the king’s messengers took 
place as the spies were in her house; it appears that she stalled the messen-
gers at the door while the spies are hiding inside.”42 
While offering a different sequence of events, Aḥituv’s exegetical-
literary approach is similar to Kaufmann’s regarding seeming contradic-
tions and repetitions. His understanding of the role Rahab plays in the story 
is also the same. His reconstruction therefore fits Kaufmann’s in three 
points, found in no other commentary:  
1. The encounter took place outside her door while the spies were in-
side the house, ignorant of the danger;  
2. There was no prior “sensing” of the danger by Rahab, who was un-
aware of the true identity of the spies and innocent of manipulation. 
She first found out about it from the king’s messengers;  
3. The second mention of the act of hiding is a detailed version of the 
first, which was a brief account of the act.  
                                                     
40  A comparison to the story of the Gibeonites in Joshua 9—the only other case of locals in 
the story of the conquest who avoided the fate of proscription decreed for all the Ca-
naanites—strengthens the possibility that her manipulating the hunt for the spies and 
their escape was indeed hinted at by the author. According to the conquest story as it 
now stands before us (Jos 1–12), extorting an oath of protection stronger than the injunc-
tion of ḥerem through deception (see Jos 9:15, 18–19) is the only way to avoid it. Many 
scholars attribute shrewd cunning to Rahab who was “running the show” (quoted from 
F. Scott Spencer, “Those Riotous—Yet Righteous—Foremothers of Jesus,” in Are We 
Amused? Humor About Women in the Biblical Worlds [ed. Athalya Brenner; London & 
New York: T&T Clark International, 2003], 17). See Yair Zakovitch, “Humor and The-
ology or the Successful Failure of Israelite Intelligence: A Literary-Folkloric Approach 
to Joshua 2,” in Text and Tradition: The Hebrew Bible and Folklore (ed. Susan Niditch; 
Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 85–86 (re Rahab informing the king), and 86 n. 4 (re the 
comparison to the Gibeonites). 
41  Joshua (above, n. 36), p. 82. 
42  Ibid, 83. His use of the verb “hiding” (םירתתסמ) rather than “staying” inside indicates 
that Aḥituv practically admits that Rahab already hid the spies, whether before the mes-
sengers came (Radak and others) or during their visit (Kaufmann). 
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1.2. The Flight of the Spies 
The second sequence problem in the narrative to be discussed here is found 
in the scene in which Rahab negotiates with the spies as she helps them 
escape (Jos 2:12–21). In verses 12–13 Rahab bids the spies to swear they 
will save her and her family asking for a “reliable sign” תמא תוא—a hapax 
legomenon—and in v. 14 they comply, promising to show her “true loyal-
ty” תמאו דסח. Nothing is said in regards to the sign. Verse 15 informs us that 
she let them down the rope from her window, with an added explanation 
that this was possible because her house was located in the wall. Verse 16 
details her orders to them to hide in the mountains for three days. In verses 
17–20 the spies renegotiate the terms of their oath, giving her a crimson 
cord (ינשה טוח תוקת) to tie to that very window. In v. 21 Rahab tersely 
agrees, the spies leave, and she ties the cord in the window. The dialogue 
scene is thus here too disrupted by a note referring to Rahab’s initiative, in 
this case her letting them down the rope. Most commentators note the im-
probability of the negotiations taking place as the spies are dangling outside 
her window, literally hanging by a thread, in danger of being revealed by 
the locals. There are also other issues of discrepancies and inconsistencies 
in this scene. We hear of a “reliable sign” (v. 12), a rope (לבח, v. 15), and a 
“crimson cord” (vv. 18, 21); the question is what the relationship between 
them is. The Septuagint version lacks the words “provide me with a reliable 
sign” in verse 12, but this version may be a secondary harmonizing emen-
dation to the Masoretic text. One solution was to see here a conflation of 
two versions or even more, one speaking of Rahab asking for a “reliable 
sign” for signalling the Israelite military forces which house to spare, which 
is the crimson cord the spies offer her, the other consisting of an escape 
through the window by a rope and an oath to ensure the commitment of the 
spies to their rescuer.43 The disruptive note regarding her letting them down 
the window then is either part of one of the two versions or a later addition. 
True to his literary method, Yehezkel Kaufmann rejects this solution. In 
his view, the sign Rahab is requesting is not to be deleted nor equated with 
the cord (as many suggest) “but really the meaning of the words is: in that 
act of your loyalty (דסחה השעמבו) you will be giving a sign of your loyalty 
to your servant.”44 The saving act, called תמאו דסח by the spies in v. 14, will 
be the sign, separate from the cord. The words in verse 15 “she let them 
down by a rope through the window,” seemingly impossible at this stage if 
this is a unified story, were interpreted already by Radak as a note in ad-
                                                     
43  Hans Wilhelm Hertzberg, Die Bücher Josua, Richter, Ruth (ATD 9; Göttingen: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 1953), 21. Fritz (above, n. 25), 35–41 sees three layers here: the orig-
inal story, Deuteronomistic editing and later additions. Zakovitch (above, n. 40, pp. 92–
93) regards verses 17–21 as an addition intended to insert the scarlet cord into the story, 
and the words “and they departed, and she bound the scarlet cord in her window” (21b), 
missing in the Septuagint, as “an addition on top of an addition.”  
44  Kaufmann, Joshua (above, n. 8), 97, commentary to v. 12.  
 THE LEGACY OF KAUFMANN’S COMMENTARIES TO JOSHUA AND JUDGES 193 
 
vance relating a later incident (“this happened when she had finished talk-
ing to them or after they slept a while”), a solution accepted by many com-
mentators.45 Kaufmann agrees, and further charges the verb with the notion 
of intent: 
She let them down by a rope—this is not the story of the end of letting the 
spies down through the window, but a story about what she intended (המ 
הננוכתהש) to do, and in our minds we must complete the preparations 
(תונכהה) for the letting down which were not detailed. Obviously, the talk in 
verses 16–21 did not take place after the letting down… Such conversation, 
from the window to the ground, at night, in the city’s wall, near the gate, 
with spies for whom the king is searching is a great folly, and it is not likely 
that the author was referring to such a conversation.46  
Kaufmann explains the literary logic of this preliminary note. In his view 
its appearance at this stage of the story indicates a change of scenery: First 
Rahab tells the spies her plan to send them away that very night. They stop 
talking and move down from the roof to the room with the window.47 Only 
then she explains how she will let them down that window, and we, togeth-
er with the spies, learn that her house is situated in the wall. As she is pre-
paring the means of their escape (the rope), she explains to them how they 
will succeed to get away (v. 16). They continue their negotiations. The 
actual execution of the escape takes place only in verse 21 where the text 
notes: she sent them on their way and they left (וּכֵֵליַּו םֵחְלַּשְׁתַּו).  
Kaufmann offers a similar solution for the note in verse 21b, regarding 
Rahab’s tying the crimson cord after the spies leave, again following Radak 
who says: “she did not tie it now as they left, but the text tells us that she 
had fulfilled their order and tied the cord in the window at the time of the 
conquest of the city” and others who offer similar reconstructions.48 Kauf-
mann adds here too the literary motivation to the untimely note: 
She tied (the crimson cord to the window)—he (the author) revealed in ad-
vance what will happen later רחואמה תא םידקה( ): when the time came she 
tied the crimson cord in the window. For obviously such a sign in the win-
dow would have aroused suspicion. And the narrator told about it here to 
                                                     
45  Among others, Hertzberg (above, n. 43), 20.  
46  Kaufmann, Joshua (above, n. 8), p. 97, commentary to v. 15; emphasis in original. 
47  Though he separates between the two parts of the dialogue between Rahab and the spies 
in terms of their literary source, Fritz too notes the change of site from the roof (v. 6) to 
the room with the window (v. 15), and wonders whether there was an original explana-
tion to clarify the change of place (above, n. 25, p. 37). He also claims that the flight 
took place only after the dialogue, and the reason it was mentioned before was to 
heighten the suspense of the hearer or reader: “wird die Spannung des Hörers oder 
Lesers erhöht.” This is a true sign in his eyes of the artistic ability of the author (ibid., 
38). 
48  See, for example, Hertzberg (above, n. 43), 20.  
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end the whole story of Rahab in Jericho. 6:22–25 relates only what the sons 
of Israel did to Rahab.49 
Kaufmann’s literary approach is based mainly on the elliptical character of 
the story, allowing him to supplement required information completing the 
narrative wherever necessary, in line with the logic of the story as he un-
derstood it. He also refers to the flexibility of times and modes indicated in 
the biblical narrative, when despite the usual chronological sequence of 
events, a verb can designate an incident that (a) had already occurred, as in 
the case of the second mention of the hiding of the spies (הגגה םתלעה איהו… 
v. 6); (b) indicate intent, as in the case of their escape by rope—she intend-
ed to let them down the rope (לבחב םדרותו v. 15); (c) indicate an event as yet 
to come, as in the case of Rahab’s hanging the crimson cord in the window 
(ןולחב ינשה תוקת תא רשקתו v. 21). Kaufmann’s use of the phrase תא םידקה
רחואמה perhaps alludes to the rabbinic measure: “there is no early and late 
in the Tora.”50 
Those chronological inconsistencies serve various literary purposes, 
which need to be determined from the context: to complete and supplement 
the required details as in 2:6; to mark a change of scene as in 2:15; or to 
conclude the details of a story, even if it is to happen later, as in 2:21. 
Kaufmann was also sensitive to the verbal flexibility in relation to time and 
context, which was not always reflected in their form. When referring to 
the order of the spies to Rahab, “You tie this length of crimson cord to the 
window through which you let us down” in verse 18 he remarked: “וּנֵתְּדַרוֹה 
is by its meaning here futurum exactum, which in Hebrew has no special 
form: the window, through which by then you would have already let us 
down. The letting down and the tying are both as yet to happen, but the 
letting down will come first, and once the tying occurs it would have al-
ready been past.”51  
Apparently following Kaufmann’s literary guidelines, Shmuel Aḥituv 
reaches similar interpretive solutions in his commentary to the escape sce-
ne, as the following points demonstrate:  
  
                                                     
49  Kaufmann, Joshua (above, n. 8), 98, commentary to v. 21. 
50  He utilizes similar language in his commentary to verses 23–24: “as at the end of verse 
21, here too the narrator revealed in advance what will happen later for a literary reason 
יתורפס םעטמ רחואמה תא ןאכ םג רפסמה םידקה( ): to narrate the entire tale of the spies in one 
sequence. But the calculation of the days requires that the journey from Shittim began 
before the spies had returned” (ibid., 98–99).  
51  Ibid., 98. 
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1. He too declines the deletion of the “reliable sign” in verse 12 or its 
identification with the crimson cord from verse 18. Like Kaufmann 
he prefers to view it as indicating the act of saving Rahab and her 
family, an act of “true loyalty” תמאו דסח as the spies define it in 
v. 14.52  
2. He too considers the notice of Rahab’s letting the spies down by 
the rope in verse 15 as a note in advance. The two sets of negotia-
tions should be seen as one continuum, “whose time is before the 
spies came down the window; the second detailing and adding to 
the first” ןושארה לע ףיסומו טרפמ ינשה.53 
3. He too views the spies’ request in verse 18 to tie the cord “in the 
window through which you have let us down” as a relative past: 
“future followed by past. When you tie this crimson cord in the 
window it will be after you have already let us down through it.”54 
4. He too considers the note in verse 21 regarding Rahab’s tying the 
crimson cord as referring to an event yet to happen: “not now… but 
in the right time” ןמזה אובב אלא ...התע אל.55 
5. The same phrase, רחואמה תא םידקה, with which Kaufmann explained 
the word רשקתו, “and she tied,” in the context of v. 21 and again 
when referring to the return of the spies to Joshua in verses 23–24, 
is utilized in Aḥituv’s interpretation of the first mention of Rahab’s 
hiding the spies in verse 4a, which, as we have seen, he considered 
to be a note in advance: and she took the two men and hid him: “he 
(the author) revealed in advance what will happen later”  תא םידקה 
רחואמה.56 
6. As we have seen, Kaufmann speaks of the verb “she let them 
down”  ֵדִרוֹתַּום  in v. 15 as indicating Rahab’s intent. Aḥituv attrib-
utes a similar notion of future intent in relation to another verb and 
another seeming discrepancy, which we have not discussed: when 
the spies come to Jericho, the story reports that “they came to the 
house of a harlot named Rahab, and they lay there”—the Hebrew 
verb is from the root ב"כש: המש ובכשיו  (2:1). Later on, however, af-
ter the pursuers have left the house, the story discloses that the 
spies “had not yet gone to sleep” (v. 8), using the same root: המהו 
ןובכשי םרט.57 In the context of the first “they lay there” in verse 1 
Aḥituv says: “The text reveals that the spies’ intention (הנווכ) was 
                                                     
52  Kaufmann, ibid., 97; Aḥituv, Joshua (above, n. 36), 85, commentary to v. 12; see also 
Aḥituv’s assertion in regards to the words “crimson cord” ינשה טוח תוקת: “it is not the 
rope with which they came down the window,” p. 86. 
53  Aḥituv, ibid., 82. 
54  Ibid., 86, commentary to v. 18. 
55  Ibid., 86.  
56  Ibid., 83. 
57  This forms another literal link to the story of Sodom (Gen 19:4). See Fields (above, 
n. 35), 112–113 for the motif “night spelling danger.”  
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to sleep in her house. But at this stage of the evening they did not 
yet go to sleep”.58 
Aḥituv follows Kaufmann in rejecting solutions to contextual problems 
based on division to separate sources or versions, assembled, in his words: 
“crudely and mechanically” סג ינכימ בוליש.59 Compare to Kaufmann’s words 
about those editors who “piled [words] together carelessly and inattentive-
ly” הבשחמ רסוחבו תונלשרב םירבד בובגו דובע ינמיס םיראבמה םיאצומ הז קרפב.60 
According to his methodological expositions Aḥituv does not base his re-
construction on the elliptical nature of the biblical story, though he too nec-
essarily offers additional information not provided by the text. He refers 
mostly to the flexibility of the biblical verb system. Concerning “she let 
them down” in verse 15, Aḥituv remarks: “If the Hebrew had a developed 
time system like Indo-European languages it could have used ‘secondary 
times’ here (such as past of past, English pluperfect). In the absence of such 
a system those relative times must be inferred from the situations depicted, 
thus creating the correct sequence of events.”61 
Aḥituv does not agree of course with each and every one of Kaufmann’s 
interpretations and completions. But his methodology is similar, and his 
goal is identical to Kaufmann’s. It is to reconstruct the correct sequence of 
events ןוכנה יגולונורכה ףצרה, without resorting to dividing the text into sepa-
rate sources or versions. The means Aḥituv utilizes are also the same even 
if applied to different cases, and sometimes the phraseology is identical or 
at least similar. Thus both commentators: 
 
1. reinterpret verbal sequence according to context and not form. 
a. According to both Kaufmann and Aḥituv some verbs note an 
occurrence ahead of time; both, at times, apply the phrase  םידקה
רחואמה תא to this phenomenon. 
b. They both charge the verbs with notions of intent, הנוכ; Kauf-
mann speaks of תוננוכתה. 
c. Some verbs note an event that had already occurred (cf. 
Aḥituv’s words regarding the sending of the spies in verse 1: 
“apparently the spies were sent before the order to the people 
to prepare for the crossing of the Jordan”). 
2. explain repetitions as a brief note followed by completion and de-
tailing, regardless of the “true” sequence of events on which they 
can differ: Kaufmann defines it by the term: םיטרפ םילשמ;62 Aḥituv 
by: ןושארה לע ףיסומו טרפמ ינשה,63 or: השעמה יטרפל בושי ךכ רחאו.64 
                                                     
58  Aḥituv, Joshua (above, n. 36), 83, commentary to v. 1. 
59  Ibid., 82. 
60  Kaufmann, Joshua (above, n. 8), 94. 
61  Aḥituv, Joshua (above, n. 36), 82; emphasis mine. 
62  Kaufmann, Joshua (above, n. 8), 95, re v. 6.  
63  Aḥituv, Joshua (above, n. 36), 82, re vv. 14–20. 
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More important than the details or even the literal dependence revealed 
here is the similar literary approach that Aḥituv adopted. Both scholars 
view exegetical-logical problems as resulting from the gaps between mod-
ern literary conventions and biblical ones, specifically the elliptical charac-
ter of the text stressed by Kaufmann and the ambiguity of the biblical ver-
bal system accentuated by Aḥituv. The answer according to both is not to 
dissect the text into sources which were carelessly assembled, but to com-
plement the narrative lacunae in the text and reconstruct the true stream of 
events. In modern scholarship Kaufmann was among the first to suggest 
this literary method; Aḥituv followed his lead and implemented it in his 
commentary. 
2. Judges 
Another case demonstrating the impact of Kaufmann’s approach to biblical 
prose on Israeli scholarship is found in his interpretation of a larger literary 
issue. In Kaufmann’s introduction to the book of Judges he discusses the 
well-known problem of the so-called “major” judges:65 Othniel, Ehud, 
Deborah and Barak, Gideon, Jephtah and Samson. The other category is of 
the so called “minor” judges. Those are Tola and Yair the Gileadite listed 
before the story of Jephtah (Judg 10:1–5), and Ibzan, Eilon and Abdon 
listed after it (12:8–15). For the “minor” judges the text relates schematized 
details including name, descent, place of origin, number of years in office 
(with seemingly realistic numbers), site of burial, and in three cases (Yair, 
Ibzan, and Abdon) additional details regarding sons, daughters, daughters-
in-law, grandsons, asses, and affiliated cities in stereotyped numbers. The 
succinct list of the “minor” judges is thus of a different genre and lacks 
stories of delivery or accounts of military achievement. 
Predictably, critical scholarship explained the differences between the 
stories of the “major” judges and the notices of the “minor” judges resort-
ing to the literary history of the text, either as reflecting two separate 
sources, or regarding the list of the “minor” judges as a later addition. 
Charles F. Burney, in his commentary to the book of Judges in 1918, typi-
cally suggests that the notices of the “minor” judges were a late editorial 
insertion, by someone who wished to raise the number of judges to twelve, 
representing all twelve tribes of Israel.66 The “minor” judges were thus 
literary fictitious figures, personifications of clans or regions, invoked from 
genealogical lists. 
                                                                                                                          
64  Ibid., 83, re v. 4: קתוונפצתו םישנאה ינש תא השאה ח . 
65  Kaufmann, Judges (above, n. 12), 46–48. 
66  Charles F. Burney, The Book of Judges with Introduction and Notes (London: Riving-
ton, 1918), 289–290. 
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Along different lines, the literary distinction between these two groups 
was explained as reflecting a real differentiation in the functions of the 
characters belonging to each group. In particular, Martin Noth has claimed 
that the “major” judges served as local, sporadic, charismatic military de-
liverers in tribal setting, while the “minor” judges served an official perma-
nent and consecutive office as legal authorities in Israel’s national amphic-
tyony, his notion of Israel’s twelve tribe league. In his view the “minors” 
were the real (meaning judicial) judges in early Israel. Their title was ap-
plied to the military heroes when the traditions regarding the two types of 
leaders were combined.67 According to Noth, the literary, as well as realis-
tic, linchpin between the two groups was Jephtah, who belonged to both 
groups, and was thus both a judge in the national sense, as well as a mili-
tary hero. 
Writing a decade after Martin Noth, Kaufmann explicitly dealt with 
Noth’s influential suggestion in the introduction to his commentary to the 
book of Judges. In particular he rejected Noth’s historical reconstruction, 
differentiating between two functions. This he does in two ways: first, he 
claims that the concept of a national permanent office of a “judge of Israel” 
successively held by a chain of “judges” is unacceptable as there is simply 
no proof for its existence. Furthermore, the “minor” judges appear one after 
another (הז רחא הז) and not one in the place of the other (הז תחת הז) as do 
hereditary kings. Then he tries to minimize the differences between the two 
groups, thus undermining the possibility of their reflecting different histori-
cal functions: “Although the list of minor judges is unique, it is not that 
different from the rest of the material in the book of Judges that we can find 
in it evidence for a special phenomenon in the period of the judges, evi-
dence of a special kind of ‘judges’.”68 
On the one hand the list of “minor” judges hints at their heroic deeds, 
which were not detailed. The notice at the beginning of the list that “After 
Abimelech, Tola son of Puah son of Dodo, a man of Issachar, arose to de-
liver Israel” (Judg 10:1) is according to Kaufmann “a general opening to 
the entire list,” indicating that some or even all of the “minors” were hero-
saviors too. He notes further that Yair, following Tola, is referred to by the 
same verb: he arose, םקיו )10:3( . Similarly, some of the traditions of the 
“major” judges incorporate details parallel to those characterizing the “mi-
nors”: Abimelech rules three years rather than a schematic number (9:22), 
and we are informed of Gideon’s many sons and his place of burial (Judg 
8:30, 32), as well as Samson’s grave (16:31).69 Thus the “minor” judges are 
in his view somewhat “major”; the “major” are a bit “minor”. 
                                                     
67  Martin Noth, “Das Amt des ‘Richters Israels’,” in Festschrift Alfred Bertholet (ed. 
W. Baumgartner; Tübingen: Mohr, 1950), 404–417. 
68  Kaufmann, Judges (above, n. 12), 47. 
69  Ibid., 48. 
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The story of Jephtah, the linchpin, serves him on both accounts. It 
shows that the literary differences between the two groups are not absolute, 
and contrary to Noth’s opinion, it proves that a national office never exist-
ed: “This story is located within the list of the minor judges. Two of them 
preceded Jephtah. He himself belongs to this category of judges according 
to the end of his story. But in his days the tribes are every bit divided as in 
the days of the rest of the major judges. We are forced to say that Jephtah 
as a hero-deliverer is tribal, yet carries a national office as a judge. Howev-
er, his story clearly indicates that he never received a national ‘office’ from 
any judge.”70  
In this case, however, the literary differences between the two groups 
were still such that Kaufmann could not comfortably iron them out com-
pletely. Because he could not find any apparent literary reason for the dif-
ferences, Kaufmann acknowledges they must have originated from differ-
ent sources: “The distinction of this special unit of tradition is correct in its 
own. But the condition is duly explained by the fact that the book of Judges 
is made from different collections (םיטוקלי) whose authors differed in the 
way they fashioned the tradition. In contrast, the assumption concerning the 
nature and function of the minor judges as different from the major ones is 
hanging on a thread.”71 
Kaufmann, however, was not totally satisfied with his solutions regard-
ing the historical as well as the literary reconstruction. He was not com-
pletely convinced that there were absolutely no historical differences be-
tween the various judges. In the following, much quoted paragraph from 
his introduction to the commentary of Judges, after adamantly declaring 
that there was no real historical difference between the “majors” and the 
“minors,” he still presents the possibility that some of the judges differed in 
the way they rose to power, becoming judges by virtue not of a delivery 
act, but due to their fortune and family standing. He also seems not to be 
happy merely with the notion of different sources underlying the biblical 
text. In this paragraph he settles for another explanation: the differences 
between the two groups are owed not so much to diverse sources as to liter-
ary choices the author had made when composing the book of Judges: 
It follows from all this that there was no substantive difference between the 
major and minor judges. Both (הלאו הלא) were deliverers, both (הלאו הלא) 
were charismatic. Both (הלאלו הלאל) did not hold any “office,” and both 
(הלאו הלא) were sporadic. In the days of both there was no national unity. It 
may be that not all of the judges were deliverers. There may have been dis-
tinguished, wealthy people, of prominent family, who also rose to the posi-
tion of judges, as is reflected in 10:4; 11:9, 14. We may speculate that the 
“minor judges” became “minor” and differed from their comrades because 
                                                     
70  Ibid., 47. 
71  Ibid., 46–47. 
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the stories concerning them were deleted. Shamgar was a warrior and a de-
liverer (3:31), but he also became “minor” because the story about him was 
truncated to one brief hint. Abimelech was a deliverer (10:1), but there is no 
story pertaining to his battle with his enemies. The “minor judges” were 
particularly harmed by the process of abbreviation.72 
Kaufmann’s multiple-choice solution to the question indicates his hesita-
tion regarding the reasons for the apparent differences between the “ma-
jors” and the “minors,” despite his intense language.  
Significantly, all his alternative ideas on the source of the literary diver-
gences resonate in later works of Israeli scholars who dealt with this issue. 
His initial idea that the differences should be traced back to various literary 
traditions was picked up by the Israeli historian Abraham Malamat. Writing 
in 1967, five years after Kaufmann published his commentary to Judges, 
Malamat too rejects Noth’s idea of different functions for “major” vs. “mi-
nor” judges, for “The assertion that while the major judges did not achieve 
national recognition (notwithstanding their acts of deliverance), it was specif-
ically the minor judges who enjoyed pan-Israelite recognition and authority 
is difficult to accept.”73  
He too suggests that the reason for the apparent differences lies in their 
presumed literary sources and tries to identify them, building on the unique 
features of the two distinct groups. In his view, the detailed stories of the 
heroic “major” judges originated from folk tales, while the succinct lists of 
the “minor” judges derived from family chronicles, similar to the tribal 
genealogical lists. 
Malamat follows Kaufmann also in attributing heroic deeds to the “mi-
nor” judges which were only hinted at, adopting Kaufmann’s conclusions 
and sometimes his words too: 
It is quite possible, on the other hand, that the minor judges also engaged as 
leaders in actual battle, but no information of their deeds has come down to 
us. The mention that the first minor judge, Tola son of Puah, “arose to save 
[lehōshī‛a] Israel” (Judg 10:1) is not necessarily a late editorial interpola-
tion: it might even be the original heading of the entire list of minor judg-
es… It would thus appear that there was no essential difference between 
major and minor judges, except from the above mentioned variant manner 
in which they were portrayed in the Book of Judges. Both (original Hebrew: 
                                                     
72  Kaufmann, ibid., 48. The English translation of this paragraph is taken from Yairah 
Amit, The Book of Judges: The Art of Editing (trans. J. Chipman; Biblical Interpretation 
Series 38, Leiden: Brill, 1999), 84. The sentence “both were deliverers, both were char-
ismatic. Both did not hold any ‘office’,” is quoted also in Hanoch Reviv, “Leadership in 
the Period of the Judges” (in Hebrew), Beer Sheva 1 (1973): 216. 
73  Abraham Malamat, “The Period of the Judges,” in The World History of the Jewish 
People, Vol. 3: Judges (ed. Benjamin Mazar; Givatayim: Jewish History Publications 
Ltd. and Rutgers University Press, 1971), 130. The Hebrew original was published in 
1967. 
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הלאו הלא) types represented the sort of political regime prevailing prior to 
the monarchy.74 
Kaufmann hesitantly admits that the members of the two groups may have 
originated from different historical backgrounds in the following brief sen-
tence: “It may be that not all of the judges were deliverers. There may have 
been distinguished, wealthy people, of prominent family, who also rose to 
the position of judges, as is reflected in 10:4; 11:9, 14”.75 This admission 
was picked up by another Israeli historian, Hanoch Reviv. In an article 
published in 1973, “Leadership in the Period of the Judges,” he developed 
the notion that the differences between the “majors” and the “minors” relat-
ed to their base of power. The “major” judges, he suggested, rose to power 
in the military track, while the “minors” took the money and power track. 
The “minors” were men of fortune and family eminence, in connection to, 
if not part of, the longstanding establishment of “the elders”. Though they 
were not military heroes, the “minor” judges may have sustained a military 
force, which explains how the minor Tola “arose to deliver Israel” (10:1).76 
In his view the similarities between the “majors” and the “minors” relate to 
their local rule and territorial authority and to the nature of their military 
and economic sway. Their realistic background as local tribal leaders is the 
reason why the author of the book of Judges joined the two types together 
in his book.77 
A third Israeli scholar who dealt extensively with the book of Judges, 
Yaira Amit, picked up on Kaufmann’s central suggestion in the issue of 
“major” vs. “minor” judges. Unlike Kaufmann, Amit does not attach any 
historical importance to the notes of the “minor” judges, regarding them as 
rhetorical literary devices. But she notes his emphasis on the role of the 
editor rather than the sources in producing the final result: “Kaufmann… 
does not restrict the act of editing to the organization of available materials, 
but sees it as allowing for the possibility of shortening and expanding, even 
if he does not explain the reasons for this expansion or contraction.”78 
Amit, utilizing an all-encompassing literary approach, prefers to put the 
entire historical question aside, concentrating on the possible explanation 
                                                     
74  Malamat, ibid., 131–132. 
75  Kaufmann, Judges (above, n. 12), 48. 
76  Reviv (above, n. 72), 215–219. Reviv presents his view as completely opposed to 
Kaufmann’s yet as the quote shows Kaufmann already presented the idea in its nascent 
form. 
77  Reviv, ibid., 218. 
78  Amit (above, n. 72), 84–85. The Hebrew original was published in 1992, by Bialik 
Institute. Kaufmann utilized a similar solution in another case of literary differences. He 
suggested that the descriptions of the tribal portions of Ephraim and Manasseh in the 
book of Joshua originally incorporated detailed lists of cities like that of Judah, which 
were later removed by a Judean editor (Kaufmann, Biblical Account [above, n. 6], 34–
36). The motive for the omission he suggests was “neither political nor religious, but, if 
one may say so, publisher-scribe’s convenience” (ibid., 36). 
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for the editor’s motives in expanding or contracting the image of the judge. 
The motive she proposes is: “A rhetorical tactic, serving the editor’s plan to 
build within the reader, in a gradual and controlled manner, an openness 
and understanding towards the emergence of the monarchy.”79 
In her opinion, with the list of “minor” judges, the editor deliberately 
avoided the cyclical formulas of periods of enslavement and peace so as to 
create a rhetorical effect of continuity.80 The continuous rule of “the con-
secutive judges” as she terms the “minors” is inferred also from the linking 
phrases, “after him…there arose/judged.” Even the fact that the list is di-
vided, two consecutive judges appearing before Jephtah, three after him, 
plays a part in this scheme: “The presentation of the phenomenon only once 
(10:1–5) could have been interpreted as chance, while the incorporation of 
the second expanded list (12:8–15) suggests a tendency to bring out the 
advantage of consecutive rule.”81 
By choosing to focus on consecutive rule the author is inviting the read-
er to make a connection between periods of governance and quiet in oppo-
sition to periods of lack of leadership and sin, leading eventually to the 
establishment of monarchy.82 
Kaufmann’s analysis of the differences between the “major” and “mi-
nor” judges can thus be seen as planting the seeds from which three differ-
ent interpretations grew. Malamat stressed the notion of the different 
sources from which the author drew his material; Reviv developed the idea 
that the literary variances reflect the historical routes through which the 
figures rose to power; and Amit related to Kaufmann’s suggestion that the 
differences originated in editorial choices, supplying a possible explanation 
to the author’s rhetorical goals.  
Some of the solutions Kaufmann had offered were also developed, in-
dependently, by non-Israeli scholars a decade or two later, in articles by 
Hauser (1975) and Mullen (1982), apparently without direct contact with 
his commentary.83 It seems that Kaufmann’s literary approach was ahead of 
its time, a sign of a true genius. 
                                                     
79  Amit (above, n. 72), 85. 
80  Ibid., 81. 
81  Ibid., 85. 
82  Ibid., 81–85. 
83  Alan J. Hauser, “The ‘Minor Judges’—A Re-Evaluation,” JBL 94 (1975): 190–200 also 
criticizes Noth’s theory, emphasizing like Kaufmann that the note that the minors came 
one after the other does not indicate an immediate succession (ibid., 194). He too be-
lieves that there was no essential difference in the roles played by the “minors” and “ma-
jors” based on the opening note for Tola “arose to deliver” (10:1) which indicates an act 
of deliverance like that of the “majors” (199). A similar attitude is offered also by 
E. Theodore Mullen, Jr., “The ‘Minor Judges’: Some Literary and Historical Considera-
tions,” CBQ 44 (1982): 201, who explains the literary difference as reinforcing theologi-
cal purposes of the Deuteronomistic historian. 
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Conclusions 
The commentaries to the books of Joshua and Judges have never been 
translated, and their impact remained within Israeli circles. In his commen-
taries Kaufmann set out to achieve a theological goal by a literary analysis 
of the narratives relating to the early days of Israel in its land. Kaufmann 
sought proof in the books of Joshua and Judges for the historical separation 
between Israel and Canaan in order to reinforce his theological conviction 
of Israel’s unique monotheistic belief. In the long run this idea was totally 
rejected, both the theological notion of complete separation as well as the 
historical reconstruction of the period of the settlement. However, his liter-
ary approach to the texts, innovative at the time, was influential. 
In this literary method there is consistent continuity between the com-
mentaries and Toledot. Kaufmann is ready to accept theories of multiple 
sources and authorships as well as of later additions to the text when he 
thinks the evidence warrants it. At the same time he curtails the use of 
source-criticism as a wholesale solution to all exegetical problems. Where 
other scholars see, for example, multiple layers in First Isaiah and Micah, 
Kaufmann, in contrast, regards almost all of Isa 1–33 as the product of a 
single eighth-century author, and most of Micah as the product of another 
eighth-century author.84 Similarly, he regards Isaiah 40–66 and 34–35 as 
the product of one author, rejecting the idea of Trito-Isaiah or of multiple 
editorial and supplemental layers in these chapters.85  
In retrospect, the long-lasting outcomes of his search for a theological 
“kingdom” via an historical investigation are valuable literary “donkeys.” 
In this paper I tried to shed some light on his so-far unacknowledged con-
tribution to the literary method, and thus to place his commentaries, written 
in Hebrew more than fifty years ago, in the context of biblical scholarship. 
 
 
                                                     
84  For First Isaiah see Toledot (above, n. 3), 3:150–173; for Micah see ibid, 3:265–279, in 
particular his perception that the book contains a collection טקל of prophecies which 
were prophesized by one prophet in various, distant times (3:274).  
85  I thank Benjamin Sommer for pointing out this continuity in approach between Toledot 
and the commentaries. For survey of Kaufmann’s treatment of Second Isaiah see Ben-
jamin D. Sommer, A Prophet Reads Scripture: Allusion in Isaiah 40–66 (Contraver-
sions: Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 188–190. 
  
Yehezkel Kaufmann and Recent Scholarship: 
Toward a Richer Discourse of Monotheism1 
Benjamin D. SOMMER 
While the influence of Yehezkel Kaufmann on Jewish biblical scholars has 
been immense, his work has rarely been studied outside Jewish circles. 
There have been some exceptions to this trend; one thinks, for example, of 
William Foxwell Albright, Morton Smith, and Mark Smith. These scholars, 
however, are atypical among their American colleagues in citing Kauf-
mann’s work.2 Among Europeans, Kaufmann’s work seems to be all but 
completely unknown. And yet some important European scholars have 
presented theses resembling central elements of his work. It is abundantly 
clear that the scholars in question have no knowledge of Kaufmann’s work, 
and for this reason the fact that their own reasoning and evaluation of evi-
dence has led them independently to comparable conclusions is significant. 
The congruence between their work and Kaufmann’s shows that European 
scholarship is not as removed from Kaufmann’s views as one might as-
sume. Further, the reasoning used by these scholars provides both addition-
al support for his theses and, we shall see, a degree of nuance that renders 
Kaufmann’s approach less brittle and more convincing. I would like to 
review the ways that several major scholars have articulated theses or per-
spectives similar to those found in Toledot ha-emunah ha-yisre’elit (hence-
forth Toledot).3 The theses I shall discuss are concerned with the dating and 
nature of Israelite monotheism. In what follows I discuss several European 
                                                     
1  I am indebted to participants at the conference on Yehezkel Kaufmann co-organized by 
the Universities of Bern and Freiburg, as well as to members of the Biblical Colloquium, 
who commented on earlier versions of this paper. Detailed comments by Job Jindo 
greatly enhanced the conceptual clarity of this essay. It is a pleasure to thank him for his 
careful reading.  
2 Indeed, one can question the extent to which any of these three scholars can be consid-
ered outsiders to Jewish scholarship. Morton Smith, for example, was one of the first re-
cipients of a doctoral degree from the Hebrew University. Professor Shalom Paul read 
Kaufmann’s work aloud to Albright in the late 1960s, when Albright’s eyesight had de-
teriorated to the point that he could not read. When Paul asked Albright whether he 
should translate into English as he went, Albright responded, “Mr. Paul, need I remind 
you that I taught a course at the Hebrew University, in Hebrew, before you were born?” 
(Paul, personal communication).  
3 Yehezkel Kaufmann, Toledot ha-emunah ha-yisre’elit (in Hebrew; 4 vols.; Jerusalem: 
Bialik and Tel Aviv: Devir, 1937–56). 
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scholars of the Bible and the ancient Near East; I also consider one anthro-
pologist of religion trained in Britain who worked on African religion. 
1. Kaufmann’s Approach to Monotheism 
It will be useful to review some crucial elements of Kaufmann’s thesis 
regarding Israelite monotheism. I will begin by examining his definition of 
monotheism, and then I will move on to his dating of monotheism and his 
view of its origin. 
1.1. Defining Monotheism  
For Kaufmann, as for the neo-Kantian Jewish philosopher Hermann Cohen 
in his Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism,4 monotheism is 
about the nature of divinity, not about the number of divinities; it is a mat-
ter of quality, not quantity.5 For Kaufmann and Cohen, monotheism is 
above all the belief that there exists a supreme and unique being in the uni-
verse whose will is sovereign over all other beings. These other beings may 
include some who live in heaven and who are in the normal course of 
events immortal; but a theology remains monotheistic if these other heav-
enly beings are unalterably subservient to the one supreme being, except in-
sofar as that supreme being voluntarily relinquishes a measure of control by 
                                                     
4 See the first chapter in Hermann Cohen, Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Juda-
ism (2nd ed.; trans. Simon Kaplan; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995), 35–49. 
5 For a comparison of the two thinkers, see Eliezer Schweid, “Biblical Critic or Philo-
sophical Exegete? The Influence of Hermann Cohen’s The Religion of Reason on 
Yehezkel Kaufmann’s History of Israelite Religion” (in Hebrew), in Massu’ot. Studies 
in Qabbalah and Jewish Thought in Memory of Professor Efraim Gottlieb (eds. Michal 
Oron and Amos Goldreich; Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1994), 414–28. Its title notwith-
standing, Schweid’s illuminating essay refers little to influence and focuses on philo-
sophical and ideational similarities and divergences between these two influential Jew-
ish thinkers. The possible influence of Cohen on Kaufmann is a separate issue not rele-
vant to my concerns here. In an essay translated in this volume, Menahem Haran argues 
that Kaufmann came to the ideas in question independently of Cohen, since the core of 
Kaufmann’s intellectual project is already evident in his earliest published essay, which 
appeared several years before the publication of Religion of Reason. See Menahem 
Haran, “Judaism and Bible in the Worldview of Yehezkel Kaufmann” (in Hebrew), 
Madda‛ei Ha-Yahadut 31 (1991): 76 (= p. 147-163 in this volume); Haran refers at n. 4 
to Kaufmann’s essay on Aḥad Ha-‛Am, published in 1914, five years before Cohen’s 
Religion der Vernunft first appeared. On the ways the essay adumbrates Kaufmann’s lat-
er work, see further Thomas Krapf’s discussion of the essay (p. 17-19 in this volume). 
At the same time, it is unlikely that Kaufmann never read Cohen, who was the leading 
neo-Kantian thinker of his day as well as a significant figure in Jewish philosophy. After 
all, Kaufmann’s doctorate was in philosophy, and his writings always remained philo-
sophical and neo-Kantian, as the essays by Staubli, Jindo, and Zevit in this volume make 
clear. 
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granting other beings free will. It is thus appropriate to term the supreme 
being the one God and the other heavenly beings gods or angels.6 In this 
definition, distinguishing between monotheism and polytheism involves not 
counting divine beings but studying the relations among them. A theology 
in which no one deity has ultimate power over all aspects of the world is 
polytheistic (even if that theology knows of only one deity); so too a theol-
ogy in which people pray to multiple deities due to a belief that multiple 
deities have their own power to effect change. A theology in which all 
power ultimately resides in one being is monotheistic—even if that theolo-
gy countenances prayer to subservient heavenly beings in the hope that they 
might intercede with the supreme being, or in the belief that the supreme 
being is too distant to be addressed directly.7 What is absolutely crucial for 
monotheism is that this unique God is not subservient to any other force, be 
it nature or fate.8 Thus God’s transcendence, rather than the exclusive wor-
ship of God, is the essence of monotheism for Kaufmann. We may refer to 
this definition of monotheism as the qualitative definition (as opposed to a 
quantitative definition). Because this approach sees the core of monotheism 
in the transcendence of one deity over all other beings, whether earthly or 
                                                     
6 See, e.g., Yehezkel Kaufmann, The Religion of Israel: From Its Beginnings to the Babylo-
nian Exile (trans. and abridged by Moshe Greenberg; Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1960), 60, 63–67; Toledot, 1:417–419, 422–33. 
7 Thus Kaufmann maintains, “Even the worship of other supernatural beings, which is for 
the Bible the essence of idolatry, cannot be considered in necessary contradiction to 
monotheism. The doctrinal aspect of biblical monotheism is that YHWH is God, there is 
none else... There is room in monotheism for the worship of lower divine beings—with 
the understanding that they belong to the suite of the One. Thus Christianity knows the 
worship of saints and intercessors, as does Islam... Not even the worship of ‘other gods’ 
can thus in every case be counted automatically as a departure from the fundamental 
idea” (Religion of Israel, 137; cf. Toledot, 1:666–667). Thus, as my co-editor Job Jindo 
stresses to me, insofar as the idea of God’s transcendence is not fundamentally compro-
mised, a doctrine of monotheism can go without the idea of the exclusive worship of 
God. In this respect, Kaufmann’s approach is more nuanced than generally assumed. To 
be sure, Kaufmann points out, the Bible “proceeds to infer a drastic cultic consequence 
of this doctrine: the prohibition of worshiping any other beings or objects … satyrs, de-
mons, the dead, and idols”—even though “monotheism need not inevitably come to this 
extreme conclusion” (Religion of Israel, 137). It follows that Kaufmann’s position re-
verses what many scholars, without any particularly strong reason, see as the natural or-
der of things: while many other scholars believe that exclusivity of worship monolatry 
evolved into quantitative monotheism in ancient Israel, Kaufmann believes that a mono-
theism of transcendence led to monolatry in ancient Israel—though it did not have to do 
so. That there can be a non-monolatrous monotheism of transcendence is clear, for ex-
ample, from the cult of the saints in Catholicism, and, in less formalized ways, from re-
course to dead ancestors as רשי יצילמ (intercessors) in some popular forms of Jewish pie-
ty. 
8 Kaufmann, Toledot, 1:245, 440–48; cf. Kaufmann, Religion, ch. 3, esp. 60, 72–74. See 
also Kaufmann, “The Biblical Age,” in Great Ages and Ideas of the Jewish People (ed. 
Leo W. Schwarz; New York: Random House, 1956), 10–14.  
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heavenly, we may also refer to it as the monotheism of transcendence (ra-
ther than a monotheism of enumeration).9 
Kaufmann argues persuasively that the Bible is monotheistic in the qual-
itative sense, even as the Bible acknowledges the existence of other gods 
whom it generally does not deign to mention by name. Although the Bible 
recognizes other gods’ reality, Kaufmann argues, it is not polytheistic, be-
cause in a polytheistic system the position of a supreme deity is marked as 
contingent in ways that Yhwh’s supremacy in the Bible is not. Unlike the 
highest deity in polytheistic systems of Greece or the ancient Near East, 
Yhwh is not the child of any other deity.10 Yhwh is never seriously chal-
lenged by any member of the divine retinue in the Bible. We never hear of 
Yhwh ascending to His exalted status in the way that Baal, Zeus, and Mar-
duk do.11 Further, the Bible presumes a relationship between divinity and 
powers present in the cosmos entirely different from that found in polythe-
ism. Yhwh’s will is never frustrated by forces of nature, by matter, or by 
other gods. Only in one area can Yhwh be thwarted: by human free will.12 
                                                     
9 I take the term “monotheism of transcendence” from Adrian Schenker, “Le mono-
théisme israélite: un dieu qui transcende le monde et les dieux,” Bib 78 (1997): 448. 
I discuss Schenker’s work in greater detail below. 
10 Kaufmann, Toledot, 1:245, 419–22; cf. Kaufmann, Religion, 60–63.  
11 The single biblical exception may be Psalm 82, if one follows the reading suggested by 
scholars including Mark Smith, The Origins of Biblical Monotheism: Israel’s Poly-
theistic Background and the Ugaritic Texts (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 155–57. According to this reading, which is based on the sound judgment that the 
word םיהלא in verse 1 stands in place of the tetragrammaton (since the tetragrammaton 
has usually been replaced with םיהלא in Psalms 42–83), Yhwh is not the same person as 
El in this poem. In this case, Psalm 82 describes the rise of the young god Yhwh to su-
premacy in the council of the older deity El, who is effectively given the role of god 
emeritus. Ronnie Goldstein, “A New Look at Deuteronomy 32:8–9 and 43 in the Light 
of Akkadian Sources” (in Hebrew), Tarb 79 (2011): 5–21, provides a reading of Deut 
32:8–9 (or rather of a more ancient Israelite hymn to the young deity Yhwh that has 
been re-used by the author of Deuteronomy 32) that resembles Smith’s reading of Psalm 
82; see also Smith’s own discussion of these verses in Origins, 143, 156–57. On the oth-
er hand, if Yhwh/Elohim in this text is the same individual as El (or if the term לא תדע is 
simply a frozen expression meaning the divine council, as argued by E. Theodore Mul-
len, The Divine Council in Canaanite and Early Hebrew Literature [HSM; Chico, CA: 
Scholars Press, 1980], 230), then another reading is possible, according to which Psalm 
82 depicts not Yhwh’s ascent to power but the moment in which the human believer 
comes to understand Yhwh’s universal dominion. For a sensitive presentation of this 
reading, see Matitiahu Tsevat, “God and the Gods in Assembly,” in The Meaning of the 
Book of Job and Other Biblical Studies (New York: Ktav, 1980), 155–76, and see the 
brief presentation of this reading Jon Levenson, Sinai and Zion: An Entry Into the Jew-
ish Bible (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987), 61–62. Against the sort of reading 
represented by Smith, see further the remarks of Schenker, “Monothéisme,” 443.  
12 Kaufmann, Toledot, 247; see further Kaufmann, Religion, 65, 74–77, 292–95, 328–29. 
Cf. Erich Zenger, “Das jahwistische Werk—ein Wegbereiter des jahwistischen Mono-
theismus?” in Gott, der Einzige: zur Entstehung des Monotheismus in Israel (ed. Ernst 
Haag; Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 1985), 41–42, who points out that in J “Yhwh’s ‘oppo-
nents’ are not gods but humans or socio-political institutions. J identifies the root of all 
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This exception results from Yhwh’s own decision to create beings who 
have the ability to choose for good and for ill. Yhwh’s single limitation in 
the Hebrew Bible is self-imposed, but the limitations on the gods in poly-
theistic texts are often the result of forces beyond themselves. 
To be sure, several texts do famously describe a conflict between Yhwh 
on the one hand and the Sea and his helpers on the other: the most famous 
examples include Isa 27:1, 51:9–11; Hab 3:8–9; Pss 74:13–15, 89:6–14; 
and Job 26:5–13. As many scholars have noted, these passages use terms 
that also appear in the Ugaritic myth in which Baal defeats Yam or Sea.13 
The biblical texts differ from their Ugaritic parallels, however, in crucial 
respects. They describe a doomed revolt against a deity who was already in 
charge, a revolt Yhwh puts down without any difficulty. These passages 
lack any real drama, for they convey no sense that Yhwh was required to 
engage in real exertion to suppress the insurrection. Baal and Marduk, Zeus 
and Kronos toil in order to attain an exalted status; Yhwh had that status to 
begin with and retains it with ease.14 Further, several of these biblical texts 
downgrade the status of Sea from deity to object. The word yam can be a 
personal name, as it is in Ugaritic, where it refers to the god Yam (Sea); but 
it can also be a noun, simply meaning “the sea.” By prefacing the definite 
article to this word, Ps 89:10 and Job 26:12 make clear that yam refers to an 
object, not to a person, since the definite article does not attach to personal 
names in Hebrew. The texts describing Yhwh’s conflict with the S/sea in 
Isaiah, Habakkuk, Psalms, and Job remind us of the older myth in order to 
make clear to us precisely what story is not being told: to wit, a genuine 
theomachy.15 
                                                                                                                          
evil in Genesis 1–11 as humanity’s striving to draw itself away from its dependence on 
Yhwh as the primum agens.” Zenger also points out (p. 40) that already in J (as in Deu-
tero-Isaiah, we might add) the sources of evil and chaos are traced back to Yhwh, a cir-
cumstance that shows what I would term the monotheistic nature of this source. 
13 The bibliography is of epic, if not quite mythological, proportions. See especially John 
Day, God’s Conflict with the Dragon and the Sea: Echoes of a Canaanite Myth in the 
Old Testament (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), as well as Frank 
Moore Cross, Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic: Essays in the History of the Religion 
of Israel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 112–44 (and, on the rela-
tionship between Baal and Yhwh more generally, 145–94). A helpful review of the main 
primary texts is provided by Samuel E. Loewenstamm, The Evolution of the Exodus 
Tradition (trans. Baruch Schwartz; Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1992), 240–57. 
14 Cf. Kaufmann, Toledot, 1:423; cf. Kaufmann, Religion, 62–63. It is possible that in 
some lost Israelite texts a story with a genuine struggle was once told (see Umberto 
[Moshe David] Cassuto, “The Israelite Epic,” in Biblical and Oriental Studies [Jerusa-
lem: Magnes Press, 1973], 1:69–109, esp. 80–97), but what concerns me here is the bib-
lical portrayal of Yhwh, not speculation about texts that may once have existed and dis-
appeared. The single biblical exception may be Psalm 82, on which see n. 11 above. 
15 Similarly, one might object to my argument here by noting that Yhwh fights against 
other gods in the Exodus story. Indeed, the biblical narrators specifically present the Ex-
odus events as a battle between Israel’s deity and the gods of the Egyptians (Exod 12:12, 
18:11, Numb 33:4). But the motif of struggle so prominent in the Mesopotamian and 
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Thus it is difficult to imagine Yhwh, confronted by any other being, 
smiting his thigh and biting his lip, like Anshar in Enuma Elish when he 
hears of Tiamat’s war plans.16 Yhwh never feels threatened by His under-
lings’ revolt to the point bursting out in tears, like Enlil in Atraḫasis.17 Nor 
can one imagine Yhwh being intimidated into agreeing to another being’s 
demand by threat of violence against Yhwh,18 in contrast to El in the Baal 
texts.19 In spite of the similar language which describes Yhwh’s council and 
various pagan pantheons, their resemblance hardly shows that their respec-
tive theologies are identical. On the contrary, those similarities and the 
comparisons they foster help us to realize that in almost no biblical texts is 
there any sense that Yhwh’s authority, like Tiamat’s or Enlil’s, El’s or 
Baal’s, is contingent.20  
                                                                                                                          
Ugaritic texts is absent in the Exodus story. The biblical narrative shows that Yhwh had 
no need to break a sweat in defeating the Egyptian gods. The conflict was drawn out 
over some ten plagues not because the Egyptian gods were successful in slowing Yhwh 
down, but because God wanted to prolong the Egyptians’ suffering so that His own vic-
tory would appear all the more impressive (see Exod 14:4, 17–18). 
16 Enuma Elish 2:50. 
17 Atraḫasis 1:167. Rabbinic literature not infrequently portrays God as weeping; see, e.g., 
b. Berakhot 59a, b. Ḥagigah 5b, Pesiqta deRav Kahana 15.4. Even in these rabbinic 
texts, however, God weeps not because God feels threated by some greater power or be-
cause God has been defeated by one, but because God has punished Israel, for whom 
God retains (in spite of divine anger) abiding love. On the suffering of God in rabbinic 
literature, see especially the magnificent collection of sources and discussion in Abra-
ham Joshua Heschel, Heavenly Torah as Refracted Through the Generations (ed. and 
trans. Gordon Tucker; New York: Continuum, 2005), 108–26; see also Meir Eyali, 
“God’s Sharing in the Suffering of the Jewish People” (in Hebrew), in Studies in Jewish 
Thought (eds. Sarah Heller Wilensky and Moshe Idel; Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 
1989), 29–50. On divine weeping specifically in rabbinic literature and its connection 
with ancient Mesopotamian tropes, see the thorough discussion in Michael Fishbane, 
Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 160–
73. On the limits of monotheistic myth among the rabbis, see further the crucial reserva-
tions of Fishbane, 212–13: in the end, creatures remain creatures and God remains in 
charge. 
18 Granted, God can be moved to action by prayer, but this is somewhat different: no threat 
against Yhwh is made. Even Moses’ demand to be relieved of his job and his life if need 
be (Num 11:20), though a threat, is not a threat directed against the life, safety, or power 
of Yhwh. 
19 See El’s capitulation to Yamm in KTU 1.2.i.30–38 (for translations, see Dennis Pardee, 
“The Ba‛lu Myth,” in Canonical Compositions from the Biblical World, vol. 1 of The 
Context of Scripture: Canonical Compositions from the Biblical World [eds. William W. 
Hallo and K. Lawson Younger; Leiden and Boston: Brill, 1997], 246b, and Mark Smith, 
“The Baal Cycle,” in Ugaritic Narrative Poetry, ed. Simon Parker [SBLWAW; Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1997], 100–101), and also El’s capitulation to Anat’s threat of violence 
in KTU 1.3.v.19–29 (Pardee in Hallo and Younger, 254b; Smith in Parker, 105). 
20 All this is not to deny that some or many Israelites might have imagined Yhwh feeling 
vulnerable or intimidated as Anshar, Enlil, and El are. There may even be hints of such a 
view in the Bible here and there. Yhwh does seem to feel threatened by humankind in 
Gen 11:6 (an obscure verse in any event) and perhaps in Gen 6:1–4 (among the most ob-
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scure passages in all scripture). Interestingly, both of these are J verses; on J’s tendency 
to portray Yhwh’s act of creation, and hence Yhwh Himself, as flawed, see Israel Knohl, 
The Divine Symphony: The Bible’s Many Voices (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Soci-
ety, 2003), 37–49. Even these verses, however, do not regard any other force as superior 
to or mightier than Yhwh. Further, when reading any of narratives that give a sense that 
some being or force opposes Yhwh, we need to recall that we are in fact reading a narra-
tive—that is, a text with a plot, and hence, by definition, with conflict. If there is to be a 
monotheistic narrative, it is inevitable that this narrative will give some sense that the 
one God’s power is limited or at least challenged. As Propp has pointed out, “In any cul-
ture, we must distinguish between mythology, where gods’ powers are limited for plot 
purposes, and cult, where gods are lauded as virtually omnipotent” (William Propp, 
“Monotheism and ‘Moses’: The Problem of Early Israelite Religion,” UF 31 [1999]: 566 
n. 142). 
 Jon Levenson, Creation and the Persistence of Evil: The Jewish Drama of Divine Om-
nipotence (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988), 8–9, argues against Kaufmann’s 
reading of the passages in which sea creatures fight against Yhwh, pointing out that 
some of them (in particular Ps 74:12–17) do not make clear that they describe a revolt 
rather than a genuine theomachy. Nonetheless, the contrast between the biblical passag-
es and the Mesopotamian or Canaanite passages remains striking. Even in verses such as 
Gen 6:1–4, Gen 11:6, and Ps 74:12–17, God succeeds in thwarting the will of the other 
beings permanently, which is much more than Tiamat or even Enlil can say. On the di-
vine fight against chaos in biblical and other ancient Near Eastern literature, see esp. the 
thorough survey and discussions in Othmar Keel and Silvia Schroer, Creation: Biblical 
Theologies in the Context of the Ancient Near East (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 
2015), 97–106, 147–50, 159–70. This monograph is significant both for its integration 
of textual and iconographic evidence and for its attention to Egyptian data (and not only 
to Mesopotamian and Northwest Semitic data typically discussed in treatments of the-
omachy) in a manner rarely seen outside the work of Keel and his students. Levenson, 
Creation, passim, esp. 11–25, further argues that many biblical passages attest to the 
biblical belief that God did not in fact vanquish chaos at the outset of creation. Each of 
his arguments demands attention.  
 (1) Levenson maintains (11–13) that passages like Isa 51:9–11, in which the prophet 
calls on God’s mighty arm to wake up and defeat chaos as it had done of old, show that 
those adversarial forces “were not annihilated in perpetuity in primordial times” (12). In 
fact, however, the adversaries in these passages are not primordial, semi-divine monsters 
but human beings (usually the Babylonians) who have attacked Jerusalem. The exist-
ence of the current adversary, then, does not show that the mythic forces of evil still ex-
ist; rather, it reflects Yhwh’s sovereign decision to give human beings free will and the 
power to use it for good and for ill. As we shall see below, this represents the primary 
limitation on Yhwh in the Hebrew Bible, but we must note that it is a self-imposed limi-
tation, and one that Yhwh can easily thwart if Yhwh so chooses.  
 (2) In Job 40:25–32 God does not crush Leviathan but imprisons him. “The confinement 
of chaos,” Levenson points out (17), “rather than its elimination is the essence of crea-
tion, and the survival of ordered reality hangs only upon God’s vigilance…” Here again, 
however, the persistence of chaos results from Yhwh’s own decision, not from any limi-
tation on Yhwh’s power.  
 (3) Levenson’s disagreement with Kaufmann is smaller than one might initially think. 
Levenson acknowledges “the inevitability of the defeat of Yhwh’s adversaries” so that 
the faithful Yhwhist must “wait patiently and confidently for his master’s reactivation of 
his infinite power to deliver. The benevolent, world-ordering side of God may be 
eclipsed for a while, but it can never be uprooted or overthrown” (21). In this case, Le-
venson’s understanding of the biblical picture of God is ultimately the same as Kauf-
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In assessing Kaufmann’s definition of monotheism and applying it to 
specific texts, we may find it useful to introduce a conceptual distinction of 
great import. One can imagine two models of divine kingship: a monotheis-
tic one, in which members of a divine retinue praise the one God and carry 
out that God’s wishes; and a polytheistic one, in which the divine king is 
first among equals, mightiest to be sure, but in control of the universe nei-
ther automatically nor permanently. Conceptually, the difference between a 
monotheistic council and a pagan pantheon is clear: The divine retinue of 
the monotheistic God is comparable to the American cabinet, where secre-
taries of various departments carry out the president’s policies and serve at 
the president’s whim. The polytheistic pantheon resembles the British cabi-
net, where each minister may have an independent power base, and in 
which all cabinet members, the Prime Minister included, may be dismissed 
at the whim of lower politicians in Parliament or, at least in theory, at the 
direction of a higher and more august, if otiose, authority.21   
On the basis of this distinction, it is clear that the pantheons of Canaan, 
Greece, and Mesopotamia were polytheistic. Each had a high god, but Baal, 
Zeus, Marduk, Anu, or Enlil could not be called supreme or all-powerful in 
the monotheistic sense. Even the high god or goddess could be seriously 
challenged, and indeed kingship did pass from one god to another, some-
times peacefully (from Enlil and Anu to Marduk, as described in the pref-
ace to Ḫammurapi’s code),22 sometimes violently (from Baal to Mot and 
vice versa in the Ugaritic Baal Cycle; from Tiamat to Marduk in Enumah 
Elish; from Kronos to Zeus). Some biblical passages that speak of other 
heavenly beings (for example, Deut 4:19, many texts from both Isaiahs, 
Genesis 1), on the other hand, allow only the presidential reading. But it is 
possible to read other lines or passages according to the “parliamentary” 
model or according to the “presidential” one. These include Exod 15:11, 
Deut 32:8–9 and Psalm 82. But the fact that the Hebrew Bible, unlike the 
literatures of Greece, Canaan, and Mesopotamia, provides not a single ex-
ample that must be read according to the parliamentary model indicates that 
                                                                                                                          
mann’s, but Levenson describes the theology in a more nuanced way. We might sum up 
Kaufmann’s view thus: The biblical God is omnipotent. We can sum up Levenson’s 
view thus: The biblical God can choose to be omnipotent. Indeed, the biblical God 
chose to be omnipotent at creation, and biblical authors are confident that one day God 
will choose to be omnipotent again. Meanwhile, they acknowledge that we live in a 
deeply imperfect world. Levenson’s reading of the biblical material is influenced by cer-
tain strands of rabbinic and qabbalist thought (concerning which see n. 17 above), and 
also by the reality of the world we inhabit; it is also a more accurate and subtle descrip-
tion of biblical theology. But ultimately his view of divine omnipotence and Kauf-
mann’s are congruent. 
21 In this analogy, Zeus or Marduk is Prime Minister rather than monarch. The British 
monarch (essentially a powerless though respected figure) would then be comparable to 
an inactive, older god such as Enlil. 
22 Martha Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor (SBLWAW; Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1997), 76. 
212 BENJAMIN D. SOMMER  
 
the presidential model is the norm for the anthology that is the Hebrew 
Bible.  
What, following Kaufmann, I have constructed in the previous para-
graph may be regarded as an argument from silence: it is the absence of 
several crucial elements found in the polytheistic religions of Israel’s 
neighbors that leads me to conclude that the Hebrew Bible exemplifies 
monotheism. In regard to any one text, such an argument lacks validity. We 
cannot say definitively that Exod 15:11, or Exod 20:2, or Psalm 96, on its 
own, is a monotheistic text. But when we examine a wide variety of biblical 
texts from several different genres (narrative, law, prophecy, prayer), the 
consistent omission of unambiguously polytheistic themes is indeed reveal-
ing. In such a case, an argument from silence is legitimate. The fact that the 
Hebrew Bible as a whole, in marked contrast to any sampling of texts from 
elsewhere in the ancient Near East, fails to attest any examples that must be 
read in a polytheistic fashion justifies the conclusion that the anthology in 
question is indeed a monotheistic one, and that texts like Psalm 82 or Exod 
15:11 are to be taken, in the context of that anthology, as monotheistic. 
Before I move on to mention a few additional aspects of Kaufmann’s 
approach to monotheism, permit me to say a word in defense of the defini-
tion of monotheism put forward by Hermann Cohen and employed by 
Kaufmann. The definition of monotheism in the work of these two thinkers 
is far more sensible than the more common definition, according to which 
monotheism is a mere matter of counting deities. In that more common 
definition, once our count has gone beyond the number one, we’ve entered 
the realm of polytheism. This quantitative definition is not very useful, for 
two reasons. 
First, according to the quantitative definition, there probably are no ex-
amples of actual religions that are monotheistic. If we adopt that definition, 
it is not only the Hebrew Bible (with its םישודק להק ,םיהלא ,םילא ינב ,םילא\ דוס
םיכאלמ םישודק), that cannot be termed monotheistic; most forms of Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam will have to be classified as polytheistic, too. After 
all, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all exhibit a belief in angels, beings 
who reside in heaven and who do not normally die. In the case of Catholic 
and Orthodox Christianity, we can also note a belief in saints residing in 
heaven, i.e., humans whose death had no deleterious effect on their contin-
ued existence and activity; similar beliefs are attested, albeit in less formal-
ized ways in Islam (especially in its Shi‛ite and Sufi forms) and in Judaism. 
Many Jews, Christians and Muslims believe that prayer can be directed to 
these beings with realistic hope of the prayer’s efficacy.23 An especially in-
structive example appears in rabbinic literature: The rabbis regard the wor-
ship of the angel Michael as a forbidden form of worship (b. Ḥullin 40a; b. 
Abodah Zarah 42b; t. Ḥullin 2:6 [= 2:18 in the Zuckermandel edition]). As 
                                                     
23 As Kaufmann notes in Toledot, 1:666–67, and Religion, 137. 
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the Talmudic scholar José Faur has pointed out regarding this passage, the 
rabbis “considered Michael a benevolent angel who interceded with God on 
behalf of Israel. His existence was not in dispute, yet worship of him was 
considered idolatry.”24 The rabbis, who are usually considered to be mono-
theistic, acknowledged the existence of this heavenly being and were con-
cerned only that Jews should not worship him—not because such worship 
was pointless, but because it was insulting to Yhwh. It was possible to im-
agine Michael hearing prayers from the Jews he was responsible to protect; 
but such prayers were unnecessary, since Yhwh was willing to listen to 
Israel’s prayers Himself, and it was Yhwh who directed Michael’s activities 
in any case. In short, the common definition of monotheism is too narrow: 
If we use it, then the religion of the Hebrew Bible is not monotheistic; but 
then neither are Judaism, Christianity, or Islam, with the exception of a few 
highly philosophical forms of these religions which are historically late and 
have attracted few adherents.25 A definition that requires us to classify not 
only the Hebrew Bible but most forms of Judaism, Christianity and Islam 
as polytheism fails to capture something essential that distinguishes these 
religions from classical Greek religion, from most forms of Hinduism, or 
from Shintoism. A category of polytheism that includes both Hinduism and 
Judaism, both the worship of the Greek pantheon and the worship of the 
biblical God, is so large as to be meaningless. The reason that we have 
categories and definitions is that they make connections and distinctions 
that are meaningful. The distinction between Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam on the one hand and Hinduism, Shintoism, and traditional African 
religions on the other is real and useful. This remains the case, even though 
the extent of the distinction should not be overstated, and even though vari-
ous theological, ritual, and ethical isoglosses also unite, say, some forms of 
Hinduism and some forms of Judaism.26 That this definition, like all cate-
gorizations and heuristics, has limitations does not mean it should be dis-
pensed with. 
                                                     
24 José Faur, “The Biblical Idea of Idolatry,” JQR 69 (1978): 14–15. On the worship of 
angels among Jews, see also Jerusalem Talmud Berakhot 9:7 (12a). “Idolatry” here 
means forbidden worship, not worship of a nonexistent being. 
25 Cf. the astute remark of Propp, “Monotheism,” 454–55 n. 42: “For the ancient world, 
functional definitions of ‘monotheism’ and ‘polytheism’ are more useful than philosoph-
ical definitions: ‘monotheism’ is monotheistic behavior. Apparently, apart from the 
minds of philosophers and mystics, there is no such thing as monotheism; compare Wil-
liam James’s obiter dictum, ‘[polytheism] has always been the real religion of common 
people, and is so still today’ (The Varieties of Religious Experience [New York: New 
American Library, 1958], 396).” Propp’s critique of purist definitions of monotheism is 
quite on target. 
26 On some of the complexities and limitations of the monotheism/polytheism polarity in 
the study of Hinduism, see Wendy Doniger, On Hinduism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 10–20.  
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There is a second reason to prefer the qualitative definition of monothe-
ism over the quantitative one: the former is more consistent than the latter. 
This becomes clear when we reflect on the implications of each definition. 
Let us imagine a theology in which there is one supreme being as well as 
many other beings who have some degree of free will and self-conscious-
ness. These other beings may be mortal or immortal, or they may be both: 
that is, they may be able to achieve immortality after they die. In this theol-
ogy, it is clear that the supreme being is not alone in the universe and is not 
the only being who can have some effect on the universe. The fact that 
these other beings have free will constitutes a limitation, though a voluntary 
one, on the supreme being. Now, according to the common or quantitative 
definition of monotheism, such a theology is to be classified as monotheism 
if these beings live on earth and are called “human,” but it is to be classi-
fied as polytheism if some of these beings live in heaven and are called 
“angels” or “gods.” The qualitative definition championed by Cohen and 
Kaufmann is more consistent: the theology I just described is monotheism, 
regardless of where these beings happen to live. There is no reason that we 
should find the existence of subservient beings in heaven any more surpris-
ing in monotheism than the existence of subservient beings on earth. Con-
sequently, the definition of monotheism found in the work of Cohen and 
Kaufmann is far more sensible than the common one. To be a useful cate-
gory for scholars of religion to think with, monotheism has to be a matter 
of divinity’s quality, not its quantity; to use Cohen’s terms: monotheism 
must be concerned with God’s uniqueness, not with God’s oneness.27 
1.2. The Dating and Origin of Monotheism 
It is not only in his definition of monotheism that Kaufmann differs from 
many other biblical scholars; he is distinctive in three additional respects.  
First, Kaufmann dates monotheism to the earliest period of Israel’s ex-
istence as a people—to the time of Moses.28 In this Kaufmann differs from 
those who date monotheism to the exile or post-exilic period (for example, 
those who regard Deutero-Isaiah as the first monotheist). But Kaufmann 
differs no less from scholars who locate the emergence of monotheism in a 
Jerusalemite intellectual elite of the eighth century. These scholars regard 
monotheism as a response to the rise of Assyrian imperialism and its claim 
that Ashur was the mightiest force in the universe.29 For Kaufmann, mono-
theism is much earlier than the eighth century.  
                                                     
27 Cohen, Religion, 35. 
28 Kaufmann, Religion, 222–31; Kaufmann, “The Biblical Age,” 14–29.  
29 E.g., Baruch Levine, “Assyrian Ideology and Israelite Monotheism,” Iraq 67 
(2005): 411–27; cf. Othmar Keel, Die Geschichte Jerusalems und die Entstehung des 
Monotheismus (2 vols.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 1276, and Konrad 
Schmid, “Anfänge politikförmiger Religion: Die Theologisierung politisch-imperialer 
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Second, Kaufmann regards monotheism as far more widespread in an-
cient Israel than most scholars claim.30 He avers that monotheism was not a 
notion that existed only in the ruminations of a small group of priests in 
Jerusalem; rather, according to Kaufmann, both the monotheism of tran-
scendence and also the exclusive worship of Yhwh were central features of 
popular religion. To the extent that the worship of foreign gods did infil-
trate Israelite and Judean religious practice, it was largely an idiosyncrasy 
of the royal elite, rather than the people at large.31 (In this regard Kaufmann 
views pre-exilic religion as similar to Jewish religion of the second century 
BCE, when it was the Jerusalem elite who were most attracted by Hellen-
ism, while rural families, like the Hasmonean family from Modi’in, re-
mained most committed to Israel’s distinctive religious and cultural herit-
age. His view of Israel’s culture in both eras also calls to mind those of, 
say, India or Hong Kong in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, when it was precisely the landed and wealthy who were most likely to 
emulate British culture.) It should be noticed that in regarding both mono-
theism of transcendence and exclusive worship of Yhwh as widespread in 
pre-exilic Israel, Kaufmann is decidedly skeptical of the biblical record. He 
rejects the claims of historiographers like the authors of Judges and Kings 
and the testimony of the prophets that many or most Israelites were poly-
theists.32 Some critics of Kaufmann label him “conservative” in his ap-
proach to biblical texts, but in this as in other respects Kaufmann was any-
thing but wed to the perspective of the biblical authors. Kaufmann regards 
the Bible’s claims of rampant polytheistic belief and practice in ancient 
Israel as inaccurate. He maintains that for polemical reasons, biblical au-
thors exaggerated the extent of worship of other deities or forces. Biblical 
authors needed to find sins of sufficient magnitude to justify the catastro-
phes that befell the northern kingdom and, increasingly, the southern king-
                                                                                                                          
Begriffe in der Religionsgeschichte des antiken Israel als Grundlage autoritärer und tole-
ranter Strukturmomente monotheistischer Religionen,” in Religion—Wirtschaft—Politik. 
Forschungszugänge zu einem aktuellen transdisziplinären Feld (ed. A. Liedhegener; Zü-
rich: Pano and Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 161–77.  
30 E.g., Kaufmann, Religion, 60, 132–33.  
31 Kaufmann, Religion, 138–42, 273–75; Toledot, 1:661–63, 2:221–38, esp. 233–36.  
32 Kaufmann writes: “The biblical arraignment is exaggerated; sins of particular groups are 
ascribed to the entire people” (Religion, 135). To be sure, he acknowledges that this ex-
aggeration is based on something: both on the sins of a small minority of the nation who 
were responsible for royal cults in the ninth through seventh centuries (Religion, 139–
144) and on a popular worship of objects that was not genuinely polytheistic (because it 
is unrelated to any specific foreign deity) but was “a magical, fetishistic, non-mytho-
logical worship of images” (144), a worship that was fundamentally unfamiliar with the 
realities of polytheistic worship and the icons that played a role therein: “Worship of 
‘dumb idols’ is, in the biblical view, arrant, sinful foolishness” (146), for the idols, un-
like the lower ranking gods, are not real; they have no power, not even the derivative 
power that, say, Chemosh or Marduk enjoy in the view of biblical monotheism. (Cf. To-
ledot, 1:672–76.)  
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dom from the eighth century forward, and for this reason they largely in-
vented the trope of the polytheistic pre-exilic Israelite population.33 But 
Kaufmann emphasizes that this biblical testimony is historically unrelia-
ble.34 
Finally, Kaufmann’s approach to monotheism is distinctive within bibli-
cal studies in a third respect: Kaufmann insists that monotheism appeared 
suddenly and did not unfold slowly from polytheism.35 (Thus Kaufmann 
argues that Israelite monotheism arose the same way that Islamic monothe-
ism arose: in a revolution, not as a result of an evolution.) For Kaufmann, 
monotheism is the product of genius, of the quirky or bizarre insight of 
some religious thinker or thinkers. Underlying this conception of the origin 
of monotheism is one of the most important and, from an academic point of 
view, iconoclastic elements of Kaufmann’s approach to humanistic re-
search. He rejects the notion that the emergence of ideas in human culture 
should always be accounted for in historicist and materialist terms. He op-
poses reductionism, insisting (if I may paraphrase a saying attributed, prob-
                                                     
33 See the useful summary in Kaufmann, Toledot, 2:53, as well as 1:659–85.  
34 It is important to emphasize that biblical texts largely portray the Israelites as polythe-
ists, because many modern scholars somehow assume that the biblical texts said that Is-
raelites were monotheists. A depressingly large amount of scholarly writing on this sub-
ject attempts to debunk the Bible by demonstrating something the Bible repeatedly em-
phasizes: that Israel before the exile worshiped many gods. A particularly acute example 
of this tendency is found in William Dever, Did God Have a Wife? Archaeology and 
Folk Religion in Ancient Israel (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdmans, 2005). To give but 
one illustration: Dever asks why biblical authors do not discuss the many female figu-
rines found by archaeologists in Israelite sites, which he understands to be images of a 
goddess. He maintains that their failure to mention these figurines results from their de-
liberate attempt to suppress any reference to them: “They did not wish to acknowledge 
the popularity and the powerful influence of these images” (p. 184). In fact, however, 
biblical authors constantly acknowledge the widespread polytheism of Israelites, and 
they mention Israelite goddess worship specifically on a number of occasions (e.g., Jer 
7:18, 44:17–19). Israelite authors (rather like many later Jewish and contemporary Israe-
li authors) love talking about how awful their own people are; self-criticism, sometimes 
of an exaggerated sort, is one of the most prominent hallmarks of biblical (and later Jew-
ish) literature. When Dever attempts to portray the Bible as whitewashing Israelite histo-
ry, he fails to attend to the fact that biblical authors are in fact obsessed with tarnishing 
Israelite history. Scholars like Dever who argue that pre-exilic Israelites were polytheists 
seek not to overturn the biblical picture of Israelite religion but to confirm it. On the oth-
er hand, scholars like Kaufmann who minimize the extent of pre-exilic polytheism reject 
the biblical picture as inaccurate or vastly overstated. Thus Kaufmann reminds us not to 
take the reports of biblical writers in Kings as reliable: “The historiographer could not 
account for what had taken place—the collapse of Israel’s monarchy—without sin. Isra-
el’s sinfulness is essential to biblical theodicy. Hence the biblical denunciations require 
careful evaluation before they can be utilized as historical records” (Religion, 135; cf. 
Toledot, 1:663). On this irony, see David Berger, Religion, “Nationalism, and Historiog-
raphy: Yehezkel Kaufmann's Account of Jesus and Early Christianity,” in Persecution, 
Polemic, and Dialogue: Essays in Jewish-Christian Relations (Brighton, MA: Academic 
Studies Press, 2010), 301 n. 24. 
35 See Kaufmann, Religion, 229–31; Toledot 2:54–57. 
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ably apocryphally, to a Jewish intellectual a generation older than Kauf-
mann) that sometimes an idea is only an idea. Kaufmann avers that in some 
cases—perhaps, the most significant cases—an idea is not a cipher for or 
manifestation of economic, political, social, or psychological forces. There 
are some intellectually and spiritually creative forces within the capacity of 
human beings that cannot be explained or reduced as epiphenomena of 
historical events.36 Here Kaufmann’s connection to Hermann Cohen re-
emerges, for the neo-Kantian philosopher was an avowedly anti-historicist, 
and in many ways anti-Hegelian, thinker.37 But Kaufmann achieves a syn-
thesis that Cohen does not even attempt: Kaufmann is an empirical, philo-
logical, and historical scholar, but he does not accept the radical—not to 
say, nihilist—form of historicism so common among empirical, philologi-
cal, and historical scholars in the academy, the shallow but common form 
of historicism that insists all ideas can traced back to material, political, or 
economic causes.38 Kaufmann contests this type of historicism, which de-
volves into cynicism, a historicism that regards all religion, literature, or art 
as masking psychological, political, or economic drives. It is those drives, 
this historicism cum cynicism alleges, that account for what humans, or 
humanists, naively think of as creativity or meaning. Kaufmann’s core dis-
agreement with many of those who date the emergence of monotheism to 
the eighth century is not simply his claim that monotheism emerged earlier 
than that; more importantly, his disagreement lies in his claim that mono-
theism need not be reduced to a reaction to geopolitical trends that affected 
ancient Israel. By assuming that monotheism’s emergence should be, or 
even could be, explained by geopolitical events (an assumption that none of 
the scholars in question pause to defend), these scholars fail to grapple with 
the nature of human creativity. 
                                                     
36 On Kaufmann’s rejection of what we now call reductionism in Religious Studies, see 
esp. Schweid, “Biblical Critic,” 416–18. To be sure, Kaufmann’s well-taken emphasis 
on the power of ideas in shaping history and his polemic against overemphasizing mate-
rialist forces can be taken too far; see Berger, “Religion,” 12-13 for an example. 
37 On Cohen as an anti-historicist thinker, see David Myers, Resisting History: Historicism 
and Its Discontents in German-Jewish Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2003) 35–67. 
38 On various meanings of the term “historicism,” some pejorative and some favorable, see 
my remarks in Benjamin D. Sommer, “Dating Pentateuchal Texts and the Perils of 
Pseudo-Historicism,” in The Pentateuch: International Perspectives on Current Re-
search (ed. Thomas B. Dozeman, Konrad Schmid, and Baruch J. Schwartz; FAT 78; 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 101–8. I should note that I am far from reviling histori-
cism; on the contrary, I apply the adjectives “shallow” and “nihilist” to some forms of 
historicism precisely because historicism need not be either of these. Like Kaufmann, it 
is precisely as a historicist that I object to these forms of historicism; what I protest is 
the unhappy combination of reductionism with an unsophisticated form of historicism, 
as I explain at greater length in “Dating.” I am pleased to thank Ronald Hendel, Chris-
toph Uehlinger, and Esther Hamori for encouraging me to express myself more clearly 
on this matter. 
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It should be noticed that the first and third factors I mention here appear 
to be harmonious with each other, but closer inspection reveals them to be 
contradictory. If, as Kaufmann posits in the third element I mentioned just 
now, the origin of monotheism is beyond reduction to a historical factor, 
then attempts to date its emergence are likely to amount to so much striving 
after the wind. If we cannot know how human genius created the idea of 
monotheism, then we cannot ascertain when monotheism arose with any 
confidence whatsoever. It may be true that the Pentateuchal sources JE, P, 
and D all date the emergence of monotheism to the time of Moses, or at 
least point to the age of Moses as especially crucial in the development and 
spread of monotheism in the nation Israel. But Kaufmann hardly claims 
that the Pentateuchal sources themselves date to Moses’ day; he regards all 
of them as products of pre-exilic, Iron Age Israel. It follows that we cannot 
know very much about the historical Moses of the late Bronze Age, assum-
ing he once existed; we can only know how Moses was recollected or con-
structed in the Iron Age, when all the Pentateuchal sources (as opposed to 
the later Torah book that encompasses JE, P, and D) were composed. It 
may be the case that by the time these documents were composed monothe-
ism had long existed, but the date of its emergence is simply shrouded in a 
mist that empirical, historical research cannot penetrate. In his dating of the 
origin of monotheism, Kaufmann’s opposition to a shallow if common 
form of historicism leads him to a reaction that is no less shallow. 
1.3.  Some Texts 
Before we turn to examples of recent approaches comparable to Kauf-
mann’s, it will be useful to review a few familiar texts that exemplify quali-
tative monotheism or the monotheism of transcendence. The locus classi-
cus occurs in Deuteronomy 4: 
Take care—for this is a life-and-death point—lest you look up to the heav-
ens and, seeing the sun and the moon and the stars, the whole host of heav-
en, you allow yourselves to be seduced to bow down to them and worship 
them—those gods, whom Yhwh your God allotted to all the peoples under 
the heavens (םימשה־לכ תחת םימעה לכל םתא ךיהלא 'ה קלח רשא); Yhwh took 
you, on the other hand, and led you out of the iron furnace, out of Egypt, so 
that you belong to Him, as His private possession, to this very day. You 
have been shown; indeed you know: Yhwh is God; there is none other than 
Him. (Deut 4:15, 19–20, 35) 
This passage tells us in verse 19 that there are many deities, to whom Yhwh 
has assigned various roles, yet it goes on to tell us in verse 35 that there is 
none other than Yhwh. There is no contradiction between these two verses: 
the gods have their roles only because Yhwh assigned those roles to them. 
Consequently, one can rightly say that there is none other than He, for He is 
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at a wholly other level from the many gods. He is thus the only true deity. 
Another biblical passage relevant to our concerns reads: 
When the Highest One gave the nations their possessions, 
When He divided humanity, 
He established the boundaries of nations  
In accordance with the number of the gods.39 
Indeed Yhwh’s share is His nation,  
Jacob, His very own inheritance. (Deut 32:8–9) 
According to the conception in this second passage, just as there were sev-
enty gods, so there were seventy nations,40 each of which had its own god. 
(Thus Ashur received responsibility for the Assyrians, and Marduk for the 
Babylonians, though Deuteronomy does not condescend to mention these 
minor gods by name.) But the high God Yhwh kept one nation as His own 
property, and it was their responsibility to pray only to Him. (For this con-
cept in Deuteronomy see also 29:25.)41  
To be sure, if we read verses 8–9 outside their textual setting in Deuter-
onomy (which is to say, if we read these verses decontextually and thus, in 
a sense, midrashically), it would be possible to speculate that ןוילע and '  ה  
are not the same person, and that this text is not monotheistic.42 It is entirely 
                                                     
39 My translation follows the old text preserved in the 4QDeutj, q; cf. similar readings in 
LXX (κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀγγέλων θεοῦ, or, in some mss., κατὰ ἀριθμὸν υἱῶν θεοῦ) and re-
lated readings in Targum Pseudo-Jonathan. The issue is widely discussed; see especially 
the helpful treatment of the issues in this verse and in 32:43 in Jeffrey Tigay, Deuteron-
omy (JPSTC; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1996), 513–18, as well as the 
useful summary of the versions in Emanuel Tov, Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 269.  
40 On the stereotypical use of the number seventy here and its wider context, see Mark 
Smith, Origins, 55, and cf. 48–49. 
41 The understanding of these verses I present here is hardly new; it was already set forth 
in detail in the twelfth century by Nachmanides in his commentary to Lev 18:25. See 
Alon Goshen-Gottstein, “Other Gods in Ramban’s Thought: Adapted Conceptions and 
Their Implications for Possible Connections to Other Religions” (in Hebrew), in ‛Al Pi 
Ha-Be’er: Studies in Jewish Philosophy and in Halakhic Thought Presented to Gerald 
Blidstein (eds. U. Ehrlich, H. Kreisel, and D. Lasker; Beersheba: Ben Gurion University 
Press, 2008), 28–62. Interestingly, Nachmanides arrived at this interpretation even with-
out the text of Deut 32:9 preserved in the Septuagint and 4QDeutj, q; Nachmanides based 
his reading on the MT, which reads “in accordance with the number of the children of 
Israel” rather than “in accordance with the number of gods.” What was a possible read-
ing for him is even stronger in light of the Septuagint and Qumran texts. For a similar 
reading of these verses, see Schenker, “Monothéisme,” 438–41, who astutely notes that 
by praying to their own gods, the other nations also give glory to Yhwh, who assigned 
those gods to them and commanded them to pray to those gods. 
42 For this reading, see, e.g., Mark Smith, Origins, 48–49 and 143–44. See also the refer-
ences to this reading and a balanced assessment of its contextual unlikelihood in Peter 
Machinist, “How Gods Die, Biblically and Otherwise: A Problem of Cosmic Restructur-
ing,” in Reconsidering the Concept of Revolutionary Monotheism (ed. Beate Pongratz-
220 BENJAMIN D. SOMMER  
 
possible that in a polytheistic system a high god would assign all the gods 
their responsibilities; indeed, in Enuma Elish 6:39–46, Marduk divides the 
gods into various groupings, and his ancestor Anshar proclaims Marduk the 
one whom the gods themselves obey in 6:101–120. Similarly, Anu and 
Enlil appoint Marduk ruler of Babylon and of the whole world in the pref-
ace to Ḫammurapi’s legal collection.43 The introduction to Ḫammurapi 
does not indicate that Anu and Enlil are monotheistic deities (or bitheistic 
co-deities); on the contrary, this act seems to represent their retirement 
from active duty. These examples demonstrate that in polytheism one deity 
can appoint another deity to a particular role, and thus Deut 32:8–9 could 
be read polytheistically. But in the context of the poem in which these vers-
es appear, this reading becomes less likely, since (as Jan Joosten points out) 
in verses 12, 17, 21, 31, and 37 the poet “knows of other gods […but] un-
derlines YHWH’s superiority over them: the other gods are non-gods, mere 
djinns, םידש, their force doesn’t match that of the God of Israel.”44 This 
theme is hammered home later in the poem, in verse 39:  ןיאו אוה ינא ינא
ידמע םיהלא (“I, indeed I, am He, and there is no god together with Me…”). 
It is also underscored in verse 43 as it appears in 4QDeutq: 
ומע םימש ונינרה45 םיהלא לכ ול ווחתשהו   
Rejoice, O heavens, with Him, 
And bow down to Him, all ye gods… 
In short, when read decontextually, verses 8–9 of Deuteronomy 32 can be 
seen as polytheistic, but in the context of the poem as a whole this reading 
becomes much less likely. The setting of all these lines in the Book of Deu-
teronomy further bolsters a monotheistic reading of them. The phrasing in 
Deuteronomy 4 is especially clear in this regard. 
The same theology underlies Mic 4:1–5. In the eschatological future that 
these verses imagine, individual nations still exist, and they still have con-
flicts with each other. These conflicts cannot be adjudicated by their own 
gods, who will not be impartial: Marduk would tend to side with Babylon 
and Ashur with Assyria, with warfare as the result (indeed, this is what 
happens in the pre-eschatological present). What will make the eschaton 
different is that all nations will acknowledge that Yhwh, the God dwelling 
on Mount Zion, is the ultimate authority, and they will travel there in order 
                                                                                                                          
Leisten; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2011), 196–97, and Jan Joosten, “Note on the 
Text of Deuteronomy xii 8,” VT 57 (2007): 553–54. 
43 For the text, see Roth, Law Collections, 76. Similarly, Anu, Enlil, Ea, Belet-ili and 
Ninlil acknowledge the sovereignty of Ashur in a seventh-century Assyrian prayer (Ben-
jamin Foster, Before the Muses. An Anthology of Akkadian Literature [2 vols.; Bethesda, 
MD: CDL Press, 1993], 2:700).  
44 Joosten, “Note on the Text of Deuteronomy xii 8,” 553. 
45 Against MT, the first syllable of ומע should probably be vocalized with ḥiriq, not a 
pataḥ, as LXX seems to show with its rendering ἅμα αὐτῷ (the preposition ἅμα with the 
dative indicates together with). 
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to receive judgments relating to international conflicts: “For legal ruling 
comes from Zion, and Yhwh’s oracle from Jerusalem” (Mic 4:2b).46 Con-
flicts will be resolved by a Security Council located on Mount Zion with a 
membership of One and an unsurpassed ability to ensure compliance. Con-
sequently, there will be no need for warfare, so that swords can be turned 
into plowshares, spears into pruning hooks (Mic 4:3). Even great nations 
will accept God’s censure there (Mic 4:2aβ). The entire world will accept 
the sovereignty of Yhwh in this eschatological future. But for Micah, the 
world-wide recognition of Yhwh does not mean that the gods of the nations 
are non-existent, irrelevant, or unemployed: “For all the nations will take 
pride in their own gods, but we will take pride in Yhwh, our God, forever” 
(Mica 4:5).47 Even in the eschaton, the other nations will relate primarily to 
their own gods, turning to Yhwh only when conflicts among them necessi-
tate recourse to a higher authority. This passage from Micah makes espe-
cially clear the supreme position of Yhwh above other gods (as well as the 
unusually privileged place of Israel, who have the distinction of a personal 
relation to the supreme deity).48 It is perfectly monotheistic, when we, sen-
sibly, define monotheism in a qualitative manner.  
1.4. Toward a More Perfect Unity? 
The qualitative monotheism of these texts is not simply a primitive way-
station between polytheism and true monotheism, an imperfect pre-exilic 
forerunner of the true monotheism that would emerge only in the post-
exilic era. The suggestion that this belief is merely a developmental stage to 
be located on a temporal continuum assumes a flawed understanding of the 
history of ideas, according to which once an old belief evolves into a new 
one, the old one disappears. That assumption has been a stumbling block 
that led all too often to erroneous reconstructions of history and to unsound 
dating of texts. In fact, the monotheism of transcendence, with its acknowl-
edgement of the reality of many gods, endures well into the post-exilic era. 
Few would doubt that the second-century BCE sage Ben-Sira is a monothe-
ist, but he echoes Deut 32:8–9 in Sir 17:17–18: “He appointed a ruler 
(ἡγούμενον) for every nation, but Israel is the Lord’s own portion; whom, 
being his firstborn, he brings up with discipline.”49 The same notion also 
                                                     
46 On הרות in the sense of “ruling” (precisely equivalent to the later Hebrew-Aramaic term 
קספ), see also Deut 17:8–11, Jer 18:18, Hag 2:11–13, Mal 2:7. 
47 I understand the Hebrew phrase םשב ךלה following the LXX translation of םשב ךלהתה in 
Zech 10:12 as κατακαυχήσονται (from κατακαυχάομαι = to boast, be proud of, exult in). 
48 Further, as Schenker, “Monothéisme,” 442, points out, the other gods really exist, but 
they exist only in some limited time-frame, whereas Yhwh alone exists forever. 
49 Translation from NRSV. The second of these verses (beginning with “whom”) appears 
only in some manuscripts of the Greek Sirach (see Alfred Rahlfs, ed., Septuaginta, 1935 
[reprint Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1979], 405, note to 17 [+18]). The He-
brew original of this section is not attested in the Geniza, Qumran, or Masada texts. 
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appears, with an interesting twist, in Jub. 15:31–32: “There are many na-
tions and many peoples, and they all belong to him [viz., to God], but over 
all of them he caused spirits to rule so that they might lead them astray 
from following him. But over Israel He did not cause any angel or spirit to 
rule because he alone is their ruler, and he will protect them.”50 A similar 
idea is assumed in various rabbinic passages, such as Pirqei deRabbi 
Eliezer 24. Moreover, this belief appears as late as the thirteenth century, in 
Nachmanides’ commentary on the Pentateuch.51 In his commentary to Exod 
20:3 (at the words ינפ לע) Nachmanides discusses several types of improper 
worship. The first of these involves the worship of gods who have genuine, 
if limited and derivative, power. Nachmanides acknowledges that the “oth-
er gods” whom Israelites are forbidden to worship include real beings with 
jurisdiction over other nations (though not over Israel, which constitutes 
God’s personal property). These other beings, Nachmanides explains, are 
termed “gods” in biblical literature; they are also called “angels.” Their 
power stems from the fact that Yhwh appointed them over specific nations, 
though at some point Yhwh will depose them and take direct control over 
the whole earth. The same idea appears in Nachmanides’ commentary to 
Lev 18:25, where, referring to the MT of Deut 32:8–9, he arrives at the 
same interpretation we arrived at on the basis of the even clearer text found 
in LXX and Qumran. 
2. Comparable Approaches to Monotheism  
in Recent Scholarship 
Although Kaufmann’s oeuvre remains largely unknown among European 
scholars, it is remarkable that some biblical critics in Europe in the past 
generation have arrived at positions regarding Israelite monotheism similar 
to Kaufmann’s.  
2.1. Early Monotheism 
In spite of the increasing tendency of biblical scholarship, especially in 
Europe, to date biblical texts into the Persian and even Hellenistic periods 
and hence to date theological beliefs found in them accordingly, several 
leading figures have argued not only that monotheism (which they largely 
define in quantitative terms) existed in ancient Israel in the monarchic peri-
od, but also that it was not an exceptional feature limited to a theological 
elite; rather, the widespread nature of the exclusive worship of one deity is 
attested in the archaeological record. Thus Rainer Albertz writes:  
                                                     
50 O. S. Wintermute’s translation, from OTP 2:87.  
51 See Goshen-Gottstein, “Other Gods.” 
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Whereas earlier scholars generally saw the exclusiveness of Israel’s worship 
of Yhwh as an old legacy of the early period52…, in more recent scholarship 
the exact opposite has been maintained, that throughout its pre-exilic phase 
the religion of Israel had been a ‘polytheistic religion which was no differ-
ent from the religions of the surrounding world.’53 The propagation of the 
sole worship of Yhwh is said to have begun only with Hosea in the eighth 
century, and to have been the concern of only small opposition groups (the 
‘Yhwh alone movement’54). According to this view, this movement was on-
ly able to influence society for a short period under Josiah, but then finally 
helped monotheism to victory in the exilic and early post-exilic period.  
Albertz goes to question this newer view. He asks whether  
such a model […] can […] demonstrate plausibly why […] opposition 
movements [such as the ‘Yhwh alone movement’] could arise […] in Isra-
el—in contrast to all the other societies of the Near East. What drove men 
like Elijah, Elisha and Jehu to be discontent with the official diplomatic 
syncretism of Ahab, if this was customary throughout the polytheistic world 
of the Near East? […] It is not enough to refer to social and political crises 
as an explanation of such abrupt and sometimes bloody battles over reli-
gious demarcation in later Israel. For people could equally well have taken 
the typical polytheistic way of overcoming crises and have sought the back-
ing of other gods (cf. Jer. 44.15-19). No, there must have been a potential 
for difference within Yhwh religion which distinguished it from the usual 
polytheistic religions, a potential to which opposition groups which saw the 
exclusive worship of Yhwh as the only possibility of overcoming crises 
could appeal. To this degree the approach of earlier scholars, who started 
from an inherent tendency to monolatry within Yhwh religion from the 
start, still has a lot to be said for it. So there must have been something in 
Yhwh religion which led to the formulation of the later prohibitions of alien 
gods. We certainly cannot speak of monotheism or even only of monolatry 
in the strict sense, at least in the pre-exilic period, but the claim to the sole 
worship of Yhwh which was made at the latest from the middle period of 
the monarchy onwards cannot be explained fully from the opposition to 
state syncretism and polytheism in this relatively late period […]; it must 
have had some support in the structures of Yhwh religion, which are older 
[…] The reasons for the distinctive tendency to exclusiveness intrinsic to 
 
                                                     
52 Albertz cites, among others, Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology (2 vols.; trans. 
D. M. G. Stalker; Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1962–65), 1:203–41. 
53 Here Albertz quotes Bernhard Lang, “Die Jhwh-Allein-Bewegung,” in Der Einzige 
Gott: die Geburt des biblischen Monotheismus (ed. Bernhard Lang, Morton Smith, and 
Hermann Vorländer; Munich: Kösel, 1981), 53. 
54 Albertz notes that this is Morton Smith’s phrase. See Morton Smith, Palestinian Parties 
and Politics That Shaped the Old Testament. (2nd ed.; London: SCM Press, 1987), pas-
sim, esp. 11–42. 
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the religion of Israel are to be sought in the extraordinary combination of 
social and religious factors out of which it emerged: under the extreme con-
ditions of political liberation and a lengthy existence in the wilderness, a 
close personal relationship developed between the Exodus group and 
Yhwh.55  
Like Kaufmann, Albertz emphasizes that the exclusivity of Israel’s rela-
tionship with Yhwh stems from the earliest periods of Israel’s existence, 
before the Exodus group so crucial to creating Israelite identity settled in 
Canaan. He regards widespread polytheism as a development of the later 
monarchic period and views it as especially prominent in royal and upper-
class circles. Both Albertz and Kaufmann see an ancient norm of worship-
ing Yhwh exclusively, which deteriorated especially among the upper clas-
ses in monarchic times.  
Nevertheless, differences between Albertz and Kaufmann are also evi-
dent, especially because Albertz recognizes complexities and ambiguities 
that Kaufmann rarely addresses. Albertz notes that the identity of Yhwh 
with the god worshiped in family piety was not always a given; the deity of 
family piety was not necessarily distinguished from Yhwh, but the average 
Israelite did not necessarily pause to identify the family deity with Yhwh 
either.56 Albertz’s work provides an outline of a more nuanced version of 
Kaufmann’s thesis regarding monotheism. Thus it represents something 
that Kaufmann’s student Menahem Haran has called for in an essay he 
published in 1991: a re-statement of Kaufmann’s theses in  תצק שימג חוסינ
תוחפ תצק ינקוודו רתוי (“a formulation that is somewhat more flexible and 
rather less deliberately contrary”); Haran avers that שימגהל טלחהב רשפא  תא
ויתונעטב תעלבומה תוחישקה ןמ והשמ טיעמהלו ותדמע (“it is surely possible to 
make his position more flexible and to minimize some of the rigidity found 
in his claims”).57 
In the material I quoted, at least, Albertz, like Kaufmann, avoids the 
shallow historicism that pervades biblical studies: “It is not enough to refer 
to social and political crises as an explanation of such abrupt and some-
times bloody battles over religious demarcation in later Israel.” But unlike 
Kaufmann, he does not lean so far in the other direction as to achieve a 
position that is no less unthinking. Albertz does not feel a need to insist on 
Mosaic monotheism in a full-fledged way; indeed, he tells us that “we cer-
tainly cannot speak of monotheism or even only of monolatry in the strict 
sense, at least in the pre-exilic period.”58 But there is something well along 
on the way to monotheism already at the time of the settlement, even if it is 
                                                     
55 Rainer Albertz, A History of Israelite Religion in the Old Testament Period (2 vols.; 
Louisville, KT: Westminster John Knox, 1994), 1:61–62 = middle of section 2.24. 
56  Albertz, History, 1:95–99, 187. 
57 Haran, “Judaism and Scripture,” 70, 71. See further the English translation of these 
passages in this volume, p. 152. 
58 Albertz, History, 1:62. 
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not “strict.” Unfortunately, Albertz does not define any of these terms; he 
does not make clear how the “strict” monolatry or true monotheism differs 
from what existed in the pre-exilic era. (Here Albertz could have learned 
much from Kaufmann’s careful discussions of his terminology.59 By the 
most sensible definitions, we saw above, it is quite possible that there was a 
monotheistic religion at a very early period.) In any event, Albertz recog-
nizes that Israelite peasants were not theologians and thus something much 
like monotheism could co-exist with polytheistic tendencies in the family 
religion and all the more so in the aggregate of religions practiced by sever-
al contemporaneous families. 
Similarly, Othmar Keel finds early evidence of at least monolatry, or the 
practice of venerating only one deity, in ancient Israel. Further, Keel shows 
that this practice was not the work of a small elite of priests or scribes but 
was more widespread. In this regard his thesis about pre-exilic Israelite 
religion (and not just biblical religion) resembles Kaufmann’s. To be sure, 
there are significant differences to be borne in mind as well: in particular, 
when Kaufmann speaks of polytheism he means, above all, the notion that 
divinity is embedded in nature rather than transcending it, while Keel 
means worship of many deities. But he provides impressive extrabiblical 
evidence of widespread exclusivity of worship in pre-exilic Israel, thus 
bolstering one of Kaufmann’s central claims. In his study of a database of 
over 8500 ancient Near Eastern seals, Keel, along with Christoph Ueh-
linger, shows that Israelite seals differ from non-Israelite seals in several 
respects.60 First, they tend not to portray more than one deity, in striking 
contrast to non-Israelite seals. Mesopotamian, Phoenician, Aramean, and 
Egyptian seals portray a wide variety of deities; often more than one deity 
is present on a single seal. This contrast suggests that Israelites really did 
tend to obey the command known to us from the Decalogue, “You shall not 
have any other gods besides Me” (Exod 20:3). Second, Israelite seals al-
most never provide a picture of their deity; rather, the deity is represented 
symbolically, most often by a sun disk. This finding suggests that Israelites, 
already in the early pre-exilic period, tended to obey the command, “You 
                                                     
59 E.g., his definition of “monotheism” in Religion, 29, 60, 121, and 226–27; his discussion 
of its relationship to monolatry on 137; and his distinctinon between polytheism and fet-
ishism, 90 and 144–48.  
60 Othmar Keel and Christoph Uehlinger, Gods, Goddesses, and Images of God in Ancient 
Israel (trans. Thomas Trapp; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), which was first published in 
German in 1992. I have summarized information especially from chapters 5–9. On the 
decline of anthropomorphic representation of deities early in Iron Age Israel, see espe-
cially the useful summary in 173–74 (but note exceptions to this tendency, 306–16; 
341–49). On monotheism and monolatry, see especially 277–81; on the emergence of 
greater polytheistic tendencies in the late pre-exilic period, see 323–49; on a reaction to 
this development and a greater stress on avoiding any portrayals of the deity, even sym-
bolic ones such as a sun disk, see 354–67.  
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should not make any sculpted image or picture” of a deity (Exod 20:4).61 
Evidence of polytheism in ancient Israelite seals does crop up here and 
there, especially in the seventh century B.C.E, but vastly less often than in 
seals from other cultures.62  
Keel and Uehlinger show that statuary and graffiti provide similar evi-
dence. Precisely as Israel begins to emerge in the highlands of Canaan early 
in the Iron Age, anthropomorphic representations of deities became signifi-
cantly less common in those highlands, though they never disappear com-
pletely even in Israelite contexts. Of course, seals provide evidence regard-
ing the religious practice and by implication, the religious beliefs of an elite 
within Israelite and Judean society: they tell us about the lives of those 
people who owned enough property to warrant having a seal for use in legal 
transactions. But the population of seal owners went well beyond the nar-
row confines of the Yhwh-alone party as scholars like Morton Smith imag-
ined that party.63 Owners of seals were not limited to a selection of priests 
or Levites with peculiar, highly atypical beliefs. For this reason, Keel’s 
work bolsters Kaufmann’s claim that exclusive worship of Yhwh was the 
norm in ancient Israel and not only among the minority who composed the 
texts preserved in the Bible. Like Albertz, however, Keel avoids the inflex-
ible formulations so characteristic of Kaufmann. Keel’s textured and nu-
anced examination of extrabiblical evidence does not lead ineluctably to the 
                                                     
61 This finding is in accord with the conclusion of Tryggve N.D. Mettinger, No Graven 
Image? Israelite Aniconism in Its Ancient Near Eastern Context (ConBOT; Stockholm: 
Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1995), 145. There Mettinger discusses Israelite aver-
sion to images in the larger context of Northwest Semitic religions, which displayed 
similar characteristics, though to a lesser degree, already in the Bronze Age. Conse-
quently, Mettinger concludes, “Israelite aniconism is as old as Israel itself and not a late 
innovation. The express prohibition of images is just the logical conclusion of a very 
long development” (145). For further defense of this thesis, see Tryggve N.D. Mettinger, 
“Israelite Aniconism: Developments and Origins,” in The Image and the Book: Iconic 
Cults, Aniconism, and the Rise of Book Religion in Israel and the Ancient Near East 
(ed. Karel van der Toorn; Leuven: Peeters, 1997), 173–204; Tryggve N.D. Mettinger, 
“A Conversation with My Critics: Cultic Image or Aniconism in the First Temple,” in 
Essays on Ancient Israel in Its Near Eastern Context. A Tribute to Nadav Na’aman (eds. 
Yairah Amit et al.; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2006), 273–96; Ronald Hendel, “An-
iconism and Anthropomorphism in Ancient Israel,” in The Image and the Book: Iconic 
Cults, Aniconism, and the Rise of Book Religion in Israel and the Ancient Near East (ed. 
Karel van der Toorn; Leuven: Peeters, 1997), 205–28, and Theodore Lewis, “Divine 
Images and Aniconism in Ancient Israel,” JAOS 118 (1998): 36–53.  
62 Uehlinger later recanted these conclusions, arguing that pre-exilic Israelite religion was 
thoroughly polytheistic; see Christoph Uehlinger, “Anthropomorphic Cult Statuary in 
Iron Age Palestine and the Search for Yhwh’s Cult Images,” in The Image and the 
Book: Iconic Cults, Aniconism, and the Rise of Book Religion in Israel and the Ancient 
Near East (ed. Karel van der Toorn; Leuven: Peeters, 1997), 97–155. The treatment of 
the evidence in the earlier work remains the more convincing. See the critique of the lat-
er work of Uehlinger in Mettinger, “Conversation,” 278–81. 
63 See Morton Smith, Palestinian, 11–42. 
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uncompromising articulation of this point that Kaufmann demands: Keel’s 
work suggests that exclusive worship of Yhwh was typical in pre-exilic 
Israel, but it does not prove that exceptions to this tendency were vanish-
ingly rare.  
Jeffrey Tigay came to a similar conclusion on the basis of Israelite and 
Judean onomastica, which overwhelming mention the deity Yhwh and fair-
ly rarely mention other deities.64 Patrick D. Miller arrived at the same thesis 
on the basis of examining divine names appearing in Israelite inscriptions 
from the ninth to the sixth centuries—which, he found, mention only one 
deity: Yhwh.65 (Miller discusses not the personal names of humans men-
tioned in these inscriptions, as Tigay did, but assertions made in the text of 
the inscriptions themselves.) I think it is fair to say that Keel, Tigay, and 
Miller provided the first real evidence on behalf of Kaufmann’s thesis that 
the exclusive worship of Yhwh was widespread in pre-exilic Israel. Insofar 
as Kaufmann’s claim was based only on biblical evidence, it was more an 
assertion or perhaps an extrapolation than an argument (and, as we have 
seen, Kaufmann’s claim in significant respects contradicts the claims of 
many biblical authors). But Keel, Tigay, and Miller examined evidence that 
went beyond the restricted circles responsible for producing and transmit-
ting biblical texts. They show that if we were to write a history of Israelite 
belief and practice on the basis of epigraphic and iconographic evidence, 
we would have to conclude that the Yhwh-alone party was dominant in 
much of the pre-exilic era. As in Albertz’s case, it is important to see how 
much more nuanced the work of Keel, Tigay, and Miller is when compared 
to Kaufmann’s. For example, Keel does not ignore, minimize, or argue 
away the exceptions to a more general trend, such as the finds from the 
seventh century showing evidence of polytheism. Here again we find 
someone producing precisely what Haran hoped to see: a softer, more real-
istic version of Kaufmann’s hypothesis. 
2.2. The Definition of Monotheism 
Several scholars in the past half century arrived independently at a defini-
tion of monotheism remarkably similar to Kaufmann’s. Adrian Schenker, 
in his 1997 article on Israelite monotheism, argues that “monotheism must 
not be defined exclusively in terms of being and non-being. It suffices that 
                                                     
64 Jeffrey Tigay, You Shall Have No Other Gods: Israelite Religion in the Light of Hebrew 
Inscriptions (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986) and, more briefly, Jeffrey Tigay, “Israelite 
Religion: The Onomastic and Epigraphic Evidence,” in Ancient Israelite Religion: Es-
says in Honor of Frank Moore Cross (ed. P.D. Miller, P.D. Hanson, and S.D. McBride; 
Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 157–94. Note also Morton Smith’s tantalizing reference to 
Tigay’s work in the preface to the second edition of Palestinian Parties, vii. 
65 Patrick D. Miller, “The Absence of the Goddess in Israelite Religion,” in Israelite  
Religion and Biblical Theology (JSOTSupp; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
2000), 198 n. 2. 
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a god should be of a nature or a degree so different from all other gods that 
this deity transcends them in a manner analogous to the transcendence of 
the gods in relation to human beings.”66 Schenker sensibly refers to this sort 
of monotheism as “a monotheism of transcendence which encompasses 
polytheism.”67 It is a monotheism of transcendence in the sense that the one 
God is qualitatively different from all other beings, whether heavenly or 
mundane. It encompasses polytheism (in the numerical sense of this term, 
though not in Kaufmann’s sense of the term as a theology in which deity is 
embedded within nature and the world) because it acknowledges the exist-
ence of other heavenly beings. Schenker employs the term monotheism in a 
flexible way that reflects the realities of lived religions (in particular, those 
of the ancient Near East) and succeeds in viewing monotheism from within 
the religious world of the ancient Near East. Consequently, he is sensitive 
to how monotheism looks as it arises in the world of polytheism—or 
against the world of polytheism, if you prefer. Schenker notes that in bibli-
cal monotheism, humanity and the gods/angels are basically on the same 
subservient level, linked with each other in their ontological difference 
from Yhwh.68 We may provide further support for Schenker’s point by 
nothing that in 1 Kgs 22:19–23, Isaiah 6, Isaiah 40, and Zechariah 3, a hu-
man being attends the heavenly council’s meeting, and in the two cases 
from Isaiah, the human even speaks during the meeting.69 This circum-
stance underscores the fact that humanity and the gods or angels who make 
up the council are basically on the same ontological level in Hebrew scrip-
ture. This ontological similarity of humanity and the gods becomes appar-
ent in Pss 29:1–2, 103:20–22, and 148:1–3. There humans call on the gods 
to praise Yhwh, just as humans call on each other to praise Yhwh so often 
in other psalms. In these passages, human beings and gods or angels pray 
together as members of a single congregation located in two places, heaven 
and earth. Moreover, in these passages the humans take the role of liturgi-
cal leadership, for they are the choir-masters, directing the gods to sing.70 
(The similarity of humanity and the gods may also be reflected in Ps 8:6, 
םיהלאמ טעמ והרסחתו.71) Schenker’s description of a type of monotheism that 
encompasses but also transcends numerical polytheism is useful precisely 
                                                     
66 Schenker, “Monothéisme,” 437–38. 
67 Schenker, “Monothéisme,” 448. 
68 See Schenker, “Monothéisme,” 438. 
69 On Isaiah 40 as involving a divine council attended by the prophet, see Frank Moore 
Cross, “The Council of YHWH in Second Isaiah,” JNES 12 (1953): 274–77. The proph-
et speaks in the council according to the LXX and 1QIsaa versions of verse 6. 
70 On these psalms as examples of the heavenly prayer Gattung, see Benjamin D. Sommer, 
“A Little Higher Than Angels: Psalm 29 and the Genre of Heavenly Praise,” in Built by 
Wisdom, Established by Understanding: Essays on Biblical and Near Eastern Literature 
in Honor of Adele Berlin (ed. Maxine L. Grossman; Bethesda, MD: University Press of 
Maryland, 2013), 148–53. 
71 On Ps 8:6, see especially LXX, Targum, Ibn Ezra, and Radak. 
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because it is so supple. He points toward the extent to which these two theol-
ogies can also overlap; what is philosophically or theoretically a polarity is, 
in lived religion, a continuum.72  
Similar approaches appear in the work of other scholars, though not all 
of them use the term monotheism to describe the theology in question. For 
example, P. D. Miller argues that Yhwh had absorbed the powers of all 
other deities at an early point in Israelite history, even though worship of 
deities other than Yhwh persisted.73 Norbert Lohfink acknowledges that 
what he terms “theoretical monotheism” appears only in the exilic era, but 
argues that an exclusive focus on one God, under whom all other heavenly 
beings are anonymously subservient, appears already in the period of the 
monarchy and perhaps before.74 Rather than cataloguing biblical scholars 
who adopt this approach,75 I would like to attend to two scholars outside 
biblical studies who evince a similar approach as well.  
                                                     
72 The difference between Schenker and Kaufmann here is rhetorical, rather than a matter 
of substance. Kaufmann does not use the words “monotheism” and “polytheism” in the 
numerical sense, and so he might speak rather of a monotheism that encompasses and 
transcends the worship of many deities. But this rhetorical difference is significant, be-
cause the phrasing Schenker uses more readily acknowledges the messiness of lived re-
ligion and the potential for overlap between what seem to be philosophically distinct po-
sitions. 
73 Patrick D. Miller, “Absence,” 202–3. 
74 Norbert Lohfink, “Zur Geschichte der Diskussion über den Monotheismus im Alten 
Israel,” in Gott, der Einzige: zur Entstehung des Monotheismus in Israel (ed. Ernst 
Haag; Freiburg: Herder, 1985), 22–25. 
75 For this definition of monotheism, see James Barr, “The Problem of Israelite Monothe-
ism,” Glasgow University Oriental Society 17 (1957–58): 52–62; David Petersen, “Isra-
el and Monotheism: The Unfinished Agenda,” in Canon, Theology, and Old Testament 
Interpretation: Essays in Honor of Brevard S. Childs (eds. Gene Tucker, David Pe-
tersen, and Robert Wilson; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988), 97. So also Faur, “Biblical,” 4. 
Cf. the similar remark of Morton Smith: “Worship of several deities is compatible with 
monotheism—one has only to believe, for example, that the supreme (‘true’) deity has 
created beings inferior to himself but superior to men and has ordained that men should 
worship them. This belief is expressed in Deut. 4.19 and 32.8” (Morton Smith, Palestin-
ian, 165 n. 11). See also Werner H. Schmidt, The Faith of the Old Testament: A History 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1983), 379 and C. J. Labuschagne, The Incomparabil-
ity of Yhwh in the Old Testament (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966), 148. Georg Fohrer, History 
of Israelite Religion (trans. David Green; Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1972), 103, 
suggests an identical description of Israelite religion, though he does not term such a be-
lief system monotheism.  
 An interesting and instructive case is Zenger’s “Jahwistisches Werk.” Zenger does not 
apply the term “monotheism” to J, describing that source rather as “unpolemically mo-
nolatrous” (53). He regards later expansions of J (which are largely identical with what 
classical source critics call E) as “polemically monolatrous,” and dates true monotheism 
to the sixth century. The reasoning behind this use of terms, apparently, rests on assump-
tions: One is that ideas evolve in a straightforward and largely unidirectional manner, so 
that texts that come after J must be more advanced, and true monotheism can emerge 
only at the end of a long process that scholars must reconstruct. The second is that a text 
can only be termed monotheistic if it specifically denies the existence of other gods; for 
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In his recently published Babylonian Creation Myths, the late Assyriol-
ogist W. G. Lambert argues that in the Late Babylonian period (henceforth: 
LB—from the middle to the end of the first millennium BCE) a Marduk 
monotheism emerged. During this period—though not earlier—“in some 
circles Marduk absorbed other deities into himself, so that a kind of mono-
theism resulted.”76 Lambert claims that in at least one Late Babylonian god-
list, many of the names of various major deities are presented as names of 
Marduk, so that one might say that these other gods themselves came to be 
seen as manifestations of Marduk that focus our attention on particular 
roles. Thus Nergal was Marduk’s name in his role as god of warfare, and 
Shamash was his name in his role as god of justice. Nevertheless, Lambert 
avers, “there are the hundreds of minor gods and goddesses who were 
probably not included” in a list of Marduk’s name. “But once the major 
members of the pantheon have become aspects of Marduk merely, there is 
no escape from the conclusion that this is an assertion of monotheism.”77 
This theology is fairly late, and fairly short-lived; it is evident only in the 
LB period, and not, for example, in earlier documents such as the Introduc-
tion to Ḫammurapi’s laws or in Enuma Elish, nor is it always present in 
earlier god-lists, even god-lists with the triple-column format found in the 
LB list Lambert discusses as evincing monotheism. This Marduk monothe-
ism resulted from the extension to its logical extreme of what other scholars 
have called “summodeism,” or the tendency of one deity to absorb the 
roles, capacities and even persons of other deities.78 What is interesting 
from our point of view is the fact that the existence of multiple local and 
minor deities does not prevent Lambert from calling this theology mono-
theism. Monotheism for Lambert, as for Kaufmann, Cohen, and Schenker, 
is not a matter of counting; it is a matter of power. Because Marduk ab-
sorbed all the important powers, at least in the particular god-list Lambert 
discusses, he is the One God, and the fact that unimportant deities existed 
alongside Marduk does not alter this fundamental fact.  
                                                                                                                          
Zenger, monotheism must always be explicitly polemical. For this reason, he dates true 
monotheism to the sixth century. In fact, however, a monotheistic text need not specifi-
cally deny the existence of other gods; Zenger’s assumption that a monotheistic text 
must specifically attack polytheism would render a great many Jewish, Christian, and 
Muslim texts non-monotheistic. If we jettison the evolutionary assumption and the ex-
traordinarily narrow definition of monotheism Zenger employs, we can readily conclude 
that J is a monotheistic text. 
76 W. G. Lambert, Babylonian Creation Myths (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 
2013), 264. 
77 Lambert, Babylonian Creation, 265. 
78 On the term, see, e.g., Machinist, “How Gods Die,” 230–31; Mark Smith, God in Trans-
lation: Deities in Cross-Cultural Discourse in the Biblical World (FAT 57; Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 167–74. 
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Significantly, Lambert does not regard Enuma Elish as monotheistic.79 
There, Marduk ascends to Enlil-status, but other significant deities remain 
distinct from Marduk, and they have their own power, so that Marduk is 
king of the gods but not a qualitatively monotheistic deity. (To use the meta-
phor I suggested earlier: the council of deities under Marduk recalls the 
British cabinet, not the American.) The same is true for another remarkable 
text Lambert published in his recent volume. That text resembles crucial 
monotheistic texts in the Hebrew Bible on a surface level, but on closer 
examination the differences between the texts in question are just as mean-
ingful as the similarities. I refer here to a Seleucid-era tablet that preserves 
an Old Babylonian or Cassite-era text, to which Lambert gives the title 
“Enmešarra’s Defeat.”80 Part of this text describes how various deities took 
responsibility for various nations:  
After Marduk . [ . . . 
He did not grasp his crown [ . . . 
The rule of heaven and nether world he [ . . . 
[He] perfected the regulations . [ . . . 
He ascended and sat in the heavens, 
He took up residence in the abode of Anu magnificently. 
Bēl took Babylon, 
Nabû took Borsippa, 
Nergal took Cuthah, 
Zababa took Kish, 
Šamaš took Sippar, 
Sîn took Ur, 
Adad took Bīt Karkara, 
Enlil took Nippur,  
Uraš took Dilbat, 
Erimabinutuku took Isin, 
All the gods got land.81 
On one level, the picture here resembles the passage we examined above 
from Deuteronomy 4 and 32: various deities receive responsibility for vari-
ous places and peoples, and this divvying up of areas of sovereignty is con-
nected with Marduk’s ascent to the heavenly throne. Yet we are not told 
that Marduk assigned these roles; rather, the various gods took these roles 
(the verb used in all these lines is iṣṣabat). In Deuteronomy Yhwh was the 
subject, and the various unnamed gods were the objects (more precisely, 
the dative) of the verb’s action. But in this Babylonian text the various gods 
are named, and they are, tellingly, the grammatical subjects in the lines 
                                                     
79 Lambert, Babylonian Creation, 265. 
80 Lambert, Babylonian Creation, 281–300. 
81 Lambert, Babylonian Creation, 292–95. 
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describing their powers.82 Further, the very fact that the immediately pre-
ceding lines describe Marduk’s ascent to Anu’s status itself argues against 
reading this passage as monotheistic: a monotheistic deity cannot, by defi-
nition, achieve monotheistic status in historical or mythic time; such a deity 
can only have that status.83 The fact that Deuteronomy, like all other bibli-
cal documents, tells us nothing of Yhwh’s origins (it never attempts to ex-
plain where He came from) underscores this difference between Deuteron-
omy 4 and 32, on the one hand, and “Enmešarra’s Defeat,” on the other.  
One additional element of Lambert’s reading of this text recalls Kauf-
mann’s discussion of monotheism. Immediately, after the lines I just quot-
ed, the text goes on to report that “a voice proclaimed from heaven” (ištu 
šamê ilsâ zaqīqi).84 Lambert discusses the origin of this voice: “In a mono-
theistic world, the supreme and only god is of course responsible, but in a 
polytheistic world one asks, Whose voice? The only possible answer is that 
the voice speaks for the Destinies—a set of regulations governing the uni-
verse, including the gods. If any one god had been responsible, this would 
surely have been stated.”85 This notion of a force of destiny stronger than 
the gods is at the very heart of Kaufmann’s definition of polytheism, and it 
is one of the most crucial elements that differentiates between biblical reli-
gion and polytheism.86 Lambert’s reference to the same idea shows how 
closely the independent approaches of Lambert and Kaufmann match each 
other. To be sure, we may wonder about Lambert’s understanding of the 
line itself. The noun zaqīqu is translated in CAD as “ghost, phantom; 
haunted place; god of dreams; soul,”87 which would considerably alter 
Lambert’s claim regarding the meaning of this line. Even if Assyriologists 
                                                     
82 The same is true in Atraḫasis I:7–18, where the major gods take their areas of dominion.  
83 The same is true of the second-millennium hymn, “The Exaltation of Ishtar,” discussed 
by Goldstein, “New Look,” 13–16. For all their similarity to Deut 32:8–9 and 43, they 
are unalterably polytheistic in the roles they describe Anu, Enlil, and Ea as playing. If 
we did not speculate that in an earlier literary setting Elyon and Yhwh were different de-
ities, there would be no polytheistic reading of Deut 32:8–9; in the context in which it 
stands, at least, the poem known to us from Deuteronomy does not allow such a reading. 
84 Lambert, Babylonian Creation, 294–95, line 18. 
85 Lambert, Babylonian Creation, 283. 
86 Kaufmann, Toledot, 1:245–47, 447–48; cf. Kaufmann, Religion, 73–74. On the im-
portance of fate as a force beyond the realm of divinity in ancient Greek religion, see 
Walter F. Otto, The Homeric Gods: The Spiritual Significance of Greek Religion (trans. 
Moses Hadas; New York: Thames and Hudson, 1979), 263–64, 267; W. K. C. Guthrie, 
The Greeks and Their Gods (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 130, and Albert Henrichs, 
“Moira,” in Der Neue Pauly: Enzyklopädie der Antike (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2000), 
8:340–43, esp. 342. 
87 The Assyrian Dictionary of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago (21 vols.; 
Chicago: The Oriental Institute, 1956–2006), 21:58–60. Jeremy Black, Andrew George, 
and Nicholas Postgate, eds., A Concise Dictionary of Akkadian (SANTAG 5; Wiesba-
den: Harrassowitz, 1999), 445, 448, identifies zāqīqu with zīqȋqu and renders “wind, 
breeze, phantom, nothingness, haunted place, dream,” an understanding that also, so far 
as I can see, seems to undermine Lambert’s interpretation of the line. 
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dispute Lambert’s interpretation of this specific line, what remains interest-
ing for our concerns is the distinction between monotheism and polytheism 
Lambert assumes here. Lambert’s use of these terms is identical to, though 
independent of, Kaufmann’s. 
Because this issue of a realm transcending that of the gods is crucial to 
the distinction between monotheism and polytheism for Kaufmann (and for 
Lambert), it is worth addressing Mark Smith’s critique of Kaufmann on this 
issue. Smith writes, “There is little, if any, evidence for an independent 
order having mastery over the deities in either Ugaritic or Mesopotamian 
mythologies.”88 In fact, the facts Kaufmann emphasizes—the mortality of 
gods; their youth in comparison with the universe itself; their use of magic, 
a technology available to humans as well, to effect change in the world—
clearly denote the existence of an independent order in both mythologies.89 
Smith’s protest notwithstanding, the realm of the divinity in both Ugaritic 
and Mesopotamian literature is deeply embedded in the world of matter, a 
circumstance that differs from what we find in the Hebrew Bible as a 
whole. Smith goes on to assert there, “No idea of such an independent order 
of ‘fate’ exists in ancient Middle Eastern mythologies. Ugaritic lacks a 
word even approximating this notion, and Akkadian šimtu, usually taken to 
mean ‘fate,’ refers to a ‘determined course’ that can be changed.” It is true 
that the Greek thinkers articulate this idea with reference to the terms μοῖρα 
and ἀνάγκη, whereas Akkadian texts do not use šimtu in the same way. 
Nevertheless, in both narrative and ritual contexts, Akkadian texts make 
clear the gods’ subservience to forces greater than themselves. The same 
idea is expressed differently in Greek and Akkadian literature, and this 
difference of expression is hardly surprising. As a rule, what Greek thinkers 
state in abstract terms ancient Near Eastern thinkers convey through con-
crete examples.90 Thus the contrast Smith draws merely points to a typical 
                                                     
88 Mark Smith, Origins, 12; see further his remarks at 201 n. 70.  
89 See Toledot, 1:286–358, esp. 325–43; Religion, 21–42, esp. 31–37. 
90 On this difference, see Stephen Geller, Sacred Enigmas: Literary Religion in the He-
brew Bible (London: Routledge, 1996), 6; for an Akkadian example, see Stephen Geller, 
“Some Sound and Word Plays in the First Tablet of the Old Babylonian Atraḫasīs Epic,” 
in The Frank Talmage Memorial Volume (ed. B. Walfish; Haifa: Haifa University Press, 
1992), 1:63–70, esp. 65–66. See also Henri H. Frankfort and Henriette A. Frankfort, 
“Myth and Reality,” in The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man: An Essay on Specu-
lative Thought in the Ancient Near East (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1977), 6–15, and Geoffrey Miller, The Ways of a King: Legal and Political Ideas in the 
Bible (JAJSup 7; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 16–20. On Mesopotami-
an magical rituals performed by humans as appealing to a realm beyond the gods, see 
H. W. F. Saggs, The Encounter with the Divine in Mesopotamia and Israel (London: 
Athlone Press, 1978), 131–33, who argues that the Mesopotamian omen literature was at 
its core non-theistic: The omens did not reveal the will of a god who was communi-
cating with humans; rather, they reflected the extraordinarily complex and interconnect-
ed structure of the universe itself. “The omen thus represented not a god’s decision upon 
a situation but rather a recognized correlation between past and future phenomena. The 
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difference between intellectual expression in these cultures, not to the ab-
sence of this concept among Babylonian and Assyrian thinkers.  
A very similar understanding of monotheism has also been proposed by 
a scholar of African religions, E. Bọlaji Idowu, in what is widely regarded 
as a classic study, Olódùmarè: God in Yoruba Belief. Idowu discusses what 
he terms “diffuse monotheism”: “a monotheism in which the good Deity 
delegates certain portions of His authority to certain divine functionaries 
who work as they are commissioned by Him.”91 These other deities, Idowu 
explains, are know as the orìşà, and they include gods of wisdom, justice, 
iron tools, wrath, cultivation, and other specific areas: “All together, the 
orìşà form the Yoruba pantheon. Olódùmarè is not one among them. He is 
‘wholly other’ than they. But they are under His constant vigilance and 
control, and to Him they owe absolute fealty.”92 The diffuse monotheism of 
the Yoruba as Idowu describes it is not identical to biblical monotheism in 
Kaufmann’s presentation. The god Olódùmarè has become more distant, 
though not otiose, and it is normal and acceptable in Yoruba culture that 
people pray to the lower deities of the orìşà.93 But the theological structure 
is similar: the lower gods are ontologically distinct from the supreme being, 
and subservient to that being.94 For Idowu, as for Kaufmann, Cohen, 
                                                                                                                          
gods came into the matter only as the divine beings able to intervene to cut the web” 
(132). To be sure, other scholars see more of a role for deities in magical rituals. Thus 
Jean Bottéro, Religion in Ancient Mesopotamia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2001), 170–85, emphasizes the religious and god-centered nature of divination. Bottéro 
notes that before performing some omens, the human practitioners would beseech the 
gods, which suggests that gods could inscribe a message into the object utilized for the 
omen. Saggs argues that these passages are late theistic additions to what was basically a 
non-theistic literature. He points out that the deities invoked in these occasional passages 
remain remarkably lacking in specific or personal characteristics. Both Saggs and Botté-
ro provide intelligent readings of the texts at hand, which result from the fact that both 
understandings of omen literature obtained in various places and times. Nonetheless, the 
presence of the understanding Saggs demonstrates indicates a fascinating contrast be-
tween Mesopotamian polytheism and the religion of biblical texts (though not the reli-
gion of all ancient Israelites): at least at times the powers inherent in matter are thought 
of as independent of divinity in the former but not the latter. 
91 E. Bọlaji Idowu, Olódùmarè: God in Yoruba Belief (London: Longmans, 1962), 204. 
92 Idowu, Olódùmarè, 62. 
93 As Job Jindo points out the me, this corresponds to what Kaufmann sees as having taken 
place in the Second Temple period, viz., the rise of angelology and God’s exaltation to a 
more distant status; see Toledot, 1:231–34.  
94 Patrick Ryan, “‘Arise, O God!’ The Problem of ‘Gods’ in West Africa,” Journal of 
Religion in Africa 11 (1980): 166, notes that Olódùmarè has no priests, no festival, and 
no cult-group. He explains that this deity does not belong to the same category as the 
orìşà at all, and it is members of the latter category who have priests, festivals, and cult-
groups based on paternal or maternal lineage. “Olodumare is sometimes, if rarely, re-
ferred to as an orişa, but the usage seems to be uncommon. [Here Ryan refers to Idowu, 
Olódùmarè 61.] If this limited linguistic usage may be taken as evidence that Olodu-
mare (Olorun) was once considered to be one of the orişa, at least in some parts of Yo-
rubaland, little memory remains today of such a conception of the transcendent. The 
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Schenker, and Lambert, monotheism is about quality, not quantity; about 
transcendence, not counting.  
Idowu’s perspective is heuristically useful for biblical scholars not only 
because of its similarities to Kaufmann’s, but also because Idowu worked 
with a living religion rather than one known only through ancient texts and 
artifactual finds. As a result, certain weaknesses are more evident in 
Idowu’s presentation than they are in Kaufmann’s. This emerges, for in-
stance, when Idowu writes,  
The Yoruba knows, in spite of all this heavy structure of theocratic, gov-
ernmental arrangements, that at the head of all, and controlling all is 
Olódùmarè, and that there is no time, really, when He is far away from 
them, or when they keep Him absolutely out of their minds. They may ap-
pear to live their lives in absolute devotion to the divinities, but underneath 
all their acts of worship is the deep consciousness that Olódùmarè is above 
all and ultimately controls all issues.95 
Idowu maintains that a deep consciousness of Olódùmarè-monotheism lies 
beneath what appears to be absolute devotion to other deities. It is difficult 
to read this and similar passages in Idowu’s work, however, without won-
dering whether that deep consciousness of Olódùmarè-monotheism is na-
tive to the Yoruba or a creation of Idowu’s interpretive lens. Idowu had his 
own commitment to monotheism: he was both a scholar of religion trained 
at Cambridge and the University of London and a Methodist clergyman; in 
fact, from 1972 to 1984 he served as the president and later Patriarch of the 
Methodist Church of Nigeria. Further, his writing evinces his admiration 
for his own Yoruba heritage.96 It is at least possible that his commitment to 
monotheism along with his esteem for Yoruba culture may have led him to 
discover Yoruba monotheism where there was none. Specialists have read 
Idowu’s work with varying degrees of agreement in this matter. On the one 
hand, some later scholars of African religion (who are likely to be more 
methodologically skeptical and aware of problems of unintentional bias and 
subjectivity) have been receptive to Idowu’s claim. Thus Patrick Ryan 
points out that Semitic and European categories are ill-suited to describe 
Yoruba conceptions of the transcendent. Nevertheless, he affirms Idowu’s 
reading of Olódùmaré as ontologically distinct from the òrişà and trans-
cendent in comparison with them. Indeed, Ryan writes that  
                                                                                                                          
complete absence of any patrilineage dedicated to Olodumare (Olorun) as well as the 
almost total lack of any direct ritual worship of the Supreme Being may be taken not as 
indicators of Olodumare’s otiose nature but of His absolute transcendence. He is not 
merely God above the gods.” 
95 Idowu, Olódùmarè, 50. 
96 For a sense of both these aspects of his worldview, see further the remembrance written 
by C. Njideka Ebisi in the reprint of Idowu, Olódùmarè, published by African Tree 
Press in 1994, pp. vii–ix. 
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both the Yoruba and Akan populations of West Africa are better equipped 
linguistically than are Semites, Greeks, Romans and their inheritors to ex-
press the absolute uniqueness of God. There is no need for Olodumare 
(Olorun) […] to arise above the “other gods,” as Psalm 82 bids Him. It 
would seem, in fact, that even before Muslims and Christians arrived in the 
West African forest zone, where both the Akan and Yoruba peoples live, 
speakers of Yoruba and Akan were assured of the supremacy of the One 
Whom a modern theologian calls “the incomprehensible term of human 
transcendence.”97  
One finds similar discussions of the concept of a God who is distinct from 
lower-ranking powers in the work of both African scholars such as John 
Mbuti and Europeans such as Edward E. Evans-Pritchard.98 On the other 
hand, some scholars including Robin Horton, Ezra Chitando, and 
C. N. Ubah have criticized work by Idowu and similar scholars as fatally 
flawed by those scholars’ faith commitments.99 (In this regard, a European 
                                                     
97 Ryan, “Arise,” 169–70. For the phrase “the incomprehensive…,” Ryan citers Karl Rah-
ner, Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity (trans. 
William V. Dych; New York: Seabury Press, Crossroads, 1978), 454. 
98 On this trend among anthropologists and scholars of African religion, see Robin Horton, 
“Judaeo-Christian Spectacles: Boon or Bane to the Study of African Religions?” Ca-
hiers d’Etudes Africaines 96 (1984): 396–97. For summaries of Evans-Pritchard’s de-
scription of Nuer ideas of the divine realm (which have several points of resemblance 
with Yoruba views as presented by Idowu), see Mary Douglas, Edward Evans-Pritchard 
(New York: Viking Press, 1980), 94–96, 101–9, and (especially relevant to our concerns 
regarding the distinction between monotheism and polytheism) 116–18, and Daniel L. 
Pals, Seven Theories of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 209–13. 
The classic study itself is Edward Evan Evans-Pritchard, Nuer Religion (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1967). 
99 See Horton, “Judaeo-Christian Spectacles” (and in particular on diffused monotheism, 
402–406); C. N. Ubah, “The Supreme Being, Divinities and Ancestors in Igbo Tradi-
tional Religion: Evidence from Otanchara and Otanzu,” Africa: Journal of the Interna-
tional African Institute (1982): 90–105, esp. 91–94; as well as the balanced discussion 
by Ezra Chitando, “African Christian Scholars and the Study of African Traditional Re-
ligions: A Re-Evaluation,” Religion 30 (2000): 391–97. Horton’s detailed study is espe-
cially compelling, in spite of its tendency to essentialize what he calls “Judaeo-
Christian” beliefs and practices (by which he means Christian, more specifically, mod-
ern Western Protestant beliefs and practices) and his tendency to ignore crucial differ-
ences within Christianity and within Judaism. Thus his distinction (422, 425) between 
religious systems that emphasize communion with the divine as opposed to explanation, 
prediction, and control of divine forces is potentially useful. But it overlooks the fact 
that both tendencies exist within Judaism and within Christianity—one thinks, for ex-
ample of the prominence of theurgy in various forms of Judaism: in kabbalah, in rabbin-
ic literature, and in the Pentateuch’s Priestly Document. Similarly, when Horton criti-
cizes the imposition of “Judaeo-Christian” notions of a monotheistic God on African 
conceptions of a creator being (402–3), he attributes a naive view of God-concepts to 
Judaisms and Christianities. Thus he claims that the monotheistic creator is male, but it 
is noteworthy that P and Deutero-Isaiah, who stress the theme of creation perhaps most 
among biblical authors, are precisely the authors who suggest that Yhwh has both gen-
ders—and they do so precisely in passages that deal with creation. A similar point can 
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like Evans-Pritchard resembles Idowu and Mbuti in that all three share deep 
commitments to Christianity even as all three set out to describe African 
religions in a manner that is at once empirical and sympathetic.100) In the 
absence of a written corpus that scholars can independently analyze, it is 
difficult to make a determination, but the validity of the criticism seems at 
the very least plausible. 
Alternatively, it is possible that in generations prior to Idowu’s, some 
Yoruba may have asserted a monotheism of Olódùmarè in response to 
Muslim and Christian propagation of monotheism in Nigeria. In that case, 
Idowu is correct to speak of a native Olódùmarè-monotheism, but that na-
tive monotheism may have arisen in response to Islam or Christianity, in 
which case its similarity to biblical monotheism may not represent an inde-
pendent parallel that is heuristically useful.101 Further, even if this monothe-
ism is a genuine feature of traditional Yoruba culture and not Idowu’s crea-
tion, one may further wonder how many Yoruba worshipers participate in 
the consciousness of one wholly other deity’s status and the orìşà’s subser-
vience, and how consistently they do so. The distinction between polythe-
ism and diffuse monotheism is conceptually quite clear, yet not all wor-
shipers will grasp it, and some may be concerned with the distinction only 
some of the time.102 
Much the same can be said of Israelite monotheism. To be sure, the bib-
lical injunctions against worshiping other (real) deities are clearly intended 
to prevent the confusion that diffuse monotheism invites. But the vocifer-
ous and repetitive nature of the Bible’s insistence on this point suggests that 
the priestly, deuteronomic, and prophetic authorities had reason to worry on 
this point. Indeed, even in later forms of Judaism, veneration of lower-
                                                                                                                          
be made regard the connection of the creator deity with evil in Deutero-Isaiah (at Isaiah 
45:7), which Horton (402) assumes is impossible. Nonetheless, to the extent that Hor-
ton’s essentialist and naive assumptions of monotheism may have been shared by schol-
ars like Idowu, Horton’s critique of Idowu’s imposition of Christian categories on his 
African data may remain valid. 
100  On this shared concern of African and European scholars, see further Horton, “Judaeo-
Christian Spectacles,” 428, where he mentions H.W. Turner rather than Evans-
Pritchards as an example. On the influence of Evans-Pritchard’s Christianity (especially, 
but not only, after he was received into the Catholic Church) and on his sympathetic 
view of African theologies, see Pals, Seven Theories, 223, 229 notes 27 and 30, 230 n. 
46, as well as Douglas, Evans-Pritchard, 102–5, 114–15. 
101  For a clear example of a native discovery—rather, creation—of primitive monotheism in 
response to Christian missionary activity and political domination, see the discussion of 
“primitive monotheism” centered around the Maori deity, Io, in J. Z. Smith, “The Un-
known God: Myth in History,” in Imagining Religion from Babylon to Jonestown (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 67–90. For similar examples in Africa, see 
Horton, “Judaeo-Christian Spectacles,” 408–10. 
102  For an even more skeptical evaluation of discussions (by Idowu and similar scholars) of 
worshipers’ attitudes toward a monotheistic being, see Horton, “Judaeo-Christian Spec-
tacles,” 410–12. 
238 BENJAMIN D. SOMMER  
 
ranking deities never quite fully disappears; most religious Jews, after all, 
not only address these lower-ranking beings but ask for their blessing when 
they recite the line, אלמ םולשל ינוכרבןוילע יכאלמ םולשה יכ  (“O angels of peace, 
angels of the Highest One, bless us with peace”), every Friday night when 
reciting the table-hymn, םכילע םולש.103 In most cases, this sort of appeal to 
lower-ranking heavenly beings among rabbinic Jews does not impinge on 
the qualitative monotheism of the Jews in question, but one imagines that it 
could, and at times does, slide into a degree of veneration that threatens to 
do so. This is perhaps most clear among kabbalists who have practiced not 
only theurgy but magic, and in the development in Second Temple, rabbin-
ic, and medieval Judaisms not only of a Jewish angelology but demonology 
as well. A worshiper, or a worshiping community, might stray from a quali-
tatively monotheistic acknowledgement of forces that serve God to a genu-
inely polytheistic belief in independent forces that can threaten God; in-
deed, it was fear of just that deviation that led medieval Jewish rationalists 
and even some mystics to condemn the practical kabbalah. While a mono-
theism of transcendence and qualitatively defined polytheism are conceptu-
ally distinct, in practice there is likely to be a much smaller a gap between 
them than Kaufmann allows. The conceptual problems that Idowu’s work 
raise clarify this tension between Kaufmann’s theory and the realities of 
lived religion. 
Conclusion 
Comparisons among Kaufmann and various scholars who did not know his 
work are useful for several reasons. First, they demonstrate how the more 
supple and flexible presentations of scholars such as Albertz, Keel, and 
Schenker offer a useful step forward from Kaufmann. In their recognition 
of the ambiguities inherent in monotheism and the liminal forms monothe-
ism sometimes found in lived religions, they present a more empirically 
realistic and historically grounded picture, even as their basic insights re-
main, however unknowingly and unintentionally, Kaufmannian. Second, 
these more recent scholars, along with Tigay and Miller, provide crucial 
extrabiblical support for central claims of Kaufmann’s. Third, the greater 
precision, sophistication, and utility of Kaufmann’s definition of monothe-
                                                     
103  Rabbi Ḥaim of Volozhin (1749–1821) is said to have omitted this line precisely because 
the appeal to blessing from heavenly beings other than Yhwh is problematic; see the 
brief discussion and references in Siddur Eizor Eiliyahu ʿal Pi Daʿat Hagra (in Hebrew; 
ed. Yehoshua Cohen, Yeshayahu Vinograd, and David Cohen; Jerusalem: Kerem Eliyahu, 
5760), 174–75 n. R. Ḥaim’s practice is not widespread, however, even among Lithuanian-
mitnagdic Jews who are Ḥaim’s followers. That a single line can be seen by some author-
ities as evincing polytheism and by other authorities and almost all worshipers as not do-
ing so points to the gray area that Kaufmann ignored. 
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ism allow for a more philosophically rigorous and religiously meaningful 
understanding of the contours of Israelite religion than we find in the work 
of Albertz and Keel; a person who has read Kaufmann can add greater 
depth to their richly textured treatment of extrabiblical material. Finally, 
skeptical consideration of Idowu’s work encourages us to realize that, con-
trary to the rhetorical force of Kaufmann’s work, monotheism and polythe-
ism are far more closely related to each other than one might initially as-
sume. By saying this, I am not arguing that Israelite monotheism was a 
chimera, a polytheism in disguise; nor am I suggesting that Israelite mono-
theism was an exceptional and elite outcropping amidst a sea of Israelite 
polytheism, or a way station on the path to a truer monotheism. Rather, 
I am suggesting that in every monotheistic community, whether in the Iron 
Age or the contemporary world, the minds of religious people are flexible 
and encompass what can appear to be self-contradictions. The deepest and 
most serious form of monotheism—which is a monotheism of quality and 
not quantity—can have elements of intersection with polytheism.  
In significant ways, Kaufmann’s approach is more accurate in its rela-
tionship to the evidence (including artifactual evidence unknown in Kauf-
mann’s own day) than that of the majority of biblical scholars (from whom 
Keel, Albertz, Schenker, Tigay, and Miller also diverge). Further, it is more 
rigorously thought out in several respects: in its realization that monothe-
ism is about God’s independence from matter and fate, in its awareness that 
monotheism need not be a response to geopolitical events, and in its con-
clusion that there is no reason that its origin needs to be dated as late as the 
eighth century. But Kaufmann’s approach is also deeply unrealistic insofar 
as he insists that monotheism and polytheism are worlds apart, and that the 
Israelites were so monotheistic that they could not even understand poly-
theism and therefore only misrepresented it. Attention to various scholars 
whose work resembles Kaufmann’s helps us to realize that monotheism and 
polytheism are less polar opposites than they are variations on a theme, and 
they can co-exist in a single culture, and even in a single religious person’s 
mind.104 
                                                     
104  On the closeness of monotheism and polytheism in crucial regards, see my remarks in 
Benjamin D. Sommer, The Bodies of God and the World of Ancient Israel (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 30–37, 173–74, and Doniger, On Hinduism, 10–20. 
  
Response to Benjamin Sommer’s “Yehezkel Kaufmann 
and Recent Scholarship on Monotheism” 
Adrian SCHENKER 
Introduction 
First, I must confess that indeed I did not know Kaufmann’s work on Isra-
elite monotheism. I am all the more impressed by his pioneering research in 
the history of Israelite religion, and I can’t but be grateful to Professor 
Sommer for finally paving the way for a broad reception of Kaufmann 
which is overdue and should have happened long ago. The language barrier 
(Kaufmann wrote his history of Israelite religion in Ivrit) may have played 
an unfortunate role in this undeserved neglect of his contribution. 
At the same time, Benjamin Sommer is embedding Kaufmann’s view of 
the Israelite religion and of its specific monotheistic outlook into present 
day research, with a wealth of new data which Kaufmann could not yet 
know and which Professor Sommer now discusses in depth. Thus he does 
not simply comment on Kaufmann’s ideas as a historian of research in Re-
ligionsgeschichte. In reality he continues the scholarly debate on monothe-
ism in ancient Israel with his own thorough contributions to it. This is a 
point I explicitly wish to acknowledge. 
What follows are not objections to Professor Sommer’s paper but rather 
four complementary observations. 
First observation 
“Polytheistic” expressions, i.e. expressions implying real existing deities 
besides Yhwh, occur in the Hebrew Bible in passages considered early and 
in others that most probably are late. Among the early texts one may cite 
Judg 11:24; 1 Samuel 5–6 (Dagon is no illusive deity: the Philistines do not 
revere an illusion; they revere a true god, but subordinate to Yhwh, much 
less mighty than he; the conflict between Yhwh and Dagon is not between 
Yhwh and an illusion but between Yhwh and a subordinate deity); Micah 
4:5; the oaths, practiced everywhere in the Ancient Near East, implied the 
firm belief in the reality of the warrant deity; otherwise the oath would have 
been without any force: Gen 31:53 etc. As late texts one may call to mind: 
Ex 12:12 (P); Deut 4:19–20 together with Deut 29:25, 32:7–8; Pss 95:3, 
97:9, 135:5 etc. Thus there is no indication of a line of demarcation be-
tween the period before and after the 6th century regarding the existence of 
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deities under the supremacy of Yhwh. As far as the biblical texts are con-
cerned, we find the relationship between Yhwh and existing deities ex-
pressed by the concise creed-like formula of Ps 97:9 (“Yhwh high above all 
the earth, most exalted above all the gods”; the parallelism of the gods with 
the earth, which certainly exists, makes it clear that the gods exist too), 
from the most ancient texts throughout until the 4th or 3rd centuries. This 
picture suggested by the Bible is not different from the epigraphic data of 
theophoric personal names (Tigay). Thus it seems that on this point the 
Israelite conception of monotheism essentially remained the same from the 
beginnings until the end of the composition of the Hebrew Bible. 
Second observation 
Monolatry is not sufficient a category if one wants to describe the relation-
ship between other deities and Yhwh. For in the case of ancient Israel, as 
mirrored in the biblical texts, monolatry presupposes the sovereign power 
of Yhwh, not only to forbid Israel to adore other deities, but also to forbid 
any claim of other deities to be worshiped by Israel. This is particularly 
clear in Ps 138:1–2 in comparison with Exod 20:3—according to the Psalm 
the Israelite worshiper of Yhwh has the right to sing in the presence of the 
other gods in praise of Yhwh (the Israelite worshiper must not fear these 
gods because he excludes them from his worship) while, according to the 
first word of the Decalogue, Exod 20:3=Deut 5:7, this worshiper has no 
right to worship other deities in the presence of Yhwh. This means that 
Israel may be monolatrous on earth because in heaven Yhwh is sovereign 
with regard to the other deities. This is the condition for monolatry in the 
Bible. Yhwh excludes the other gods from being worshiped by Israel in the 
same way as he excludes Israel from worshipping the other gods. These are 
the two sides of the same coin. In other words, in ancient Israel, monolatry 
includes monotheism as supremacy of Yhwh on deities inferior to him. 
Third observation 
Second Isaiah has the same idea of Yhwh as the supreme or transcendent 
deity in comparison with existing minor gods. This clearly results from Isa 
41:21–24. This is the first judgment “in court” between Yhwh and other 
gods: Yhwh invites them to prove that they are able to foresee the future 
and thus to prove that they are gods (namely the gods of the other nations, 
especially the gods of Babylon, famous for their ruling of the times and of 
the future). V. 23 makes it clear that these rivals of Yhwh in fact are the 
other gods: “that we may know that you are gods”. However, they can’t 
furnish the proofs that they had foreseen the future and thus governed the 
242 ADRIAN SCHENKER  
 
future events (most probably allusion to the rise of King Cyrus). Conclu-
sion in v. 24: “you are nothing” (or, perhaps, “less than nothing”). Here it 
becomes clear that “nothing,” in the language of Second Isaiah, may mean 
“as much as nothing,” a being “next to nothing,” but nevertheless a being 
which exists! Only a real being can be addressed as “you are nothing”. If 
this were not so, the whole procedure in court, where Yhwh alone is able to 
prove that he has announced the rise of Cyrus while the other side was un-
able to do so, a procedure so important for Second Isaiah that he repeats it 
several times, would be a mere imagination without reality, a vue de 
l’esprit: if—what however is not the case—the gods existed, then they 
would be incapable of proving anything with regard to forseeing the future. 
It is obvious that such an interpretation would destroy the whole thrust of 
this repeated proof of Yhwh’s exclusive position which Second Isaiah em-
phatically wants to establish. Therefore, Second Isaiah is far from pro-
claiming an absolute monotheism excluding the existence of other divine 
beings, as far as Deut in 4:35 (because of 4:19 which must be read together 
with v. 35). Yhwh’s exclusive rank on the contrary presupposes the exist-
ence of other deities subordinated to him. 
Fourth observation 
Another point concerns the image of the deities of the nations other than 
Israel. It seems that there are two explanations in the Bible: the one, occur-
ring in Second Isaiah, Psalms and elsewhere, claims the full incapacity of 
these representations of the gods to produce any real positive effect. They 
are but materials, shaped by men into a form, without any divine power. In 
Deut 4:15-19 there is, however, another explanation, more thoughtful and 
closer to the iconic theology of ancient Near East religions. According to 
this biblical “theology” of divine representations, as far as Yhwh is con-
cerned, it is impossible to represent him because he has not shown his form 
at Sinai. There is no portrayal possible where the artist does not see the 
being he wants to represent. On the contrary, the other gods of the neigh-
boring nations of Israel have a form because they appear as stars in the 
heavenly vault where they move. Therefore, they have a form which can be 
reproduced. This explanation, however, is more implicit than explicit in 
Deut 4:15–19, but, perhaps, nevertheless open to be made explicit. 
 
I am ignorant whether some of these observations were already made by 
Yehezkel Kaufman or by Benjamin Sommer. In this case it will honor me 
to agree with such great authorities. In the other case I hope these sketches 
may be a modest contribution to the ongoing debate on monotheism in the 
Bible and in ancient Israel, so brilliantly led by Yehezkel Kaufmann and 
Benjamin Sommer. 
  
Response to Benjamin Sommer’s “Yehezkel Kaufmann 
and Recent Scholarship on Monotheism” 
Othmar KEEL 
Most of the elements of the position presented here are developed and ar-
gued at length in my two-volume work Die Geschichte Jerusalems und die 
Entstehung des Monotheismus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
2007). A very short version of this extensive publication (1384 pages, 725 
illustrations) was edited by Brent Strawn and published by Fortress Press, 
Minneapolis, in July 2017 under the title “Jerusalem and the one God”. 
1. Two Preliminary Remarks 
Remark 1: Sommer follows Kaufmann and others in distinguishing differ-
ent kinds of monotheism, such as qualitative vs. quantitative monotheism—
a distinction which I can generally agree. I propose, however, to distinguish 
also exclusive and inclusive or cumulative monotheism, a distinction 
which, in my view, is crucial for understanding YHWHism in a satisfactory 
way. A prominent example of exclusive monotheism is Echnaton’s 
(Achenyati’s) Aton-Monotheism. Only Aton is God, all other deities are 
irrelevant and insubstantial. On the other hand, YHWHism is at least at its 
beginnings a highly inclusive monotheism. Consider, for example, the del-
uge story in Genesis, whose Mesopotamian parallels are many centuries 
older than the biblical ones. In Mesopotamian deluge stories different dei-
ties are involved, including Enlil, Adad, Enki/Ea, and a female deity—each 
deity assuming a distinct role. In the Israelite versions YHWH plays all the 
parts. The result is a not very coherent figure, but a rich figure. In contrast, 
that is not the case with Aton-Monotheism. For example, Aton does not 
respond in a satisfactory way to many aspects of life, such as the problem 
of death and afterlife which is considered to be highly important in Egypt. 
Therefore, the Egyptians went back to Osiris and the other deities important 
for the afterlife. Thanks to a cumulative monotheism, YHWH answered an 
increasingly wide spectrum of needs. Only later, under the influence of 
Assyrian loyalty oaths, does YHWH come to assume features of an intoler-
ant, violent, exclusive monotheistic deity. This kind of deity remains a god 
of a particular people of Judah, and is not the deity of all other peoples and 
nations. I shall address the relation between this particularistic and a fully 
developed “ripe” monotheism in section 3 below. 
244 OTHMAR KEEL 
 
Remark 2: Kaufmann and Sommer combine the word historicism regu-
larly with “shallow”. Just the word “historicism” is already pejorative. 
“Historiography,” however, is anything except “shallow.” It tries to de-
scribe how reality became what it is. Whatever happens in our universe—
be it natural-biological or human—it is related to time and space. Even the 
everlasting mountains have their history. They are far from being “everlast-
ing.” History is, like any kind of reality, immensely complex. Good history 
writing is based on material, so-called sources and their interpretation by an 
interpreter conscious of his/hers subjective position. The source-material of 
the second half of the second and the first two thirds of the first millennium 
for Palestine are in comparison to other historical periods extremely scarce. 
Most of it is lost. The six Amarna-Tablets from Jerusalem survived by 
chance and were found by chance. The scribe of Abdikhepa produced 
probably hundreds of texts and not just six letters. The same is true of all 
the other “sources.” The consequence should be that good history writing 
dealing with periods characterized by such a scarcity of “sources” has to 
take into account as many as possible of the available “sources,” including, 
of course, textual sources, such as biblical, extra-biblical, epigraphic, icon-
ographic, and archaeological, as Ziony Zevit has done in his major and 
meticulous work The Religions of Ancient Israel (2001).  
2. Outlines of a History of YHWHism 
I agree with my colleagues Adrian Schenker and Benjamin Sommer that 
the YHWH-monotheism is (finally) a qualitative monotheism whose view 
of god is characterized by his independence of matter and destiny, a mono-
theism of transcendental sovereignty. In contrast to Kaufmann and his con-
scious or unconscious followers I think that YHWH ascended gradually to 
this position. 
2.1. YHWH as a Proper Name 
YHWH was not right from the beginning this type of a transcendental 
monotheistic god. This contention is based mainly on the fact that YHWH 
is a proper name. A monotheistic god is the only one of its kind. There is 
no need to have a proper name to be a “person.” Mohammed’s Allah is 
clearly conceived as a “person,” but has just a generic name. “There is no 
other god than God.” In a polytheistic world a proper name is indispensa-
ble. In the story of the burning bush YHWH appears to Moses and gives 
him the order to bring his people out of Egypt. Moses says: “If I come to 
the Israelites and say to them, ‘The God of your ancestors has sent me to 
you,’ they will ask me, ‘What is his name?’ what shall I say to them?” 
God’s answer is a double one: First he says: “God said to Moses, ‘I am who 
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I am.’ He said further, ‘Thus you shall say to the Israelites, ‘I am’ has sent 
me to you’” (Exod 3:14). The second answer is: “God also said to Moses, 
‘Thus you shall say to the Israelites, ‘YHWH’ the God of your ancestors, 
the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, has sent me 
to you’: This is my name forever, and this my title for all generations” (Exod 
3:15). 
The interpretation as “I am who I am” in the first answer is highly so-
phisticated. It does not render the original meaning of the name as we will 
see. At the origin YHWH was a god similar to Kemosh, the god of the Mo-
abites, together with whom he appears in the Mesha-Stela Inscription and 
in Judg 11:24. 
Once YHWH had become a true monotheistic deity, the proper name 
YHWH became obsolete. A deity who is the only one of his kind can be 
called by a generic name, such as Elohim. Gen 1:1: “In the beginning when 
God (Elohim) created the heavens and the earth...” The generic designation 
Elohim is here in a monotheistic context used as a kind of proper name. 
That supposes a unique and only god as the designation ho ouranos used 
for the god of Israel in the Books of the Maccabees or adonay or kyrios 
respectively in the Septuagint. Jewish texts of the period when YHWH had 
ascended to the position of a unique and only god avoid more and more the 
proper name. 
2.2. Why and How YHWH Ascended to the Status of a Transcendental Only 
God 
There is not one clear reason why YHWH in contrast to Kemosh and simi-
lar national deities ascended to a transcendental status. But there are ele-
ments that, up to a certain point, render plausible and understandable why 
and how this happened to YHWH and not to Kemosh. 
MOTIF/REASON 1: YHWH came from far away, from a region foreign and 
alien to Palestine and this fact survived in the collective memory of Israel. 
We have quite a number of “sources” and arguments confirming this as-
sumption. 
 Argument 1.1: The complete name of the deity YHWH does not oc-
cur in pre-Israelite Levantine texts, neither in the Amarna tablets, nor 
in the texts from Ugarit, nor in the toponyms of pre-Israelite Pales-
tine. 
 Argument 1.2: A list of toponyms from Soleb from the time of Ame-
nophis III (1390–1353 BC), quoted in two temples of Ramses II 
(1279–1213 BC) in Amara West and Aksha, however, mention ta-
shasu yahw, “The land of the Shasu of Jahu”. Yahu is probably the 
name of a deity identical with YHWH. The shasu were a tribe in 
246 OTHMAR KEEL 
 
Northwestern Saudi Arabia, modern Hijaz, the biblical Midian. They 
were pushing north to biblical Seïr/Edom. The “shasu of Yahu” were 
probably a group of shasu worshipping the god Yahu.  
 Argument 1.3: According to Deut 33:2 YHWH comes from Sinai, 
from Seïr, from Har Paran; according to Judg 5:4 from Seïr and 
Edom; Hab 3:3 and 7 enumerate Teman (South), Har Paran, Kushan 
and Midian. YHWH from Teman is mentioned already at the begin-
ning of the 8th century BC in the Kuntillet Ajrud inscriptions. 
 Argument 1.4: In the light of the later Judean animosity against the 
Midianites, e.g., in Numbers 31, it is highly surprising that Exodus 
18 presents the father-in-law of Moses as a Midianite priest and 
teacher of Moses. 
 Argument 1.5: The biblical descriptions of YHWH’s theophanies in-
clude many volcanic elements. The “pillar of cloud by day and the 
pillar of fire by night” in Exod 13:21 is one of these. Another one is 
the fire and smoke of a kiln (tannur) in Exod 19:18; another one 
“mountains melting like wax before YHWH” (Ps 97:5). Phenomena 
like these are never found in descriptions of theophanies in Egypt, 
Ugarit or Mesopotamia. The only region in the Near East with volca-
noes still active in biblical times is the Hijaz. 
 Argument 1.6: A sixth and last argument is the proper name YHWH, 
which is most probably a preformative 3rd person masculine form. 
According to E. A. Knauf, divine names of this type are found only 
in preislamic Arabia. The etymology is probably from hawah “to 
blow, wave (of the wind)”. 
MOTIF/REASON 2: In the oldest traditions in Judges and the Books of 
Samuel, YHWH is a god of war and tempest, not of fertility, similar to the 
Egypto-Canaanite Baal-Seth or the Moabite Kemosh. The including and 
cumulative tendency of YHWHism led apparently early to a deity not relat-
ed only to one single natural or cultural phenomenon but to several ones. 
Thus the deity related to them has to be above and independent of them. 
A god who is responsible for the manifestations of the sun and at the same 
time of clouds and tempests cannot anymore be very close to the one or to 
the other of these phenomena. The more parts he assumes, the less he can 
be close or let alone be identified with the one or the other. He gets a status 
of sovereignty and transcendence. There are again quite a number of 
“sources” and arguments confirming the hypothesis of accumulation of 
several parts. 
 Argument 2.1: There are several cultic representations of YHWH. 
The oldest one known of seems to be the “ark of YHWH” brought by 
Abiathar, David’s priest, from the south to Jerusalem (1 Kgs 1:26). 
There, YHWH was apparently identified with El. 
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 Argument 2.2: In the Jerusalem temple stood a second cultic symbol, 
an empty throne, typical of sun deities. Beside the priest Abiathar 
who came with David to Jerusalem, David “inherited” in Jerusalem a 
second priest, Zadok (2 Sam 8:17 and 20:25). The most probable in-
terpretation is that Zadok was a priest of the sun-god whose sanctu-
ary with the empty throne as divine symbol YHWH shared, repre-
sented by the ark. The Solomonic temple was oriented to the East, 
the raising sun. The empty throne was later appropriated by YHWH. 
So was a story originally told of Shemesh as main actor, the Sodom 
story. The two messengers of the sun-god are Zedeq and Mishpat, 
the steady attendants of the sun-god as a judge. They are not able to 
spend one single night (lîn; cf. Gen 19:2 and Isa 1:21 and 26) un-
harmed in the city. This is the reason why Shemesh-YHWH destroys 
the city when he rises in the morning. 
 Argument 2.3: In the sanctuary in Bet-El established by Jeroboam I, 
YHWH is represented by the image of a bull. The bull is in this case 
not a symbol of fertility but of aggressiveness. It represents the 
YHWH who brought Israel out of Egypt (1 Kgs 12:28; cf. Num 
23:22; 24:8). The story of the “Golden Calf” in Exodus 32 is at its 
origin probably the Hieros Logos of the Jeroboam sanctuary in Bet-
El, later transformed in Judah into a polemical story. 
 Argument 2.4: Only in the time of Hosea, in the second half of the 8th 
century BC, did YHWH take over the part of a weather and fertility 
god from Baal. In Hosea 2:8 YHWH complains: “She [Israel as a 
woman] did not know that it was I who gave her the grain, the wine 
and the oil.” 
 Argument 2.5: Not only in the story of the Deluge does YHWH in-
herit the part of a female deity. The ‛aštěrōt haṣṣō’n are as the name 
says originally a blessing granted by Astarte (cf. the Latin veneres 
gregis). In Deut 7:13; 28:4, 18, and 51, they are mentioned as a 
blessing of YHWH. 
 Argument 2.6: In the 7th century BC under Assyro-Aramean influ-
ence, the cult of the moon god of Harran became very important in 
the Levant. In the vision of Zechariah 4, the lampstand between two 
trees, a symbol of the moon god of Harran, is used in its new context 
to make visible YHWH’s promise of a new beginning with his peo-
ple. 
MOTIF/REASON 3: Besides the foreign origin of YHWH and the enigmatic 
and long lasting process of YHWH taking over parts of more and more 
deities, there seems to be as a third motif/reason: a single event and its 
interpretation, actually its misinterpretation, which is at the origin of 
statements in the Hebrew Bible that can definitively be considered as mon-
otheistic in a strict sense. 
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 Argument 3.1: This event was the attack and the siege of Jerusalem 
by the Assyrians under Sennacherib which failed to conquer the city. 
Different biblical and Assyrian texts agree on that fact. Normally, the 
Assyrians pushed to the end and didn’t stop their attacks before they 
had punished “the rebel.” The fact that Sennacherib did not follow 
this policy in the case of Hezekiah and Jerusalem can be explained 
by different historical circumstances. For the prophet Isaiah, the de-
struction of all Judean cities except Jerusalem was a catastrophe. One 
hundred years later a completely different view was predominant. 
A cluster of stories transmitted twice in the Hebrew Bible (2 Kgs 
18:17–19:37 and Isa 36:1–37:38) maintains that the event was a great 
victory and that it was a miracle and exclusively the consequence of 
an intervention of YHWH or his angel. Many other and more im-
portant cities were not saved by their protector-deities, because ac-
cording to the story, they were not real deities at all. YHWH alone is 
god and has demonstrated this unique status through this event, 
which is described with what probably is the oldest strictly monothe-
istic formulae (Isa 37:16; 2 Kgs 19:19). The stories were told at the 
time when the Babylonians under Nebuchadnezzar threatened the 
city. There was a lively debate between two factions. The one argued 
for military opposition advocating the Sennacherib and the David 
and Goliath stories to support their view. 
The main representatives of the other party were the prophets Jer-
emiah and Ezekiel who pushed to submit. The political leaders 
followed the advice of prophets such as Hananiah (Jeremiah 28) 
recommended military action. They were convinced of YHWH’s in-
tervention in favor of Jerusalem as at the time of Sennacherib and 
Hezekiah. After the destruction of Jerusalem and the temple of 
YHWH by Nebuchadnezzar, Hananiah and his colleagues were con-
sidered pseudo-prophets and Jeremiah and Ezekiel as true and relia-
ble prophets. The monotheistic Credo, however, of the “pseudo-
prophets” survived, although their argument was no more valid. 
Usually the so-called Deutero-Isaiah is considered the first representa-
tive of a clearly articulated not just a latent monotheism. Deutero-
Isaiah takes up the monotheistic formulation of the Sennacherib sto-
ries, but without the unambiguous argument the latter had to present. 
After the destruction of Jerusalem and the temple their argument was 
no longer valid. 
 Argument 3.2: Deutero-Isaiah combines the monotheistic formula of 
the Sennacherib/Hezekiah stories with latent but fully developed 
monotheism. According to this view the one God is in charge of all 
peoples and nations not just of Israel or Judah respectively. This 
view may have been favored by the topographical/geographical sit-
uation of Jerusalem, which rendered possible the encounter with 
 RESPONSE TO BENJAMIN SOMMER 249 
 
many cultures and nations, being however less vulnerable than Gaza, 
which had the disadvantage to be right on the main road between 
Egypt and the Levant and Mesopotamia and so exposed to the devas-
tating attacks of different armies. An observation point a certain dis-
tance away in the mountains, such as Jerusalem, favored the view 
that one single deity governed the movements of the different peo-
ples and nations. Already for Isaiah, Assyria is an instrument in the 
hands of YHWH (Isa 7:20; 10:5). For Jeremiah, Nebuchadnezzar is a 
servant of YHWH (Jer 27:6; 43:10), and for Deutero-Isaiah, the Per-
sian king Cyrus is even his anointed (Messiah; Isa 45:1), a view ab-
solutely unthinkable for Deuteronomic/Deuteronomistic theologians 
with their one God only in charge of Israel. 
 
Despite the different reasons, motifs, and arguments that can be listed in 
favor of a certain historical development as, for example, the fact that the 
history of European philosophy starts in the Ionian cities of Asia Minor, 
there always remains in history an element of arbitrariness due to the mul-
tiplicity of influences and their multiple possibilities of interactions. 
  
Biblical Research in Hebrew 
A Discussion of its Character and Trends* 
Menahem HARAN 
Lecture delivered November 5, 1968 at the Inauguration  
of the Yehezkel Kaufmann Chair of Bible Studies 
 
Author’s Note: This lecture, delivered at the inauguration of the Yehezkel 
Kaufmann Chair of Bible Studies at the Hebrew University, is brought here 
essentially without changes, as it was presented at the ceremony, except for 
its English translation. The two last sections, however, which were not pre-
sented at that time (they were published subsequently in Ha-’ûniversitah, 
Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 10–12), are added here, since they constitute a direct 
continuation of the lecture. Certain aspects of the subject discussed here 
were treated by me in a more elaborate and detailed form on several occa-
sions, in various Hebrew periodicals (Bitzaron, the Hebrew monthly of 
America, Mo’znaim, the monthly of the Hebrew Writers Association in Is-
rael, the bi-monthly Molad, as well as Ha-’ûniversitah, a periodical of the 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem).  
I wish to express my gratitude to Mrs. Batya Rabin for her help in casting 
my thoughts into an English mold and formulating this version. 
M. H. 
1 
Biblical exegesis began as early as the end of the biblical period itself; at 
any rate, it has been in existence continuously ever since the biblical canon 
was concluded unto the present. Until the Renaissance in Europe, biblical 
exegesis (that is, of that part of the Bible dealing with the Mosaic dispensa-
tion) was actually confined to Jews. Christian scholars were, on the whole, 
strangers to the meaning and letters of the Hebrew language and could ap-
proach it only with the assistance of Jewish scholars or Jews converted to 
Christianity. It is doubtful whether after St. Jerome, throughout the entire 
Middle Ages, Christianity produced even as many as three scholars with a 
                                                     
*  Editor’s note: This essay has been edited for correction of errors and stylistic uniformity.  
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real knowledge of Hebrew.1 As against this, Jewish biblical exegesis, which 
had direct access to the Hebrew original and for the greater part was even 
written in Hebrew, attained some achievements which did not lose in im-
portance throughout the generations. The brilliant intuition, fine sensitivity, 
and ability to listen to the tone of the text that characterized the great medi-
eval Hebrew biblical exegetes frequently raised their work to an exceeding-
ly high level and turned it into a model of this kind. Their work is still highly 
significant today. 
However, following the Renaissance and particularly from the mid-
eighteenth century onwards, upon the awakening of sciences and the hu-
manistic scholarship in Europe, a new subject was born—a subject which 
no longer contents itself with biblical exegesis, but endeavors to study the 
Bible by employing methods of philological and historical criticism. The 
aims and means of critical research differ completely from the classical 
exegesis. Critical research is not satisfied with a literal and grammatical 
understanding of the text as it stands. It also seeks to answer the fundamen-
tal question of how the books of the Bible came into being—when, where, 
under which historical circumstances and conditions of creativity; if possi-
ble it even tries to arrive at the identity of the author (in any event it exam-
ines the authenticity of the text) and the definition of the literary and typo-
logical nature of the work in question. The implements of the critical re-
search are literary and form analysis, historical investigation, as well as a 
study of the text itself. It presumes that there is a considerable distance, 
even a certain tension, between the utterances and words as committed to 
writing by the biblical authors and the books of the Bible as we possess 
them today. One might say that criticism always seeks to introduce the 
historical factor into the text and to illuminate it from a historical angle—
when it determines how and when the works were composed, or how they 
became joined together in more composite units, or how and to what extent 
the text has been preserved or modified in the course of time.  
The appearance of biblical critical research constituted somewhat of a 
sensational innovation, which had no place in the concepts or the imagina-
tion of the early exegetes. The problems of this research did not, in fact, 
concern the exegetes, whereas the methods designed to solve the problems 
were completely foreign to them. The arguments of Porphyrius or the skep-
tical reflections of Clemens of Alexandria in the period preceding the Mid-
dle Ages (both of whom were of the third century B.C.E.), do not detract 
from the decisiveness of the turning point which came about with the ap-
pearance of systematic criticism, but only serve to emphasize it. On the 
other hand, Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra’s casual and ambiguous allusions 
                                                     
1  The one who stands out among these few is Nicolaus de Lyra, who in his biblical inter-
pretations drew on Rashi and occasionally even translated him word by word. His inter-
pretations were studied by Luther and thus he constituted one of the concealed connect-
ing links between the Middle Ages and the Reformation. 
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cannot blur the general, traditional character of the medieval biblical exege-
sis. Any attempt at pushing back the date of Hebrew biblical criticism and 
finding early signs of it in Talmudic literature or in the works of medieval 
scholars, puts the cart before the horse and obscures the border line be-
tween historical periods. 
2 
Today, after some two hundred years of activity, biblical criticism has al-
ready become an old established and somewhat complicated subject. It is 
older than quite a few subjects in the humanities and social sciences. How-
ever, its entrance into the Hebrew language actually began only some sixty 
years ago.* Moreover, its acceptance by Jewish scholars, including those 
who did not write in Hebrew, was no easy matter. It involved inhibitions, 
revulsion, an absence of continuity, and lack of significance; and it some-
times appears as though the acceptance of this subject is found hard for 
them even to the present day. There were, of course, a number of excep-
tions. One of these was Leopold Zunz who, in addition to his observations 
on the Book of Chronicles, within the framework of his monumental histo-
ry of Jewish homiletics (Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der Juden, histor-
isch entwickelt, Berlin 1832; Second edition, Frankfurt a.M. 1892), occu-
pied himself in his old age with the study of the Pentateuch and devoted 
much attention to de Wette’s work on Deuteronomy.2 Then there was 
Abraham Geiger who, in addition to his great work on the Bible and its 
translations (Urschrift und Übersetzungen der Bibel in ihrer Abhängigkeit 
von der innern Entwicklung des Judentums, Breslau 1857; Second edition, 
Frankfurt a.M. 1928), in his lectures at the Hochschule für die Wissenschaft 
des Judentums in Berlin, gave an introduction to the Bible in which he 
touched upon various aspects of biblical criticism.3 Heinrich Graetz pub-
lished studies and commentaries on several of the books of the Prophets 
and the Hagiographa, in which he adhered to an extremely critical system 
(without, however, touching the Pentateuch).4 S. Maybaum, D. Hoffmann, 
                                                     
*  I.e., the turn of the nineteenth century into the twentieth [editor’s note]. 
2  See L. Zunz, “Bibelkritisches,” Gesammelte Schriften, I, Berlin 1875, pp. 217–70. 
3  A. Geiger, “Einleitung in die biblischen Schriften,” Nachgelassene Schriften, IV, Berlin 
1876, pp. 1–279. 
4  Besides his articles on various biblical subjects which appeared in MGWJ between the 
years 1871–1887, a mention may be made of his commentaries on Ecclesiastes (Leipzig 
1871), Song of Songs (Wien 1871), and Psalms (in two parts, Breslau 1882–1883), his 
work on Joel (published in Jahresbericht des jüdisch-theologischen Seminars, Breslau 
1873), and the posthumous publication Emendationes in prelosque Sacrae Scripturae 
Veteris Testamenti libros (ed. W. Bacher; Breslau 1892–1894). 
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and I. Rabin wrote monographs on specific problems of biblical research,5 
while B. Jacob wrote his detailed commentary on the Book of Genesis in 
which he sought to contest the concepts of criticism.6 Yet, these works 
were not sufficient to alter the picture, all the more so since a considerable 
part of even this modest output was not created for the purpose of setting 
out and conquering new horizons, but rather because of defensive impulses 
aimed at halting the wave that was storming in from outside. 
Such was the attitude of Jewish scholars who wrote in the German lan-
guage; even more so did this attitude hold within the limits of the Hebrew 
language, where the harvest was poor indeed. Explanations and emenda-
tions of the biblical text were present in the works of such scholars as Josh-
ua Heshel Schorr (in the periodical He-ḥalutz), Abraham hen Nachman 
Krochmal (in his book Ha-ketav ve-ha-mikhtav [Lemberg] 1873, which 
includes a German translation of the Pentateuch) and Elimelech (Wechsler) 
Ish-Noami (in his brochures ‛Eṭ sheqer sopherim [Drohovicz 1905] and 
particularly Hago Sigim [Drohovicz 1909]). But such concerns were mar-
ginal in their work and look like incidental labors which, for some rea-
son, they did not see themselves free to desist from. Tiny and incidental 
glimmers of significant thought are lost among mountains of verbosity 
in the publica-tions of that time. The same applies to studies with a di-
rect or indirect bearing on the Bible, written by scholars of the type of 
Jacob Reifmann. The latter actually was a Talmudist and a scholarly 
maskil (enlightened person), whom biblical subjects engaged mainly 
through his occupation with Talmudic material. This type too represent-
ed a special form of quasi-biblical scholarship among Eastern and Cen-
tral European Jews, that is to say, scholars who were mainly concerned 
with, and worked in Talmudic literature, dealing incidentally in their 
own way also with biblical problems inasmuch as the Bible was reflect-
ed to them in a Talmudic mirror (Jewish Enlightenment in those parts of 
Europe appears to have momentarily forgotten one of Mendelssohn’s 
principles). The most outstanding scholar of this type of Talmudic-
                                                     
5  S. Maybaum, Die Entwicklung des altisraelitischen Priestertums, Breslau 1880; 
D. Hoffmann, Die wichtigsten Instanzen gegen die Graf-Wellhausensche Hypothese, 
Berlin 1903 (a mention may also be made of his series of articles “Probleme der Penta-
teuchexegese” dealing with the Book of Exodus; in Jeschurun [monthly], vols. 1–6, 
1914–1919); I. Rabin, “Studien zur vormosaischen Gottesvorstellung,” Festschrift zum 
75-jährigen Bestehen des jüdisch-theologischen Seminars, I, Breslau 1929, pp. 257–356. 
6  B. Jacob, Das erste Buch der Torah: Genesis, Berlin 1934. He is also the author of some 
other studies relating to the Bible. His commentary on Exodus, molded in the same form 
as the one on Genesis, has been preserved in a manuscript (copied by University micro-
films, Ann Arbor). [Both of these are now available in English translation: Benno Jacob, 
The First Book of the Bible: Genesis, abridged and translated by Ernest Jacob and Wal-
ter Jacob (New York: Ktav, 1974); and Benno Jacob, The Second Book of the Bible: Ex-
odus (abridged and translated by Walter Jacob and Yaakov Elman; Hoboken, NJ: Ktav, 
1992).—Editors.]  
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biblical learning was R. Meir Ish-Shalom (Friedmann), the prominent 
scholar of midrashic literature who wrote a number of studies on bibli-
cal subjects, including not a little apologetic argumentation in a hearty 
style, while all his discussions are exclusively based on Talmudic litera-
ture, considering any non-Jewish work on the Bible to be completely 
beyond the pale. On the other hand, a scholar as distinguished as Nach-
man Krochmal, the author of Moreh nevukhe ha-zeman (The Guide for 
the Perplexed of Our Time, first edition, edited by L. Zunz [Lemberg 
1851]), who built up his work on philological bases and absorbed in it a 
number of critical concepts bearing upon the Bible, did not, of course, 
become thereby an active associate in the field of biblical criticism. At 
the most, he was passively connected with this subject, some of whose 
principles served to underpin his Hegelian thinking.  
The path found to be most suitable for Jewish scholars to pursue was 
the one of exegesis. Here they were able to fasten on to a long chain of 
builders and innovators as well as to a tradition of masterpieces, which 
has been stamped even with a style of its own. A few prominent work-
ers in this field appeared, in fact, also in and after the period of Enlight-
enment. But then, the imprints of critical research, even after it had 
gained in strength and become a real branch of study, were few and 
slight in the works of these biblical exegetes. Samuel David Luzzatto, 
Arnold B. Ehrlich (the author of Miqra’ Kipheshuto, Berlin 1899–1901, 
and Randglossen zur hebräischen Bibel, Leipzig 1908–1914), let alone 
Moses Mendelssohn (the promoter and editor of the Hebrew Bi’ur with 
a German translation of the Torah) were nothing but exegetes and in 
this respect the medieval heritage was active in their works. Criticism 
was not their forte) though its echoes can be heard in their writings, and 
were we to evaluate them according to their critical qualities, their stat-
ure would sadly diminish. The same applies to the commentaries of 
R. Benjamin Szold (the author of a Hebrew commentary on Job, Balti-
more 1886) and R. Meir Ish Shalom who, in addition to his above-
mentioned studies, wrote commentaries and notes to several books or 
chapters of the Prophets and the Hagiographa. These scholars con-
sciously ignored criticism, its methods, and its principles, yet, at the same 
time their works make certain contributions in the sphere of exegesis. 
3 
There are some reasons for the recoil of Jewish scholars from biblical criti-
cism and for the historical delay in the meeting between this subject and the 
Hebrew language.  
In the first place, the Wissenschaft des Judentums directed its efforts to 
the study of Talmudic and rabbinical Judaism, for the declared purpose of 
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turning this field into an academic discipline. Against the circumstances 
prevailing at that time, there existed obvious motives which drove Jewish 
scholars to the study of post-biblical and medieval Judaism only. In West-
ern Europe, the Jewish community was in the process of emerging from the 
ghetto, beginning to fit itself into the frameworks of a democratic state. It 
was only natural that the intellectual élite of this community, which had 
already begun to sense modern culture, should aspire to turn its Jewish 
heritage into a subject for research according to critical methods. Zunz 
desired to raise this subject to a branch of humanities, and all his lifetime he 
sought to obtain a foothold for it in German universities. However, as far as 
the Bible was concerned, the Wissenschaft des Judentums had no ambitions 
whatsoever. In any case the Bible constituted one of the foundation stones 
of Christian civilization and its study, being already accepted and recog-
nized in the academic establishment, did not need the approval of Jewish 
scholars. In his program, Zunz actually excluded the Bible from the subjects 
with which the Wissenschaft des Judentums was to deal in the future. Those 
scholars who published their studies in Hebrew and participated in the 
building up of the Hebrew Enlightenment literature in Western and Central 
Europe (such as S. J. Rappaport, Nachman Krochmal, and S. D. Luzzatto), 
were also among the builders of the Wissenschaft des Judentums and had 
no reason to change its orientation. In Eastern Europe, the Wissenschaft des 
Judentums followed in the footsteps of its western counterpart, sharing with 
it the same motives and tendencies. During the period of Enlightenment, 
scholarship there did not, for the most part, come up to the standards of the 
west, while the occupation with biblical matters was still less successful 
and frequently showed signs of ineffectuality.  
Another, perhaps still more compelling reason which delayed the ac-
ceptance of biblical criticism by Jews in general and by the Hebrew lan-
guage in particular, is connected with the special theological significance 
possessed by the Bible in Judaism. The Wissenschaft des Judentums used 
the scalpel of criticism on the post-biblical strata of Judaism, thereby turn-
ing them into a function of evolution and historical situations and shaking 
their dogmatic authority. It did not, however, dare to touch the Bible itself, 
or at least the Torah (characteristic is the fact that even Graetz who demon-
strated a fairly critical approach to the books of the Prophets and the Hagi-
ographa, refrained from touching the Pentateuch). Even for the most ex-
treme Enlightened (maskilim) who did not hesitate to carry out pretty wild 
emendations in the biblical text, the Bible still served as a last bastion of 
pure faith, as a kind of fundamental principle of Jewish religion, which was 
not to be shaken. To quote the words of one of them (modeled after the 
saying of Paul), which turned into a slogan in the writings of the Enlight-
ened: “Verily, the letters and the words are like corpses and only the spirit, 
the spirit of God that hovereth over the face of the Holy Writings, is that 
which preserves the nation alive and sets it up as a banner of the peoples, 
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etc.”7 This apprehension did not help Jewish scholars to wrestle freely with 
the incisive problems of biblical criticism. Protestant Christianity, which 
was born in the tremendous crises of the Reformation and consolidated a 
new theology for itself, was prepared to stand up to these problems and to 
absorb their sting. Judaism was apparently not yet in this position.  
However, with the awakening of the national consciousness among the 
Jewish community in Eastern Europe, Judaism began to be perceived in 
new categories—that is, as national, historical, “secular” entity. Henceforth 
the Bible was depicted mostly as a great monument of a mere national cul-
ture, as the most outstanding creation of the Jewish people during the peri-
od when it lived a full national life, before it was uprooted from its land. 
The national metamorphosis in the consciousness of East European Jewry 
took place only near the end of the nineteenth century, and it was this 
which gave the final legitimization for the absorption of biblical criticism in 
the Hebrew language. 
4 
The literary enchanter who gave a publicistic and theoretical expression to 
the national awakening of East European Jewry and whose forceful imprint 
was stamped on all the discussions of his contemporaries as well as of the 
following generation, was Aḥad Ha-‛Am (Asher Ginzberg). His national 
theory is partly founded on the basic assumption of Bible research as con-
ceived and formulated at the turn of the century. At the same time, his theo-
ry designs to link up the various manifestations of Judaism throughout the 
generations. Aḥad Ha-‛Am talks of “the will for national survival,” which 
operates in the existence of a national group and is comprehended by him 
as instinctive and unconscious in nature. He further speaks of “the national 
spirit” which is embodied in different historical forms, all the national man-
ifestations becoming its external expressions and “raiments.” In this way he 
unites biblical and post-biblical Judaism as parallel representations of the 
same national spirit and abolishes the partition which Christian theology 
had put up between the two (occasionally also Western Jewish scholarship, 
even though unintentionally, tended to admit the existence of such a parti-
tion). Moreover, in Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s thinking the biblical period turns into 
the ideal one in Jewish history, a period which had given full and explicit 
expression to the national spirit of this group. The “raiments” of Israel’s 
national spirit in that period had not as yet become circumscribed and cur-
tailed as they were destined to become in the diaspora. The highlight of that 
period and the essence of Israel’s spirit in all times was, according to Aḥad 
                                                     
7  J. H. Schorr, He-ḥalutz, I, 1852, p. 98. 
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Ha-‛Am, prophecy, in which he saw the purpose of the Jewish existence 
also for the future.  
It will not, therefore, surprise us to find Aḥad Ha-‛Am demanding that 
all that is good and substantial in non Jewish Bible scholarship be accepted 
into the Hebrew language. He denounces the Wissenschaft des Judentums 
for immersing itself “in diaspora darkness, in ghetto ruins” and protests that 
the study of the ancient, original period, in which the spirit of our people 
was created and evolved in its own unique way and where the right key for 
solving all ‘the problems and difficulties’ is preserved” has been handed 
over to strangers.8 He reminds his readers that in this field important con-
tributions are being made in the European languages, “through tremendous 
diligence which testifies to a great and deep love,” and as an example he 
mentions the Handkommentar zum Alten Testament which was being pub-
lished at that time in Göttingen under the editorship of W. Nowack. In this 
connection he maintains that “A perfect understanding of Scripture ought to 
occupy the first place among the most important aims of work on modern 
(Hebrew) literature,” since “the root of our national spirit” is concealed 
there.9  
And yet, for all the inherent paradox, it was Aḥad Ha-‛Am who sought 
also to forestall the acceptance of biblical criticism by the Hebrew lan-
guage. There was a certain ambivalence in his attitude to this subject—with 
one hand he reached out for it while with the other he pushed it away. In his 
essay on Moses he differentiated between archeological truth, to which he 
did not attribute much importance, and historical-psychological truth that 
embodies the nation's spirit and on which it exerts a hypnotic influence.10 In 
his remarks on the program of Bible studies at the Herzliah High School in 
its early years, he came out with explicit anti-philological pronouncements: 
“The text as we now have it before us . . . that is our national Bible, just as 
if that is how it was primarily created; we have no wish whatsoever to 
know the original text as it issued from the lips of the prophet.”11 
Possibly, the reason for this ambivalent attitude is rooted deep down to 
the ground in Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s national ideology which, in the course of 
years, revealed an inner, dialectic development. Aḥad Ha-‛Am the positiv-
ist, the disciple of A. Comte and H. Spencer, was pulled more and more 
towards idealism. He no longer comprehended the national spirit as an ab-
stract sum total of the concrete historical manifestations of the national 
culture; rather, he conceived of it as a super-historical, metaphysical idea 
manifesting itself in different forms, but remaining constant and unchang-
                                                     
8  Aḥad Ha-‛Am, ‛Al parashat derakhim (At the Crossroads—Collected Essays), Introduc-
tion to the first edition (1895). 
9  Ibid., Yalqut qatan (Small Miscellany), sect. XXXI. 
10  Aḥad Ha‛am’s Collected Writings, Fourth edition (in Hebrew; Tel Aviv: Dvir and 
Hotza’ah ‛Ivrit), 1947, pp. 342–43. 
11  Ibid., p. 419. 
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ing in its essence. As far as Israel is concerned, this was, according to Aḥad 
Ha-‛Am’s theory, the idea of absolute justice whose great exponents were 
the prophets. Thus, he sought to transform Judaism, a historical religion as 
it is, into a kind of new, secular but nonetheless positive, clear-cut and 
binding ideological reality. The new Judaism was to be distinguished from 
the old one, in Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s thought, only by the substitution of “I feel” 
for “I believe.” Another possible reason for Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s recoil from 
biblical criticism may be connected with his practical disposition and the 
utilitarian contents of his teaching, which did not allow him to pay much 
heed to philological research for its own sake. He appreciated the kind of 
practical research appertaining to the public and “connected with the life of 
the present and the future”—not theoretical scholarship reserved for profes-
sionals.12 One should still mention the considerate nature of Aḥad Ha-‛Am 
the person and the great care he took not to hurt the feelings of readers by 
publishing things unpalatable to them. The result was that precisely Ha-
shiloaḥ, the central Hebrew periodical of the time, which appeared under 
his editorship, was actually closed to articles connected with Bible re-
search. 
5 
However, not even the authority of “The Master” (Ha-moreh—the epithet 
applied by his contemporaries to Aḥad Ha-‛Am) could any longer prevent 
biblical research from entering the Hebrew language. Once the historical 
door was opened, there was no possibility of closing it any more. Plans 
started to take shape and projects began to be carried out, which pointed to 
some kind of change—though for the time being the output was rather 
scanty, as most of the projects failed from the start. In this connection we 
ought to mention the attempts made around the circle of Aḥad Ha-‛Am 
himself by the Aḥiasaf publishers, later Dvir, at the beginning of the centu-
ry and in the twenties. One of the earliest harbingers was the attempt of 
Ch. N. Bialik and A. I. Zalichenko to bring out a Hebrew translation of 
Wilhelm Nowack’s work on Hebrew (i.e., biblical) archeology (Warsaw 
1905). It was a characteristic wish that the translators expressed in the 
foreword to the slim brochure which they succeeded to publish: “We view 
this book . . . as opening a door in our literature to the subject of research 
into our antiquities and our sacred Scriptures, ‘the heritage of the na-
tions.’”13 After that, in the twenties, Dvir published two issues of its quar-
                                                     
12  Ibid., p. 126 et al. 
13  The quotation marks for the last words are applied in the original. This turn of phrase is 
reminiscent of the text in Jer. 3:19. The authors intended to pun upon the word goyim, 
which in biblical Hebrew means “nations, peoples,” whereas in post-biblical Hebrew al-
so implies “gentiles, non-Jews.”  
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terly magazine of Jewish studies (Berlin 1923–24) and also tried to main-
tain a special series of Bible studies within whose framework appeared the 
highly useful and substantial book, bearing the title Toledot biqqoret 
ha-miqra’ (The History of Biblical Criticism; Berlin 1925), the work of 
Menahem (Max) Soloweitchik (Solieli) and Zalman Rubasheff (Shazar, at 
present the President of the State of Israel). 
Two other projects grew in the course of years and achieved serious di-
mensions and were almost completed. Both were connected with the na-
tional awakening that took place in East European Jewry at the beginning 
of the century.  
One is the critical commentary to the Torah, Prophets and Hagiographa 
published under the editorship and with the participation of Abraham Ka-
hana (Zhitomir-Tel Aviv 1904–1930). Kahana hoped to obtain the collabo-
ration of Jewish scholars from all over Europe and to divide the Books to 
be worked on amongst them, without relinquishing his own share. But there 
were not many Jewish scholars whose training and inclination fitted them 
for this task (even today there are not many) and not all of those who con-
sented to participate succeeded in carrying out their intention. A great deal 
of the missing material had to be supplied by Kahana himself who, in addi-
tion to planning and editing the project, also undertook the writing of the 
commentary of some dozen books, but even so the series was not complet-
ed. The series as a whole is not of an even quality, depending on the apti-
tude and ability of the contributors, yet it at least has a historical credit, 
since it was the first to confront the Hebrew reader with biblical criticism 
with its real problems and specific methods, without any intention to soften 
it by means of retouching and attaching to it a Jewish image. The approach 
of this commentary is completely critical and therein lies its strength and its 
mission. There is, indeed, no doubt that in its preparation Kahana was 
moved by a sense of mission which sprang from the deepest sources of the 
national awakening, and the strong urges which drove that generation 
prompted also this scholar with his learned work. Only in this way can one 
explain the daring, energy and perseverance that characterized him in this 
undertaking (as well as in other scholarly projects). Suffice it to say that to 
this day his commentary has remained the only one of its kind in Hebrew, 
and the critical commentaries written in Hebrew even on individual books 
of the Bible to this day are as yet very few in number, hardly totaling to 
half a dozen. 
The second is Yehezkel Kaufmann’s monumental undertaking in the 
field of biblical research, his voluminous Toledot ha-emunah ha-yisre’elit 
(History of the Israelite Faith, Tel Aviv 1937–1956) and the books con-
nected with this work—the commentaries to Joshua (Jerusalem 1959) and 
Judges (Jerusalem 1962) with the monographs and articles which depend 
on them. 
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No one could be further removed from Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s thought and 
from the style that was characteristic of his school than Kaufmann. Never-
theless, in Kaufmann’s great project in biblical research, most of the desires 
on which this school had set its heart were realized. First of all, he too 
closed the breach which Christian theology had made between biblical and 
post-biblical Judaism, conceiving of them both as an ideological and histor-
ical continuum—even though he comprehended this continuum quite dif-
ferently from Aḥad Ha-‛Am. He too saw in the Bible the purest embodi-
ment of Judaism and in the prophecy the summit of Israel’s spiritual world. 
His working method was critical, secular in character, based on absolute 
freedom of thought, as philological research can only be. At the same time, 
unlike Kahana’s project, Kaufmann’s work contained a strong element of 
creativity, innovation, and revolt. He fought a royal battle with gentile criti-
cism which he sought to defeat with its own weapons. In that way too he 
gave an expression to the desires which thrilled the hearts of Jewish schol-
ars of the generation of national awakening and scholars who gathered 
round the circle of Aḥad Ha-‛Am in particular. They longed for research in 
the Bible to be not merely Hebrew in form, but also new and revolutionary 
in content. Even though they wished this research in its Hebrew garb to free 
itself from parochialism and narrow-mindedness, they did not want it to be 
a mere repetition of the achievements and the perceptions that the subject 
enjoyed in the European languages. They desired creative Bible research, 
which, as stated by one of them, on the one hand would shake off “the out-
worn ideas concerning the mission of Judaism” (i.e., as they were appre-
hended by the western liberal Jewry), while on the other hand would have 
the strength to stand up to the waves of truisms emanating from a foreign 
world.”14 One could possibly claim that the impulses of orthodox or liberal 
Judaism were exchanged by them for national impulses. They were not, at 
any rate, strong enough to realize these longings. Paradoxically enough, it 
was precisely Kaufmann, whose thoughts were diametrically opposed to 
Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s school, that set to realize those longings. Furthermore, in 
Kaufmann’s system as well, Bible research becomes the cornerstone in 
explaining the essence of Judaism and in solving the mystery of Jewish 
survival. That is to say, it was precisely he that found in the Bible “the right 
key for solving all ‘the problems and difficulties.’”  
6 
The national awakening in East European Jewry brought forth wonderful 
literary productions in the Hebrew language, while the Zionist movement, 
                                                     
14  N. B. S. (= Naftali ben Shemuel), being a pseudonym for Y. N. Simḥoni, Ha-tequfah 
VIII, 1921, pp. 504, 508 (in a review on E. Auerbach’s book Die Prophetie, Berlin 
1920). 
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which erupted in different forms in Eastern and Western Europe brought 
about a decisive change in Jewish history, and after the efforts and struggle 
of three generations led to the establishment of the State. However, critical 
work in Hebrew, in Jewish Studies in general and in Bible studies in partic-
ular, lagged far behind the belles-lettres—at least until the end of the first 
third of the twentieth century. Hebrew periodicals specializing in Jewish 
Studies, which sprouted in Europe15 were left out of breath and disappeared 
at rapid rate. At that time professional studies could find place mostly in 
general magazines, in which belletristic and popular articles stood side by 
side with scientific works of varying degrees of popularity. Moreover, Jew-
ish scholars writing Hebrew, as far as their philological methods matured 
and their standards rose, desired to bring their results to other participants 
in the field, and consequently they were forced, even if against their will, to 
write in languages other than Hebrew. Such an inevitability is inherent in 
the nature of things, and whoever acknowledges the international character 
of critical, professional research, cannot avoid it even today. However, 
under the conditions prevailing at that time the Hebrew language was not as 
yet even able to absorb serious philological works in the fields of Judaica 
and Biblica, both on account of the limited scope and provincial character 
of its readers and because of the meagerness of literary and institutional 
tools. Scholars working on these subjects were compelled to forgo Hebrew 
altogether. It is typical that even M. J. Bin-Gorion (Berdyczewski), a dis-
tinguished writer and thinker in the Hebrew language, did not refrain from 
writing his critical Bible researches in German. In this manner Jewish 
scholars in the beginning of the twentieth century actually though inadvert-
ently continued the line of demolition characteristic of the nineteenth-
century Wissenschaft des Judentums in Western Europe, whose inherent 
destructive tendencies have already become well recognized.  
There was, of course, a difference between the scholars of the classical 
Wissenschaft des Judentums in its earlier phases and the nationally con-
scious scholars of the twentieth century who engaged in Jewish Studies. 
For the former, writing in a language other than Hebrew was a purposeful, 
intentional matter, whereas with the latter it was only natural and inescapa-
ble. On the latter, the non-Hebrew language was forced by objective cir-
cumstances and some of them even tried, within the limited possibilities, to 
free themselves of it. The most important factor influencing this language 
question of modern Jewish scholarship was indicated by the editors of the 
Dvir magazine when in the foreword they pointed out the limitation and 
dearth of the “reading public devoted to Hebrew (i.e., Jewish) scholarship 
in the Hebrew language.”16 One might add to this statement that under the 
                                                     
15  Such as S. A. Horodezky’s Ha-goren, ha-tzofeh le-ḥokhmat yisra’el of the Hungarian 
scholars, as well as Dvir which was connected with the state of mind in Aḥad Ha-‛Am’s 
circle and patronized by Bialik. 
16  Dvir I, 1923, p. V. The editors were I. M. Elbogen, Y. N. Epstein, and N. H. Torczyner. 
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conditions of the modern diaspora, after the fall of the ghetto walls, such a 
public is of necessity destined to remain severely limited in number. The 
modern diaspora has no room for a Hebrew community producing an intel-
lectual élite, which engages professionally in humanistic studies, and that, 
for whatever reason, in the Hebrew language. In the present state of affairs, 
especially after the extermination of East European Jewry, the literary crea-
tivity in Hebrew outside of the Land of Israel has become a contradiction of 
the natural order of life and is therefore also short-rooted and powerless. 
The reading public which the editors of Dvir were looking for could only 
become a reality under the conditions of the Land of Israel.  
In actual fact, it was the new life coming into being in this country in the 
Hebrew language, which really created this public. No wonder that Ka-
hana’s project was transferred to Palestine, while that of Kaufmann was 
from the very start carried out here.17 The new conditions in the Land of 
Israel brought about the establishment of a Hebrew University—an act 
which clearly testified to the comprehensive nature and completeness of the 
Hebrew reality being built in this country still prior to the founding of the 
State. It was the Hebrew University which acted as a natural raising ground 
for an intellectual élite which is Hebrew in language and thought (while in 
recent years, with the sharp rise in educational needs and the “explosion” of 
institutions of higher learning in Israel, the Hebrew University’s counter-
parts outside of Jerusalem were made partners in this task). On the other 
hand, from the very beginning the Hebrew University constituted a natural 
setting for research in Jewish Studies, and it opened the way for scholars in 
these fields to conduct their work or to carry it on in the Hebrew language. 
Within this framework, Bible research has become a part of Jewish Studies 
and was clothed in Hebrew, as was demonstrated already by the work of 
the first Bible teachers at the University: M. H. Segal and M. D. (U.) Cas-
suto, who were given the opportunity to engage in this subject in, or to 
transfer their activity to, the Hebrew language. The same can be said of the 
other teachers, such as M. Buber and N. H. Tur-Sinai (Torczyner), whose 
scholarly undertakings included also Bible studies. In this framework room 
was also found for Y. Kaufmann in the last decade of his life. 
7 
By now we have reached a stage in which we take the Hebrew dress of 
philological Bible research for granted. There is no longer any reason to be 
                                                     
17  While M. J. Bin-Gorion’s biblical studies appeared in Hebrew only a few years ago. 
These are: Ḥayyey Mosheh (Tel Aviv: Moreshet Mikhah Yosef, 1961); Sinai u-gerizim, 
2 vols. (Tel Aviv: Moreshet Mikhah Yosef, 1962–63; Yehudah ve-yisra’el (Tel Aviv: 
Moreshet Mikhah Yosef, 1965. His German publication in this field is the posthumous 
volume Sinai und Garizim, Berlin: Morgenland-Verlag, 1926. 
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grateful to critical Bible studies only for their being published in the He-
brew language and we evaluate them on their own, inherent merit. Biblical 
research in Hebrew, which in the nature of things is today concentrated in 
the State of Israel, has already become fairly complex and variegated in 
content and trends. A quite considerable number of scholars devote them-
selves to it and some of these endeavor to select their own approach or to 
accentuate an individual method of work which is particularly close to their 
heart. Contact with the land, its scenery and concrete conditions are felt in 
several of the publications brought out in Israel, while the subjects of Pales-
tinian archeology, topography, historical geography, and biblical realia—
that have gained very much in importance in the last generation—are leav-
ing their marks on biblical research carried out here. 
For all that, we have not yet reached the point of having a common cen-
ter of gravity or the emergence of characteristic features of the work being 
carried out in this subject in Israel—we are still a long way from being able 
to boast of a Jerusalem or Israeli school. Moreover, on occasion it appears 
that we do not even agree on the basic assumptions of philological research 
in this subject, and we sound as if we were speaking in different languages. 
Centuries of critical occupation with the Bible in Europe’s institutions of 
higher learning sufficed to take the subject apart and subdivide it into many 
branches—but did not shake the agreement which existed in every genera-
tion (and which exists also today) as regards the fundamental concepts of 
biblical criticism; neither did it make it impossible for scholars, wherever 
they be, to communicate with each other on the specific problems of the 
subject. Even the Scandinavian School, which has moved rather a long way 
from Bible research as pursued in other countries, nevertheless agrees with 
the rest of the schools on a number of basic assumptions of biblical criti-
cism (e.g., the Deuteronomistic edition of the complex of Former Prophets, 
the compositional continuity existing between the Books of the Former 
Prophets as well as within the Pentateuch, the supposed times of the official 
canonization—if not of composition itself—of Deuteronomy and of the 
Pentateuch as a whole, and the like). In the Hebrew language and in Israel 
today where the critical study of the Bible is still recent and the academic 
institutions are still few, one sometimes tends to get the impression that 
among Bible scholars there is hardly that basic conceptual agreement which 
can be found between the Scandinavians and the others, since the distance 
in the very axioms of the subject seems even greater. One is occasionally 
made to feel that not only do we lack a school of our own, but that the uni-
fying factors in our research work in the Bible and related subjects, apart 
from its being done in the same country, are merely the common garb of 
the Hebrew language, agreement on the actual literary material in its objec-
tive manifestation and the acknowledgement of the most firm and trivial 
historical and archeological facts. 
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Maybe the reasons for this situation are to be sought in the preceding 
generation of Bible scholars in this country, each of whom was highly indi-
vidualistic in his scholarly work and all of whom arrived at this field of 
study from completely different points of view. Some of them did not pay 
too much heed to the notions of international biblical research (Kaufmann 
and Buber did take more cognizance of these notions than the rest)—
excluding the purely linguistic facts which were admitted by all. Their 
work too lacked any real common framework, the framework of a school, 
apart from their using the same language, belonging to the same academic 
institution, and living in the Land of Israel. There may be a variety of addi-
tional reasons for our situation. In any event, the future is likely to loosen 
the contradictions so that agreement could be reached on a certain basis of 
common concepts and a theoretical, fruitful dialogue will thus be possible. 
It is our obligation to hasten this process in order that the professional con-
fusion and multitude of tongues will give way to a significant, harmonious 
and productive give and take, which would be in the nature of a school. 
8 
While we wish to impart a specific character to Hebrew biblical criticism in 
Israel and to join together to make it a trend on its own, we cannot start 
from zero. Just as we shall not skip over the building-stones laid down by 
the first generation of scholars in this country, so we must not shut our eyes 
to real results already achieved by international research. Deliberate ignor-
ing of such results can infrequently be accompanied by a multitude of bib-
liographical references. An admission of those results makes it incumbent 
that the critical consideration itself be based on assertions and facts which 
have been sufficiently tested by philological criteria. Our work must be a 
continuation of that of International scholarship, that is, from a certain point 
of contact with the latter onwards—which means that we must base our 
considerations on its achievements and apply its concepts, namely, those 
which we will be prepared to accept as confirmed. Modern Bible research 
has in the course of time undergone a number of metamorphoses, but every 
one of its stages was in the nature of a sequel of the preceding stage, either 
directly or by way of dialectic relation. Whoever today attempts to begin 
the work from the start will be considered as toiling in a vacuum. 
Furthermore, let us not try to condemn the whole of biblical scholarship 
because of defects that can be found in the historical method or in the hu-
man capacity of judgment. Let us neither argue in this context for the rela-
tivity of historical truth, nor bring as an excuse the objective shortcomings 
of the documents being studied, which are fragmentary, random, ambigu-
ous—and the subjective limitations of the student, who of necessity relies 
on prior assumptions and cannot divorce himself from his own personality, 
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and for whom the material in question is charged with emotional tension.18 
Much truth as there is in such arguments, they cannot uproot biblical criti-
cism from its position. If they do contain a certain reply to the results (the 
real ones) of this criticism, then it hits the humanistic studies as a whole. 
He who is not prepared to desist altogether from the effort of knowing and 
comprehending the historical occurrence would do better to resign himself 
to the certain weaknesses which are liable to inhere in the humanistic stud-
ies and to console himself with the thought that at least he stands on guard 
over the philological rules so as to reduce the breaches and lessen the dan-
ger of vague subjective impressions. All the defects that are apt to occur in 
the historical method do not justify the approach which represents things in 
such a way as though research in one of the humanistic subjects (far less in 
all of them) in the last resort is baseless, being a mere intellectual game 
whose forms and results change from one generation to another since, in 
any case, the historical truth will never be obtained, for it has many facets 
and any given explanation is only a perspective possibility existing along 
with other or even contrary possibilities. The truth of the matter is that in 
spite of the oscillations of modern biblical research and beyond its various 
schools and trends a certain sum total of results adds up which are no more 
subject to the laws of the pendulum. For our own work, it is important that 
it be based on these results. 
Similarly, we would do well not to brand modern biblical research as 
“Protestant scholarship,” since such a definition might come back as a 
boomerang hitting “Jewish scholarship.” Again, do not let us hide behind a 
seeming relativism with regard to scholarly work. True, in international 
Bible scholarship, several lines do actually cross which tend to distinguish 
between styles of research. Sometimes they admittedly become severe 
enough as to attest to the influence of national and religious prejudices—
yet, even they cannot invalidate the subject and obliterate the philological 
foundation, which is real and firm enough and from which all the styles are 
drawn. It is towards this foundation that we must strive and on which we 
must lean our work for it to persist and be successful. 
                                                     
18  Characteristic in this regard are B. Uffenheimer’s recent remarks in Ha’aretz literary 
supplement of October 4, 1968. 
  
  
IV. 
 
Key Texts by Yehezkel Kaufmann 
(translated into English for the first time) 
 
  
  
A Concise Summary of the Work Golah ve-nekhar 
Introductory Note by Thomas M. Krapf 
A prolific scholar and essayist, Yehezkel Koifman (1889-1963) authored 
almost all his works in Hebrew, thus dwarfing his bibliography in German 
of some two dozen titles which he published mainly between 1916 and 
1933, signing them Jesekiel Kaufmann.1 
Kaufmann’s first opus magnum was published just before and after he 
turned forty: Golah ve-nekhar (Exile and Alienation: A Socio-Historical 
Study on the Issue of the Fate of the People of Israel from Antiquity to the 
Present, 1929–1930; henceforth Golah).2 This work soon established 
Kaufmann’s fame in the Hebrew language discourse. In 1933, Golah 
earned him the first Bialik Prize for Jewish Studies to be awarded. Hayyim 
Nahman Bialik (1873–1934), Kaufmann’s former teacher at the Odessa 
Modern Yeshivah in 1907–1910,3 was euphoric about the significance of 
his former student’s contribution to the Jewish and Hebrew academic dis-
course. Unshakably convinced that the Hebrew University would forfeit a 
rare opportunity, should it fail to appoint Kaufmann to a professorship, 
Bialik prevailed on the first chancellor of the Hebrew University to facili-
tate Kaufmann’s appointment. On 9 March, 1930, he wrote to Judah Leon 
Magnes (1877–1948) as follows:4 
This time I am under the powerful impression of the work Golah ve-nekhar, 
Part II, still fresh from the printing press, and I have finished reading it 
twice. In my view, this is a great work, and for a long time there has been 
nothing on a par with it in Israel. Two more parts are about to be published. 
In its four volumes (sic)5 the work will cover all the fundamental problems 
of Israel’s fate among the nations, from the day it went into Exile up to the 
present. It also seeks to make out future prospects and to delineate new ave-
nues. All this based on a profound and broad insight of a kind that is unusu-
                                                     
1  See Thomas Krapf, Yehezkel Kaufmann: Ein Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg zur Theologie 
der Hebräischen Bibel (Studien zu Kirche und Israel 11; Berlin: Institut Kirche und Ju-
dentum, 1990), 47f.; Krapf, Koifman, in this volume, pp. 3-44, consider pp. 37-39. 
2  1929: Books 1–2 (= vol. I); 1930: Books 3–4 (= vol. II) by Dvir, Tel Aviv. While Golah 
translates effortlessly to German as “Exil und Fremde,” the Hebrew notion nekhar 
(German: “Fremde”) needs to be rendered with both “alienation/estrangement” and 
“foreign lands” in English. Hence the English translation of the title ought to convey 
“Exile and Alienation/Estrangement/Foreign Lands,” followed by the subtitle. 
3  See Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 30; Krapf, Koifman, in this volume, 
p. 29. 
4  H. N. Bialik, Letters of Hayyim Nahman Bialik (in Hebrew; 5 vols.; ed. Fishel Lachow-
er; Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1937–1939), 5:44–45 (my translation from Hebrew). 
5  The four components of the work to which Bialik is referring are the four parts, not 
“volumes” (of which there were only two). 
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al in our contemporary literature. I am drawing your attention to this out-
standing work recommending that you make time to read it. I am sure you 
will do me this favor. How I ardently wish to see a man of such broad 
knowledge and profound wisdom as the author of this work within the walls 
of the University. Two, three men like him are all it takes to bring new vig-
or into the University, and to give a new aspect to the entire evolution of 
Hebrew education and scholarship. Keep the author’s name in mind: 
Yehezkel Kaufmann. My intuition tells me that a redeemer of Hebrew 
thought is among us. 
Bialik’s initiative was unsuccessful, as the Hebrew University did not ap-
point Kaufmann to its faculty until 1949.6 Nevertheless, the significance of 
Golah was certainly recognized in the 1930s. Considerable efforts were 
made to have it translated to European languages, both in the 1930s and 
after World War II.7 However, none of these initiatives were successful, 
and Kaufmann did not live to see the English publication of the three chap-
ters on the origins of Christianity half a century after Golah had been pub-
lished.8 
Back in 1936, Kaufmann himself had authored a highly succinct 3,000-
word summary in German of his Golah, a Hebrew text of over 1,000 pages. 
The existence of this German summary had been unknown for more than 
half a century, before it surfaced in 1989. At that time, in the course of my 
research on Kaufmann’s biography,9 I had both the privilege of reviewing 
his personal papers10 and of discovering this important text in the process. 
In addition to this gem, Kaufmann’s personal archives also yielded exten-
sive documentation on the circumstances that induced him to make the 
effort to commit this summary to writing, at a time when he had already 
decided to cease publishing his contributions to biblical studies in Ger-
man.11 Conceivably, Kaufmann was hoping that this short summary might 
facilitate making Golah accessible to the larger public outside the intellec-
tual discourse in Hebrew. 
In 1936, the Vienna-based Zionist historian and well connected editor 
Adolf Böhm (1873-1941) inquired of Abraham Schwadron (1878–1957), a 
                                                     
6  See Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 59–60, 78; Krapf, Koifman, in this 
volume, pp. 40-41. 
7  Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 61; Krapf, Koifman, in this volume, 
p. 29. 
8  Yehezkel Kaufmann, Christianity and Judaism. Two Covenants (trans. C. W. Efroym-
son; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1988). This is an English translation of Golah, vol. 1, chaps. 7–
9. 
9  See footnote 1 above. 
10  Yehezkel Kaufmann Archive of the Jewish National Library in Jerusalem, cited in the 
following as “Kaufmann Archive, no.” 
11  See Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 72–75; Krapf, Koifman, in this 
volume, pp. 37-39. 
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famous autograph collector in Jerusalem,12 whether any translations of the 
much discussed Hebrew work Golah had been published.13 Schwadron 
referred Böhm’s enquiry to Kaufmann, who was living in Haifa at the time. 
On 31 August, 1936, Kaufmann replied to Schwadron that to date Golah 
had not been translated, and made the following offer: “I could write a 
summary in German of a few pages for Dr. Böhm, outlining the general 
argument of my book, provided he quotes the summary, should he use it.”14 
After three weeks Böhm sent Kaufmann a postcard: “Herr Dr. Schwa-
dron has let me know, that for volume II of my work you would be willing 
to communicate the general argument of your book. I am extremely grateful 
to you. Accurate citing goes without saying. Never would I appropriate 
somebody else’s intellectual property!”15 
Four weeks later, on 27 October, 1936, Böhm wrote to Kaufmann 
thanking him for his German summary, congratulating him on his work and 
discussing some of its issues.16 This response documents that Böhm was 
not going to discuss Kaufmann’s summary of Golah in his new edition of 
Die Zionistische Bewegung, as he had initially contemplated.17 Subsequent-
ly, Böhm never had another opportunity of processing Kaufmann’s text in 
his own work, as he and his wife were murdered in the Shoa, before he 
managed to find the peace of mind to concentrate on his planned volume 
III.18 
                                                     
12  His vast collection of documents, the Abraham Schwadron Collection, belongs to the 
National Library in Jerusalem. On the collection’s origins, see Abraham Schwadron, 
“Meine Autographen- und Porträtsammlung,” Jüdische Rundschau, 3.1.1928.  
13  This is evident from Kaufmann’s letter to Schwadron of 31 August, 1936 (Abraham 
Schwadron Collection, National Library Jerusalem, Jeheskel Kaufmann). 
14  See the previous note (my translation from Hebrew). 
15  Postcard of 23 September, 1936, Kaufmann Archive, no. 115b (my translation from 
German, emphases in the original). 
16  There is no date on the type-written manuscript of “A Concise Summary of the Work 
Golah ve-nekhar.” However, the outlined correspondence provides the circumstantial 
evidence required to date the text: it must have been authored between Adolf Böhm’s 
two communications of 23 September and 27 October, 1936. Considering that during 
this period three exchanges of letters/postcards took place by mail between Vienna and 
Haifa, it would seem that the text must have been committed to writing in the first half 
of October 1936. 
17  Böhm’s explanation that he would only be able to refer to Kaufmann’s summary “in the 
2nd edition of volume I” (“in der 2. Auflage von Band I”) appears to be erroneous, since 
volume I had already been published in its “2nd expanded edition” (“zweite erweiterte 
Auflage”) in 1935. The planned third volume never came to fruition. 
18  Apart from making intellectual contributions to cultural and academic life, Adolf Böhm 
was a successful industrialist and highly respected leader of the Jewish community in 
Vienna. Following the Anschluss or “Integration” of Austria into the Third Reich on 12 
March, 1938, Böhm had to countenance visits by SS-Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eich-
mann to his cotton wool factory on every week day for six weeks. Böhm never respond-
ed to the henchman’s demands of a hit list with the names of the most influential and 
most wealthy Jews in Austria. When Eichmann tried to have six leaders of the Jewish 
community, who had not yet been deported to Dachau, appoint Böhm to serve as their 
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In his letter to Kaufmann of 27 October, 1936, Böhm encouraged the 
author of Golah to try to have an abridged German translation of his work 
published by the publisher Schocken. He also urged Kaufmann to have his 
German summary re-printed in the newspaper Jüdische Rundschau. It is not 
known whether Kaufmann took any initiatives to follow up on either of 
these suggestions. In his extensive personal archives, there is nothing to 
suggest that he did. In any event, in the two remaining years of the Jüdische 
Rundschau19 it did not publish the text Kaufmann had committed to writing 
for Böhm’s benefit. 
In the following, both Kaufmann’s German summary of Golah and 
Adolf Böhm’s response to it are documented in English translations.20 All 
footnotes are by the translator. 
  
                                                                                                                          
liaison, they chose Alois Rothenberg instead, in order to spare Böhm further duress. 
However, this did not put an end to Böhm’s ordeal of Eichmann’s visitation routine.  
 In the process, Böhm suffered a nervous breakdown, from which he never recovered. 
Having been shunted around the infrastructure of the industrialized murder administra-
tion for at least seven months, Böhm was eventually disappeared to the Tötungsanstalt 
Hartheim (near Linz) on 13 March, 1941, where more than 70,000 handicapped victims 
were gassed (“Aktion T4”). The official death certificate, issued in Berlin and mailed 
from Poland, had Adolf Böhm “die” on 10 April, 1941 in Chelm, Poland. This merely 
documents his murder, which in all likelihood was committed at the Tötungsanstalt 
Hartheim. Böhm’s wife, Olga, was murdered at Auschwitz in 1944. 
19  The last edition of the Jüdische Rundschau appeared on 8 November, 1938, i.e., one day 
before the infamous pogrom night wreaked havoc throughout Jewry within the borders 
of the Third Reich. 
20  For the original version of Kaufmann’s German summary of Golah, a type-written 
manuscript (Kaufmann Archive, no 75), see Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkennt-
nisweg, 123–33. The original German version of Böhm’s reply to Kaufmann, a hand 
written letter (Kaufmann Archive, no 115 b) is documented in T. Krapf, “Exil und Frem-
de—Ein Gedankenaustausch zwischen Jesekiel Kaufmann und Adolf Böhm,” Bulletin 
des Leo Baeck Instituts 87 (1990): 67–79. The purpose of this publication had been to 
document the original German versions of both Kaufmann’s summary of Golah and 
Böhm’s response to it. Regrettably, my manuscript went to press with several long 
omissions including entire passages of Kaufmann’s text. Since vol. 87 was the last issue 
of the Bulletin des Leo Baeck Instituts to be published, there was no opportunity of ret-
rospective emendation. Thus the only authentic documentation of Kaufmann’s text is 
Krapf, Kaufmann: Lebens- und Erkenntnisweg, 123–33. 
  
A Concise Summary of the Work Golah ve-nekhar1 
Yehezkel KAUFMANN 
In four books,2 the work addresses the entire problem of Judaism, taking 
into account both the problem of its history and the problem of its present. 
The peculiarity of the history of the Jewish people is the result of the “fate-
ful” coinciding of different factors. Decisive were above all: (1) the cultur-
al-religious p o w e r , and (2) the ethnic-political p o w e r l e s s n e s s  of the 
Jewish people. 
To begin with, what is the solution to the fundamental question: the par-
adox of the Jewish people continuing to exist in its dispersion? 
This historical phenomenon cannot be explained with reference to racial 
difference,3 perennial persecution, economic conditions, or the drive of 
national self-preservation. The primeval uniqueness of the Jewish people 
consists of its culture, to be more precise: of its religion. Hence we need to 
conclude that it is the cause of its unique history. The religious uniqueness 
of the people was the prima causa4 and in addition other factors came into 
play. However, the religion did not operate as a “national cult” (Hess).5 
National culture always dissipates as a result of dispersion and linguistic 
assimilation. Had Judaism been a truly national religion, it could not possi-
bly have survived the Exile. In reality the religion of Israel was a universal 
religion. It sought to embrace all nations. This is borne out by both the 
hopes of the prophets and by the purely religious proselytism of Judaism, 
according to which every human being may become an “Israelite” by reli-
gious rite only. The universal character of the Jewish religion was of deci-
                                                     
1  Translated and annotated by Thomas M. Krapf. In the following emphases rendered by 
underlining in Kaufmann’s original typescript are reproduced in italics. Quotation marks 
and spaced print correspond to the original. Where the English translation fails to con-
vey the subject of emphasis, this is recorded in an editorial note. Single, double and tri-
ple spacing between paragraphs follows the layout of the typescript. 
2  See footnote 2 above. 
3  Kaufmann uses the word “Rassenunterschied.” 
4  Latin for “fundamental reason” or “main reason.” 
5  Moses Hess (1812–1875), protagonist of socialism and Zionism. During his life time, he 
primarily influenced the German and European left as a socialist author and activist. In 
1848, Hess parted company with Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–
1895), considering their approach, with its exaggerated emphasis of materialistic-
economic issues, as lopsided. Hess’ lasting legacy was his late work, Rome and Jerusa-
lem: A Study in Jewish Nationalism (published in German in 1862), a classic that left a 
lasting impact on the Zionist discourse of the 19th and 20th centuries. Inter alia, Leo 
Pinsker (1821–1891), Peretz Smolenskin (1842–1885) and Aḥad Ha-‛Am (1856–1927) 
were indebted to it. Theodor Herzl (1860–1904) referred to it as a precursor of the con-
temporary Zionist concept (diary entry of 2 May, 1901). 
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sive significance for the preservation of the dispersed and linguistically 
assimilated people. A u n i v e r s a l  factor was of  n a t i o n a l  consequence. 
This is indeed the core of the paradox. How was this possible? 
 
In Israel, an altogether new religious idea entered the world, hitherto un-
known to all humankind, namely, the concept of a supra-magical, supra-
mythological, sole god. The idea was of phenomenal consequence. Only 
over the course of many centuries did it evolve its entire impact. It aimed at 
eradicating the pagan perception of god and the world. Initially, battle was 
done in Israel. In bloody battles paganism was defeated. Subsequently, the 
war against the paganism of the nations began. Again, the new religious 
idea prevailed. The work expounds in extensive detail that it was precisely 
Judaism that overcame paganism. In Christianity and in Islam the Jewish 
idea was simply becoming effective. 
However, parallel to this series of historical facts, there is another one 
that runs in the reverse direction: the religion of Israel was victorious, but 
Israel was vanquished by the pagans. The Israelite religious concept was 
mightier than paganism, but the pagans were more mighty than Israel. The 
Heavenly Jerusalem proceeded to conquer the world, while the Earthly 
Jerusalem lay in ruins. Israel did not own empires, politically it was peren-
nially weak, and eventually it was subjugated and exiled. The dichotomy 
between the idea and the reality was formidable. The defeat of the people, 
the owner of the idea, stood in the way of its proliferation. The pagans 
could not receive the religion out of the hands of the vanquished and subju-
gated people. Hence the victory of the idea could only be realized under 
one condition: the religion had to be severed from the people. Not from 
peoplehood per se, but from the despised people. Not in order to become 
more universal. For Christianity and Islam are not an iota more universal 
than Judaism, as is demonstrated in great detail. But the religion had to be 
extricated from the ignominy of the exiled people. To absorb the Jewish 
religion, paganism required a “new covenant,” a pagans’ covenant that was 
independent of the real Jews. New prophets had to come. In Christianity 
and Islam, this disengagement was carried out. The pagans became the 
“true” Israel; the real Israel was “discarded.” Jesus (or rather Paul) and 
Mohammad were the prophets of the new covenants. 
However, it is clear that the Jews themselves had no share in this need 
of the pagan world. In Israel, the fight for paganism, that was now raging in 
the pagan world, had already been decided in times immemorial. The Mes-
siah of the Jews was not to be the founder of a new religion. Given the alti-
tude of their religious consciousness, they were in no need of a new cove-
nant. For Christianity and Islam, there was no role within Judaism. In this 
way, the Jewish people stayed beyond the great religious movements that 
unfolded in the pagan world. It remained true to the “old covenant.” Thus a 
chasm between the Jews and the nations came about that could no longer be 
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bridged. It is a fact of Jewish history of all times: never has there been a 
drive in Judaism towards Christianity or Islam on religious grounds. Perse-
cution or acquisitiveness has motivated some or even many to convert. But 
there was no falling away for genuinely religious motives. Due to this de-
velopment, Judaism, albeit universal per se, remained the legacy of the 
Jewish people. It thus became the “tribal religion,” the tribal characteristic 
of the Jewish people. This has been of tremendous social-historical signifi-
cance. 
 
The history of the galuth6 is the history of a “universal nation,” a nation 
that is held together by a universal factor: a religious community that is a 
tribal community at the same time. In the Diaspora, the Jewish people has 
indeed been a “spiritual nation.” But precisely because of this, it became 
the ghetto people. 
 
Many have chosen to regard the ghetto as a community of non-working, 
“brokering” persons (Berdizcewsky,7 Brenner8 et al.). But this notion is in-
correct. It is borrowed from anti-Semitism and is based on ignorance. Most 
ghetto Jews were working. Only to some extent and by force were the Jews 
estranged from working. They had to fight hard for their right to work. 
“Ghetto” is not an economic, but an ethnic-social notion. The ghetto com-
munity is a community perennially in want of the natural ethnic right to 
territory. The latter legal concept is of fundamental significance. Without 
it, the Jewish problem cannot be comprehended under any circumstances. 
The natural right to territory of a people cannot be comprehended either 
as a notion of positive law or in political terms. It is a primordial category 
of the consciousness of the people, of the popular concept of law. Apart 
from the right to property of the individual, of the family, of the class, of 
the state, of the church etc., there exists, from time immemorial, a peculiar 
natural right to a specific portion of the surface of the earth that is owned 
by the ethnic group (the tribe, the people etc.). This right is “vested,” it 
does not rest on a contrat social nor is it based on any written law. In virtue 
of this right, since time immemorial the surface of the earth has been dis-
tributed in tribal territories. The peoples considered themselves “born of 
the earth,” regarded certain territories as “belonging” to them, as their 
“property.” The boundaries of these territories were delineated by the set-
                                                     
6  The semantics of the Hebrew word galuth, which Kaufmann uses in his German text, 
include both “(forced) exile” and “Diaspora.” 
7  Micha Joseph Berdizcewsky (later: Bin-Gorion; 1865–1921), Hebrew writer and thinker 
(sporadic publications in Yiddish and German). He came from a Hassidic rabbis’ family 
and had a highly ambivalent attitude to the Jewish shtetl of his eastern European ances-
tors. With an eclectic intellectual disposition, he was a freethinker and averse to ideolog-
ical commitment. 
8  Joseph Haim Brenner (1881–1921), Hebrew writer, socialist author und activist. 
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tlement of the tribes. A territory belongs to the tribe that abides in it. The 
characteristic of this belonging is: the natural prevalence of the language. 
The linguistic boundaries are the natural borders of the tribal lands. Cuius 
lingua eius terra9—this is a primordial law of world history. The bearer of 
the ethnic right to territory is the tribe. It is therefore acquired solely by the 
belonging to the tribe. 
Nowhere in exile were the Jews in a position to attain such a right to ter-
ritory. The dissemination of the Jews in the lands of the nations did not 
bear the hallmark of ethnic settlement. Nowhere have the Jews as a tribe 
taken possession of a country. Everywhere they settled in “neighbourhoods 
of aliens.”10 Nowhere did they create an independent ethnic economy as a 
foundation for the natural predominance of the national culture in a specific 
tract of land. This state of affairs manifested itself in the linguistic assimila-
tion of the Diaspora. Everywhere the Jews were speaking the language of 
their environment. Their ethnic strength was crushed. They were unable to 
attain tribal property. No territory, where they settled, was “Jewish.” This is 
the historical-social significance of the Assimilation, which is an inner trait 
of Diaspora existence: i.e., the characteristic of the inability to acquire the 
right to tribal territory11 in one’s own right. Assimilation harbours the 
recognition of foreign tribal sovereignty. The linguistic assimilation indi-
cated that the normal foundation of their separate ethnic existence was no 
more. Henceforth they could attain a natural ethnic right to territory solely 
by joining the tribal community of the ambient population. 
However, this basic disposition of the exilic community to assimilate 
was countered by a peculiar factor: the universal factor of the religious 
evolution that distinguished them from the environment. And to be sure, 
not merely as a religious, but also as an ethnic group. For as a result of the 
course of history, the Jewish religion became both the tribal religion and 
the characteristic of a tribe. The basic disposition to assimilate could never 
fully come into its own. The religion posited a “universal” barrier. The 
Jews were unable to join the tribal community of their environment. Con-
sequently, they were likewise unable to gain a share in the natural right to 
tribal territory of their environment. They were, thus, a community that 
could attain neither its own nor a foreign right to tribal territory. Every-
where they remained “alien.” The state was able to grant them political and 
civil rights or privileges. It was unable to give them a natural right to tribal 
territory. Precisely this was thier cruel and fateful calamity. 
                                                     
9  Latin for “whose language, his land,” analogous to cuius regio, eius religio “whose 
realm, his religion,” the principle of the 1555 Peace of Augsburg. 
10  “Fremdenvierteln” (quotation marks in the original). 
11  “Stammesbodenrecht” is introduced and used by Kaufmann as a technical term. In this 
translation it is rendered “right to tribal territory.” 
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Thus the “being alien” of the Jews in the lands of the nations is not a 
malicious invention of the enemies. Its most profound roots are in the psy-
che of the Jewish people. 
From this vantage point the ferocious fight of the nations against the 
Jews of the Diaspora becomes comprehensible. It was a battle of one peo-
ple against another people. To be sure, the persecutions of the Jews have 
also had a religious root. However, it appears that national antagonism was 
pre-dominant, which was often disguised by religious motifs. The cause of 
the fighting tended to be economic competition. It was the mean “envy of 
the other’s livelihood.”12 But—“envy of the other’s livelihood”13 between 
human beings, who were facing each other as members of an alien tribe. 
Peoples fighting each other tend to result from economic causes. Fighting 
the Jews was particularly fierce, because they were always felt to be “alien 
to the land.” It was a peculiar “civil war” based on ethnicity. 
 
To be sure, the following observation is of fundamental historical signifi-
cance: at all times the driving force behind the fight against the Jews has 
been the broad popular masses. For Diaspora Jewry, the basis of subsist-
ence was the “privileges,” which they were granted by the state, virtually 
always—against the will of the populace. The populace, the demos, would 
be incensed against the Jews. The kings, the nobility protected them against 
the wrath of the rabble. The kings and the nobles call the Jews to come into 
the land. The populace always seeks means to get rid of them again. This 
can be observed everywhere: in Greece, in the Roman Empire, in Spain, in 
France, in Germany, in Poland, etc. An “Empire” is the most advantageous 
state for the Jews. 
Of course this is not without cause. 
The malum metaphysicum14 of the Diaspora was the “being alien,” the 
lack of the natural right to tribal territory. However that may be, at all times 
the bearers of this right were the peoples, not the state. The state of old was 
often in conflict to this right. It always tended to be a law unto itself. It was 
“above the people.”15 The populace and the state were divided. The state 
could favour, what the populace would fight. In the legal sphere of the 
state, there was space for the Jews, but in the legal sphere of the populace, 
the Jews had no place. Hence the Jews could solely rely on their “privileg-
es.” To the populace and also to the land, they remained “alien.” 
 
The legal manifestation of this peculiar situation of the Diaspora was the 
Autonomy. This was something altogether different from autonomy of mi-
                                                     
12  “gemeiner Brotneid” (quotation marks in the original). 
13  “Brotneid” (quotation marks in the original). 
14  Latin for “metaphysical evil,” analogous to the philosophical and theological notion 
malum physicum “natural evil.” 
15  “übervolklich” (quotation marks in the original). 
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norities in certain modern states. It was not the recognition of limited sov-
ereignty within defined territory, but the constitution of an “alien” commu-
nity. Thus it was also perceived by the Jewish people. The predicament of 
the Diaspora people translated into the mood, which manifested itself as the 
messianic hope. The people, unable to attain a land in the dispersion, per-
ennially dreamed of re-gaining its own land. The unabating antagonism of 
the peoples kept this hope perennially awake and vivid. 
 
In Modern Times an acute turnabout occurred. 
With the Enlightenment, the Age of Emancipation and, above all, the 
age of the new assimilation dawn in Jewish history. For assimilation per se 
is as old as the Diaspora. In Modern Times, however, it emerges in an alto-
gether new form. First of all, in this era the assimilation is extraordinarily 
intense and pervasive. Particularly characteristic, however, is its manifesta-
tion as a movement and namely—as a “messianic” movement. To be sure, 
the new assimilation was also a natural process. But far more significant 
was that it was purposeful pursuit. It was a social movement, which set 
itself the “messianic” goal of solving the galuth16 question. It was a “theo-
ry,” an “ideology.” It was closely affiliated with the “messianic” move-
ments of Europe: with the Enlightenment, with humanism, with democracy, 
with liberalism, with socialism. 
In this work, the various forms, which the theories of assimilation have 
taken in eastern and western Europe since the Enlightenment, are re-
searched in extensive detail. It is established that assimilation aimed at a 
sole goal: attaining the natural right to tribal territory in the lands of the 
Diaspora. This was, albeit perceived merely reconditely, its “messianic” 
goal. Since the Jewish tribe was incapable of attaining such a right, the 
Jews as individuals were supposed to acquire it by being incorporated into 
the peoples “nationally.” By virtue of the national assimilation, they were 
expected to become “indigenous.” Initially (in the early 19th century), the 
discussion was about unification with the state, then with the “nation” (ac-
cording to French usage of the term), then with the language, then with the 
culture, and eventually also—with the people. The Jews are no longer a 
nation. The Jews are no longer a people. Indeed, the Jews in Exile had nev-
er been a “nation,” etc. Are they, however, a tribe? To be sure, tribe equals 
“race,” and race is “fraud.” In this way, this fundamental issue was dodged. 
The ideology of assimilation has been referred to as the product of the 
slavish mentality of western Jewry. However, this is only part of the truth 
and merely on a subjective level. For in reality, this ideology was the ulti-
mate outcome of an objective historical necessity. The assimilation of the 
Jews was a heavy demand of the nations in modern times. Indeed, it was 
the spokespersons of non-Jewish, liberal society, who created the theory of 
                                                     
16  See above, p. 275, fn. 6. 
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assimilation. It was the theory of the friends of the Jews who wished to 
resolve the Jewish question in Europe once and for all. Since Clermont-
Tonnere,17 the condition of the “national” assimilation has again and again 
been made out to be indispensable for emancipation. Subsequently, the 
Jews appropriated this theory. It was their “messianic” hope. But it was 
also more than that. Jewry perceived correctly that the existence of the Jews 
among the nations in modern times depended on the probation of this theory. 
 
Why was assimilation a necessity? Why did liberal society demand the 
“national” assimilation of the Jews? Why was the Jewish “national ques-
tion” the first national question in Europe? 
This is the fundamental question of modern Jewish history. 
 
In the wake of the collapse of the old dynastic, aristocratic, corporate state, 
the legal and actual cause of existence of ghetto Jewry was no more. 
A community relying on “privileges” granted by the rulers was now impos-
sible. In the new state, the people was sovereign—the “demos,” the pri-
mordial enemy of ghetto Jewry. What is to become of the Jews at this 
point? The situation was altogether new. Now a pact with the people had to 
be struck: to be sure, initially democracy was liberal and complied willing-
ly. The Jews have to exit their seclusion to merge with the sovereign “peo-
ple.” This demand was being raised with increasing forcefulness: The Jews 
must join the “people” by means of “national” assimilation. 
At the time of the French Revolution, the democratic ideology was cos-
mopolitan. The “people” was perceived as an abstract “society.” In reality, 
however, in its innermost core democracy was national. This work ex-
pounds in extensive detail that the modern national movement of the peo-
ples of Europe and Asia is rooted in democracy. Democracy did not give 
sovereignty to the “people,” but to the peoples. Democracy was bent on 
establishing the state on a national foundation. The nationality principle 
was a principal maxim of the democratic age. However, what does this 
principle mean? Surely nothing other than: the highest possible political 
priority is due to the natural right to tribal territory. Every people should 
rule in its tribal land. Now the primordial notion of the natural right to trib-
al territory attained highest validity. 
Now there was one single people in Europe, that did not own a right of 
this kind: the Jewish people. Nowhere was there even one span of “Jewish” 
                                                     
17  Comte Stanislas-Marie-Adélaïde de Clermont-Tonnere (1757–1792) advocated civil 
equality for the Jews, holding that as a nation the Jews needed to be denied everything, 
while all rights had to be granted to them as citizens of the state: “Il faut tout refuser aux 
Juifs comme nation et tout leur accorder comme individus; il faut qu’ils ne fassent dans 
l’Etat ni un corps politique ni un ordre: il faut qu’ils soient individuellement citoyens.” 
Due to this statement in the Assemblée constituante on 23 December, 1789 the slogan, 
“Tout aux Juifs comme citoyens, rien comme nation!” is attributed to Clermont-
Tonnere. 
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land. In the community of peoples, this people alone could not lay claim to 
its own natural right to territory. Everywhere, it dwelled on “alien” tribal 
land. Could it, however, continue to exist as a “landless,” “alien” ghetto 
people? The “privileges” were gone. Furthermore, there was no longer any 
authority that could protect it against its primordial enemy, the demos. No 
longer was it possible that it continued to remain “alien.” It appeared that it 
had no other alternative left than to merge with the peoples by means of 
“national” assimilation. 
 
At this point, one and a half centuries of assimilation have established be-
yond dispute that this has been a wild-goose chase after phantoms. “Na-
tional” assimilation has indeed been nothing but theory. A genuine assimi-
lation is in no need of a theory. The assimilation of the Jews needed to be, 
first and foremost, “proven;” hence it was not real. For in spite of all the 
assimilation, with regard to one decisive point everything remained as of 
old: even now the Jews were still a special tribe. (For indeed, tribe does not 
equal “race”). They were, after all, not just “coreligionists,” but also 
“members of the same tribe.”18 They were “only” a religious community. 
But in the wake of the course of history, the Jewish religion became a tribal 
religion and was therefore a distinct tribal feature. The attempts to strip off 
what is “national” by means of a Reform were doomed to fail. For it did not 
come down so much to the content as it did to the matter of the historic 
connection between the Jewish tribe and the Jewish religion. There was no 
reform in the world that could eliminate this connection. Hence, as a tribe 
the Jews remained alien to the peoples. Therefore, assimilation could not 
procure them a share in the natural right to tribal territory of the peoples. 
They remained “alien”—they had not become “indigenous” according to 
popular perception. The malum metaphysicum of the Diaspora people en-
dured. Assimilation had not attained its “messianic” goal. In the cultural 
sphere, it was successful, formidably successful. But as for the social ques-
tion of the Exile, it was unable to provide a solution. Hence it has failed as 
a movement. It has been incapable of procuring the Jews a home. 
 
When the new anti-Semitism erupted in the 80s,19 it dawned on the Jewish 
people that now an altogether different path had to be taken. There was no 
turning back to the medieval Ghetto. In the democratic state this was not 
possible. There was no alternative: The Jews had to procure themselves a 
genuine right to a home. However, only as a tribe did they have this option. 
                                                     
18  A literal translation of Kaufmann’s juxtaposition “Glaubensgenossen” and “Stammes-
genossen” might read “co-religionists” and “co-tribalists.” 
19  The “new anti-Semitism of the 80s” in the 19th century refers both to the pogroms and 
the suppression of the largest Jewish community ruled by Tsar Alexander III (1881–
1894), and to the virulent anti-Semitism in Germany at that time. Holding these two de-
velopments to be inter-connected, Kaufmann considers the “new anti-Semitism of the 
80s” as the beginning of a new era of hatred of the Jews. 
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What assimilation and emancipation had failed to give them as individuals, 
they now have to seek to attain as a tribe. This gave rise to the Jewish Na-
tional Movement, whose historical goal is solely and only: a Jewish land. 
The intellectual endeavours are nothing but side effects of this fundamental 
endeavour. 
 
Assimilation and national movement thus originate from the same root: the 
necessity that arose for the Jews in the age of the rule of the demos to attain 
home territory. 
Apart from that the solution of the Jewish question is only possible by 
means of the disappearance of the old culture, namely of all religion. This 
is the promise of communism. However, the price demanded in return is 
egregious: the surrender of the human soul, intellectual enslavement and 
impoverishment. It is unlikely that humankind will wish to pay this price. 
This prospect is therefore also “messianic.” So within foreseeable historical 
time, there is only one route for the Jewish people: into the Jewish land. 
 
 
PALÄSTINA 
Zeitschrift für den Aufbau Palästinas 
Herausgeber und Redakteur (im Ehrenamt): ADOLF  BÖHM 
Wien  XIV/1,  Postfach Amt 10320 
Vienna, 27 October, 36 
Very esteemed Herr Dr,21 
I have just received your kind mail and I am extremely grateful for the great 
effort you have taken to inform me about your line of thought. 
To begin with: for me the issue per se belongs with the subject matter of my 
volume I, where I have briefly described the Emancipation “and its conse-
quences” and later outlined the Zionist theories in the first chapter. There-
fore I can only come back to your book in the 2nd edition of vol. I. But per-
haps there will be an opportunity in vol. III. Vol. II (actual history up to the 
end of 1925) is now going to press. 
In any event, it is important to me to know your theory, which appears to 
me to be extraordinarily interesting. On many issues my opinion accords 
with yours. In a series of lectures I delivered at Bnei Brith, I have delineated 
incisively, that in Judaism the national element and the universal element 
have been preserved profoundly interconnected, and with the highest degree 
of awareness … “When the barriers of the ghetto opened up, the universal-
ism of the Jews was set free literally like an explosion” etc. However, in this 
regard I did not go as far as you did. But I have already described in my 
                                                     
20  Below this printed letter head Böhm’s hand written letter follows on three pages. In the 
following translation, his underlined passages are italicized. 
21  This line reads “Sehr geschätzter Herr Dr.” 
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book that the Jews embraced assimilation enthusiastically, when they be-
lieved they saw their messianic ideals (peace among the nations, rule of the 
spirit and ethics) being realized by the peoples. 
The incisive delineation of the right to territory of every nation is the novel-
ty and the interesting aspect, also the pivot of your argument! To be sure, 
we Zionists have always pointed out that the Jews have been excluded from 
acquiring land, that without being rooted etc. no own culture, no guarantee 
of survival would be possible, but never has this been made the focus of the 
discussion in a comparable way. 
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that it has always been the people, 
who were hostile against the Jews, likewise that the longing for Eretz Isra-
el22 included the hope for land. 
The discussions on assimilation—some of which I have occasionally devel-
oped along similar lines: purposeful pursuit, demand of the non-Jews, ob-
jective necessity et al.—ought to be translated to German. In my view, this 
is very urgent. We do not have an adequate theory (and history) of assimila-
tion, we need this urgently, if only to propagate the Zionist idea, which is 
still being rejected by the majority of German Jews. (We have nothing at all 
on recent history—surely, I may save my breath regarding Dubnow23). 
I am not quite convinced that already in the 19th century, the era of the 
emergence of the large cities, of industry (rural flight), of the rationalistic 
Weltanschauung, “the right to tribal territory” was being emphasized by 
democracy. In my view, this is more of a logical construction a posteriori, 
in the wake of today’s blood-soil-theory. For today, however, this is correct. 
Would it not be possible that a section of your book be published in Ger-
man? Schocken would certainly have it published. Given the dreadful pau-
city of our ideological literature and research, this would be very welcome. 
Schocken suffers from a lack of editable works. The director of the publish-
ing house, Dr M Spitzer, is in Jerusalem right now. But Schocken himself 
could certainly become interested. 
Again many thanks, in any event I will be keeping track of your work. With 
Zion-Greeting24 
humbly 
Böhm 
PS: Could this summary not be published in the Jüdische Rundschau? 
                                                     
22  I.e. “the (Holy) Land of Israel.” Although Böhm does not master Hebrew, here he writes 
the Hebrew letters א and י, the acronym for “E(retz) I(srael).” 
23  The first edition of Dubnow’s opus magnum was Aaron Steinberg’s German translation 
of Dubnow’s unpublished Russian manuscript: Weltgeschichte des jüdischen Volkes: 
Von seinen Uranfängen bis zur Gegenwart, vol. I–X, Berlin 1925–1929. 
24  Böhm concludes in three lines: “Mit Zionsgruss / ergebenst / Böhm.” 
  
The General Character of Israelite Religion* 
Yehezkel KAUFMANN 
Unity and Incorporeality 
The question of the emergence of Israelite religion is a sui generis problem 
in the history of the human spirit first of all because of the popular charac-
ter of Israelite monotheism. 
To our way of thinking, the idea of God’s unity is one of the most ab-
stract ideas in human thought. We regard this idea as bound up with ab-
straction (hafshatah)** from the multitude of phenomena manifested in our 
world and with grounding all reality on an invisible unity beyond our com-
prehension. The one God is the cause of causes, eternal substance, the be-
ing of all beings, transcending everything sensible and conceivable, beyond 
all conception of time and space, a supreme idea. The question is: How 
could such a faith come into being in ancient Israel? Israelite culture was a 
culture of shepherds and farmers. Moreover, even in a later period the crea-
tive genius of the Israelite people did not find embodiment in the creation 
of a conceptual culture (nor, for that matter, in the creation of a technologi-
cal culture). Israel did not create conceptual science, logic, philosophy, or 
natural science. Its strength was in poetry, narrative, ethics, religious vision, 
and the like, far from theoretical abstraction. Nor was its language rich in 
abstract concepts. The Hebrew of the biblical period was a pictorial and 
poetic language, unfitted for expressing philosophical views. How, then, 
was the monotheistic idea conceived in ancient Israel within such a cultural 
rubric? 
Moreover, biblical monotheism did not arrive at abstract expression. 
The Bible innocently resorts to tangible descriptions of God. It does not 
sense any defect in depicting God through imagery.*** The biblical God is 
                                                     
*  Ofiyah ha-kelali shel ha-emunah ha-yisre’elit (תילארשיה הנומאה לש יללכה היפא). Chap. 9 of 
Toledot ha-emunah ha-yisre’elit, translated by Lenny Levin.—Translator’s note: I am 
deeply grateful to Professor Lawrence Kaplan for reading and commenting on an earlier 
version of my translation. 
**  Translator’s note: The Hebrew term hafshatah (from the Hebrew root hifshit, to strip off 
clothing, etc.—see Gen. 37:23) connotes both abstraction and incorporeality. In the con-
trast between the biblical and Greek-philosophical conceptions of God, both these as-
pects are relevant. Accordingly, hafshatah will be translated “abstraction” or “incorpo-
reality” as suits each context, but in many contexts, both are implied. In rare cases, 
I have even spelled out both English equivalents in the translation to emphasize this 
double significance. 
***  Translator’s note: There is a particular challenge in translating the key terms in this 
essay representing mental pictorial images that the biblical and rabbinic authors con-
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holy and exalted, eternal and almighty, righteous, good and merciful. But 
philosophically examined, the biblical conception is nothing but the popu-
lar vision of God. The Bible does not refrain from depicting God with the 
colors of the popular imagination. In a later period the imagery in the Bible 
became a matter of interest for philosophers, who interpreted them in their 
own fashion by departing from their plain sense. Our question may there-
fore be phrased: How did Israel arrive at the monotheistic idea from such a 
non-philosophical conception of the divinity? 
Many have tried to find various solutions to this double problem. There 
were some who sought to see Israelite monotheism as a discovery to be 
credited to the general worldview of the Near East. The cradle of monothe-
                                                                                                                          
ceived to represent the deity. Kaufmann’s most frequent Hebrew terms for this are de-
mut and the phrase dimmui demut used here (or in other contexts dimmui demuyot). Ideal-
ly, it might have been preferable to use a consistent word or word-root throughout the 
essay for Kaufmann’s terms dimmui and demut. But the most obvious English terms, 
“image” and “likeness” (both taken from the standard English translations of the account 
in Genesis 1 of God creating the human being in the divine image or the divine like-
ness), both have defects. The term “image” is unfortunately too close to the term “grav-
en image,” which is precisely what is prohibited by the Second Commandment. (As 
Kaufmann uses the term pesilim for “graven images,” the Hebrew original does not raise 
the same problems of ambiguity for the reader as would be raised by an English transla-
tion of demut as “image.”) The term “likeness” also has its limitations, because it refers 
to a copy of the original, whereas the issue at stake here is that the biblical authors imag-
ined that the deity himself has an intrinsic shape or form that is a property of the origi-
nal, not just of a copy; however, there are contexts where “likeness” works well in the 
translation. “Appearance” also has the unfortunate side effect of implying that what is 
referred to is a mere appearance that differs from the underlying reality. In passages 
such as the present, where the emphasis is on the creation of these images in the imagi-
nation of the biblical author, I am able to speak of “imagery” (and elsewhere “imagistic 
depiction”), which in English has the connotation of a literary figure rather than a plastic 
representation. This does not work in contexts where the emphasis is on the intrinsic re-
ality of the form in the deity himself. In such cases, I have occasionally adopted the term 
“visage” (< video, “to see”) to refer to the form of the deity that is an intrinsic feature of 
his nature but that is visible on rare occasions to the perceiver. I am alerting the reader to 
this variation of terminology, which is all in the service of trying to communicate Kauf-
mann’s main thesis. To summarize this thesis in my own words: (a) The biblical and 
rabbinic authors were rich in devising word-pictures and mental pictorial images repre-
senting the deity; (b) they did not regard these mental images as crossing the line drawn 
by the Second Commandment prohibiting plastic images; (c) they conceived God as ac-
tually or possibly having a quasi-material form to which these mental images corre-
sponded; and (d) that God could have such an actual form did not offend against their 
notion of God’s sublimity and absolute mastery over the created world (at least, until 
Jewish thinkers adopted the philosophical notion of divine incorporeality well into the 
middle ages). Within this complex thesis, Kaufmann uses the terminology of dimmui 
demut (and synonymous terms) to speak both of the work of the imagination of the bib-
lical authors in creating these images and of their belief that these images had or could 
have a real referent in God’s own nature. As no single word in English will work for 
both of these usages, I have tended to prefer “imagery” in talking of the first and “vis-
age” in talking of the second. If the reference of both to Kaufmann’s dimmui demut is 
kept in mind, the unity of his thesis will hopefully be clearer to the reader. 
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ism was not in Israel but in Egypt or Babylonia. The monotheistic doctrine 
could only be born in a place where a highly developed polytheism existed, 
where polytheism could no longer satisfy the needs of developing thought. 
It could not be born amidst tribes of shepherds and tillers of the soil but in a 
place where there was high culture, where “the spirit of man labored to 
adapt the conclusions of highly developed science to all the phenomena of 
the world.” From there, monotheism was exported to Israel.1 According to 
this view, one should thus see monotheism as the legacy of a mature pagan 
culture. This legacy came over time to assume a special form in Israel, but 
its source was in Near Eastern pagan science, in the speculations of Babylo-
nian and Egyptian priests, in monotheistic currents that were present in the 
ancient pagan world. 
But the dominant school in biblical studies sensed the absurdity of this 
solution and tried to solve the problem in another way. The general tenden-
cy of these attempts among biblical scholars can be formulated thus: Bibli-
cal scholarship sought to solve the question by transferring biblical mono-
theism from the cosmological realm to the realm of historical and ethical 
thought. Biblical monotheism proceeded not from a new religious view of 
the cosmos but from a new religious ethical conception; not from consider-
ing the relation between God and the world but from considering the rela-
tion between God and humanity. The biblical YHWH was originally not 
the sole God of the world but a national God. Biblical monotheism was 
born of the special relation between this God and the people, out of national 
history and social morality. Its root was not “metaphysical” but social, his-
torical, and ethical. It developed gradually by expanding the domain of the 
national God in the wake of political transformations that Israel underwent 
from the upheavals of the period of destruction of the Ephraimite and Jude-
an monarchies. At first, YHWH was a god among other gods; later, the 
greatest god among the gods; still later, unique among the gods on account 
of his moral and holy character; and finally, the God of all nations and crea-
tor of the world. The expansion of the historical domain preceded the idea 
of cosmic unity. This monotheistic faith therefore did not proceed from 
metaphysical inquiry, nor did it require a rubric of conceptual scientific 
culture. It proceeded from emotion: from sensing the uniqueness—social, 
ethical, or religious—of one of the gods, or some special intensity in the 
hearts of this god’s adherents; out of this feeling, this god was enthroned 
over the entire world.2 
                                                     
1  See Zimmern and Winkler, Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament (1903), 208–9. 
Compare above [Editor’s note: in Toledot]: “The Study of the History of Israelite Reli-
gion,” 3, n. 4.  
2  See chapter cited above [Editor’s note: in Toledot], “The Study of the History of Israel-
ite Religion,” 5ff. It is possible to say that biblical scholarship generally followed the 
path outlined by Spinoza, who was one of the fathers of biblical criticism, and in a cer-
tain respect David Hume, even though Hume did not directly influence this scholarship. 
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But these solutions do not really solve our problem, and they are based 
on incorrect historical assumptions. The overwhelming majority of scholars 
have already recognized that biblical monotheism does not originate from 
the speculations of Babylonian and Egyptian priests. The “monotheistic” 
speculations that we find here and there in Babylonia and Egypt have a 
tendency to conceive of a mysterious identity amid the multiple images of 
divinity. But biblical religion has no mystical tendency, nor any unity aris-
ing out of multiplicity; it is absolute unity. Aside from this, the Bible con-
tains no mention of this supposed connection with the higher speculations 
of Babylonia and Egypt. The view that the adherents of faith in YHWH 
were opposed only to the “mythological anthropomorphisms” of paganism 
but not to the “higher content” of the Near Eastern worldview, to which this 
faith was “integrally connected,” has no basis.3 The Bible fought furiously 
against all paganism. It also mocks pagan “wisdom” and makes no distinc-
                                                                                                                          
In his book Theological-Political Treatise (chap. 2 and especially chap. 13), Spinoza 
emphasized that the Bible depicts God in corporeal terms and does not employ abstract 
philosophical terms. The prophets experience visions through the power of the imagina-
tion but do not devise a system of theoretical concepts. Spinoza expresses the view that 
according to biblical faith ethical action is the main objective, not true philosophical 
knowledge. The biblical God revealed His moral attributes (merciful and gracious) and 
requires that people should emulate Him, but the Bible does not require that people have 
correct concepts, nor does it regard intellectual error as sin. Biblical faith was given to 
the popular masses, and its objective was to teach them ethical virtues and proper behav-
ior, not a philosophical system. (This view, which has a root in Maimonides’s outlook 
concerning the practical ethical objective of Israelite religion, had a certain influence on 
Samuel David Luzzatto, who nevertheless was an energetic opponent of both Spinoza 
and Maimonides.) Spinoza’s outlook was a cornerstone of biblical scholarship, which 
however gave it another direction and sought to explain the monotheistic idea itself on 
an ethical historical basis. As for Hume, in his book The Natural History of Religion 
(1757), part 6, he seeks to give an empirical historical explanation for the emergence of 
Israelite monotheism. He finds here an example of the enthronement of one god over 
other gods and his ascent to the rank of chief of the gods. Other causes can bring about 
that one god, who belongs to the entourage of gods of the same pantheon, rises over his 
fellows and becomes supreme god over them, while the other gods decline to the rank of 
servant spirits, angels, or saints. Thus the Roman Jupiter, after raping fair Europa and 
castrating his father, rose in rank to Optimus Maximus. Similarly, the “God of Abraham, 
Isaac, and Jacob,” who at one time was walking in the garden at the breeze of the day, 
rose to the rank of “El Elyon—God Supreme—or YHWH of the Jews.” This outlook has 
been adopted as the foundation of biblical scholarship: the beginning of Israelite faith is 
belief in a national god, one god among the gods, who in time becomes the supreme 
God. The conception of the contributing causes has undergone considerable change, but 
the fundamental outlook remains the same. In the last generation, it led Delitzsch to cre-
ate a stir in the world about the “great deception” whereby the Israelite prophets, acting 
out of racial pride, deceived the world into believing that the national God of Israel was 
the true God. See Friedrich Delitzsch, Die große Täuschung (Stuttgart/Berlin: Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt, 1920). 
3  See Alfred Jeremias, Das Alte Testament im Lichte des alten Orients (Leipzig: J. C. Hin-
richs, 1916), 268–69. 
 THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF ISRAELITE RELIGION 287 
 
tions within paganism. If the Bible had accepted esoteric doctrines from 
paganism, there would be no reason to hide the fact.4 
However, the accepted view that biblical monotheism had a social, his-
torical, or ethical source is insufficient to solve our problem. Let us reiter-
ate what we said earlier, with another twist. The accepted view is only an 
artificial construction, a homiletical invention that combines things that 
have no natural connection of their own. We find in the Bible recognition 
of an ethical God, faith in the rule of justice and equity in the world. We 
find an attempt to explain Israelite history and world history on the basis of 
this recognition. We find in the Bible the belief in a single God who gov-
erns the world with justice. But to say that the faith in a single God derives 
from the belief in the rule of justice and ethics—that is an artificial inven-
tion that has no basis in truth. In the prophetic books these two ideas appear 
together. YHWH is both a single God and the God of justice and equity. 
There is no mention of the idea that God’s unity is based on the ethical 
demand, which is its consequence. Similarly, there is no way to understand 
how the recognition that Israel’s national God is single and exclusive pro-
ceeded from the ethical conception of history. The aspiration to an ethical 
understanding of the world does not by itself lead to monotheism. Ethical 
consciousness operated also within polytheism. The rule of the gods was 
conceived as the rule of justice and equity. In Persia, faith in the rule and 
victory of ethical good and an ethical, optimistic conception of the world’s 
becoming was conceived on polytheistic assumptions. The prophets’ oppo-
sition to the popular belief that YHWH would save them from all harm 
could have been expressed also on the basis of the view that justice rules in 
the realm of the gods and that the gods decided to punish Israel and other 
nations for their sins. Why weren’t Israel and the other nations chastised for 
their misrepresentation of divinity, in the manner of the sages of Greece 
and Rome? Why did the prophetic indictment require monotheism and not 
merely a religious monarchism that placed YHWH at the head of the pan-
theon?5 Ethical consciousness by itself does not serve as a natural bridge 
                                                     
4 Indeed, the Bible tells of God-fearing people and prophets who were not Israelites: 
Adam, Noah, Melchizedek, Balaam, Job, and his friends. Moses receives instruction on 
setting up a judiciary from Jethro. But in all these stories the God-fearing gentiles are 
depicted as worshipping the God of Israel. At any rate, they do not appear as exemplars 
of pure paganism. In its depiction of paganism, the Bible makes no distinction between 
“mythological corporeal depictions” and “higher doctrines” but views them all together 
as foolishness and abomination. 
5  In Königtum Gottes (The Kingdom of God, Berlin: Schocken, 1932), Martin Buber 
seeks to explain Israelite monotheism as proceeding from the unique religious feeling of 
the believers in the God-King YHWH, demanding absolute faith and absolute personal 
devotion without condition and without limitation. In this faith, nothing was added to the 
Semitic faith in a God-King except for the absolute demand and absolute subordination 
of the human “I” to the divine “Thou” (91, 93ff., 99ff., 149, 153, etc.). Out of this de-
mand was born the ancient “kingdom of God” that sought to subordinate one and all to 
the God-King (106ff., etc.). But how we get from here to the view that there is one God, 
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from polytheism to monotheism. At any rate, there would be place here for 
gropings and hesitations. However, in the prophetic books there are no 
gropings or hesitations. Monotheism is visibly present and self-evident, and 
there is no hint that it is a new idea. 
 
Later we shall set forth in detail our critique of the accepted view concern-
ing the emergence of Israelite monotheism. We point out here the mistaken 
historical assumptions on which that view is based. 
The accepted view assumes that absolute monotheism was born in the 
period of literary prophecy, in the same period that conceived of the prima-
cy of ethics. For this reason, it was misled into making monotheism de-
pendent on this doctrine and artificially sought to find a connection be-
tween them. But the assumption itself is incorrect. For in the Torah we do 
not find the idea of the primacy of ethics, but the idea of monotheism is 
absolutely dominant in it. The Torah is much more ancient than the pro-
phetic literature, as we have seen, and for the most part it was formulated 
prior to the trauma of the destruction. The idea of God’s unity is thus not a 
consequence of prophetic moral consciousness or of the national experienc-
es in the period of the destruction. The proponents of the accepted view 
also assumed that one can find in the Bible traces of a merely national stage 
of the belief in YHWH and that YHWH of popular belief was merely a 
national god. We shall deal with this assumption below, and we shall see 
that in fact there is no evidence of such a stage, and that the belief in 
YHWH contained an element of cosmic monotheism from the outset. In the 
ancient song of Deborah and in the ancient creation legends, YHWH is a 
single God, and there is no tension between him and any other god. In the 
song of Deborah he is one in playing a national role, and in the creation 
legends he is one in playing cosmic, transnational roles. In both the song of 
Deborah and the creation legends, YHWH rules the world alone, and there 
is no other god with him (or against him!). God’s unity is the primal idea, 
not God’s ethical character or historical activity. In biblical monotheism, 
the cosmic element is fundamental. We must seek its root precisely in 
God’s relation with the world as expressed in the creation legends. Mono-
theism in its very essence is rooted in this conception. 
 
                                                                                                                          
who is the Creator and Ruler, is not explained. An especially intense feeling of relation 
of the human “I” toward the divine “Thou” is possible in itself to find satisfaction also in 
polytheism. Indeed, paganism knew great personal devotion to its deity, which led its 
worshippers to self-flagellation and castration or to forgoing the life of this world. 
Strength of feeling sought embodiment also in henotheism, elevating each god over his 
peers for his appointed time. Indeed, the absolute demand of biblical faith insists on the 
view that YHWH is God and there is none other. The unity of God is the first assump-
tion, and only on its basis can we explain the absolute demand. Buber’s attempt to ex-
plain the divine unity on the basis of a special relation between the believer and his God 
is only one version of the dominant outlook in today’s biblical scholarship. 
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Moreover, our question is not truly a question of genetic origin and for-
mation. It encompasses the entire history of the Israelite religion, even its 
later periods. It is not only a question of “In what time and from what 
background was the monotheistic idea born?” but also “How was this idea 
understood, and how did it develop and operate without a theoretical meta-
physical formulation?” If monotheism is bound up with the idea of first 
cause, substance, infinity, supra-sensibility, and the like, is it proper to 
speak of monotheism in the absence of these metaphysical concepts? Can 
there be true monotheism where there is no abstract metaphysical concep-
tion of divinity? How can we explain the phenomenon that a religion pro-
claims God’s unity and fights for it with unbounded strength of spirit, de-
ploying its weapons against paganism (with all its logic and abstractions) 
while it itself has not arrived at an abstract stage of conceiving God that 
would seem at first sight to be a prerequisite for monotheism? 
For we should not think that the concrete depictions of God (anthropo-
morphisms) in the Bible are only remnants of folk legend or poetic figures 
of speech with only a symbolic intention, as later philosophers interpreted 
them.* The entire biblical literature, without distinction of source or stra-
tum, envisages a visage of God and does not regard this as a defect. The 
Bible has no abstract God-concept, nor does it have any drive to abstrac-
tion. Moreover, one can say that throughout Jewish literature, up to the 
point that Greek influence started to operate in it, there is no sense of defect 
in envisaging a visage of God. The same applies to original Judeo-Christian 
                                                     
*  Translator’s note: Hagshamah in this essay is alternately rendered “corporeal depiction” 
and “anthropomorphism.” Just as there is a problem in rendering hafshatah (abstraction/ 
incorporeality), so there is a parallel problem in rendering hagshamah (corporealization, 
anthropomorphism). Each is due to the same root problem, namely, that the Hebrew 
language did not develop vocabulary for discussing abstract philosophical issues until 
the medieval period, and then coined those terms on the basis of word-roots with a con-
crete signification. Maimonides famously framed the issue of hagshamah in terms of the 
issue whether God is corporeal. However, the Greek philosopher Xenophanes had al-
ready criticized the tendency of mythic religion to portray the gods as reflections of their 
human authors, and it is clear from some of the rabbinic material that Kaufmann cites 
that the rabbis were sensitive to this dimension of the problem. (See n. 20, citing the 
rabbinic dictum: “Great is the presumption of the prophets, that they compare the image 
of power of the Supernal One to the form of a human.”) Without a doubt, the issue of 
divine-human resemblance in personal aspects (“anthropomorphism” in the inner sense, 
expressed in the idea of the human being created in the divine image, and correlation of 
the human will with the divine will) is central to biblical authors’ conception of the di-
vine-human moral drama, whereas the question whether God therefore had a material 
aspect was peripheral to their concerns. As a result—and as Kaufmann masterfully 
demonstrates in this essay—the biblical and rabbinic depictions of God often naively in-
corporate material aspects that were embarrassing to medieval Jewish thinkers schooled 
in the refinements of Greek metaphysical speculation. In the examples Kaufmann cites, 
sometimes the material aspect of God’s representation is predominant and sometimes 
the personal or moral aspect. Accordingly, hagshama will be rendered variably “corpo-
reality/corporeal representation” or “anthropomorphism” to fit the various contexts. 
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literature and to the original literature of Islam, which is a pristine embodi-
ment of monotheism. 
 
Israelite religion vanquished the corporeal depiction of God in one basic 
and decisive respect: it depicted God as outside every connection with the 
material of the world. God has no material quality, and He transcends mate-
rial nature. God is spirit, not flesh (see Isa. 31:3). He is not a body. More-
over, it depicted Him as above all connection to the laws of the world, to 
nature, to the stars, to fate. This is the point of departure between Israelite 
religion and paganism; from this point, it ascended to its own unique 
sphere. Its God is above mythology and above nature; that is its fundamen-
tal idea. As we shall expound this issue in detail later, this idea is imprinted 
in the entire being of Israelite religion and woven into its entire tapestry. 
For that reason, we are entitled to view each corporeal depiction that of-
fends this idea of God’s transcendence and non-materiality as an innocent 
poetic survival, a symbol, or an archaic remnant. 
But the Israelite religion did not overcome imagistic depiction, nor did it 
arrive at metaphysical abstraction. In its metaphysical innocence it offers 
imagistic depictions of God and does not sense that this is at all problemat-
ic. There is of course a difference between the periods and the various liter-
ary creations. But there are images common to all the periods of original 
Judaism, as similarly there are to original Christianity and original Islam. 
God’s heavenly tabernacle, the supernal palace, the throne, the chariot, the 
human visage, the voice, the heavenly entourage—there is no sense of de-
fect or diminution of the divine image in these images, and they are preva-
lent throughout the whole literature. 
In the depictions of God in the Bible there are differences among the 
sources. The JE narratives are poetic and richly colored, while those of P 
are pale and dry. The depictions of JE are thus more vivid. But even in P, 
with its spiritual and reflective cast, we find the same images in all their 
innocence. In P we find the view that man was created in the divine image 
(Gen. 1:26–27; 5:1; 9:6). This figure has decisive value for our topic, and it 
is more instructive than many of the poetic figures in the Bible.6 Moreover, 
                                                     
6  Also among the more recent commentators there are some who think that “divine im-
age” refers to man’s intellectual faculty. See Holzinger in his commentary to Genesis 
1:26, citing evidence from the end of the verse, “and he shall have supremacy over the 
fish of the sea, etc.” The purpose of creation in God’s image is to rule over the world, 
and this is a spiritual attribute. See also 9:6: it is forbidden to kill a human being because 
he possesses a divine quality. But from the end of this verse we learn only this—that be-
ing created in the divine image includes also a spiritual quality. In 9:5–6 man’s creation 
in the divine image imposes an obligation also on the animals (“I will require his blood 
also from every animal”) and the animal does not discern this spiritual quality. See also 
5:3, where the reference is necessarily to both a physical and a spiritual image. The Mid-
rash also interpreted this as “image in the tangible sense”; see especially Rashi on these 
verses. (See also n. 25 below.) Gunkel in his Commentary on Genesis (112) concedes 
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belief in revelation occupies a more central place in biblical religion than in 
any other religion,7 and this belief is bound up innocently with the specific 
imagery and localization of the divine presence. Revelation of God in the 
Bible is integrally connected with seeing God’s appearance through vision 
and hearing God’s voice. In some cases God reveals Himself to a person 
while awake and is seen through the human eye, whereas in other cases 
God appears in a vision or a dream. God appeared to the prophets in a vi-
sion or dream (Num. 12:6). But in ancient times God appeared to people in 
a waking state and spoke to them. On Mount Sinai God appeared in fire to 
all the Israelites, and in the wilderness He appeared to them in His cloud. 
These stories presuppose that God has a visual appearance. To be sure, the 
Bible wraps the manifestations of God in clouds of mystery. There is no 
fixed image; rather, there are diverse images. God appears as a king seated 
on his throne, as a warrior (Isa. 27:1; 31:4; 34:5ff.; 42:13; 63:1–6; Zech. 
14:3, etc.), as a white-haired old man (Dan. 7:9), as a wanderer with a 
walking-stick (Judg. 6:11–21), and more. It appears that ancient biblical 
lore already sought to stress that these images of God are only appearances 
and visions, and for this reason we find in several tales that God and the 
angel appear interchangeably. In these tales the angel is no mere messenger 
but an apparition of God, a visible emanation manifested to the person.8 In 
other tales the glory (kavod) of God appears to the viewer, and this is usual-
ly a majestic radiance without a shape. But even this representation sug-
gests a local concentration of the divine presence. Aside from this, we find 
that Moses requested of God that He show him His divine glory (Ex. 
33:18), and the meaning here is vision of a divine visage, as is apparent 
from the reply, “You cannot see My face…but you will see My back; how-
ever, My face will not be seen” (Exod. 33:20, 23). The assumption of this 
story is that there is a divine visage, but that no creature is allowed to view 
its majestic splendor. Implicit in biblical man’s fear of seeing God—
expressing his fear of the exalted—is the faith that there is a divine appear-
ance that is capable of being seen. Contrasting with Exodus 33:18–23, it 
                                                                                                                          
that one should here understand these matters in the plain sense, but he is of the opinion 
that at a later time the tendency to abstraction increased and that in the New Testament 
this tendency is dominant. In fact, this is not the case, as we shall see later. Against the 
plain sense interpretation of these texts, see Jacob, Das erste Buch der Tora (1934), on 
Genesis 1:26. 
7  See my later chapter: “The Israelite Faith—Prophecy.” [Editor’s note: a crossreference 
within Toledot.] 
8  See Gen. 16:7–13; 18–19; 21:17–18; 22:11–14; 48:15–16; Judg. 6:11–24. In these sto-
ries the “angel” suddenly acts as God himself or speaks as God in the first person. See 
especially Gen. 18–19: God appears alternately in the guise of three men or three angels. 
There is no reason to assume later “redaction” here (see Gunkel in his commentary to 
Genesis), for imperfect “redaction” such as this fixes nothing and seems purposeless.  
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says in Exodus 33:11 that God spoke “face to face” with Moses, and it says 
in Numbers 12:8: “He views the likeness of YHWH.”9 
Nor do we find the idea of divine incorporeality among the prophets. In 
the prophets’ conception God is righteous and holy, exalted and sublime, 
one and all-powerful, but they do not ascribe to Him the attribute of incor-
poreality. Prophecy is entirely rooted in the popular faith of revelation, and 
therefore ascription of a visual appearance to God is basic to a certain ex-
tent. The prophets see God in a vision and hear God’s voice. In their vision, 
they see God as “standing,” “seated on a throne,” “riding on a cloud,” 
borne on “the ḥayya/beast” (the Ḥayyot of the chariot), and the like. The 
style of the prophetic visions cannot be accounted for by the necessity of 
language or poetic figures of speech. The prophets see their visions in all 
innocence, and we find no hint in them that all of this is poetic imagination, 
not reality. Moreover, they do not propound the doctrine of divine incorpo-
reality, nor do they battle against the imagery of popular folklore, as we 
find among the Greek philosophers.10 In this respect, the prophets were as 
one with the popular belief. Philosophic Judaism, which accepted the doc-
trine of incorporeality, was able to explain this entire phenomenon only out 
of the assumption that the images that the prophets saw were no more than 
“created light,” apparitions that God created in order to show to the proph-
ets. But the prophets themselves offer no hint of this. The question of di-
vine image and incorporeality is outside the domain of the biblical prob-
lematic. 
For the great battle that the Bible fights against worship of graven imag-
es does not stem from an idea of incorporeality and has nothing in common 
with it, even though it is customary to connect the two. The Bible does not 
fight against the worship of graven images for the reason that God cannot 
be physically represented or that the physical representation may lead to 
conceptions that fall short of the divine essence. The Bible does not at all 
conceive of the graven images as representations of divinity but as fetishes. 
Worship of graven images is the worship of “wood and stone.” We shall 
discuss later in detail the fetishistic account that the Bible gives of idol 
worship. But here we shall focus on the decisive fact regarding the question 
discussed in this chapter that the Bible never specifically addresses the 
worship of representations of YHWH but lumps it together with idol wor-
ship in general. The Bible never distinguishes between graven images of 
                                                     
9  See Exod. 33:20: “for no man can see Me and live.” This implies that seeing God is 
possible, but if one sees God, he will die. (Compare R. Dosa’s interpretation of this 
verse in Sifra on Leviticus chapter 2, and Sifre end of Beha‛alotekha.) Similarly, Moses 
fears to look at God and hides his face (Exod. 3:6). Compare Gen. 32:31, Deut. 4:33 and 
5:21–23, Judg. 6:23–24, and 13:22–23. In addition, one should note that the belief that 
one who looks at a divinity will be struck down or die is to be found also in popular pa-
gan belief. At any rate, this belief does not derive from the idea of divine incorporeality. 
10  See Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (1922): Xenophanes §§ 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 23, 
24; Heraclitus § 5; the Skeptics §§ 127, 128. 
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YHWH and graven images of pagan gods but includes them all in the cate-
gory of “other gods.” If it had conceived of graven images as representa-
tions of gods, this lumping together would not be possible. For by such a 
conception, there is a basic difference between the reason for prohibiting 
graven images of YHWH and those of other gods; the former would be 
prohibited because one may not represent YHWH, whereas the others are 
prohibited because they turn the worshippers’ loyalty to the gods represent-
ed by them. At any rate, it is clear that only the war against graven images 
of YHWH, not the war on the graven images of other gods, can be ex-
plained on the basis of the notion of incorporeality. But if the Bible’s war 
on the worship of graven images had derived from the same root as the idea 
of incorporeality, it would have had two different formulations in the Bi-
ble’s exhortations and in its laws. But neither the Torah nor the prophets 
devote one kind of utterance against graven images of YHWH and another 
against graven images of other gods. In the classic prohibition of graven 
images in the Ten Commandments (in both versions), graven images and 
pictures are forbidden after the prohibition of other gods (Exod. 20:3–4, 
Deut. 5:7–8). The text does not say, “I am YHWH your God… Do not 
make for Me any graven image or picture… Do not have any other gods… 
Do not make a graven image or picture of them, etc.” The comprehensive 
prohibition of graven images that comes after the prohibition of “other 
gods” can only be understood as a prohibition of the worship of fetishes, 
which are “other gods.” The graven images do not represent gods but exist-
ing beings “in the heavens above and the earth beneath, etc.” and the repre-
sentations of these existing beings are themselves worshipped as “other 
gods.” Thus you find that the calf, which was not made for the sake of any 
foreign god, is regarded as a sin, not because of the gross corporealization 
embodied in it but because it itself is considered “another god” as if to take 
the place of YHWH (Exod. 32:1, 4, 8; Ps. 106:20; Neh. 9:18; I Kings 
12:28, 14:9; 2 Chr. 13:8). We find this conception also in the other prohibi-
tions of graven and molten images in the Torah. Nor do the prophets speci-
fy in any place that they are speaking of worship of representations of 
YHWH, nor do they give a separate reason for its prohibition, but they 
chastise the people for worshipping graven images in general and only give 
one reason to this prohibition: it is the ignorant worship of “wood and 
stone.”11 
                                                     
11  Only in two places does the idea of incorporeality seem to come up as a reason for the 
prohibition of idols, and these places are customarily cited as biblical evidences for the 
idea of incorporeality (Saadia in Book of Doctrines and Beliefs, chap. 2, and Maimoni-
des frequently cites them in polemical contexts). But the reason of divine incorporeality 
is not even expressed in these texts. In Deut. 4:12ff., the prohibition of idol worship is 
explained by the reason that the Israelites “did not see any shape [temunah]” from the 
fire at Mount Horeb. But if the text had intended to express the idea of divine incorpore-
ality, it would not have limited its assertion to the expression that no shape was seen at 
Mount Horeb, but it would have said explicitly that God has no shape. From the contin-
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In the biblical war against idol worship, a protest was indeed expressed 
against “corporealizing” the divinity. Namely, it is a protest against the 
faith that there is a divine dimension in matter and in its natural or artistic-
magical forms, or that divinity is sown and planted in the world and its 
faces. This protest was expressed also in the war against the worship of the 
heavenly host. As we said earlier, biblical faith severed every connection 
between divinity and the material of the world. But the question of material 
corporealization is altogether different from the question of depicting [God] 
through imagery.  
 
Nor do we find the idea of incorporeality in Second Temple Jewish litera-
ture. In Second Temple times, the Israelite conception of divinity tended 
more and more to transcendence. Reverence for the exalted surrounded the 
divinity with clouds of mystery and increased the distance and partitions 
between God and the creaturely world. One no longer spoke about God 
with simple innocence as in previous times. One felt ashamed now to say 
things that the old folklore felt no shame in saying. The role of the angels 
expanded. Where God had acted directly, the angels now acted as His em-
issaries and delegates. Language became more discriminating. One forbore 
to pronounce the divine name and began to resort to secondary and tertiary 
appellations of the divinity. The tendency of this process was to render God 
more remote from any contact with the material, to increase one’s rever-
ence for the exalted, and to increase beyond any limit the feeling of sanctity 
and mystery of the divine being. But in all these there was no tendency to a 
notion of divine incorporeality. The accepted imagery concerning God was 
not displaced. The depictions of God as having His abode in the heavens, 
                                                                                                                          
uation it appears that the passage deals not with worship of YHWH through graven im-
ages but with worship of graven images in general as well as worship of the heavenly 
host. It includes all these in the general statement that YHWH apportioned these “to all 
other nations” (4:19; compare Deut. 29:15–28). Earlier (4:3) the worship of Baal Peor is 
mentioned. It is clear that one cannot say that the text seeks to forbid graven images of 
the gods of the gentiles for the reason that YHWH is incorporeal. Moreover, this portion 
does not deal with representation images but with fetishes (see especially verse 28), and 
it naively argues that there is no basis for worshipping any “shape” in the world, because 
the people saw no shape at Mount Horeb. The second place is Isaiah 40:18: “To whom 
shall you compare God? What likeness shall you arrange for Him?” Some see here a ra-
tional proof against worshipping graven images, and in effect against worshipping God 
through representational images. (See Duhm’s commentary on this verse.) But from the 
continuation it is evident that the prophet is arguing against fetishism. (Understanding 
idolatry as fetishism is particularly clear in Second Isaiah.) The intention there is not to 
constructing an image of God but to comparing God to man-made gods, to any “image” 
or shape made by an artisan, with respect to their power and activity. This is evident 
from the parallel verses: “To whom can you compare Me, and I will be equal?” (40:25), 
and “To whom can you compare Me or declare Me similar? To whom can you liken Me, 
so that we seem comparable?” (46:5) And this is how the Hebrew commentators inter-
preted. For the use of the verbs ‛arakh and damah, compare Psalms 89:8(7) and Job 
28:17, 19. 
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the palace, the throne, and the divine entourage were still the dominant 
images. God was regarded as sublime but not incorporeal.* 
In the apocalyptic literature we find signs of a major transformation. In 
place of revelations of God, one finds revelations of angels. But the apoca-
lyptic literature still depicts God with the imagery of the biblical lore. Its 
descriptions follow the visions of Ezekiel and Zechariah. In Daniel, in the 
Ethiopian Book of Enoch, in the Greek Apocalypse of Baruch, and in other 
apocalyptic books we find many-hued descriptions of firmaments, of the 
orders of heaven and celestial palaces, of the divine throne and those minis-
tering before it, of the heavenly court, and much more. All these descrip-
tions are the fruit of a creative imagination, and they are quite remote from 
any abstract notion of divine incorporeality. 
We find this tendency to sublimity, but not incorporeality, in the Aramaic 
targumim (Targum Onkelos and Targum Jonathan) and in the Greek trans-
lations of the Bible (Septuagint, Symmachus, and Theodotion), as well as 
in the greater part of the lore of the Talmud and Midrash. 
Later sources sensed detraction from the divine dignity in several naïve 
scriptural passages. The translations resorted to euphemistic expressions in 
rendering them. Instead of mentioning God, they substituted terms such as 
memra (word), yikra (glory), Shekhinta (divine presence), deḥila (rever-
ence); other entities from the divine surroundings, such as angel, throne, 
glory; or Makom (place), “knot of tefillin,” and the like. Saadia, Maimoni-
des, and other adherents of a philosophical faith cited these variants of the 
Aramaic translations that had acquired a status of sanctity among the Jew-
ish people and sought to prove from them that the ancients had intended to 
affirm the doctrine of divine incorporeality.12 But it has been pointed out 
that the targumim also resort to imagery, and there are anthropomorphic 
expressions that they refrain from employing in one place but do not refrain 
from employing in another place. This phenomenon cannot be explained as 
a tendency to adopt divine incorporeality. To be sure, the Aramaic transla-
tions changed over the generations, and there are differences between one 
stratum and another, and between one book and another.13 But if we wish to 
analyze the spirit of the period to the extent that it is expressed in the tar-
gumim, we should see this entire literature as one body and learn from all 
                                                     
*  Translator’s note: “Sublime/sublimity”—Hebrew hasgavah, a key word here and 
throughout the remainder of the essay. Literally: “This is sublimity, not incorporeality” 
(hasgavah hi ve-lo hafshatah). 
12  See Saadia, Book of Doctrines and Beliefs, chap. 2, argument “from the tradition”; and 
Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, 1:27ff.  
13  See Ginsburger, Die Anthropomorphismen in den Thargumim (1891), especially 24ff., 
38ff. Ginzburger explains the anthropomorphisms in the Targum to the Hagiographa 
(partzufa/“face,” Ps. 34:17; udna/“ear,” Ps. 10:17; apoi/“face,” Job 13:8; nehireih/ 
“nose,” Job 4:9; sifvatohi/“lips,” Job 11:5; and more) as reflecting the influence of the 
midrashic literature (43). But in the last analysis, one should view the targumim and 
midrashim as a single literature. 
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its strata. If we examine the targumim from this perspective, we see that in 
general they are close to the lore of the Talmud and Midrash, and that they 
share the same imagery.14 They resort to euphemisms out of deference to 
the divine dignity and in order to avoid attributing anything uncomplimen-
tary to God. But they have no inhibition concerning the basic imagery in 
which God is depicted.15 The source of their changes is an aspiration to 
                                                     
14  “In our image according to our likeness,” Gen. 1:20 (and similarly 1:26, 5:1, 9:6) is 
translated by the Targumim of Onkelos and Jonathan (Ginsburger edition) in its plain 
sense. In 1:27 and 9:6 they change the language, perhaps in deference to divine dignity 
(see Geiger in his article Tzelem Elohim, appended to his book Urschrift [1928 edition], 
14–17). But in Gen. 5:1 Jonathan translates be-diyokna deH’ ‛avad yateh (“in the image 
of the Lord He made him”) not be-diyokna H’ (“in the [human] image God made him”) 
as in 9:6, and this spoils Geiger’s generalization. In Gen. 3:8, Onkelos translates ve-
sham‛u yat kal memreh deH’ elohim demihalekh beginta as “they heard the voice of the 
Word of the Lord God walking in the garden.” But the entire description stands in place. 
The same applies to all the realism in Gen. 18. In Exod. 24:10–11, they add words for 
the sake of divine dignity: Onkelos: yekar elaha deyisrael, uteḥot kurseh yekara (“the 
glory of the God of Israel…and under His throne of glory”); Jonathan: ikar elaha de-
yisrael, uteḥot apopodin derigloi demeyatza teḥot kurseh (“the glory of the God of Isra-
el…and under the footstool of His legs that they laid out under His throne,” citing here 
the tale about a baby who was kneaded into a brick in Egypt, and they made the brick in-
to a footstool in place of the hypopodion under the throne of the Master of the Uni-
verse). In Exod. 33:11, Jonathan adds, “Except that [Moses] would not see the radiance 
of [God’s] face.” But in Num. 12:8: “He sees the image behind the Shekhinah (Divine 
Presence)”; and Onkelos: “He beholds the image of the Lord’s glory.” In Exod. 33:22, 
Onkelos and Jonathan translate “My hand” as “My word” (memri), and in 33:23, On-
kelos translates “My back” as “that which is behind Me,” while Jonathan, following the 
aggadic midrash, translates “My back” as “the knot of God’s tefillin.” In Isa. 6:1 [“I be-
held my Lord seated on a high and lofty throne, and the skirts of His robe filled the 
Temple”], Jonathan translates, “The glory (yikra) of the Lord rested on His throne…the 
Temple was filled with the radiance of His glory.” And similarly in other places. See 
Judg. 6:11ff.; I Kings 22:19; Isa. 19:1, 40:22; Ezek. 1:26; Amos 9:1; Hab. 3:4; Job 
1:6ff., 2:3; 42:5; Ps. 18:7, 10, 11, etc. In all these texts we see the same thing: a stringent 
fastidiousness not to treat God’s glory as “profane” [i.e., ordinary], but any trace of 
philosophical abstraction is absent. From the standpoint of reverence before God’s glo-
ry, there is a difference between [the biblical text’s] “under God’s legs” and [the Tar-
gum’s] “under God’s footstool,” and similarly in the other passages. But from the stand-
point of the doctrine of God’s incorporeality, there is no difference. As for Maimoni-
des’s view that Onkelos and Jonathan translated as they did in order to avoid corporeali-
ty, Naḥmanides subjected it to severe criticism; see his commentary on Gen. 46:4. 
Naḥmanides shows that in many places the translators had no inhibitions about corpore-
al depictions, and he tries to explain their method in his way. See also Isaac Arama’s 
‛Akedat Yitzḥak, § 31. 
15  God’s abode in heaven, the throne, the palace, the entourage, and the like are treated 
literally by the translators and are given no philosophical meaning, and this is decisive. 
For the basis of the whole philosophical conception of the method of the Targumim, as 
articulated by Saadia, Maimonides, and their circle is the assumption that Shekhinah 
(Divine Presence) and the Kavod (Divine Glory) sitting on the throne are a “created 
light” or “created form” (Saadia, Book of Doctrines and Beliefs, chap. 2; Maimonides, 
Guide 1:27–28) or that “Throne” is a euphemism for the heavens (Guide 1:9, 28). But 
this is not how Onkelos and Jonathan conceive them. For according to the plain under-
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sublimity, not incorporeality. Only from such considerations can we ex-
plain why they departed from the literal sense in some places and not in 
others.16 
                                                                                                                          
standing of their language, shekhinah and kavod are an emanated light, the emanation of 
the light proceeding from God himself, simulacra of God, and they are honorific appel-
lations for God himself. The throne is not heaven, but it resides in heaven, where the su-
pernal palace exists. The throne is often associated with shekhinah or kavod but not al-
ways, as Maimonides seems to think (Guide 1:28). It is sometimes associated with God 
himself, and this suggests that this is the true state of affairs. Moreover, sometimes the 
translators add to the text their own words of explanation, showing that in their concep-
tion the image, the palace, and the throne are to be taken literally. Jonathan translates 
Job 26:9 as follows: “He closes off His throne with darkness, so that the angels shall not 
look upon Him; He spreads a curtain over the clouds of His glory.” Here the throne, the 
curtain, and the object of “look upon Him” refer to God, who is the subject of the entire 
chapter. Were it not for the darkness, the curtains, and the cloud, the angels would see 
what they would see [i.e., God himself]. In Ps. 9:5: “You sit on a throne, righteous 
judge!” Ps. 93:2: “Your throne is established from prior times.” Ps. 103:19: “He sets His 
throne in the heavenly heights.” In all these verses the throne is associated in the Tar-
gum with God himself, and He dwells in heaven (compare Isa. 6:1, 6). We have previ-
ously cited Jonathan’s expression, “the footstool of the Master of the Universe.” In Ps. 
104:3, Jonathan mentions God’s exedra (parlor). In Ps. 91:1, “In the shadow of the 
clouds of the glory of Shaddai H/he dwells,” the subject is God. According to Maimoni-
des (Guide 1:28), the “pavement of sapphire” (Ex. 24:10) is the primal matter of the 
universe, whereas according to Jonathan, in the legend we cited above, it is an actual 
brick. The angels’ wings in Isa. 6:2 are explained philosophically by Maimonides 
(Guide 1:43), whereas Jonathan translates, “so that he not see [God].” Compare Job 
42:5: “But now my eyes have seen You.” “Hand” and “arm” are translated “stroke of 
His power,” but in many places, where acts of beneficence are the topic, they are trans-
lated literally (see Exod. 6:6, 15:6, 12, 17; Isa. 40:10, 62:8; Ps. 89:11, 14; Job 26:13; and 
more). Maimonides sensed the difference between his own stance and that of the transla-
tors: when he said that Onkelos only contented himself with avoiding divine corporeali-
ty but did not explain the higher meaning of the parables (1:28); or in his objections to 
several of the translations of Onkelos for the verb ra’ah (see) in relation to God (1:48). 
Naḥmanides rightly wrote concerning the use of the words shekhinah and kavod in the 
language of the Targumim: “God forbid that there be something called shekhinah or ka-
vod other than referring to the honored and blessed God! Thus Onkelos translates ‘If 
Your face not travel with us’ as ‘if Your shekhinah not travel among us’” (Naḥmanides 
on Gen. 46:4—see the rest of his comment). 
16  In his work Oheb Ger, Samuel David Luzzatto established a principle that the Targum 
was not written for the learned and did not intend to remove corporeal depictions, but 
was written for “ordinary people” in order “to remove a stumbling block from the mass-
es and proselytes,” so that study of the Torah should not lead them to think gross 
thoughts or to mockery and derision against sacred matters. Therefore, it changed cer-
tain words that would have “a base connotation to the common people” (such as the ex-
pression “under [God’s] legs”) but had no problem with using “dignified figures of 
speech” (such as “the throne of God’s glory”) even though they too spoke of divine mat-
ters in materialistic terms. From our perspective, we may say that Luzzatto’s principle is 
basically sound. The Targumim generally employ euphemisms only for propriety’s sake. 
But there is no evidence that they wrote only for “ordinary people.” If truth be told, their 
aspiration to sublimity stemmed from their religious consciousness, but it had no philo-
sophical source. Everything that we say here about the Aramaic translations applies also 
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We see a greater deviation from divine incorporeality in the tales and 
homilies of the rabbis than in the targumim. The Sages of the Oral Torah 
resort to various appellations of divinity out of respect: the Holy and 
Blessed One, the shekhinah (Divine Presence), the gevurah (Divine Pow-
er), Heaven, makom (Place—the Omnipresent), Master of the Universe, the 
All-Merciful, and the like. In this respect the Oral Torah continues the 
method of the targumim. Similarly, the Sages sense detraction from the 
divine dignity in some of the tales and literary figures of the Bible. In the 
generation of the Scribes, they amended several scriptural passages out of 
deference to the divine dignity (tikkunei soferim—the emendations of the 
Scribes). They said of several corporeal references that the text came only 
“to accommodate the ear in terms of what it can understand.” Similarly 
they would introduce anthropomorphic parables with the expression 
kiv’yakhol—“as if it were possible,” to suggest that one should not under-
stand them literally. In interpreting some biblical texts, they resorted to 
homiletic explanations in order to downplay anthropomorphism. But all 
these serve to render the conception of God more sublime, not to strive for 
a philosophical notion of incorporeality. On the contrary, the rabbinic lore 
indulges extensively in imagery, and the rabbis’ anthropomorphic depic-
tions of God were no less problematic than the biblical lore for proponents 
of philosophical interpretation, even more so. 
All of the scribal emendations sought to revise passages in Scripture that 
tended to derogate from the divine dignity, but none of them sought to 
eliminate imagery.17 The scriptural figures of speech that the rabbis said 
                                                                                                                          
to the Septuagint. Among the scholars were some who sought to find in the Septuagint 
traces of the influence of Greek philosophy (Dähne, Gfrörer, Michaelis). But Frankel 
and Zeller already knew that this was not the case. See especially Frankel, Vorstudien 
zur Septuaginta (1841), 174–79; and Über den Einfluss der palästinischen Exegese auf 
die alexandrinische Exegese (1851), 21ff. Frankel demonstrated that the Septuagint was 
influenced by the methods of interpretation of the sages of Eretz Israel and that in its 
avoidance of corporeal depictions it was influenced by them, not by Greek philosophers. 
Indeed, the method of the Septuagint in general is identical with that of the Aramaic 
Targumim. They use euphemisms for the sake of propriety, but not in order to conform 
to the idea of God’s incorporeality. They translated “in Our image, according to Our 
likeness” in Gen. 1:26 (and also 1:27; 5:1; 9:6) literally. In Exod. 24:10–11, they trans-
lated “the place of the God of Israel” and “that which was under His feet.” In Ex. 33:22–
23, they translated “My hand” literally; for “My back” they substituted “that which is 
behind Me.” In Isa. 6:1, they translated “YHWH sitting upon a throne high and exalted” 
literally, while rendering “His skirts filled the Temple” as “The house was filled with 
His glory,” and similarly in other places. One should only restrict Frankel’s verdict in 
the sense that the variations of corporeal expressions are not connected at all with philo-
sophical interpretation. It is obvious that they are not the fruit of Persian influence (Ein-
fluss, 31–32). On the question of the influence of Greek philosophy on the Septuagint, 
see Freudenthal, Jewish Quarterly Review (1890): 205–22. 
17  See Mekilta, Beshalah—Shira, § 6; Yalkut, Beshalah, § 247; Tanhuma, Beshalah, § 16; 
“the apple of his eye” (Zech. 2:12) instead of “the apple of My eye”; and “you have 
 THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF ISRAELITE RELIGION 299 
 
were “to accommodate the ear” also involved restriction of the divine pow-
er, such as “like the smoke of the furnace” (Exod. 19:18), “the lion has 
roared; the Lord YHWH has spoken” (Amos 3:8), “His voice is like the 
voice of many waters” (Ezek. 43:2), and the like.18 Similarly, where the 
rabbis used the qualification kiv’yakhol (“as if it were possible”), this was 
to avoid not imagery but the restriction of God’s power or the impugning of 
God’s dignity.19 Similarly, when they said, “Great is the power of the 
prophets, that they compare the creature to its Creator,” they were referring 
not to the fact of the comparison itself but to the indignity of comparing 
God to a human being.20 Similarly, when Rabbi Ishmael tries to play down 
                                                                                                                          
sniffed at it” (Mal. 1:13) instead of “you have sniffed at Me”; and similarly with other 
“scribal emendations.” 
18  Mekilta, Jethro–Bahodesh, § 4. Compare Avot de-Rabbi Natan, § 2: “Not like a single 
hero, but like all the heroes in the world; not like a single lion, but like all the lions in 
the world.” 
19  For example: “[‘Your right hand, O YHWH’ is repeated twice. When Israel perform 
God’s will, they make the left into right; when Israel do not perform God’s will,] 
kiv’yakhol—as if it were possible, they make [God’s] right hand into left [as it is written: 
‘He has turned back His right hand’ (Lam. 2:5). When Israel perform God’s will there is 
no sleep before Him, as it says, ‘Behold, He who guards Israel will neither slumber nor 
sleep.’ (Ps. 121:4) When Israel do not perform His will,] kiv’yakhol—as if it were possi-
ble, there is slumber before Him, [i.e., God sleeps, as it is said, ‘The Lord awakes as 
from sleep’ (Ps. 78:65)].” (Mekilta Beshalah–Shira, § 5) Also: “Kiv’yakhol—as if it 
were possible, that the wings of the holy Ḥayyot were diminished” (b. Ḥag. 13b). And: 
“Kiv’yakhol—as if it were possible, the heavenly entourage were diminished” (ibid.). 
And: “[A grievous statement did the spies make when they said, ki ḥazak hu mimenu—
for the inhabitants of the land are stronger than us. Understand mimenu not as ‘than us’ 
but as ‘than Him’]—Kiv’yakhol—as if it were possible, even the Master of the House 
cannot remove his furniture from there” (b. Men. 53b). And many similar places. 
20  See Gen. Rab., 27:1, the saying of Rabbi Yudan. Maimonides cites this saying in Guide, 
1:46. But when we examine his source, we see that it is not talking about divine incorpo-
reality. This midrash is cited in connection with the verse, “There is a man whose labor 
was with wisdom” (Eccl. 2:21), interpreting the “man” in the verse as referring to God, 
and citing as proof-texts: “I heard the voice of a man” (Dan. 8:16), “A likeness like the 
appearance of a man” (Ezek. 1:26). In the continuation of this midrash the meaning of 
the saying “Great is the power of the prophets” can only be that they dared to compare 
the voice of God and His appearance to the voice and appearance of a human being. In 
Numbers Rabbah, chap. 19 (compare Tanhuma Hukkat, § 6), the saying reappears in a 
midrash on the verse “A man’s wisdom will enlighten his face” (Eccles. 8:1), where 
again they interpret the “man” in the verse as referring to God. There, Rabbi Yudan 
says, “Great is the power of the prophets, that they compare the image of power of the 
Supernal One to the form of a human.” See Gen. Rab., 24:1, on Isa. 29:16: “Should the 
potter be accounted as the clay? [Should what is made say of its Maker, ‘He did not 
make me’?]”—“They compare the creature to its creator, the planting to the planter.” 
Rashi comments, “They compare the terrestrial eye [i.e., form] to the celestial eye.” It is 
clear that the intent is to compare status and rank. Maimonides (Guide 1:26) cites also 
the talmudic saying: “The Torah speaks in human language” (Sifre Shalah on the verse 
hikkaret tikkaret, Num. 15:31; see also b. Keritot, 11a, and other places) in order to 
prove that the rabbis implied affirmation of the doctrine of incorporeality (and this say-
ing was interpreted to mean this already before Maimonides; see Bacher, Aggadat Ha-
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the oddness of the verse “I will see the blood” (Exod. 12:13), this is only 
because of the reason, “Is not everything visible to Him?”21 In this homily 
and all other homilies of this genre, which seek to avoid anthropomor-
phism, sublimity is expressed but not incorporeality. 
In any case, we can determine the character of the Talmudic-midrashic 
lore not only from isolated expressions but from the totality of the images 
dominant in it. The legends describe God as a great, awesome King, who 
has his majestic abode in the heavens on His throne of glory, amid endless 
radiance, among the heavenly entourage, behind the curtain, at the head of 
the court, issuing and sealing decrees concerning all the inhabitants of the 
world, attired in tefillin, studying Torah, and the like. There are anthropo-
morphic legends at the level of popular or folk discourse, and these legends 
caused great confusion among the adherents of refined faith.22 But we find 
the basic imagery also in those tales that are like “fine silk” and that contain 
exalted views transmitted in the name of the leading rabbis. The depiction 
of God in these legends is exalted and sublime. God is righteous, loving, 
and merciful. His demand of human beings consists of piety and love of 
humankind. This lore raises God to the most sublime level, exalts Him over 
everything in the world, and dismisses all defects and restrictions of His 
power. But it knows nothing of divine incorporeality.23 It understands the 
creation of humanity in the divine image in a spiritual sense and bases the 
moral standing of the human being on it.24 But it does not displace the lit-
                                                                                                                          
Tannaim, 1:2:5, n. 6). But Geiger and Reggio have already demonstrated that in talmud-
ic literature they used this expression only as a hermeneutic method in halakhic midrash 
[to refrain from deducing laws from duplications of phraseology and similar stylistic 
features of the text]. (See Otzar Neḥmad 1 (5616/1856): 125–27, 159–60, and Bacher, 
Aggadat Ha-Tannaim, 4–5.)  
21  Mekilta Bo, § 7. Compare Isaac Hirsch Weiss, Dor Dor veDorshav, pt. 1, 216ff. Weiss 
also fails to distinguish between sublimity and incorporeality. 
22  See Nachman Krochmal, More Nevukhei ha-Zeman, § 14, “The Aggada and the Agga-
dists.” Krochmal seeks to prove that the corrupted aggadot are not the words of the Sag-
es and were accidentally commingled with the Talmud and midrashic compilations. 
23  This observation applies even to the most abstract saying that we find in the rabbinic 
lore: “[Why is God called Makom (place)?] Because God is the place of the world, but 
the world is not the place of God” (Gen. Rab., 68:10, on Gen. 28:11: “And [Jacob] came 
upon the place.” Compare the version in Yalkut, § 117). This saying, too, affirms sub-
limity but not incorporeality, as it does not divest God of spatiality in the philosophic 
sense. It affirms that everything is dependent on God. We learn this from the parable 
that is mentioned there: “It is like a hero who was riding on a horse. The horse is sec-
ondary to the rider, but the rider is not secondary to the horse.”  
24  See Gen. Rab., 8:12, the saying of Rabbi Jacob from Kefar Hanin, who distinguishes 
between the righteous who are “in Our image according to Our likeness” and the wicked 
who are not “in Our image according to Our likeness.” Compare the saying of Rabbi 
Akiva: “Dear is mankind, who was created in the Image” (m. Avot, 3:14). Compare also 
the saying of Rabbi Tanhuma concerning one who despises a person: “Know whom you 
despise—he was made in God’s likeness” (Gen. Rab. 24:8). 
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eral meaning of creation in the divine image.25 Sometimes it exaggerates 
and says that even the ministering angels cannot see the supernal image.26 
                                                     
25  Some examples of taking “divine image” in the literal sense: Hillel would wash his body 
for the honor of his Maker, because he was created in His image. He cited the parable of 
“the icons of kings,” which were scrubbed and rinsed (Lev. Rab., 34:3). Whoever does 
not engage in procreation “diminishes the divine likeness” (Gen. Rab., 34:2). When Ad-
am was created, “the ministering angels erred and sought to recite ‘Holy’ before him” 
(Gen. Rab., 8:9; Rashi: “They erred and thought that he was the Shekhinah because he 
was created in the divine image”). On the verse “For the hanged man is the curse of 
God” (Deut. 21:23), Rabbi Meir told a parable: “It is like twin brothers, one was the 
king, the other was a robber” (Tosef. Sanh., § 9; b. Sanh., 46b). In a baraita, we learn: 
“All faces are permitted except for the face of a person,” and they derived it from the 
verse, “You shall not make with Me [gods of silver and gods of gold]” (Exod. 20:23), 
which may be read, “You shall not make Me” (b. AZ, 43a–b, b. RH, 24a). In Midrash 
Eleh Ezkerah (ver. 1), it is said of Rabbi Ishmael the High Priest that the splendor of his 
face was similar to the splendor of the face of his Maker (Eisenstein, Otzar Midrashim, 
440; in versions 2 and 3, the text reads, “the splendor of his face was similar to that of 
Metatron”). In the wedding blessings we find, “Who created the human being in His im-
age, in the image of His likeness and form” (b. Ket., 8a; on the word tavnit, “form,” see 
Maimonides, Guide, 1:3). To be sure, the verses speaking of the creation in the divine 
image gave rise in customary fashion to different homiletic meanings. In keeping with 
the tenor of the Greek translation of Symmachus—and in part with that of the Aramaic 
translation of Jonathan—they interpreted “in his image” as “in man’s image: whole and 
perfect.” They deduced from this that Adam was created circumcised (Avot de-Rabbi 
Natan, B). See the homily of Rabbi Simlai on “in Our image according to Our likeness” 
(Gen. Rab., 5:8). But these midrashim did not seek to exclude the plain meaning of the 
text. Most characteristic is the interpretation of Rashi, who expresses nicely the spirit of 
the aggadic midrashim [by combining the human and divine “images”]. He interprets 
Gen. 1:27, “in his image,” as “in the mold made for him” (in other words, in the human 
image), but “in the image of God He created him” he explains, “The image prepared for 
him was the image of the likeness of his Maker.” 
26  On the verse “For man cannot see Me and live” (Ex. 33:20), they commented: “Even the 
holy Ḥayyot and ministering angels do not see the divine glory” (Sifra Vayikra, 2:11; 
Sifre, end of Beha’alotekha). But even this does not imply divine incorporeality, as Gei-
ger opines (see Urschrift, 1928 ed., 341, and Hebrew appendix 7), but rather extreme 
sublimity. The context in the Sifra is discussing the Ḥayyot that bear the divine throne. 
This midrash is ascribed to Rabbi Akiva, who Geiger thinks is an adherent of divine in-
corporeality (ibid., 328, 341, Hebrew excurses, 4 and 7). But we know from other homi-
lies of Rabbi Akiva that he was not an abstract thinker. His homily on Daniel 7:9: 
“When I looked, thrones were placed” is well known: “one for Him and one for David” 
(b. Ḥag., 14a, and see Weiss, Dor Dor ve-Dorshav, 2:117, 125, which seeks to explain 
Rabbi Akiva’s tendency toward anthropomorphism). Even Rabbi Yose the Galilean, 
who was critical of Rabbi Akiva, was critical only because “he spoke of the Shekhinah 
in profane terms’” (b. Ḥag., 14a; Rashi comments, “To seat a human being by God’s 
side”). This is an expression that nicely symbolizes the aspiration to sublimity of the en-
tire Talmudic-midrashic lore. For an understanding of the nature and intent of midra-
shim in this vein, which Rabbi Akiva preached on the verse “No man can see Me and 
live,” we should take note of the legend in praise of Moses, in which the angels have not 
seen and do not know the place where God resides, whereas Moses speaks with God 
face to face; Moses sees God’s form and enters into the sanctum where the ministering 
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But even this passage attests to an imagistic conception of God. The ques-
tion of reconciling the divine image with incorporeality is at any rate out-
side the purview of this entire literature. 
 
The question of the divine image was in fact raised only in the border zone 
where Judaism came into contact with Greek thought. 
Out of a desire to defend Judaism before the enlightened Greek public, 
the Hellenistic Jewish philosopher Aristobulus explains the anthropo-
morphic expressions in the Torah allegorically, including among them the 
references to the divine face, feet, and hands, as well as references to divine 
movement and utterances.27 Relying on the concepts of the Greek enlight-
enment, Philo of Alexandria sought to give the Torah an allegorical expla-
nation, eliminating any trace of anthropomorphic or imagistic understand-
ing.28 These Hellenistic Jewish philosophers followed the example of the 
enlightened Greek and Roman thinkers, especially the Stoics, who inter-
preted the pagan myths allegorically. But the efforts of the Hellenistic Jews 
to clothe Judaism in philosophic garb bore no fruit. Greek philosophy had 
practically no influence on the primary stream of Judaism, its integral core, 
that is, Pharisaic Judaism, to which the decisive majority of the people ad-
hered. The Talmudic-midrashic literature is the lineal descendant of biblical 
thought, adapted to the spirit of the times. It continues and deepens the 
biblical beliefs, but it does not occupy itself with philosophy. The “philos-
opher” as a character in rabbinic lore is not the adherent of a purified faith 
but a heretic who denies the Torah. “Pardes”* is regarded as a place fraught 
with danger. Motivated by a heightened and refined religious sensibility, 
the rabbinic literature strives to remove certain anthropomorphisms. But it 
                                                                                                                          
angels have no permission to enter (Yalkut Va’ethanan, § 815). Here we have conceal-
ment and vision of God’s form in one and the same legend. 
27  See Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica, 8:10, and Schürer, Geschichte des jüdischen 
Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi (1907–1908), 3:513–14. Frankel (in Einfluss, 33, n. 9) 
opposes the view that Eichhorn expressed: that allegorical midrash sought to defend the 
Torah from the pagans’ derision. But we should not understand this defense in such a 
narrow sense. We have here in operation the aspiration to clothe Judaism in an appropri-
ate form in keeping with the concepts of the Greek enlightenment. 
28  Josephus Flavius stands in the middle in a certain sense. He was raised in the popular 
faith, but he also had a superficial Greek education and writes in an eclectic style. God is 
eternal, and His essence is unknowable, but “He is exalted in His beauty over every per-
ishable likeness” (Against Apion, 2:16). God is all, first and last, but “He is hidden from 
us in His form and His magnitude. No matter, even the most precious, is fit that God’s 
form should be made from it. All artistry will fall short of fashioning the image of His 
likeness” (ibid., § 22). “The Jews say to Petronius that it is forbidden for them to set up 
even the image of God, much less the image of a human being” (Wars of the Jews, 
2:10:4). 
*  Translator’s note: “Pardes” (= Paradise): the “Garden” of religious speculation. “Our 
Rabbis taught: Four men entered Pardes, namely, Ben ‛Azzai and Ben Zoma, Aḥer, and 
R. Akiba. Ben Azzai looked and died; Ben Zoma looked and went mad; Aḥer mutilated 
the shoots; R. Akiba emerged in peace” (b. Ḥag. 14b). 
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contains no systematic philosophic inquiry, and it generates anthropomor-
phisms of its own. In the war that ensued between Judaism and paganism 
on another front, the Christian front, it is paganism that attacks Judaism for 
anthropomorphizing the divinity. The enlightened Greek thinkers deride the 
biblical stories, arguing that they display no correct conception of divinity 
or true knowledge of that which is exalted above any imagistic depiction. 
The Christian defense follows the lead of the Hellenistic Jewish thinkers, 
seeking to counter the arguments of the Greek skeptics by giving the stories 
an allegorical interpretation.29 But this battle takes place outside the Jewish 
domain, and it has no influence on Judaism. 
Only during the Arabic period does Greek philosophy begin to have a 
profound influence on Judaism. Philosophy’s requirement to have a re-
fined, enlightened faith now penetrates into the core of Judaism. It spreads 
first among the Jews in Arab lands starting from the time of Saadia Gaon. 
Saadia and the Geonim after him received and affirmed the doctrine of 
divine incorporeality (influenced as well by the Karaites’ critique of the 
anthropomorphisms in the Talmud and the Midrash). But this doctrine did 
not yet become a part of the legacy of all of Jewry.30 The decisive cam-
paign begins in a rather late period, about seven centuries after the closing 
of the Talmud, in Maimonides’s generation. This is undoubtedly a very 
instructive phenomenon: that the doctrine of divine incorporeality is still 
regarded in this period as a foreign innovation among the masses of pious 
believers in France and Germany, whose faith is shaped by the Talmud and 
Midrash. The accepted view among them was that the Torah obligates one 
to believe that God has a visage and that whoever denies this denies the 
Torah and God’s existence.31 We are familiar with Rabad’s criticism of 
                                                     
29  See especially the arguments of Celsus against the biblical (and Christian) lore and the 
counterarguments of Origen on this matter: Origen, Contra Celsum, throughout. Celsus 
argues against the story that God “fashioned the man with His hands and breathed the 
breath of life into him” and that He made woman from his rib (Contra Celsum, 4:36ff.). 
He also argues against the stories that God regretted that He had made mankind (Gen. 
6:5–7), that the world was created in six days, and that God “rested” afterward and “was 
refreshed” (Contra Celsum, 6:58ff., 61). It is absurd to attribute hands, mouth, and voice 
to God (6:61–62). He similarly argues against the story of creation in the divine image, 
because God is not like any form (6:63). It is also absurd to ascribe motion to Him 
(6:64). Origen responds to all this that one should understand these stories allegorically. 
30  See the letter of Abraham, son of Maimonides, which says of the doctrine of incorpore-
ality: “All this is without a doubt among any of the members of the Israelite community, 
from the extreme East to the extreme West in all the inhabitants of the lands of Ishmael 
[i.e., Muslim countries],” and only people “across the sea, among the inhabitants of the 
islands from the distant ends of the earth, err in this great principle and are ensnared by 
the literal sense of the biblical verses and the literal sense of the midrashim and rabbinic 
lore.” 
31  See Maimonides, Guide, 1:1. He writes similarly in his letter to his son concerning the 
people of France, “who speak blasphemously of God” “with their materializing concep-
tions.” And in the letter on the resurrection, he mentions the corporealizers “from the in-
habitants of the far-off lands” who consider the denial of corporeality to be heresy. Rab-
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Maimonides’s statement that whoever says that God is a body with a shape 
is a heretic: “Why should this one be called a heretic, when many greater 
and better than he followed this view?” According to Naḥmanides’s testi-
mony, the rabbis of France protested against Maimonides, who said that 
God has no visage.32 Zealots such as Rabbi Solomon of Montpellier, who 
opposed the doctrine of incorporeality, spoke in the name of “the faith of 
the Talmud.”33 Rabbi Moses Taku went out to battle against all the adher-
ents of purified faith, producing many evidences from all the sources of 
Judaism that the Creator has a visage and arguing that whoever denies this 
denies the Written Torah and the Oral Torah.34 Pious and observant Jews, 
who studied Torah and Talmud their whole lives and derived all their edu-
cation from the traditional sources, did not know that “this is all a para-
ble.”35 We have no better proof than this: the whole problem of whether 
God has a visible form is outside the purview of original Judaism. 
                                                                                                                          
bi Abraham the son of Maimonides says in the above-mentioned letter that the corpore-
alizers of France inherited their “corrupt beliefs” from their forebears. See D. Kauf-
mann, Geschichte der Attributenlehre (1877), 484ff. 
32  Naḥmanides Letter to the Rabbis of France, “Against the Ban on Maimonides’s Books.” 
See Sefer Iggerot u-Teshuvot Ha-Rambam (Lemberg, 1857). 
33  See the Letter of Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides, which says that Rabbi Solomon 
complained in writing to the rabbis of France “in reference to the faith of the Talmud, 
that there are those who deny it.” In that writ, Rabbi Solomon argues that he and his col-
leagues never said that the Creator has a form and limbs, but Rabbi Abraham neverthe-
less attributes this view to them and says “that they repented of this heresy and denial.” 
There is great significance in this detail of the debate, and from it we see how deeply 
rooted the basic images were. Rabbi Solomon and his colleagues argue that they do not 
attribute limbs to the Creator, but they believe “that the Holy God dwells in heaven, and 
His primary place is there, and a partition divides Him from His creatures.” “Darkness 
and cloud surround Him.” “He sits on the throne of glory, which is above the firmament 
that is above the heads of the Ḥayyot.” And they similarly believe that “He descended 
into the cave where Moses and Elijah stood, without a cloud.” We see here the same line 
in which Jewish religious consciousness developed previously. In ascribing limbs, the 
men of Montpellier feel that the divine image suffers defect and diminution, and they 
condemn this, but they do not feel the same way about the other images. 
34  See his book Ketav Tamim, published in Otzar Neḥmad 3 (5620/1860): 58–99. He cites 
“the entire Torah as testimony” that the Creator has a visage, that His place is in heaven, 
and that He sits on His throne, etc. He brings his proof-texts from the Bible, from rab-
binic lore, from the prayers, and from the words of later sages. He senses the difficulty 
that this raises, but he thinks that we must believe in the testimony of the Torah and that 
it is forbidden to inquire concerning God’s being, “whether He has a body and how it all 
fits together” (60). 
35  Even Rabbi Judah Alfakhar gives up on “the matter of God’s materiality” because there 
are “several texts that contradict each other,” because it is said that “the Torah speaks in 
human language,” and because Onkelos translated as he did (see his answer to Rabbi 
David Kimḥi, “The Lord rebukes you, O Satan”). Rabbi Samuel David Luzzatto, the de-
fender of naïve Judaism, is of the opinion that there is no harm in anthropomorphism, 
even though it is an incorrect view, because “theoretical truths” are inessential. See, for 
instance, his criticisms of Maimonides in the collection of his articles Meḥkerei ha-
Yahadut (Warsaw, 5673–74/1913–14), 2:241. In one of his letters he says about ibn Ga-
 THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF ISRAELITE RELIGION 305 
 
Christianity found itself within the circle of influence of Greek thought 
to a much greater extent than Judaism. In its initial phase many pagans 
affiliated with it, including some who had a Greek education. We therefore 
find that the doctrine of divine incorporeality became rooted in Christianity 
earlier than in Judaism. Despite all the words of denigration of Greek edu-
cation and of reason in general that one heard from time to time from its 
adherents, Christianity had to adapt to the views that were dominant in the 
circles of Greek intellectuals whom it wanted to influence. The anthropo-
morphisms of the Bible and of Christian legends were targets for the arrows 
of these intellectuals, and in defending them they had to explain them 
through allegorical interpretation. They could not award a crown of pure 
philosophical faith to paganism, which they detested and declared an abom-
ination. But original Christianity, born outside the domain of Greek 
thought, innocently ascribed an image to God and lived in the world of 
images of popular Jewish lore. Only in the late Gospel of John do we find 
indications of philosophical influence, as it borrowed Philo’s doctrine of 
the Logos. Not so the other Gospels, which tell their story on the level of 
popular folklore. According to the images dominant in the “New Testa-
ment,” God dwells in heaven, sits on a throne, and is surrounded by angels 
(see especially Revelation beginning chap. 4, Matt. 23:22, Heb. 4:16, etc.). 
God descends in a cloud (Matt. 17:5, Mark 9:7, Luke 9:34–35). Jesus as-
cends to heaven and sits at the right hand of God (Mark 16:19, Acts 1:1ff, 
7:56, Col. 3:1, Heb. 1:3, 8:1, etc.) or on God’s throne (Rev. 3:21). Jesus 
passes through heaven (Heb. 4:14) and comes to see the face of God (Heb. 
9:24). The righteous will ascend on clouds to heaven to be there with the 
Lord (1 Thess. 4:13–17) or the heavenly Jerusalem will come down from 
heaven and God will dwell in it with humanity (Rev. 21:3). Especially 
characteristic is the legend that Jesus ascended to heaven after he was res-
urrected. This means that he ascended to heaven in his body and sat to the 
right of God’s glory. This legend is rooted in a very corporeal outlook. 
Close to it is the belief, which Paul enunciates, that there is no reward for 
the righteous without bodily resurrection. The body of the righteous will be 
transformed and will become like Jesus’s heavenly body (1 Cor. 15, Phil. 
3:21). We similarly find in the New Testament the belief that man was 
created in God’s image literally (1 Cor. 11:7; therefore, a man does not 
need to cover his head). A sect existed in early Christianity that believed, 
based on Genesis 1:26 and similar passages, that God had a body.36 Even 
though official Christianity, whose adherents knew something about Greek 
wisdom, rejected this view and interpreted the legends allegorically, there 
was always a current of anthropomorphic thought in Christianity. The more 
                                                                                                                          
birol, “Perhaps he attributed a kind of body to the Creator, as was the view of all the ear-
lier thinkers” (Otzar Neḥmad 2 (5617/1857): 205; Meḥkerei Ha-Yahadut, 2:205). 
36  The sect of the Audians (Odians). See Epiphanius, Panarion adversus haereses, § 70. 
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that the naïve biblical outlook prevailed, the more the tendency to corpore-
ality prevailed with it. 
 
Mohammed’s spirited war against idolatry, and his spirited declaration that 
there is only one God, did not derive at all from conceiving God as incorpo-
real. The absolute monotheism of the Koran is as far as can be from the 
doctrine of incorporeality. One reads countless times the enunciation of the 
idea that Allah is one, that He has no fellow gods, that He has no wife or 
daughters or sons.37 Those who posit fellow divine beings to God are chil-
dren of Gehenna. There is also a kind of attempt to demonstrate God’s uni-
ty: if there were many gods in heaven and earth, the world would be de-
stroyed by the war among the gods (Koran, 17:45, 21:22, and other places). 
But this enthusiastic demand for the unity of God does not contain any 
element of a doctrine of incorporeality, which was beyond the comprehen-
sion of the desert people and of the Prophet himself. The Koran faith is 
parallel to a later stage of the Israelite religion, that of midrashic legend. 
According to the Koran’s conception, God does not reveal himself to hu-
mankind on earth, as the early biblical lore related. Mohammed, the “seal 
of the prophets,” does not get an utterance directly from God but from Ga-
briel.38 This is the outlook that is prevalent in the late Jewish prophetic 
literature: God reveals himself through an angel. There is similarly preva-
lent in the Koran the tendency to render God sublime and to exalt God over 
everything. God is the Good, the Merciful, the Forgiving; He fashioned 
everything himself, He rules over everything himself, He supervises every-
thing himself. He demands faith and good deeds of human beings. God is 
the one who sees, hears, and knows. “There is none like Him” (Koran, 
42:9, 21:4, 26:122, and other places). But God is not abstract and faceless; 
God dwells in heaven, “the exalted roof,” “the guarded roof” (21:33, 53:5). 
He is “Lord of the throne” (17:44, 21:22, 23:88, and other places). He pos-
sesses the “keys” of heaven and earth (42:10). He appointed guards over 
the heavens; they are the angels and officers who stand before Him. They 
guard the heavens from the satanic spirits so that they will not hear the 
words of God from the heavenly angels and know what was decreed behind 
the curtain. If a spirit lies in wait to eavesdrop, they stone him with stars 
and flames (37:6ff, 72ff, etc.). In time to come, the righteous will be privi-
leged with seeing God’s face (75:23). 
We therefore find that anthropomorphism holds full sway in early Islam. 
The dispute over corporeality began only with the onset of the Mu’tazila, 
which endeavored to examine the principles of the faith from philosophic 
assumptions. Only these sages insisted on not ascribing attributes to God 
                                                     
37  Koran, 17:43, 21:26, 23:91, 37:149, 52:39, 72:3, 112:3, etc. 
38  According to a late conception, Mohammed also spoke with God. But according to one 
tradition, Aisha would announce that whoever said that Mohammed spoke with God was 
a heretic. See Nöldeke, Geschichte des Qorans (1909), 22–23. 
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and sought to give a philosophic interpretation of the anthropomorphic 
expressions in the Koran. But the theological conservatives were opposed 
to this, and their opposition was in the name of the original tradition, which 
was similar to what prevailed in Judaism and in Christianity. They argued 
that the believer ought to believe in the words of the Prophet as they stood, 
without qualification, and the Prophet described God with human attrib-
utes. Among the anthropomorphizing sects there were some that even said 
God is “flesh and blood.” Indeed, God is “incomparable” in strength, pow-
er, and majesty. But with respect to form, God is “like you and me.” This 
controversy lasted for centuries. There is no doubt that to a certain extent 
the conservatives were right: the doctrine of incorporeality was an innova-
tion that stemmed from an external source. The founders of Islam did not 
know this doctrine at all, nor did it occur to them. 
We learn from all this that Israelite monotheism in its three original 
forms was not bound up with the theory of divine incorporeality. 
The Inner Idea of Israelite Monotheism 
The basic metaphysical idea of Israelite monotheism was born not from 
contemplating the hierarchy of the universe and the orders of its phenome-
na and connections of cause and effect but from a new primal religious 
intuition, which made all being contingent on a supreme, absolute divine 
will. 
The Israelite idea of divine unity did not stem from inquiring into the 
nature of being and the divine essence. The path to the idea of unity by way 
of this inquiry necessarily proceeds by way of abstraction. But for the Isra-
elites, this idea was born out of a new religious feeling, a lightning flash of 
faith in God, which raised the idea of a supreme, ruling divine will. The 
idea was voluntaristic, not ontological. It proposed no new idea concerning 
the divine essence but proclaimed faith in a God, the dominance of whose 
will has no boundary or limit. It did not approach the “dark cloud,” it did 
not seek to gaze inside, it did not seek to raise the curtain of the divine mys-
tery. Paganism sought all these things. But the Israelite idea announced that 
over all being rules a God who knows no limit to His will, to His rule, to 
His power. “Everything that God desires, He does.” Not incorporeality but 
absolute supremacy of the divine will—this is the originating idea of the 
Israelite faith in divine unity. 
Once this idea arose from its house of conception, it shattered into many 
splinters. All the history of the Israelite religion was latent in it. It was not 
formulated in a system of theoretical concepts but sought expression in 
symbols. 
 
Supremacy and sanctity—these were the primary symbols of the new idea. 
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The new God was revealed to Israel as a supreme God doing miracles. 
The ancient folklore pictures Him not as a God ruling only over Israel but 
as a God performing wonders with the sun and moon, in heaven and earth, 
on the sea and dry land. Everything is subordinate to Him. Furthermore, the 
ancient lore knows of no war between YHWH and other divine powers, as 
we shall prove later on. “YHWH is the God”—this is the expression of the 
new idea. Monumental testimony to the rootedness of this idea and the 
profundity of its effect is the fact that YHWH has no mythology, as we shall 
see in detail later. Israelite lore does not know how to tell anything about 
the life of this God, the events He passed through, His fate. “Fate” has no 
power over him. This God has no “genealogy,” no lust, no birth, no proge-
ny, no growing up, no death, and so forth. He has no mythological dimen-
sion. We shall see later that the popular belief conceived of this God the 
same way. This means that the basic idea of Israelite religion was bound up 
from its inception in a radical division between God and the world. The 
world and its phenomena, the warp and woof of myth, were not perceived 
in this idea as a revelation of God’s life, as the garment of God’s being, but 
as the manifestation of God’s will, the site of God’s supreme rule. God and 
the world are two beings, which have no connection, whether natural, mag-
ical, or mythological. The idea of the absolute dominance of the divine will 
severed that connection. Where such a natural connection exists, there is 
also fate, suffering, enslavement* to necessity, mythology. The idea of the 
supremacy of the divine will uprooted the notion of God and world that is 
the foundation and root of paganism: the notion of the divinity as embed-
ded in the hierarchy of the laws of the world and its material nature and 
subordinate to a supreme fate. The victory over paganism was implicit in 
severing the natural-mythological connection between God and the world, 
its material and causal laws. Elevating God over the world and its phenom-
ena also elevated God over the multiplicity of the world. A supreme God is 
one. 
Another primary symbol of the new idea is sanctity. Sanctity is not 
“natural” closeness to divinity or belonging to the divine in a property rela-
tion (taboo), as Robertson Smith tried to explain it, nor is it supreme power 
and force as Dussaud sought to explain it.39 It is a dimension of supreme 
being over natural being, an exalted sphere above the spheres of reality of 
the visible world. Beyond the visible world there is a sphere of other life 
transcending the sphere of life in which humankind and other animals have 
their existence. The visible world draws its energy [shefa‛] from that hid-
den sphere. There is a supernal, intensified sphere for good, which is the 
sacred, and corresponding to it there is an infernal, intensified sphere for 
                                                     
*  Translator’s note: “Enslavement”—shi‛bud (also translated “subordination”). 
39  See Robertson Smith, The Religion of the Semites (London: Adam & Charles Black, 
1907), 92ff., 140ff., 151, 395, 401, etc., and René Dussaud, Les origines cananéennes 
du sacrifice israélite (Paris: Leroux, 1921), 30ff. 
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evil, which is the impure. Whatever emanates from the higher sphere and 
whatever belongs to it is holy; whatever emanates from the infernal sphere 
and whatever belongs to it is impure. In this intensified realm of being are 
latent secret intensified powers. But the power in itself is not the essence of 
sanctity (or of impurity) but its activity. The sacred in itself is an attribute 
of being, not of activity. 
The distinction between the profane [i.e., ordinary] and the sacred (and 
the impure) is the fundamental distinction of religion in general, and it is 
not, of course, an innovation of Israelite religion. But paganism imagined 
the sacred as implanted in the world, as having a “natural” connection with 
its phenomena, a kind of second, hidden side of the world’s nature. Pagan-
ism sanctified many natural things; it assigned a natural sanctity to many 
phenomena in the world. It invested with sanctity the waters, fire, various 
animal species, trees, stones, fountains, rivers, mountains, and caves. It 
sanctified the earth, the heavens, and the stars and planets. Corresponding 
to this natural sanctity, it set aside a sphere of “natural” impurity. But Isra-
elite religion desacralized all natural phenomena. It knows of no material 
object that is sacred in its own right. The proof is that it does not know of 
any category of holy objects in nature. It concentrated all sanctity in God, 
who rules the world, in the God who transcends the cosmos. Objects can 
only possess “historical” sanctity by virtue of God’s will or as a result of 
God’s deeds and commandment. We can recognize the profound effect of 
the new idea especially in the transformation that took place in the concep-
tion of impurity. Israelite religion knows of no natural sanctity, but it seems 
to have knowledge of natural impurity: the impurity of the human corpse, 
of semen, of menstruation, of leprosy, of a dead animal, and of reptiles and 
other impure animal species. This is a carryover from an earlier religious 
phase. But corresponding to this, a transformation takes place in the very 
concept of impurity: biblical faith has no knowledge of the pagan concept 
of a dangerous impurity emanating from a supernatural, demonic, unique 
root, equal in its level of being to the divine. It abolished the notion of 
Ahrimanic impurity, simultaneously impure and evil, as we shall see in 
detail later. It united good and evil in one jurisdiction. This is expressive of 
a profound, radical transformation. There is only one domain of supreme 
being, that of sanctity—of God. It is not in nature, in the visible world, nor 
is it connected to it by a natural connection. The sacred is in God, and its 
flow is contingent on God’s will and commandment. Therefore, the sacred 
served in Israelite religion as a symbol of God’s supremacy over all, a 
symbol of God’s uniqueness. It reserved sanctity to God and to everything 
that flows from God’s will. Only one being is holy. The sublimity of the 
holy expresses the sublimity of God. Holy is the concept in Israelite reli-
gion that stands parallel to incorporeal in the philosophical religion. The 
sublimity of the holy God expresses a kind of aspiration toward abstraction, 
toward incorporeality. 
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But Israelite religion did not attain the idea of incorporeality in its philo-
sophical formulation on its own. This limitation followed to a certain extent 
from the very nature of the conditions of its being and development. 
The basic idea of Israelite religion—the supremacy of the divine will, 
raising God over every nature and fate—left no room for the tension of 
divine forces fighting each other, for a divine mythological drama. Is there 
any place for drama, for activity, for striving for living embodiment where 
there is one supreme decisive will? Israelite religion transferred the divine-
world drama from the domain of nature and its forces to the domain of the 
human will. The divine will rules over all. But it has one “limitation”: the 
will of the human, to whom God has granted free choice and the power to 
sin. By human sin, the supreme divine will has become, as it were, im-
paired. This is the opening for evil in the world. Opposite the divine will is 
set the human will; in place of the mythological tension between divine 
forces comes the moral tension between God’s will and man’s will. This is 
the special sphere of the divine drama in Israelite religion. To the absolute 
will belongs an aspiration that remains to be fulfilled. God commands, and 
the human can either fulfill God’s command or disobey Him. In place of 
mythological tension comes historical tension. This religion was interested 
not in the events of the god and his life, his desires, his wars, and his victo-
ries among the other gods but in the events of God’s commandment, His 
teaching, His activity among human beings. Human society, human history, 
man’s religious and ethical dedication—these were the campaigns of the 
“war” of the supreme God. For this reason, it is correct to say that a special 
connection obtains between Israelite religion, on the one hand, and history 
and morality, on the other. It is true that Israel’s God is a historical and 
ethical God and that human social life takes the place of God’s special ac-
tivity in the Israelite religion. But those scholars were mistaken who imag-
ined they had found the root of Israelite religion here. The historical and 
ethical character of Israelite religion was more correctly only a result of the 
way that the basic metaphysical idea became embodied. The national ele-
ment in Israelite religion was likewise only a mode of its embodiment, a 
necessary framework but not its foundation and root. This will be clarified 
later on. 
Indeed, a faith at whose center stands the activity and commandment of 
God within humanity could not develop on the basis of the idea of divine 
incorporeality. 
Pagan thought arrived from the idea of divine incorporeality to the idea 
of divine unity and also to the idea of God’s transcendence over the sensi-
ble world. On this line, the paths crossed. But pagan thought, with all its 
abstractions, never arrived at the root idea of Israelite religion: at the abso-
lute dominance of the divine will over being, at absolute liberation of di-
vinity from the chains of law, of nature, of fate. The subordination of the 
divinity to nature and mythic fate remains alive and standing in pagan 
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thought even at its most exalted peaks. For the hidden, impersonal God of 
pantheism, the world serves as a “natural” garb, which it cannot shed. 
There is a “lawful,” necessary connection between the sublimely hidden 
one who exists in truth and his garments, the imaginary world of phenome-
na that emanates from him. This is an eternal game. In the system of Spino-
za, one of the most striking embodiments of pagan thought, God is fettered 
by the iron chains of the “geometric method” and its eternal domination. 
This is the law of divinity; this is its fate. Aristotle’s cause of causes is first 
in rank of being. Everything proceeds from it, and there is no cause higher 
than it. But its connection with the effects contingent on it is natural and 
necessary. It is caught up with them as a link in a chain. The connection is 
an eternal connection, not dependent on a divine will. This is the fate that 
rules the divinity. 
Furthermore, in the quest of metaphysical thought for abstraction and 
transcendence, it elevated divinity above all will. Will has a human ele-
ment, the desire of imperfect being for a thing of which it senses the lack. 
But divinity is perfection, and therefore it has no striving or will. Being at 
rest, serene, without change or transformation and thus without will—this 
is the extreme of abstraction, of incorporeality. It raised divinity up above 
will and also tended to raise it over personality in general and to subsume it 
to impersonal or supra-personal being. Nirvana—this is a “divine” state 
characteristic of pagan incorporeality/abstraction. Or: happiness of the self, 
self-satisfaction. Or: the supreme idea in an unchanging world of eternal 
ideas. Or: a supreme intellect that knows only itself. The will is, in Spino-
za’s system, a vain delusion. In true, divine reality, it has no place. Here 
there is only a geometric connection of things and ideas. 
A fortiori, metaphysical abstraction, by aspiring to sublimity and tran-
scendence, removed divinity from all matters of the lower worlds and in 
particular from the human being’s concerns, aspirations, and history. The 
supreme intellect knows only itself and not the lower worlds. How much 
less does it “supervise” them or provide for their concerns. This God is too 
exalted and transcendent for them. Metaphysical incorporeality by its na-
ture rejects providence. The world order is rooted in divinity, but this is by 
virtue of a natural, necessary, eternal power, not the power of a providen-
tial, constantly active will. A fortiori, this divinity does not engage in hu-
man history, perform miracles for humanity, or give Torah and command-
ments. Similarly, this God is exalted over human morality. A “moral” 
God—another anthropomorphism! Philosophical religion transfers the fo-
cus of activity from God to man, to human intellect. The human being must 
strive toward divinity, to ascend by degrees of being and arrive at the divine 
level. Man must be released from the material. He must empower the ra-
tional soul. Perfection of intellect is the way to the supreme world of ideas. 
At a lower level, pagan-philosophical religion also believes in the power of 
certain magical rites and mystical “sanctities” to raise the soul to the divine 
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heights. Social morality can also serve as a basis for this, a lower level in 
the ladder of intellectual perfection. 
The idea of incorporeality, as it was formulated in all reaches of the pa-
gan world, did not include the liberation of divinity from its mythological 
subordination and the imposition of its will on the world. On the other 
hand, the idea of incorporeality brought about a distancing of the divinity 
from the world and from humanity and the abolition of the idea of provi-
dence. This was a fundamental negation of the popular religion. Nowhere 
did abstract philosophical religion become a popular religion. 
It is therefore natural that the Israelite religion, whose fundamental idea 
was the supreme ruling will of God, the will that commands and acts in 
human life, did not proceed at first along the path toward incorporeality. Its 
God was all will and activity; its “essence,” beyond the curtain of will and 
activity, was unknown. He was not a restful and serene God of the heights, 
happy in self-satisfaction, who had nothing to do with the lower worlds and 
with human fate. He was a “zealous God,” commanding and demanding, 
keeping track of sins and performing kindnesses, a redeeming God, doing 
good and creating evil. He was close to man’s life and destiny. Moreover, 
He was a self-revealing God. The characteristic innovation of the Israelite 
religion was prophecy in its special Israelite version. The bearer of the new 
God’s word was not the priest who contemplated the mysteries of being 
and its divine powers, nor the philosopher living in the transcendental 
world of ideas, but the prophet, and especially the apostolic prophet. The 
apostolic prophet was a unique phenomenon in the world and special to the 
Israelite religion in its period of origin. In it was embodied the essence of 
this faith: faith in the God of the will and action. It was not man who ac-
cording to this idea seeks a path to God’s serene heights; God is the one 
who comes down to man to show him the way. This faith was intrinsically 
connected with revelation and prophecy. 
It should not therefore be surprising that Israelite faith was innocently 
bound up with imagining the visage of the God of prophecy and vision. The 
divine visage was a necessary symbol of the divine personality; of God’s 
appearing in order to act, command, and judge; of God’s closeness to the 
human being and to his destiny. A symbol—for one should note the limita-
tion that Israelite religion observed from the outset in imagining a visage of 
God: it excluded any mythological likeness, any likeness that smacked of 
subordination to matter and the natural hierarchy, any likeness that suggest-
ed a biography of God. Its likenesses were not descriptions of God’s fate 
but symbols of the revelation of God’s will and activity, as we shall explain 
further below. God’s pamalia [< familia, entourage] were not God’s par-
ents, children, wives, and servants but God’s emissaries, symbols of God’s 
rule over the world. In the absence of material connection and mythology, 
the likeness of God naturally became a symbol, even though God’s incor-
poreality was not explicitly formulated as such. 
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Moreover, even though Israelite religion never arrived at the idea of in-
corporeality, it was steeped in transcendence at a level to which pagan 
thought with all its abstractions never arrived. Imposing the divine will on 
all being broke reality into two parts: the world, which was subordinated to 
law and hierarchy; and the God, who is outside the hierarchy and above it. 
The divine will draws the line between these two domains. There is no 
natural connection at all between the divine being and the being of the 
world: not the connection between the garment and its wearer, as in panthe-
ism; not the connection between the form and the image and shadow, as in 
Plato’s doctrine of ideas; not the connection of emanation, as in Neoplato-
nism; not the connection between natural cause and effect, as in Aristoteli-
anism. The divine being, behind the curtain of the divine will, is fundamen-
tally other than the being of the world. The world is created through the 
divine “utterance”—this is a major symbol. 
Similarly, the Israelite religion—despite its lack of abstraction—arrived 
at a sublimity of its God-concept that pagan thought never attained. It ar-
rived at this sublimity, too, from its fundamental aspiration: to make the 
divine will dominant over all, even evil, even matter. Out of the aspiration 
to exalt the divine being, pagan thought sought, following its mythology, to 
exclude evil from the divine domain. God is the good. It would be a defect 
to envisage God as the root of evil. Evil has its own special metaphysical 
root. Evil is something extra-divine that became commingled with the 
good. Evil is nothingness, it is the boundary edge of the good, and so forth. 
Israelite faith did not travel this path. It did not leave room for a reality 
rivaling God. Such a reality would set limits to God’s will and freedom; 
necessity would be setting bounds to God’s will. Israelite faith united evil 
and good under a single jurisdiction. This means that it raised divinity 
above good and evil. God is not light or darkness, not life or death. God 
rules over all these. All these proceed from God’s will. This unification of 
good and evil under one jurisdiction is steeped in powerful transcendence. 
All paganism envisaged the creation of the world as emergence from 
primal matter. Following mythological thought, pagan metaphysical 
thought established the preexistence of matter as a foundational principle. 
From God came the Logos, the world order, and creative force. But matter 
did not originate from the divine. The idea of the preexistence of matter 
stemmed on the one hand from the scientific assumption that something 
cannot be created from nothing. On the other hand, it satisfied the demand 
of the exalted principle of incorporeality that raised divinity over any con-
tact with matter. Matter is evil, nothingness, death. Therefore, it is foreign 
to God. We see here that in this facet also the Israelite religion did not fol-
low the pagan principle of incorporeality. The Bible in its naïveté does not 
deal with this question. We cannot determine from the creation narratives 
in the Bible whether the world was created from nothingness or from 
preexisting matter. Only one thing is clear: The Bible does not know of the 
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pagan necessity for preexisting matter. (On this, see my later chapter: “The 
Israelite Faith: Tales of God.”) Moreover, at the very moment that Israelite 
faith felt the pressing reality of this problem in its theoretical formulation, 
at the moment that it encountered the metaphysical assumption concerning 
preexisting matter, it rejected it forcefully. Preexisting matter would pose a 
limitation to the divine will and the divine rule. Matter, too, was created by 
the divine will. There is no reality outside God’s jurisdiction.40 The faith 
that had not arrived at the metaphysical abstraction of incorporeality ar-
rived nevertheless at an unprecedented sublimity of conception of the di-
vine being—a sublimity that even pagan thought, with all its abstractions 
and refinements, would never achieve. This also partook of a powerful 
impulse to transcendence. This was a unique insight into divinity, conceiv-
ing the thought that the most refined paganism could not conceive, namely, 
that matter was created, that the world was created ex nihilo. This was the 
highest idea of the divine. It is clear that such sublimity could not have 
been achieved by promoting one god to rulership over the other gods, as 
Hume hypothesized.41 This was a faith that was born of a unique primal 
intuition: from the idea of a supreme divine will. 
One therefore finds that at the hour that the Israelite faith came into con-
tact with the world of Greek thought on the question of the image or incor-
poreality of God, it accepted the idea of incorporeality and made it primary. 
It seemed to the Hellenistic Jews that this was a fundamental Israelite no-
tion, included among the core beliefs of Israelite faith, and that the Greek 
sages had borrowed it from them. It appeared that way also to the later 
                                                     
40  Ber. Rab., 1:12: “A philosopher asked Rabban Gamaliel: ‘Your god is a great artist, but 
he found good materials that aided him: tohu, bohu, darkness, air, water, and the 
depths.’ Rabban Gamaliel responded: ‘God blast his spirit! According to the Torah, eve-
ry one of them was created.’” See the saying of Rab, b. Ḥag., 12a: “Ten things were cre-
ated on the first day: [heaven and earth, tohu, bohu, light and darkness, wind and water, 
the measure of day and the measure of night].” This is perhaps also the intent of Ben 
Zoma, who “astounded the world” concerning the verse “And God made the firma-
ment”: “‘And he made?’—this is strange. Weren’t they created by [the divine] utter-
ance?” (Ber. Rab., 4:6). Nevertheless, we find that rabbinic lore tells naïvely, following 
the biblical narrative, also of creation from preexisting material. Thus they said that the 
world was established on the Foundation Stone (b. Yoma, 54b). We have also learned in 
a Baraita: “Rabbi Eliezer said: The world was built out from the middle” (that is to say, 
the solid land in the middle of the world came first, and from there all was created), 
“Rabbi Joshua said: The world was created from the sides” (that is to say, the waters 
around the land came first, and from there all was created; ibid.). On the creation of the 
lights, the aggadic masters said: “The Holy and Blessed One wrapped himself in it as a 
cloak and the light of His radiance shone from one end of the world to the other” (Ber. 
Rab., 3:4). We find in a later midrash that the waters were created from the light of 
God’s garment and the earth from the snow under the throne of God’s glory (Pirke de-
Rabbi Eliezer, § 3). Overall, the rabbinic lore is oblivious to the problem. But once it 
encounters the view that the matter was there of necessity and that without prior materi-
als God would not have been able to create the world, it rejects this view forcefully. 
41  See above, n. 2. 
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Geonim. Also Naḥmanides, who was wholehearted in his faith and had no 
tendency to philosophy, wrote that the principle that there is no supernal 
form or divine visage “is written in the Torah, repeated in the prophetic 
writings, and enunciated a third time in the Hagiographa.”42 This idea was 
later incorporated into the enumerated articles of faith and was given a 
place in the liturgy. Indeed, Judaism accepted this idea from Greek thought, 
but it assimilated it, taking it out of its pagan context and appropriating it 
with a change of essence. It found in it a complement to its own nature, 
incorporating it into a system of ideas very different from the one in which 
it had originated. In paganism the doctrine of incorporeality served as a 
factor for exalting divinity over the element of personality and will, for 
subsuming divinity into an eternal empyrean realm of being, into an idea 
exalted over all will and activity. It served as a factor for distancing divinity 
above mankind, his life and moral struggle. Even so, it never arrived at the 
idea of divine freedom, of liberating the divinity from the law of the cos-
mos. Not so in Judaism. Judaism sensed that the idea of incorporeality was 
complementary to its own basic idea: the absolute supremacy and dominion 
of God over all, liberation of God from all subordination to nature, law, 
cosmic hierarchy, fate. It did not originally sense the problem latent in the 
imagistic depiction of God. In all naïveté it envisaged a visage of God, 
without sensing that this might impugn the supremacy of His will or the 
absolute freedom of His divine rule. It did not feel that the divine visage 
was tainted with subordination to the laws of space. But once it sensed this, 
owing to the influence of Greek thought, it accepted divine incorporeality 
as a necessary complement to the idea of the supreme, free God. This liber-
ated God from a connection to space. The idea that in paganism had served 
as a basis for the concept of a distant, exalted God, beyond personality, 
beyond will, subordinated eternally to the law of being, served the Israelite 
faith as a final complement to the concept of a free God, supreme over all, 
personal, acting, and commanding. Judaism absorbed the idea while radi-
cally changing its pagan essence. It was subsumed under its concept of 
holiness. It was a new formation, and in a certain respect it drew substance 
from the inner substance of Judaism, resulting in an original intrinsic crea-
tion. 
Nevertheless, Judaism hesitated and took its bearings before absorbing 
the idea of incorporeality. The pangs of absorption lasted for a millennium. 
This was a “lily among thorns.” Incorporeality disposed of the final limita-
tion and subordination [of the original Israelite God-concept] and comple-
mented the idea of divine supremacy. But there was opposition and tension 
between the element of incorporeality and the element of will and activity. 
The envisaged God of prophecy and rabbinic lore was more appropriate to 
Judaism’s practical striving. Incorporeality provided theoretical satisfac-
                                                     
42  See his letter to the rabbis of France, cited earlier. 
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tion, but it was steeped in a kind of practical limitation. At any rate, the 
idea of incorporeality made its appearance to Jewish eyes embedded in a 
systematic framework of pagan metaphysical ideas. The idea of incorpore-
ality was bound up with raising God beyond the elements of personality, 
beyond will, beyond providence, beyond the ability to impart command-
ment and ethics. To the Jewish sensibility, the whole system smacked of 
subordinating God, not liberating Him. Accepting the idea of incorporeality 
was liable to set Judaism before a new problematic of incomparable diffi-
culty and complexity. In what respect could it prove advantageous and 
complementary to Jewish faith, and in what respect could it be a source of 
heresy and apostasy? Faced with enlightened pagan thought, wholehearted 
Jewish faith sensed first and foremost its heretical danger. It therefore re-
jected and abominated it no less than it rejected popular paganism. It pre-
ferred its liberating irrationality over the subordinating rationality of pagan 
metaphysics. 
 
This will help explain one of the most instructive phenomena of intellectual 
history. Priestly and philosophical paganism surpassed Israelite faith in its 
metaphysical speculations and arrived at the conception of an incorporeal 
divinity, whether pantheistic, idealistic, or causal. Metaphysically this con-
ception seems to surpass the Israelite personal, envisaged conception of 
God. Eventually Israelite religion accepted the idea of God’s incorporeality 
from pagan thought. Nevertheless, Judaism abominated and stigmatized all 
paganism in the name of its own conception of God’s exaltation and sub-
limity. The explanation of this phenomenon lies in the basic idea of Israel-
ite religion—the supremacy of the divine will. From it, Israelite faith was 
able to overcome myth and eliminate any mythological subordination of 
God to nature. From it, it arrived at exalting God over all being, and depict-
ing God as acting, commanding, and ethically concerned. The pagan incor-
poreal God-concept did not include the idea of God’s supreme freedom and 
supreme rule. In this respect it retained the yeast of mythology. Judaism 
accepted the idea of God’s incorporeality only by revising it substantially to 
conform to its own spirit. But Judaism was suspicious of abstract pagan 
thought, despite its advanced metaphysics, because at bottom it still repre-
sented paganism, with its limitation and subordination of the divine. There-
fore, it fought against it as well. 
 
 
* 
 
Israelite faith thus originated not from one or another historical event, not 
from sealing a national covenant, not from political prosperity, not from the 
trauma of destruction, and so forth, but from the revelation of a new reli-
gious-metaphysical idea. In the course of the generations this idea would 
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generate an entire worldview and life regimen, even though at the time it 
came into the world enveloped in a national garb and intertwined with the 
events of the day. It was steeped in transcendence unequalled since in the 
world. But it could be grasped in vision and likeness. It was born through 
visionary intuition and could be grasped through symbols. Therefore, it 
could be made into a popular faith. A God whose rule knew no bounds, 
who was all-capable, from whom everything originated, who was holy, 
sublime, zealous, ruling over good and evil, sending the word of His rule 
by way of prophets, one with no equal—all these could be grasped by pop-
ular religious feeling. This idea could be born among the people of the de-
sert and could arouse passion among the people of the desert. A similar 
idea aroused passion at a later time among the Arab tribes at the time of 
Mohammed. It was not born from the speculations of Babylonian or Egyp-
tian priests—from their aspiration to the idea of divine unity on the basis of 
abstract scientific knowledge. From the outset, it was foreign to these spec-
ulations. It declared war on all paganism, and it accepted the idea of divine 
incorporeality from paganism only after many generations and out of con-
siderable struggle. It was born of the flame of religious feeling, and it was 
infused throughout with sublimity and adoration of the supreme, the One, 
whose will rules over all. This idea of the divine unity stipulated the impo-
sition of a single free divine will over all being. Therefore, it was radically 
opposed to all paganism: popular or priestly-philosophical. It did not come 
about through abstraction and was not dependent on it. It was expressed in 
symbols, not abstract concepts. The new idea was popular, and its original 
activity was popular: a profound struggle against mythology, banishing 
mythology from Israel, creating a full world of non-mythological religious 
symbols. These were symbols of God’s freedom and supremacy. The idea 
stamped all ancient Israelite culture with its imprint. 
We will devote the following chapters to a clarification of this phenom-
enon.
  
Freud’s Book on Moses and the Monotheistic Faith 
Introductory Note by Lawrence Kaplan 
Yehezkel Kaufmann’s review essay of Sigmund Freud’s Moses and Mono-
theism (Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion) was first pub-
lished in the Israeli journal Moznaim 10 (1940): 199–211; and reprinted in 
Kaufmann’s collection of essays Mi-kivshonah shel ha-yetzirah ha-mikra’it 
(Tel-Aviv: Dvir, 1966), 240–55. Despite the essay’s evident importance 
both as a penetrating and fundamental critique of Freud’s controversial 
theses and as a major source for Kaufmann’s own views on the origins of 
religion, the fact that the essay appeared in Hebrew, and, until now, was not 
translated into any modern European language has severely limited its 
readership. Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, in his very well-known and highly 
influential book Freud’s Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991), 135, note 7, cites 
and, indeed, highlights the significance of Kaufmann’s essay, but even the 
fame of Yerushalmi’s book could not enable the essay to overcome the 
formidable language barrier. I hope that with this translation Kaufmann’s 
essay will finally achieve the readership it deserves, both among Kaufmann 
scholars and also—and perhaps primarily—among Freud scholars, most of 
whom, alas, like the master himself, are “ignorant of the language of Holy 
Writ.” 
A draft of this translation was prepared, under my supervision, by my 
student Briah Cahana, and was revised by me. I thank Ms. Cahana for her 
excellent work, it being understood, of course, that I bear sole responsibil-
ity for any errors and imprecisions. The page references in the original He-
brew essay are to Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion, Am-
sterdam, 1939; the page references in this translation are to the Vintage 
edition (New York, 1939) of Moses and Monotheism in Katherine Jones’ 
felicitous and fluent translation. All the numbered footnotes in the essay, 
with the exception of the first, are by the translators. 
  
  
Freud’s Book on Moses and the Monotheistic Faith 
Yehezkel KAUFMANN* 
1 
The book about Moses and the origins of the monotheistic faith by the 
founder of psychoanalysis1 made a great impression on wide circles of Jew-
ish intellectuals—even those who are generally unacquainted with critical 
biblical scholarship. Before the particulars of the book’s contents were 
widely publicized, Freud’s enthusiastic acolytes were unable to refrain 
from weeping tears of joy upon hearing the good news that Freud, in his 
old age, remembered the rock whence he was hewn and wrote a book on 
the Jewish faith. However, when a few details of his research became 
known, people were stunned. It became known that Freud sought to prove 
that Moses was an Egyptian, a member of the faithful entourage of the 
Pharaoh Ikhnaton, the founder of the belief in the unique divinity of his sun 
god. Apart from this, it became known that, according to Freud, Moses was 
killed by “the Jewish People.” These claims aroused bewilderment and 
outrage. Many viewed this book as even constituting an attack on Judaism, 
and in any case, it seemed to them that the book degraded the honor of the 
Jewish people. The view that Moses was murdered by the “Jewish People” 
was likely to arouse unpleasant memories. The murder of the exalted law-
maker calls to mind the memory of another murder: the murder of “the son 
of man” (Freud, indeed, views these two murders as constituting one con-
tinuum; see pp. 108, 111, 129ff.). Apart from this, he stripped from the 
people of Israel the honor of being the originators of monotheism and he 
deprived them of their most chosen son. Freud himself states in his intro-
ductory remarks that it is not an easy and pleasant task to deprive a people 
of its greatest son, and he excuses himself in the name of the obligation to 
tell the truth. However, he decided to suppress that very truth on account of 
his fear of the Catholic Church, and he finally released it to the public only 
after he was exiled from under the protection of her wings (pp. 69ff.).  
However, it must be stressed that the matter concerning Moses’ murder 
and all the more so, the matter concerning the Egyptian origin of monothe-
ism, are not Freud’s own innovations. Rather, they were already known 
conjectures in biblical criticism, and Freud did not discover any new sup-
porting evidence. Apart from this, be the sentiments of contemporary Jew-
                                                     
*  Sifro shel froid ‘al moshe ve-‘al emunat-ha-yiḥud (דוחיה-תנומא לעו השמ לע דיורפ לש ורפס). 
Translated from Mi-kivshonah shel ha-yetzirah ha-mikra‘it by Brian Cahana and Law-
rence Kaplan. 
1  Sigmund Freud, Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion, Amsterdam, 1939. 
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ish intellectuals as they may—the image of historical Judaism is not dam-
aged by these conjectures (even if we suppose that they are true). The mur-
der of prophets is one sin in the long litany of sins which both Scripture and 
later Judaism ascribe to the people of Israel. Moreover, one might view the 
murder of the prophets as even stemming naturally from the essence and 
role of prophecy, from the great tension prophecy’s harsh rebuke produces 
in the nation’s soul. The clash between the nation and the prophet is formi-
dable, and it agitates the very depths. One could say that prophecy would 
not have been prophecy had it not possessed the power and had it not been 
part of its very nature to enrage the people, arouse its wrath, and bring it to 
hostile acts against the prophets, even to the extent of spilling their blood. 
“Your sword has devoured your prophets, like a destroying lion” declares 
Jeremiah (Jer 2:30). Jeremiah, himself, they sought to kill, and just a 
hairsbreadth separated him from death. They killed Zechariah in the court-
yard of the Temple (2 Chr 24:21–22), and, according to a later legend, his 
blood remained bubbling until Nebuzaradan came and caused it to stop by 
[killing the finest of the Jerusalemites, thus avenging it by] the flowing 
streams of [their innocent] blood (Lamentations Rabbah, Petihta [23; cf. 
Gittin 57b; Sanhedrin 96b]). Despite this, Israel is still the nation of proph-
ecy, since only that people was addressed by the prophets over the course 
of many generations and only on its head did the harsh chastisements of the 
prophets fall, “as a heavy axe.” But in the end, the people sanctified the 
prophets’ words as the word of God, and they dedicated themselves to 
them. 
Similarly, the image of Judaism is not diminished in any way by the 
conjecture that Moses was an Egyptian. The Israelite faith is, to be sure, 
national in its form and its formative history. Nevertheless, it is not a “ra-
cial” faith. At its core, this faith is humanistic-universal. A characteristic 
expression of this presents itself in the attempt, which we find in the Torah, 
to view the belief in one God as the original belief of all humankind that 
existed the world over, well before the birth of the Israelite nation. Adam, 
Enoch, Noah, Shem, Ever, and others all believe in one God. Even in the 
days of Abraham, there is “a priest of God Most High” in the land of Ca-
naan, namely, Melchizedek, to whom Abraham gives a tithe (Gen 14:18–
20). God rested his divine presence also upon non-Israelite prophets. De-
spite this, Israel was the only nation in an idolatrous world in whose life the 
monotheistic faith took root and whose culture was a symbol and an ex-
pression of it. That constitutes its “chosenness.” And it makes no difference 
who Moses was—his words took root only in Israel, and on account of this 
he was an Israelite and only an Israelite. There is no Moses without Israel. 
And precisely the above demonstrates that these conjectures, which 
Freud accepted, lack all substance. Had Moses actually been murdered, that 
crime would have been included in the lengthy catalogue of Israel’s crimes 
right alongside the sin of the Golden Calf, and it would not have been bur-
 FREUD’S BOOK ON MOSES AND THE MONOTHEISTIC FAITH 321 
 
ied in enigmatic allusions, which only overly ingenious interpreters would 
be able to decipher. And had Moses received the Torah from Ikhnaton, this 
matter, too, could not have been completely forgotten. No one would have 
sensed anything problematic about a legend concerning a prophet or a king, 
“Priest of God Most High,” who built an altar to God in the land of Egypt. 
Must we not assume that Moses would have brought with him the memory 
of his teacher to Israel? And if Moses, the Egyptian, triumphed and was 
sanctified by the people of Israel—how did it happen that his teacher was 
so completely forgotten? It can only be that these conjectures do not pos-
sess even a kernel of historical truth (we will return to this later). 
2 
Freud’s innovation is not in these conjectures in and of themselves, but 
rather, in his attempt to use them to explain the origins of monotheism as 
well as the fate of the people of Israel on the basis of his general doctrine—
that is, on the basis of his psychoanalytic doctrine. His attempt here in Mo-
ses and Monotheism is a continuation of his attempt in his book Totem and 
Taboo (published in 1912) to explain the origin of religion in general using 
the psychoanalytic method. In his book on Moses he completes that study 
by clarifying the origins of Judaism, Christianity (pp. 108ff.), and partially 
also Islam (p. 118). He gleaned his knowledge of the history of the religion 
of Israel from the works of various authors, and he combined them in a 
manner that in his view would suit his purpose. He arranged the events in 
an artificial manner, so that they would require his explanation and that 
they would be able to be explained only according to the “analogy” of neu-
rotic illness. 
Freud seeks to understand religion as a product of a psychological ill-
ness, as a product of the “neurosis of humanity,” and he attempts to explain 
its powerful influence as one of the forms of “neurotic compulsion” acting 
on someone who is psychologically ill (pp. 68, 71, 130). And just like 
Freud’s method searches for the source of psychological illnesses in the 
hidden depths of the individual’s sexual and family life, and particularly in 
the impact of the father figure on the son, so here as well, his method 
searches for the source of the psychic illness that formed religion, within 
the depths of the sexual life and the family of human society, and especial-
ly—in the influence of the “primordial father” on the “sons.” Religious 
phenomena are to be grasped according to the pattern of the individual’s 
“neurotic symptoms,” and are to be viewed as a new flashing forth of for-
gotten memories from the primordial era of the human family. 
These neurotic phenomena in the life of an individual are rooted, ac-
cording to Freud, in the sexual experiences of a very young child, approxi-
mately until the age of five. At this tender age, the desire to commit the sin 
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of Oedipus awakens within him: the desire to expel the father from the 
world, to inherit his place and fulfill his roles. The threat or punishment for 
the expression of this desire fills him with terror and incises a deep wound 
upon his soul. Feelings of fear and hatred towards the father are aroused 
within him. The “I” of the child protects itself and struggles to extricate 
itself from the fear of these experiences, to suppress and repress their 
memory. With the passing of this stage of life, the experiences are forgot-
ten. They are thrust into the depths of the soul, and there they exist in sub-
merged form. The period of latency begins and extends until the age of 
puberty. This is the period of the incubation of the neurotic illness. With 
the age of puberty, the illness reveals itself and shows its symptoms. The 
forgotten experiences begin to break out from their hiddenness and influ-
ence the physical and psychical life of the youth and the adult. The clearest 
evidence of this activity is the strength and might it possesses, its power of 
compulsion. This outbreak is independent of and not in harmony with the 
rest of the foundations of the “I.” It gives rise to a strong hatred towards the 
father and the aspiration to rebel against him. Despite this, the relationship 
towards the father is not uniform, but, rather, is divided, in accordance with 
the divided intentions of the original oedipal desire. This desire includes 
not only the aspiration to expel the father but also the desire to inherit his 
place, to be just like him. Therefore, the after-growth of the reverberations 
of this outbreak in later stages of life is also divided. Hatred and fear ac-
company respect and aspiration for identification. The neurotic individual 
hates his father, but also venerates him and aspires to resemble him. This, 
then, is the schema of development: the original psychic wound—self-
protection—a period of latency—the manifestation of the illness—and the 
partial emergence of the experiences that have been hidden in the depths of 
the psyche. 
It is in accordance with the model of this phenomenon that Freud seeks 
to understand the source and development of the neurotic illness that serves 
as the source of religious belief. 
This neurosis is not individual but, rather, collective, and its roots are 
sunk deep in the life of the human species (pp. 101ff.). It is also firmly 
rooted in the oedipal desire, and it is also connected with the symbol of the 
“father” figure. However, this is not a symbol of the image of one’s person-
al father, but is rather a reflection of the patriarchal rule of the primeval 
father in the human society of this ancient and forgotten period. Freud pos-
its, in the footsteps of Darwin and Atkinson (pp. 102ff., 167ff.), that primi-
tive man lived in small hordes, and at the head of every family horde was a 
powerful male, the father, to whom all the females of his family horde, 
mothers and daughters alike, belonged, and he guarded them jealously from 
the young males—the sons. The fate of the sons was cruel. Any son who 
aroused the father’s jealousy was killed, castrated, or expelled from the 
horde. These young males who were expelled were forced to live in distinct 
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hordes and to provide themselves with wives by snatching them from other 
family hordes. And the strongest one amongst them also struggled to attain 
the status of the sole father-tyrant in his own family horde. That was the 
period of the rule of the primordial father. But with the passing of time, a 
revolution took place—“one day” the sons gathered together against the 
father, overcame him, killed him, and ate his flesh, in order to ingest his 
power and to become like him. It is reasonable to surmise that at this time 
as well a war erupted among the sons. But “in the end” they understood that 
nothing was to be gained from this war. So they established among them-
selves “a brother’s covenant,” and a sort of “social contract” was born by 
renouncing instinctual gratifications and establishing obligations and holy 
ordinances. The sons renounced the privileges of the father, and they re-
nounced the right of possessing the mothers and sisters. With this, the in-
cest taboo and the obligation of exogamy came into being. However, the 
memory of the father lived in the heart of the sons’ covenant. Remorse 
about the murder began to work its effect in them. It demanded that the 
memory of the crime be concealed and suppressed. The image of the father 
became exalted. Thus, there emerged a feeling of divided sentiment to-
wards the father. Then, there emerged in the midst of humanity the deifica-
tion of animals, which is the totemistic faith. The totem-animal was made 
into the symbol of the primordial father, and it was considered to be the 
father of the tribe, and through it the father was to be worshipped and ven-
erated. This is the beginning of religion, for totemism is the first form of 
religion. We also find a divided relationship towards the totem: it is wor-
shipped and admired, but from time to time the tribe sacrifices it and eats 
its flesh in a sacred feast—recalling the murder of the father and the eating 
of his flesh. Over the course of time, gods in the image of man came to 
replace the animals. And the belief in the gods also reveals the tendency to 
set up a father-god at the head of the pantheon. The end result of this de-
velopment is—the exaltation of one god-father figure, one ruler, modeled 
after the primordial father. The murder of “the primordial father”—this is 
“the historical truth” concealed in religion. 
3 
Following these reflections of his, Freud seeks to demonstrate that faith in 
one god is also created as a result of a wound to the collective soul: as a 
result of a new patricide—the murder of Moses (“The exalted father figure” 
pp. 113, 140–41), and of the feeling of remorse that the murder aroused in 
the heart of “the sons,” which thereby intensified the remorse over the pri-
mal murder. Sellin’s conjecture that Moses was murdered at the hands of 
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the Israelites,2 served Freud as a necessary premise in accordance with the 
principles of his system (p. 114). Were it not for Sellin, Freud would have 
had to invent it himself. 
The monotheistic idea was born in the Egyptian Empire, which raised it-
self above the realms of other nations and lands (pp. 22ff., 80, 108). The 
originator of this idea was Pharaoh Ikhnaton, who ascended the royal 
throne approximately in the year 1375 B.C.E. Ikhnaton negated the Egyp-
tian faith in many gods and in demons and spirits, as well as the belief in 
myths and magic. He proclaimed the belief in a unique god—in the sun 
god, whose name was Atan (or Aton). Aton was not a national god but 
rather a universal one, who sustains all creation. Pharaoh built a city for this 
god, and its name was Akhetaton (which is now the ruins of Tel-Ammon 
[Tell el-Amarna]), and in it he established temples for his god. He perse-
cuted the priests of the [other] gods, especially the priests of Amon, who 
were his fanatical opponents. He eradicated the cult of the [other] gods in 
the land. He opposed the traditional cult of the dead. He stressed the re-
quirement to live according to “Maat”—truth and justice. Therefore, his 
religion was universal and ethical. But a counter-reaction arose after his 
death. In the year 1350 BCE, Haremhab, the founder the 19th dynasty, as-
cended the royal throne, and he put an end to Ikhnaton’s projects. Akhe-
taton, the city, was destroyed, the old cult returned to its former state, and 
the very name of Ikhnaton was scorned and cursed (pp. 25ff., 73ff.). This 
was the end of the Egyptian monotheism. Until this point, Freud is basical-
ly following in the footsteps of Breasted3 and others.  
From that point on, Freud speculates that Moses was a member of Ikh-
naton’s entourage, from the nobility of Egypt, and perhaps even of royal 
descent (pp. 31 and more). Freud tries to demonstrate that Moses was an 
Egyptian on the basis of an analysis of the legend about his birth and his 
upbringing in Pharaoh’s house. Also testifying to this, according to Freud, 
is his Egyptian name, Moses (Mose), which appears as part of several 
Egyptian names [Amen-mose, Ptah-mose, etc]. Even after the extinction of 
Ikhnaton’s religion, Moses remained faithful to his king’s teachings and he 
did not wish to make his peace with the old religion. He was strong-spirited 
and resolute in his belief. Desolate and disconsolate, he turned his back on 
his people and decided to raise up for himself a new nation. He appeared 
amongst certain Hebrew tribes who lived in Goshen and were subjugated to 
Egypt. He brought his new religion to them. He taught them belief in the 
one god, Aton, who is Lord of the Heavens, the Adonai of the Jews. Per-
haps Moses went even further and rejected the link with the Egyptian cult 
of the sun (pp. 28, 57, 74). He imposed on the Hebrew tribes a belief in a 
                                                     
2  Translator’s Note: Ernst Sellin, Mose und seine Bedeutung für die israelitisch-jüdische 
Religionsgeschichte (Leipzig: A. Deichert 1922). 
3  Translator’s Note: James Henry Breasted, Development of Religion and Thought in 
Ancient Egypt (New York: Scribner 1912). 
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universal, moral God, forbade magic and witchcraft, supressed all cultic 
rituals, and demanded a life of truth and justice (see pp. 41, 62, 63, 80, 82, 
84, 109, 144). As a sign of the covenant, he imposed upon them the prac-
tice of circumcision, which is an Egyptian practice, and this, too, is a sign 
of the Egyptian origins of this religion (pp. 33ff., 46, 53, 74). Accompany-
ing Moses was his faithful entourage, namely the Levites. The Levites, too, 
were Egyptian. Testifying to this are the Egyptian names that are found 
among them (Pinhas, Hofni, etc). Also testifying to this is their standing 
among the Israelite tribes: they were “strangers,” who did not inherit a por-
tion of land with the other tribes (pp. 45ff.). The appearance of a high rank-
ing Egyptian official amongst the oppressed tribes made a great impression 
upon them. Moses organized the tribes and promised to bring them to the 
land of Canaan. During this period of anarchy, following the death of Ikh-
naton and preceding the anointment of Haremhab, the exodus of the tribes 
from Egypt led by Moses occurred, that is: between 1358 and 1350 BCE 
(pp. 32, 74). 
Freud describes what happens next in accordance with Sellin’s conjec-
ture, which provided him with “an unexpected way out of the difficulty” 
that he first encountered (pp. 42ff.). The Israelite tribes were unable to ac-
cept such a lofty a religion as that of Moses. They revolted against the 
powerful man, who so autocratically ruled over them. Moses’ fate was sim-
ilar to Ikhnaton’s. The wild primitive Semites rebelled against their prophet 
and murdered him, casting off the yoke of his religion (pp. 57ff., 63, 64, 71, 
74–75, 86, 114, 119ff.). This was a new murder of the father. This was a 
terrifying event that imprinted a wound in the people’s soul. And this was 
the beginning of the development of monotheism (pp. 84, 113ff.). 
The “analogy” of the development of the neurosis requires that after the 
wound in the soul there should be a period of latency, with the repression 
of the traumatic event in the hidden-depths of the soul. Freud stresses that it 
is possible to discern such a latency-period in the history of Israelite mono-
theism: it is the period between Moses and the triumph of monotheism at 
the beginning of the Second Temple. This is the period of the “incubation” 
of the neurosis, which was responsible for bringing about the triumph of 
Moses and his Torah. This is the “central fact” in the history of the religion 
of Israel (pp. 78, 87ff.). In the wake of Eduard Meyer4 and others, Freud 
relates the events that occurred after the death of Moses. The tribes that left 
Egypt, among them the Levites, encountered other Hebrew tribes (between 
1350 and 1215 BCE) in Kadesh (pp. 60 and more). They sought to forget 
and to repress the murder of Moses, therefore they recounted that Moses 
himself was in Kadesh (p. 58). It was here that the tribes established a reli-
gious covenant. The covenant, in truth, was a compromise between two 
                                                     
4  Translator’s Note: Eduard Meyer, Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme. Mit Beiträ-
gen von Bernhard Luther (Halle a. S.: Niemeyer 1906). 
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religions. Here the tribes accepted the religion of YHVH, who was the local 
god—the god of Mount Sinai. This religion was different than the religion 
of Moses. It was national and connected with cultic-rites. Its god, it would 
appear, was not unique, but only one of the gods. They attributed their re-
demption from Egypt to this god. However, the Levites were the keepers of 
Moses’ tradition, and they attempted to incorporate as much of the Mosaic 
tradition in the new religion as was possible. As a result of their influence 
the new religion was linked with the name of Moses. They forcibly im-
posed upon the nation the sign of the covenant of Moses’ religion—the 
practice of circumcision. But essentially it appears that both Moses’ fright-
ful fate and his true teaching were forgotten. However, they continued to 
exist secretly, in latent fashion, perhaps among the Levitical priests. There 
was no place for them in the actual written text. The truth about them was 
not written down, and what was written about them was distorted and ob-
scured. But they existed in the [oral] tradition. Freud stresses this notion of 
an unwritten “[oral] tradition,” and this “tradition” serves him as a type of 
realm of latency and hidden repression that parallels the realm of the un-
conscious in the soul of the individual. Moses’ religion was destined to 
triumph over the course of time, because it was “tradition” (pp. 85–86, 89, 
164, 166 and more). For generations, the nation was idolatrous. But from 
time to time, prophets arose who renewed Moses’ religion and denounced 
all cultic rites and established the faith upon truth and justice. Among them 
“the tradition” of the murder of Moses worked its effect. Finally, after 
many generations, the forgotten shadow of Moses’ God triumphed—
precisely because it was a shadow, precisely because it wrought its effect 
out of the hidden-depths of this “tradition” (pp. 60ff., 75, 85ff., 159ff.). 
Why then did the monotheistic idea triumph precisely among the people 
of Israel? Because fate strengthened in the very midst of the people the 
impact of “the primordial sin”—the latent memory of the murder of the 
father at the beginning of history of man—by virtue of the fact that fate 
brought about a new “murder of the father,” the murder of Moses. The hid-
den feeling of remorse for this sin strengthened the people’s yearning for 
the venerated father-figure, for the image of the one, singular God, which is 
a symbol of the singular, uncontested rule of the “primordial father” (pp. 
113ff., cf. pp. 171–72). 
4 
That this entire construction is just an ill-fitting patchwork of words and 
ideas artificially stitched together becomes clear to us first and foremost 
from an examination of its foundational premise: the premise that the 
“murder of the father,” the primordial collective sin of all humanity, is 
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submerged as a traumatic-memory in the hidden depths of the individual 
and frightens him from then until today. 
We would be allowed to posit a collective “murder of the fathers” in the 
days of the primordial man only if it became clear to us that the family 
structure in those days did not allow any room for the young males to satis-
fy their desire for sex and for establishing families except by murdering 
their fathers: in which case, the murder of the fathers would have been the 
most natural solution for them. However, even if we were to accept Dar-
win’s and Atkinson’s hypotheses about the origins of the primordial family, 
we are unable to arrive in any respect at this conclusion. For was it not also 
possible in the period of the primordial ruling-father for the sons to do what 
they did in a subsequent period: namely to seize women for themselves 
when they matured and became strong? And therefore they would have 
been able to attack an unrelated horde-family and kill its father with the 
young sons and abduct the women. And one may conjecture that the fear of 
their father would actually motivate them to attack precisely another fami-
ly. This also would be a way of establishing a family by murdering “fa-
thers,” but—by murdering unrelated “fathers,” which is an ordinary murder 
and not an oedipal murder. It goes without saying that the youngest sons, 
who stayed in the horde under the mothers’ shelter until their father’s death, 
achieved a family life without murdering their father. Perhaps a murderous 
war would break out among them. But this would be a fratricidal and not a 
patricidal war, the sin of Cain and not the sin of Oedipus. Certainly, in-
stances of patricide did occur in that period. But these were only instances, 
even if there were perhaps many such instances. But patricide was not a 
general precondition for establishing new families. 
Indeed, it seems as if Freud also posits this idea, inasmuch as he main-
tains that the patricide occurred in the beginning of a particular period, 
which came after the period of the rule of the father. But in no way is it 
understandable what was the real goal and practical purpose of the murder 
of the father in the beginning of the emergence of “the covenant of the 
sons.” His description of the murder and its results is perplexing and quite 
irrational. The exiled brothers rebel, kill the father, and eat his flesh. And 
after the feast, the experience teaches them that it is better for them to fore-
go becoming a ruling-father, and they then relinquish the women in their 
father’s family and establish the obligation of exogamy. Hence, they relin-
quish the women on whose account they murdered the father. And it is only 
now that they suddenly decide to take other women, when they really could 
have taken them before the murder of their father! And if experience “final-
ly” made them wise, then why does this experience occur only after the 
murder and the feast? After all, wouldn’t the fear of the cruel father also 
lead these brothers to relinquish the mothers and sisters and to establish 
exogamy, and, in this way, the rule of the father would have been negated. 
And also the youngest brothers, who would inherit the horde after their 
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father’s death, were likely, as a result of their experience of war, to recog-
nize that it is better to establish “a social contract” (and perhaps together 
with the exiled brothers), in which case they would have also been able to 
negate the rule of the father without murder and without a feast. And in 
general: The decisive undertaking that abolished the rule of the father and 
formed the first human society was, even from Freud’s premises, not the 
murder of the father and also not the taboo regarding the mothers and the 
sisters. This is because the murderous war, which arose from the aspiration 
to acquire the father’s exclusive rule, could also have broken out with re-
spect to exogamous women. “The decisive step,” therefore, was “the cove-
nant” establishing that the right to possess the women of the society is not 
the right of just one man; that is to say, “a covenant” regarding the parcel-
ing out of women. And because of this, it must be emphasized that the pro-
hibition of incest did not flow from the “first covenant” as Freud describes 
it: The war of the brothers could also have ended in the allocation of the 
mothers and the sisters. And the essential point is that precisely “this cove-
nant” of sexual tolerance among the males, which made possible the very 
foundation of this new society, is not dependent in any respect upon patri-
cide. Freud inserted here the murder of the father in an artificial way. 
Therefore, there is absolutely no basis for the assumption that “the decisive 
step” in abolishing the rule of the father and in founding human society was 
the murder of the father (p. 103). And it follows, then, that there are no 
grounds for the assumption that weighing down on the soul of all humanity 
is the “original sin” of murdering the father. 
Equally baseless is the idea that totemism is connected to the murder of 
the primordial fathers. Freud stresses that the totem comes to replace the 
primordial father, since the totem is also thought of as the father of the 
tribe, that is: the begetter of the tribe (pp. 104–105; he especially stresses 
this point in his book Totem and Taboo). To the contrary, it is clear that the 
primordial “father” is not at all viewed as the one who engenders the fami-
ly. In his book Totem and Taboo, Freud dismisses this matter with a flimsy 
remark. But in truth, there is a decisive argument, here, which completely 
destroys his viewpoint. There is no doubt that primitive man did not know 
the role of the male in procreation. Early man could see the connection 
between the child and the mother, but the connection between the newborn 
and the father escaped him. This clearly emerges from the views of several 
primitive peoples regarding the family. This is derived from the fact that 
the rights of the mother preceded the rights of the father. This is also re-
flected in the myth about the primeval mother-goddess from whom the 
cosmos was engendered.5 And since the primordial “father” is thought of 
                                                     
5  Translator’s Note: Kaufmann would appear to be referring here to the Sumerian cosmo-
gonic myth about the primeval sea, Nammu, “the mother who gave birth to all the 
gods.” Note that Kaufmann does not refer to this myth in his extended survey of pagan 
creation myths in Vol. 1 of Toledot ha-emunah ha-yisre’elit (Tel Aviv: Bialik Institute/ 
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only as a husband and not as a father, the totem consequently could not 
have been considered as symbolizing him. On the contrary, the totem is 
thought of as the true father, the divine source of the fecundity of the tribe, 
since to begin with they did not recognize its human source. This clearly 
shows that primordial man’s apprehension of divinity originated without 
any connection to the primordial “father,” and all the more so without any 
connection to the memory of some supposed patricide. 
The absence of any connection between the idea of the totem and the 
idea of the primordial father may also be proven from the fact that the 
scope of the idea of the totem is much wider even than the scope of a father 
who is an engenderer. Because, first of all, not only an animal might be 
viewed as a totem, but also a plant and even a purely physical object. Apart 
from this, we find amongst the primitives not only a belief in an engender-
ing totem, but also in a totem from animals or from plants that serves as a 
source of nourishment for man. Apart from this, the totem also serves as a 
receptacle for the “external soul” of a person: The life of every member of 
the tribe is bound up in a mysterious fashion with one of the animals that 
are viewed as the totem of the tribe. These animals are not viewed as en-
genderers, but rather as brothers and sisters. The backdrop of this faith, 
then, is the image of fraternity and not that of paternity. Neither the nour-
ishing-totem nor the fraternal-totem can be derived from the deification of 
the primordial father-husband.  
And in general, the scope of the image of the god is so much wider than 
the image of the primordial “father” that there is no true possibility to de-
rive the image of the god from the image of the “father.” The gods are crea-
tors, the providers of rain and food, the creators of thunder and lightning, 
the ministers of light and darkness, life and death and sickness, the minis-
ters of wisdom and magic; they are inventors, leaders, judges, and the like. 
These gods are the sun and the moon, the heavens and the earth, the wind 
and the waters and fire, and the like. How can all this be derived, even via a 
thousand permutations, from the veneration of the primordial father-
husband who jealously guards the women? Even the original worship of the 
fathers cannot be explained as deriving from this veneration, because in-
cluded in the worship of the fathers is the veneration of the superior man: 
the leader, the king, the creator, the inventor, the legislator, the magician. 
                                                                                                                          
Dvir, 1937), pp. 302–24, but Moshe Greenberg in his abridged translation (prepared in 
consultation with Kaufmann), The History of the Religion of Israel (Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1960), 24–25, does include in brackets a very brief summary 
of this myth. This myth was first published in Henri de Genouillac, Textes religieux su-
mériens du Louvre, Tomes I-II (Paris: Musée du Louvre, 1930), 71:6; and Edward 
Chiera, Sumerian Myths and Epics (Oriental Institute Publications XV; Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1934), 116:16. Evidently it came to Kaufmann’s notice 
sometime after 1937, the year he published the first volume of Toledot, but before 1940, 
the year he published his review of Moses and Monotheism.  
330 YEHEZKEL KAUFMANN 
 
This is the deification of heroes, as Carlyle understood it, and not the deifi-
cation of the father-husband. 
The question of religion as Freud formulates it is: is religion “material 
truth” or is it only “historical truth”? That is to say: is religion true accord-
ing to its content or is it just a shadow projected by some historical event? 
And Freud’s answer is: it is not true according to its content, but it does 
reflect an “historical truth”—the murder of the primordial father. But Freud 
does not see the third possibility, which truly fits this matter: religion is 
above all an attempt to find the truth. For religion includes the attempt to 
solve the mystery of the world—and it makes no difference if we accept its 
solution or not. Therefore, religion is the product of the experience of the 
world on the part of every generation and every individual. It is not a result 
of any one experience, such as “the historical” experience of a certain mur-
der or of any other event, but rather is the product of an ongoing-experience 
of the world as it reveals itself to man: of the heavens and the earth, light 
and darkness, life and death, fear of the infinite. Similarly, religion is a 
product of the experience of man’s inner world: of the visions of the soul, 
the secret of human creativity, the wonder of human society. And it makes 
no difference what brings a person to this religious perception of the world: 
whether the aspiration for well-being, or fear, or trembling before the un-
known, or the desire to know the cause. The religious perception of the 
world is perhaps the result of having reached the limits of human intellect 
or even the result of the intellect’s failure in its aspiration to know the 
world, the result of the triumph of imagination and feeling over intellect 
and experience. But religion is an answer to the question of existence. And 
whoever ignores this essence and wants to see it only as a permutation of 
some “memory” regarding what happened in some bygone epoch truly 
evades the core of the problem. 
5 
All the more so is it impossible to explain the monotheistic faith on the 
basis of Freud’s premise. The human neurosis that was engendered by the 
murder of the primordial fathers could have found its full satisfaction in the 
veneration of the gods. At the very most it might have led to the creation of 
an image of the father-gods, the heads of the families of the gods. For the 
image of the father necessarily includes the image of the husband; and its 
necessary complement is the mother. The veneration for the father could, 
however, find its symbol only in the realm of paganism, which distin-
guished masculinity and femininity with respect to the divinity. But it could 
not be symbolized by means of one God, hidden and concealed and trans-
cending sexuality. But Freud claims (pp. 164ff.) that it is precisely mono-
theism that needs his psychoanalytic explanation. In his view, monotheism 
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can be explicated only through the premise that in early times there was 
“one personality,” that is “the primordial father,” who was perceived in the 
imagination of the sons as exceptionally strong and great and was elevated 
to the status of a god; and it is this [“one personality”] that returned and 
resurfaced in the memory of man in the image of a single, all-powerful god. 
But all this is just weaving together a flimsy cobweb of words. He coined 
the term “primordial father” as an accepted sign of the primordial fathers. 
But in the course of his discussion he transforms this term into one real 
“personality,” whose murder he considers to be “historical truth.” However, 
the primordial fathers, to the extent that they are “historical truth,” were not 
“one personality” possessing unlimited rulership, but rather, many hus-
bands, whose rulership was limited to their individual horde-families. In 
worshiping the fathers there is no tendency to transform the fathers into 
“one personality.” The memory of the primordial fathers, therefore, could 
have returned and resurfaced in the memory of human beings only through 
the image of many father-gods, and at most in the image of the father-god 
of the tribe or of the people, but not in the image of one God who trans-
cends sexuality. Or we would have to believe that the primordial memory 
of humanity was sufficient enough to preserve not just the memory of the 
primordial fathers and of their murder, but also the extent of their rulership; 
and despite this, this memory jumbled the fathers together and made them 
into “one personality,” and transformed their limited rulership into “unlim-
ited” rulership. On what basis should we accept this irrational belief? 
Moreover—even this poor semblance of an explanation could be enter-
tained only if one were to artificially limit the notion of monotheism to the 
image of one god, who possesses unlimited rulership and power. But his-
torical monotheism was much more inclusive: It forbade worshiping nature, 
forbade worshiping idols, denounced cult and magic, and established reli-
gion on an ethical base. What connection could there possibly be between 
all this and the veneration of the image of the “primordial father” who was 
murdered and eaten? How could the cult of this “personality” with its un-
limited rule over the females in the horde clothe itself in the negation of the 
cult and the extreme ethical demands of monotheism? 
6 
The failure of Freud’s attempt becomes especially evident when he seeks to 
explain the conditions for the historical emergence of Israelite monotheism.  
In order for the soul’s wound to work its complex effect, a period of la-
tency is necessary: the wound must be forgotten and operate from the hid-
den depths. Without this, there is no neurosis and no “compulsion.” The 
murder of the primordial father precipitated the neurosis of humanity be-
cause it was forgotten. However, here the question arises: how can a forgot-
332 YEHEZKEL KAUFMANN 
 
ten event have a historical impact, that is, how can we say that the forgotten 
event acts throughout the many generations that experienced neither the 
event nor its memory? In an individual’s life, the forgotten experience 
works its effect owing to the continuity of the “I.” However, how could a 
forgotten experience continue to be effective from generation to genera-
tion? With reference to this question of collective-historical memory, psy-
choanalysts are divided among themselves. Freud claims that the “the ar-
chaic inheritance” transmitted from the fathers to the sons includes not only 
physical and spiritual dispositions and not only instincts, but even the 
memories of events (pp. 125ff.). In truth, this is impossible. But even if we 
grant that this is the case, this could only explain the transmission of the 
memory of the murder of the primordial fathers, since this murder repeated 
itself thousands of times. Therefore, one could claim that it was incised into 
the depths of the soul. But it is impossible to conceive of a “phylogenetic” 
transmission of a memory of an event that occurred only once. Indeed, even 
Freud does not claim that the murder of Moses was preserved in the phylo-
genetic memory of the Israelites and that the later generations inherited the 
memory of the murder unknowingly. But the “analogy” of the neurosis 
demands that the murder of Moses should act precisely as a forgotten and 
hidden experience. And because of this, Freud creates a replacement for the 
unconscious: the “tradition.” The memory of the murder of Moses was 
“repressed,” inasmuch as it was not allotted a place in their written litera-
ture. But the memory of the event was safeguarded in “the oral tradition” 
(pp. 85ff.). The later prophets received the “tradition” from the hands of the 
Levites (pp. 42ff.). But who will not discern here the artificial nature of this 
attempted harmonization? The oral tradition is “hidden” in comparison to 
the written tradition. But there is no resemblance between the oral tradition 
itself and the unconscious. The guardians of this oral tradition were clearly 
aware of Moses’s murder, and therefore it could have no neurotic impact on 
their souls. And as for the people, who were unaware of it, they were also 
unaware of it in the hidden depths of their souls. And, therefore, it had no 
neurotic effect on them as well. Thus the murder of Moses could not in any 
way have exerted a neurotic effect. 
The artificial nature of this explanation becomes particularly evident in 
what follows. 
At the beginning of the Israelite faith was the murder of Moses, and at 
the beginning of Christianity was the murder of Jesus. According to Freud, 
this is no coincidence. These murders aroused the memory of the primordi-
al murder etc. (pp. 114ff., 129ff.). Now the necessary condition for the 
neurotic impact of Moses’ murder was its being forgotten by the people and 
its being preserved in the “tradition.” But this necessary condition was no 
longer necessary regarding the murder of Jesus. The murder of Jesus was 
not forgotten, and nevertheless it had an enormous neurotic impact, even 
much wider than the impact of the murder of Moses: indeed, the difference 
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in the impact of the two murders is astounding. Both murders were internal, 
Jewish affairs. But, regarding the first, even though it acted by way of “tra-
dition,” it influenced only Israel. Whereas the second murder, which was 
never forgotten, in just a short period convulsed the souls of the peoples of 
many nations that had no part in the murder and that certainly did not have 
anything about which they had to feel “remorse.” Moreover, it was precise-
ly on the soul of the Jewish people that the murder of Jesus made no im-
pact, and it did not result in their believing in the Son of the Father. Even 
stranger than this is the history of Islam. In the beginning of this religion 
there was no murder, neither revealed nor hidden. Only after this religion 
already conquered the heart of the people was there a religious-political 
murder that convulsed a group of believers. And this time it was the murder 
of father and son together: the murder of Ali and Hussein. But, again, we 
are confronted with the inexplicable: this murder, as well, was never a for-
gotten experience. And here, as well, its influence was strongest precisely 
on the Shi’ites who did not carry it out. Those who actually carried out the 
murder never experienced any “remorse” for what they did, and it did not 
“remind” them of anything. In an entirely different category is the murder 
of Socrates. There is also a certain religious background to his killing: he 
was found guilty of introducing new gods, teaching an exalted concept of 
the divinity. Aside from this, Socrates—as a teacher of the youth and a 
teacher of the generation and as the husband of Xanthippe—was also a 
respected “father-figure.” However, the killing of Socrates did not “re-
mind” the light-minded Greeks of anything, even though they regretted it. 
And in contrast to this, they deified other men, fathers and sons, who were 
never murdered. 
Artificial as well, is the very link between the impact of the murder of 
Moses, the man, and the victory of his faith and his ideas in Israel. Via this 
link, Freud introduces the abstract idea of monotheism into the neurotic 
experience and associates it with its operation. But the “primordial father” 
was not a teacher of religion and faith. He was venerated because he was 
murdered, and it was only his personality that was venerated. “The teach-
ing” of that primordial father (that is, the regime of the father’s rulership) 
was abolished precisely after his murder. Corresponding to this, the murder 
of Moses, “the exalted father-figure,” ought to have resulted in the deifica-
tion of his person, especially if one pays attention to the fact that the Jewish 
people at that time, according to Freud’s premise, was a polytheistic peo-
ple. But the victory of his idea was not connected at all with this process 
(similar to this, Buddha was made into one of the gods of the popular faith, 
even though this contradicted his teaching). However, in Israel, the oppo-
site happened: The Torah of Moses triumphed, but he, himself was not 
made into a god, even in the period of Israelite “paganism.” And the con-
tinuation of this development of the religious neurosis also deviates from 
the line of the “analogy.” Because, precisely Jesus, the “son” who was 
334 YEHEZKEL KAUFMANN 
 
murdered, was himself made into a god. Freud explains, following others, 
the holy Christian meal as a metamorphosis of the totemic meal: eating “the 
body” of Jesus recalls the eating of the murdered father in primordial times. 
This is the explanation of the secret, “the Son is the Father.” Whereas Mo-
ses, although he himself was a “father-figure,” never served as substance 
for a “meal.” It seems that history, itself, was guilty of a fatal confusion in 
its developmental pattern. 
And not only this, but in the end, Freud’s psychoanalytic explanation 
does not really address the key problem, which he wished to solve, namely: 
the emergence of the monotheistic faith. Freud does not want to be satisfied 
with the answer that monotheism is a manifestation of the creative religious 
genius of Israel (pp. 80–81); therefore he tries to explain it as a product of 
the Israelite neurosis. However, in truth Freud posits that monotheism actu-
ally arose in the world before this neurosis. For this is the whole point of 
his Egyptian hypothesis: Monotheism was already created in Egypt, and 
from there it migrated to Israel. But in Egypt it did not arise as a result of 
neurosis, but rather as a result of Egyptian imperialism (pp. 22ff., 72ff., 80, 
108)! Ikhnaton formulated the idea of one god, abolished all types of cults 
and magic, and demanded a life of truth and justice. Moses rejected Ikhna-
ton’s deification of the sun, and, besides this, he forbade the worshipping of 
idols. This is to say: Monotheism was created before the murder of Moses. 
That Egyptian imperialism does not explain any of this is clear. For Babylo-
nian, Assyrian, Persian, Macedonian, Roman, and Chinese imperialism did 
not result in the idea of one God or in the prohibition of the worship of 
nature and of magic, etc. That the neurosis of the Israelites does not explain 
any of this is also clear. Because, after all, all these features of monotheism 
emerged before the neurosis. In the end, accordingly, we require another 
explanation. 
On page 71 of his book, Freud says that his research on Moses, as he 
saw it, resembled a “dancer balancing on the tip of one toe.” This is a well-
phrased self-criticism. But this image hovers before our eyes when we read 
not only what he says about Moses, but also what he says about the source 
of religion and the origin of monotheism: time and again there appears this 
dancer balancing on the tip of one toe. 
7 
In everything stated above, we assumed, for argument’s sake, that there 
really was something substantive in the claims regarding the murder of 
Moses and the monotheism of Pharaoh Ikhnaton. However, in truth, these 
matters lack all substance. 
Freud found the story about Moses’ death in Sellin, and he accepted 
Sellin’s claims, which were a true “find” for him, as if Sellin were the final 
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authority, since he was unable to examine their validity. However, Sellin is 
a typical modern biblical scholar (perhaps even too typical): He emends 
verses and makes up new ones at will, interprets them arbitrarily, and then 
“discovers” in them whatever he had read into them. These modern fanciful 
homilists have a particular affection for obscure verses, and it is precisely 
on such verses that they “base” the most revolutionary hypotheses, since in 
any case, no one knows for certain what they state. Sellin “discovered” the 
story about the murder of Moses in Numbers 25:6ff. and in Deuteronomy 
34:1ff. For since in Numbers 25:6ff., it speaks about the murder of Zimri 
and Cozbi, and in Deuteronomy 34 it does not speak about the murder of 
anyone, this implies that these texts allude to a story of … the murder of 
Moses! Sellin found a hoard of these types of “allusions” in Hosea, specifi-
cally in: 4:4–5, 5:2, 9:7–13, 12:14–13:1 (12:13–13:1 in Eng.). He made up 
these “allusions” himself. For example, where the text reads: “Therefore 
shalt thou stumble in the day, and the prophet also shall stumble with thee 
in the night; and I will destroy thy mother (ךֶָמִּא)” (Hosea 4:5), he emends 
the text and translates: Therefore shalt thou stumble in the day and in the 
night as you destroyed your nursing (ֶךָנְמוא) prophet (that is to say: as you 
killed the prophet, who is for you like a nursing mother ןֵֹמא, as stated in 
Numbers 11:12 (ןֵֹמאָה תֶא-ֵקֹניַּה אִָשּׂי רֶשֲׁאַכּ).6 And behold, an “allusion” to Mo-
ses’ murder is staring you in the face. Or: “Ephraim is a watchman with my 
God; as for the prophet, a fowler’s snare is in all his ways, and enmity 
(המטשמ) is in the house of his God. They have deeply corrupted themselves, 
as in the days of Gibeah…” (Hosea 9:8–9); again Sellin emends the text 
and translates: “Ephraim is a watchman with the tent of the prophet, a 
fowler’s snare is in all his ways, in Shitim (םיטשב ), in the house of his God, 
they deepened the pit (that is to say: they dug for the prophet a deep pit), 
etc.7 And once again we have “allusion.” Or “Ephraim, as (רשאכ) I have 
seen Tyre, is planted in a pleasant place; but Ephraim shall bring forth his 
children to the slayer” (ibid., 13). Yet again Sellin emends the text and 
translates: “I have seen Ephraim as the head (שארכ) (as a poisonous plant); 
he set for himself a prophet to hunt.”8 And so on and so forth. It is clear that 
there is no way of preventing Sellin from “finding” allusions to the murder 
                                                     
6  Translator’s Note: The Masoretic text [= MT] (Hosea 4:5) reads ’immekâ: םויה תלשכו ,
הליל ךמע איבנ םג לשכו  יתימדוךמא . Sellin emends the text to read ʾōměnekâ:  םג םויב תלשכו
 איבנה תא תימדו הלילבךנמוא . 
7  Translator’s Note: The MT (Hosea 9:8–9) reads masṭēmâ:  שׁוֹקי חפ איבנ יהלא-םע ִםירפא הפצ 
.העבגה ימיכ ותחִש וקימעה .ויהלא תיבב המטשמ ויכרד-לכ-לע Sellin emends the text to read 
běšiṭṭîm: איבנה להא םע םירפא הפוצ ,ויכרד לכ לע שוקי חפ ,םיטשב ,ויהולא תיבב ,ותחש וקימעה . 
Shitim is the place where Moses was (supposedly) murdered, as “alluded” to, according 
to Sellin, in Numbers 25:1. 
8  Translator’s Note: The MT (Hosea 9:13) reads ka’ǎšer: and šětûlâ běnāvê:  םירפארשאכ -
רוצל ותיאר, הונב הלותש.  Sellin emends the text to read kěrō’š and šāt lô nābî’:   םירפאשארכ 
)יסרא חמצכ (יתיאר , דיצלאיבנ ול תש.  Sellin, here, rearranges the letters of certain words, 
completely changing the verse’s meaning.  
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of Moses wherever he wants. And indeed, he finds them over and over 
again in many places. The undisciplined and fanciful homiletical exegesis 
prevalent in modern biblical scholarship has made all this possible. Sellin’s 
fable is not the only one that was accepted by scholars on the basis of such 
fanciful explanations. As we already said above, an event like the murder 
of Moses would not have been able to be hidden, and nobody would have 
been interested in hiding it. Rather, to the contrary, such a murder would 
have served in all the generations as a topic for prophetic rebuke. Sellin’s 
fable is complete nonsense. 
A few noted scholars hold the opinion that the origins of monotheism 
were in Egypt, and that Ikhnaton was its founder. But in reality there was 
no monotheism in Egypt, and Ikhnaton was a complete pagan. This mistake 
derives from the prevailing assumption that the essence of monotheism is 
belief in one God. But in truth monotheism is not an arithmetic concept, 
and the question of numbers is not the main issue. God’s unity is only an 
expression of monotheism’s essence, its essence being the belief in God 
who is not a symbol of any natural power and who is not governed by any 
law of existence. Where this essence does not exist, the “unity” is pagan. 
And, therefore, the faith of Ikhnaton was also pagan, because Ikhnaton 
believed in the “unity” of the sun. Here we have a great abyss dividing his 
religion from biblical religion. Aside from this, Ikhnaton believed in the 
divinity of Pharaoh and thought of himself as the “son of the sun,” who was 
born from its “limb.” And he also worshipped his father in the cult of the 
dead. He had his own “prophet” (a type of priest) as did other gods in 
Egypt. He did not abolish the cultic practices. On the contrary, he brought 
sacrifices to the sun. He also did not free himself from magic, but used 
several magic symbols. His religion was unable to develop. However, since 
all worship of nature is essentially magical and mythological, the religion 
of Ikhnaton [had it been able to develop] would necessarily have created its 
own mythology. Indeed, it also seems as if the link with the old mythology 
was not broken. The names that he used testify to this: Ra, Shu, Harakhte. 
In biblical religion there is no trace of deification of nature or man. That is 
to say, biblical religion is an absolutely new creation. It clearly follows that 
Moses was not Ikhnaton’s “student.” The hypothesis that Moses was an 
Egyptian, therefore, loses all historical credibility. And since it does not 
rest on any substantial proofs, we may dismiss it as an idle fable. 
  
The Secret of National Creativity* 
Yehezkel KAUFMANN 
The Question of the Source of Cultural Creativity 
The question of the source of cultural creativity is without a doubt the hard-
est and most mysterious among the questions of historical science and phi-
losophy of history. The attempts to “explain” creativity through some 
schema of development of the spirit according to Hegel's idealistic method, 
and similarly the attempts to “explain” it on the basis of various conditions 
and circumstances, be they geographical, climatic, political, or especially 
economic (according to the method of historical materialism), are at bottom 
only attempts to cloak the problem and to ignore its real scope. It is the 
habit of idealists and materialists to select from among the multitude of 
phenomena those that are amenable to their methods to be pressed through 
the steam roller of the fixed law and thus be “explained,” while they regard 
the majority of the phenomena as nonexistent. Thus they obscure the basic 
problem, which is the infinite variety of forms of cultural creation. It is a 
fact that wherever the power of cultural creation is given the opportunity to 
achieve free embodiment, it clothes itself in new and original forms. From 
time immemorial, human speech has been embodied in innumerable com-
binations of phonemes and syllables, comprising languages, expressions, 
and idioms, both known and forgotten. The religious imagination has fash-
ioned innumerable personas of spirits and gods. There is no counting the 
legends that human imagination has invented or the permutations of tones 
in instrumental music and song, the combinations of lines, shapes, and col-
ors in building and crafts, in drawing and sculpture, the variety of move-
ments in dance, the fashions of bodily decoration and clothing, the combi-
nations of foods, customs, laws, and the like. In every cultural domain we 
find an abundance of forms without limit. 
We are not dealing here only with the major historical cultures. Hegel 
succeeded in devising the semblance of an explanation of cultural devel-
                                                     
*  Bekivshona shel ha-yetzira ha-leumit ( הריציה תימואלה  לש הנושבכב). Translated from Moz-
naim 13 (1941): 237–51 by Lenny Levin.  
 Translator’s note: When Kaufmann included this essay as Preface to Toledot ha-emunah 
ha-yisre’elit, 2nd edition, he added a footnote: “This essay was published in Moznaim 13 
(Elul 5701/1941). It contains an explanation of the general historical-cultural assump-
tions of my book [Toledot ha-emunah ha-yisre’elit]. This essay also contains a clarifica-
tion of some fundamental questions in answer to my critics. In keeping with the request 
of many readers, we publish it as a general preface to the new edition of this book.”—I 
thank Professor Lawrence Kaplan for reading and commenting on an earlier version of 
my translation. 
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opment because he opened his exposition with the “historical” cultures and 
explicitly excluded from consideration the questions of the origins of lan-
guages and peoples and all the events concerning the earliest cultures. Ma-
terialist theory followed his example. But this is only an artificial restriction 
of the question. There is a manifestation of cultural power in every human 
creation, even the smallest and poorest. The totality of all these manifesta-
tions comprises the problem. When we include them all, we see before us 
the infinite variety of human creativity on all levels. The question is: what 
is the source of this abundance? 
It is self-evident that culture is dependent on the material conditions of 
its place of creation. In a place where there are no stones, people will not 
build stone houses, and where there is no marble, they will not sculpt mar-
ble statues. It is also true that necessity is the beginning of culture—the 
necessity that strikes a person and forces him to invent what is required for 
his survival. But the creative cultural act itself arises neither from preexist-
ing conditions nor from necessity. Particularly the abundance of forms does 
not arise from them. For from the same material, people fashioned innu-
merable forms, and they were able to satisfy the same necessity or wants in 
thousands of ways. This enormous variety appears especially in the esthetic 
side of culture. Not for nothing did Hegel exclude consideration of luxuries 
from the scope of his inquiry, for by itself it would overthrow the yoke of 
any schema. 
All the more, one cannot explain cultural creativity from the environ-
mental milieu, as Durkheim argued, that is, to explain every cultural level 
of society from the life conditions of the preceding level, for the multiplici-
ty of forms is necessarily a primary phenomenon that is not to be explained 
by a “prior” level. The same question applies to every level of culture: 
Where does the variety of forms come from? If this variety were not rooted 
in the nature of cultural creativity, it would not exist at all, and cultural 
development would consist only of the development of a single form at 
each level proceeding from the prior level. 
The only answer that we can offer to this question is: The creative pow-
er of the human spirit is the source of cultural creativity.1 
                                                     
1  Translator’s note: “Spirit” is a translation of Kaufmann’s ruaḥ, which in this essay is 
used synonymously with the German Geist (as in Geisteswissenschaften, “humanistic 
studies”). It is important to clarify what this does and does not connote. It does not con-
note the existence of spirit as a separate substance from matter, in the Platonic (and es-
pecially Neoplatonic) tradition. It does connote a domain of humanly created entities—
language, literature, art, philosophy, and religion—and is neutral as to their metaphysi-
cal status, as between Platonic-dualistic or biological-sociological-historical. The do-
main is closely correlated with the domain of the term “culture,” except that “spirit” de-
scribes the human creative faculty (whether of the individual or of the group) engaged in 
the free, unpredictable act of the creation of these entities, whereas “culture” describes 
the created products or artifacts proceeding from these actions that in turn exercise an 
influence on the students, connoisseurs, ordinary people, and future creators raised in the 
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Some believe that such an answer “explains” nothing, for it merely sub-
stitutes one mystery for another. But the natural sciences also assume the 
existence of certain “powers” and “qualities” as ultimate givens, lacking 
any “explanation.” Science is unable to “explain” the nature of matter, the 
difference among the elements, the combination of elements, the basic laws 
of motion, and the like. It can only describe them and provide fixed formu-
las, which can then be used to explain phenomena. All the more is science 
unable to explain truly the abundance of forms in the plant and animal 
kingdoms and their specific nature. It can only describe their “powers” and 
“qualities.” If we say that cultural creativity has its source in the power of 
the creative spirit, we mean to say that, in addition to the “conditions,” 
“circumstances,” and “environmental milieu,” there is an additional ulti-
mate factor that is basic and fundamental and cannot itself be explained by 
any “conditions.” It is an ultimate fact, which the various “explanations” 
cover over and divert our eyes from seeing. Our answer, by contrast, 
acknowledges this fact and emphasizes it, and this is the “explanation” it 
offers. To be sure, the spirit itself is among the eternal riddles of existence. 
But, ultimately, it is no more a riddle than the existence of matter, space, 
time, motion, life, and the like. All these serve us as primary explanations 
of phenomena. No matter what view we take as to the metaphysical essence 
or ultimate source of spirit, spirit is an empirical phenomenon, and a primal 
empirical phenomenon at that. It is the first of all things known and of eve-
ry assumption of being. That it is a creative power we learn from its mani-
festations in human culture. The power of creativity is one of the empirical 
attributes of spirit. Imagination, the intuition of genius, the power of inven-
tion, the faculty of observation and reflection, the power of abstraction and 
contemplation of the essence and the connection of concepts and ideas, 
human desires, disinterested moral evaluation, the power of expression and 
symbolization, the ability to exercise influence—these qualities and others 
cannot be explained by circumstances. Insofar as the spirit is creative, it 
adds something of itself, drawing from its own source. One may therefore 
regard it as an independent source of culture, though also dependent on a 
complex of conditions and circumstances. 
The failure of the attempt to explain cultural creativity by way of these 
conditions and circumstances becomes especially obvious to us when we 
come to the question of the creative personality, the individual genius. It 
might be possible, by a stretch, to explain this discovery or that act on the 
basis of conditions and circumstances. But can such an “explanation” pos-
sibly account for Homer, Plato, Shakespeare, Goethe, Rembrandt, Beetho-
                                                                                                                          
ambience in which these created products are valued as tokens of the group’s identity, 
narrative, and worldview. In short, “spirit” in this essay is synonymous with the human 
capacity to produce all the items included by the term “culture,” including religion. 
 Note: Later, Kaufmann will cite a secondary meaning of “spirit” (citing Montesquieu in 
The Spirit of the Laws) connoting stylistic essence or animating idea. 
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ven, and the like? The same “conditions” acted equally on all members of 
their country, people, class, and age. Why were they uniquely singled out 
from all their contemporaries and even from their family members? Their 
unique gifts point to a secret mystery, the mystery of spirit. Let us grant 
that they gave expression to the voice of their generation. But as to why it 
was specifically they we do not know. The power of creation embodied in 
them is a primal phenomenon, a primary cause, whose prior cause remains 
unknown. Someone could still say that this is not the secret of spirit alone, 
but the secret of flesh-and-spirit, the secret of matter on which spirit de-
pends. But even if we make this assumption, we advance at any rate from 
consideration of “conditions” to the realm of a new eternal riddle: the riddle 
of the connection between flesh and spirit. How does matter generate spirit 
in general, and the spirit of the genius in particular? We do not know. We 
must therefore say, cultural creativity is determined not by the aforesaid 
“conditions,” but by that mysterious thing called “spirit,” which is mysteri-
ously connected to that other mysterious thing called “matter.” But since 
“matter” gives rise to cultural creativity only through the mediation of spir-
it, we are finally entitled to say that spirit, not the “conditions,” is the 
source of cultural creativity! 
Through this first deliberation we thus arrive at the conclusion: In its 
full scope, man’s cultural creativity is not the embodiment of a single uni-
versal “idea” within the framework of a fixed dialectical schema, as Hegel 
propounded, nor the embodiment of various “ideas,” as Spengler taught. 
Rather, it is the manifestation of the abundance of creative powers latent in 
the human spirit. Furthermore, while creativity is contingent on conditions, 
one may nevertheless see every manifestation of the creative spirit as a kind 
of new creation, as a new beginning whose source is in the spirit.2  
Collective Creativity 
However, when we observe the abundant forms and contents that are the 
fruit of cultural creations, we perceive that they fall naturally into different 
groups, each marked by a uniform complexion that is immediately and 
intuitively perceivable. It is this uniform complexion that determines a 
common impress or “style.” Thus cultural creations embody different 
styles.  
Furthermore, one finds that this diversity of styles is rooted first of all in 
ethnic diversity (division by tribes, peoples, nations). Just as human society 
assumes the visible form of ethnic groups, so does human culture divide in 
fact into ethnic cultures. This is perceptible first of all in language. There is 
no one universal human language, nor does each individual have his own 
                                                     
2  On this question, compare my book Golah, vol. 1, starting on p. 59. 
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language, but languages and dialects are the property of groups. This lin-
guistic division serves as the basis and background for the division of cul-
tural realms. 
Here, as well, we do not have in mind only the major historical cultures 
on which Hegel based his historiosophical speculations. Rather, we are 
dealing with all tribes and peoples that have lived on earth since time im-
memorial. We may certainly posit that the culture of every separate ethnic 
group starts out as an original culture, that is to say, distinct in its character-
istics. Just as separate groups fashioned unique languages or expressions, 
so they created their own unique legends, songs, dances, and customs, and 
the like. 
Moreover, when we speak of this primal, formative division of ethnic 
styles, we do not mean to assert a unity of national style embracing all cul-
tural spheres (religion, art, law, etc.) as if they are the embodiment of a 
single “idea,” as Hegel and his followers conceived. We shall return to this 
question later. Here we are only dealing with the style of each cultural 
sphere by itself. Nor do we even assume the prevalence of this unity of 
style in a given cultural sphere throughout the entire history of the group. 
We affirm only the primal fact of the existence of different ethnic styles in 
human culture. 
This implies that it is in the nature of an ethnic group, qua collectivity, 
to create culture. We nevertheless assume as self-evident that the individual 
is the real carrier of all psychic activity, including experience and creativi-
ty. Still, Durkheim, Wundt, and others were certainly right to say that indi-
viduals participating in groups generate a special psychic energy that can be 
created only within groups. The carrier of that energy is the group insofar 
as it is a unified entity. At any rate, the ethnic group is based on commonal-
ity of cultural values (language, religion, customs, and the like). These val-
ues are born of this common existence, and they shape and perpetuate it. 
But the same common life that unifies a group also distinguishes it from 
other groups. Thus the very fact of common ethnic existence gives rise to 
the fostering of unique cultural values. The ethnic group is thus by its very 
existence a natural incubator for the creation of a distinct cultural impress 
and style. 
Moreover, we discern in the cultural creation of an ethnic group certain 
organic phenomena that attest to its being a natural and uniform source of 
creation. The creative products of the group exhibit organic unity, develop-
ing on their own through a natural pattern of growth. An example of this is, 
first and foremost, language, which develops on its own out of the collec-
tive life. It is no mere collection of words, but a kind of organic creature, 
embodying inner laws and an inner harmony, as if it grew from within. We 
find a similar quality in other areas of culture. In addition, we can discern 
in the entire group existence a kind of organic development. Its culture is 
born, grows, and arrives at a climax, after which it seems to exhaust its 
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resources. The Hegelian rule about the times of greatness and decline of 
national cultures is not plucked out of thin air, even if it is not a universal 
law. 
Furthermore, we find that ethnic groups differ in their rank of cultural 
creativity. We draw distinctions among different creative works in national 
cultures, and we assign them different ranks in the scale of values. Among 
cultures of a single period or stage of development, as well, there is higher 
and lower. Some nations are rich in imagination, others poorer. Some na-
tions display a proliferation of artistic creative power, while the art of oth-
ers is meager. Some nations are musical, while others are not. This differ-
ence is not dependent on time. The Roman nation came later in history than 
the Babylonian, the Egyptian, and the Greek, but it was not endowed, as 
they were, with a mythopoeic imagination or with the talent for original 
artistic invention. One could cite many similar examples. 
An absolutely objective touchstone for this evaluative difference is this: 
the extent of influence that an ethnic culture exerts outside its own domain. 
The native ethnic group has always been the site of a culture’s creative 
activity. But the domain of its influence is often wider than its ethnic crea-
tive site. There are cultural values that pass from nation to nation. We see 
that there are some cultures whose scope of influence is modest or even nil, 
whereas for others it is enormous. This influence is sometimes due to cir-
cumstances, such as political or economic supremacy. But the inner 
strength latent in a culture is an especially important factor. Israel and 
Greece exercised their influence not through their political or economic 
strength but only through the inner strength of their cultures. Powerful, 
mighty Rome was the recipient of cultural transmission, whereas Greece, 
the weak and subjugated was the giver. The worldwide influence of Israel 
began only after its final political defeat and after its national destruction. 
Countless times, ruling nations were conquered by the cultures of the sub-
jects over whom they ruled. One also finds that there are cultures whose 
influence persists even after the ethnic group in whose midst they were 
created has passed from the world. Such were Babylon, Greece, and Rome. 
From these facts, we learn that the ethnic group is the carrier of a specif-
ic, unique cultural creative power.* 
                                                     
*  Translator’s note: This part of Kaufmann’s argument has given rise to the misinterpreta-
tion that he ascribed the difference of national cultures to racial differences, i.e., that 
each nation was characterized by a specific essential “national spirit” that determined 
the character of its cultural creations. The difference between Kaufmann’s argument and 
the racial doctrines current in the 1930s (when he wrote) can best be appreciated if we 
understand the action of “spirit” in Kaufmann’s view as radically free in its operation 
(similar in this respect to the radical freedom of God over nature articulated in the com-
panion essay). Precisely because spirit acts freely, its action is not susceptible to expla-
nation in terms of preexisting material circumstances. However, the products of spirit 
create a cultural environment that subsequently shapes the trajectory of development of 
each group, so that there is a general family resemblance (falling short of strict uniformi-
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The evolution of such an ethnic group is intertwined, as we have said, 
with external factors—geographical, economic, and political. The group is 
the fruit of man’s war for survival with nature and with his fellow man, in 
which the striving for survival of the species also plays a part. A great deal 
of what we find in the life pattern and culture of the group can be explained 
by these factors—but not everything. These factors do not explain the mul-
tiplicity of forms of ethnic divisions. They do not explain the nuances that 
distinguish one culture from another, the wealth and strength of some, the 
poverty and weakness of others. They do not explain the specific constitu-
tion of a language, the construction of lexical roots, its verbal tenses, the 
profusion or paucity of adverbs, and the like. They do not explain a nation’s 
richness or poverty of religious or artistic expression, its strength or weak-
ness in power of imagination and thought. Still less do these factors explain 
the difference in the power of the influence of its ethnic cultural values on 
other peoples. We must therefore conclude that every ethnic group is the 
carrier of a unique concretization of the creative spirit. In each group, a 
specific spiritual-national creative power—or more concisely, a “national 
spirit”—is manifested. As the creative spirit is manifested in individuals, so 
it is manifested also in a tribe, a people, or a nation. 
Symbolic Ideationalism: Hegel, Spengler* 
The reader has doubtless observed that we have arrived at this conclusion 
not from considering the unified character of the national culture or of the 
nation itself, but, to the contrary, from considering the variety of national 
styles in cultural creativity generally. We say that there is a national spirit 
not because we distinguish a single impress in each national culture, a sin-
gle unified “essence” embodied in all its values and events in all periods of 
its history, but because we distinguish in human culture generally a variety 
of styles against an ethnic background. “National spirit” in the sense we 
have explained has the basic meaning of national creative power. If a na-
                                                                                                                          
ty) among the cultural products within a given cultural tradition. Thus in its later devel-
opment the cultural tradition is not entirely monistic and proceeds to develop with a 
relative degree of freedom, but still shaped by the patterns established by the original 
formative precedents of that tradition. The specifics of the cultural tradition are not es-
sentially linked to racial types, but they are rather the contingent product of historical 
development. 
*  Translator’s note: In this section, Kaufmann coins a term idionismus simlani which we 
have translated “symbolic ideationalism.” The hypothesis that all the cultural products 
of a national group are symbolic expressions of a single concept or idea (Begriff) was 
propagated by Hegel and is characteristic of philosophically inclined historians such as 
Spengler who were influenced by his method. The term “ideationalism” was adopted 
here because it has a distinctly Hegelian flavor and is thus less likely than other terms 
(such as “idealism” or “conceptualism”) to be confused with unrelated theories.  
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tion were to create a new cultural style in every generation, this would be 
even more reason to say it was richly endowed with a national creative 
spirit. 
The doctrine of “national spirit” or “spirit of the nation” that was preva-
lent from Montesquieu through Hegel and his disciples was arrived at from 
considering the phenomenon of unity of cultural style and out of an exag-
gerated generalization of that unity. In this current of thought, the expres-
sion “spirit” has a secondary meaning of common “essence,” “idea,” inter-
nal impress, and uniform direction. Montesquieu showed that there is a 
“spirit” in the laws of each nation, that is to say, a uniform essential im-
press that is congruent with the spirit of its form of government. He similar-
ly showed that there is a congruence of “spirit” between a nation’s politi-
cal-legal regime, on the one hand, and its religion, its educational methods, 
its mores, its economic enterprises, and so forth, on the other. This insight 
into the unitary character of a national culture and its way of life became a 
fundamental principle in the method of Hegel and his disciples. This meth-
od not only asserts that every sphere in a national culture (religion, law, art, 
etc.) is informed by the same impress, but it maintains (by extending Mon-
tesquieu’s basic idea) that all the domains of a national culture are inter-
twined with each other—to wit: they all embody a single spiritual essence. 
In other words, the unity of a national cultural style exists not only within 
each cultural domain but across all domains. This is because each national 
culture has a single spiritual root—a single “idea,” finding symbolic ex-
pression in all cultural values. In this method, the ideational and symbolic 
conception of culture is fundamental. For we intuitively sense the stylistic 
unity within a given cultural domain through immediate perception, with-
out the mediation of an “idea.” We recognize a Hindu temple, an Egyptian 
painting, or a Greek statue immediately, even if we do not perceive them as 
an expression of a particular idea. But this does not apply to unity of style 
across domains. The harmony between the music of a given nation and its 
architecture, its laws, its burial customs, and the like, are not perceptible to 
the senses. We can conceive of such a unity only to the extent that we con-
ceive all the values of the culture as symbols of a fundamental idea or no-
tion (as a “sign of the spiritual,” in the language of Nachman Krochmal). 
We can call this approach “symbolic ideationalism.” 
Symbolic ideationalism argues, further, not only for unity across cultur-
al domains but also for unity across historical periods of a national culture: 
a single spiritual essence is embodied in every period of a nation’s history. 
Thus Hegel conceived the culture and history of each of the “historical 
nations” as the embodiment of a particular “principle.” Human culture and 
human history flow from the striving of the world spirit to know itself and 
its “freedom.” This striving is embodied in successive stages. The historical 
culture (Oriental, Greek, and Western) comprise the stages of the ascent of 
the spirit on its journey to self-knowledge. At each stage the spirit fash-
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ioned for itself a complete world of symbols and values, as if through them 
it had assumed a body and become extended in space. A single “principle” 
is dominant in all the values of a culture. This is the spirit of the culture, its 
inner essence, the “idea” out of which it was created. The spirit of the cul-
ture is also the “spirit of the nation,” inasmuch as it determines the charac-
ter of the nation. The “historical school” of jurisprudence followed the 
same model. Spengler rejects the doctrine of a single world spirit embodied 
in successive stages. He sees cultures as separate organic creations, each of 
which underwent its own life-cycle of conception, flourishing, decline, and 
extinction. But he too views each culture as the embodiment of a unique 
“spirituality,” and all the value products of a culture as symbols of that 
spirituality or embodiments of a particular “idea.” In his view, Egyptian 
culture embodied the idea of life toward death; Greek culture, the idea of 
plastic perfection of the finite body; Arabic culture, the idea of the myster-
ies of the spiritual body; and Nordic culture, the idea of striving toward the 
infinite. In these doctrines, the unity of a culture in all its domains and peri-
ods follows from its being rooted in a single spiritual essence or soul. 
As a flight of imaginative thought, symbolic ideationalism possesses 
great power. It also contains a measure of truth and has uncovered one of 
the secrets of cultural creation—the secret of symbolism. But as a general 
comprehensive method it has no empirical basis. It depends on an overly 
bold “reworking” of historical materials and a crude factual distortion. First 
and foremost, it seems to be talking about the “national spirit” or “national 
spirits,” but in fact it never deals with a concrete people or nation, that is, 
with an ethnic cultural group. Its cultural carriers are vague geographic 
entities—the Orient, the West, the Northern peoples, and the like. It sets 
down the boundaries of “nations” and periods arbitrarily, combining or 
separating as suits the needs of the system. Characteristically, it does not 
deal at all with language, the fundamental cultural value. What it calls a 
“nation” is in fact a conglomerate of nations and languages, countries, 
lands, and even entire continents. It should thus be self-evident that the 
creative spirit of a nation of which we have spoken earlier is absolutely 
different from the “national spirit” of symbolic ideationalsim. It is the dif-
ference between a real entity and an imaginary poetic conception. 
The Source of Unity of Group Cultures 
The empirical historical view of cultural history cannot ignore the fact that 
the true creator of all original culture in its original existence is the ethnic 
group. Only by examining this real carrier of culture in its origins can we 
derive correct conclusions. Symbolic ideationalism is at any rate wrong 
with respect to this real carrier of cultural creation.  
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Ethnic culture is impressed with the stamp of a distinctive style. But this 
distinctiveness is not to be confused with the unitary character posited by 
symbolic ideationalism. To wit: the unified stamp of ethnic culture does not 
follow from a single spiritual “essence.” There is neither a complete unity 
across domains nor even an absolute unity within each domain; one there-
fore finds different “styles” within a single nation. Within the Greek nation 
there were to be found such different and opposite entities as Athens and 
Sparta. Similarly, a nation may also contain differing styles in its different 
classes. We also see that there are national values that are transmitted from 
one nation to another. A nation may adopt a foreign language. Such a na-
tion will then be speaking a language that was not created from its own 
“essence.” There are religions, artistic styles, laws, legends, and the like, 
that travel beyond their national place of origin and are propagated among 
foreign nations. Even, the most original peoples that we know of received 
cultural elements from other nations. An ethnic culture, then, can be com-
posite and receive stylistic influence from various creative sources. Rome, 
in its period of flourishing and supremacy, received from Greece mytholo-
gy, poetry, art, philosophy, and science. Later it was enormously influenced 
by the culture of the Near East. The European nations received their Chris-
tian religion from the Near East, and this religion impressed a new stamp 
upon their culture, introducing alien elements into their culture and their 
life. Monasticism, marriage without the possibility of divorce did not fit 
well with their “spirit,” and in any case derived from a foreign “essence.” 
These peoples also received important cultural elements from Greece and 
Rome. They accepted not only the “fruit” or “principle” that had been em-
bodied in Greece and Rome, as Hegel’s theory would demand it, but fun-
damental forms and contents. They made themselves subservient to them or 
tried to imitate them. At times, they experienced themselves as an empty 
vessel, devoid of any culture except to the extent that they possessed it as a 
legacy from Greece and Rome. For generations, they regarded the art and 
literature of Greece and Rome as the acme of creativity, as timeless models 
that one could only try to emulate. In thought and science they viewed 
themselves as schoolchildren, whose only option was to enroll in the 
“academies” of the sages of Greece and Rome. They adopted Roman law as 
the basis of their own jurisprudence. For centuries, Latin served them as the 
only language of high culture. One could give other examples. 
National cultures cannot therefore be considered the fruit of a single 
spiritual “essence.” A national culture is not created out of a unique “na-
tional spirit,” in the sense of an unchanging spiritual ideational entity that 
creates symbols in all spheres of the culture. 
Nevertheless, symbolic ideationalism, as stated earlier, is not spun out 
of thin air. The phenomena on which it is based are empirical phenomena, 
even though as a theory it is suspended in midair. These phenomena require 
an explanation. It is a fact that national cultures possess unity of imprint 
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and style, although it is not comprehensive and absolute. A national culture 
is not a hodgepodge of evanescent forms, but it tends toward fixity, toward 
continuity of “tradition.” Wherever there is no foreign influence, nations 
tend to perpetuate a tradition of cultural style for many generations. Also, 
an ethnic culture tends to exhibit unity not only within one domain but also 
to a certain extent across domains, of the kind that Montesquieu asserts. 
There is a harmony of “spirit” in the life and culture of a nation. A despotic 
government does not go along with liberal education. An ascetic religion is 
not compatible with gay, sensual art. A military character is not paired well 
with a commercial spirit. Free social development is not possible in the 
atmosphere and “spirit” of a caste system such as that of India. One could 
give other examples. Moreover, certain cultural phenomena are amenable 
to explanation along the lines of symbolic ideationalism. Not all cultural 
values are the garb of an “idea,” and in any case they are not the garb of a 
single idea. But some cultural values are fashioned on the basis of this se-
cret. Religion, together with everything that is created under its aegis, is an 
ideational creation. Legend, ritual, and poetry give it symbolic expression. 
Since in antiquity almost all elements of culture were grounded in religion, 
they received its ideational thrust. Religion created its symbols in architec-
ture, sculpture, drawing, dance, and song. Dress, decoration, and social 
customs have a symbolic element. Law, morality, the state, the family, and 
linguistic expression are all ideational expressions. Not in the sense that in 
these areas the idea is always the first cause, but rather that in these spheres 
an idea—from whatever source—is apt to serve as a paradigm for shaping 
an image or formulating a symbol. 
In that case, what is the root of this unity of formal stamp and ideational 
content? We cannot find its root in a common hidden “essence” embodied 
in all values and all times; as noted, such an assumption has no empirical 
basis. On the basis of empirical observation of cultural history we must say 
this: the unified character of a culture develops from the power to exert 
influence latent in a creation once it has ventured forth from the sanctum of 
the creator’s spirit and become embodied in values, in “objectified spirit.” 
That embodied creation possesses the power to shape images and chart a 
path. A society’s culture is not a series of evanescent creations of the mo-
ment. A group preserves its values and imparts them from generation to 
generation. It is subject to the power of its values and is attached to them. 
Every original manifestation of spirit that influences the society and makes 
an impression on its life is apt to be preserved and transmitted, to influence 
coming generations, and to shape them in its image and its likeness. Lan-
guage, religion, art, customs and laws, and the like are a treasury of perma-
nent cultural values, of “objectified spirit” imparted from generation to 
generation. A society imparts it to individuals, for better or worse. These 
values establish a model and type. The creative powers in each generation 
are embodied willy-nilly in the framework of a legacy. It is thus possible to 
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say that a great creation fertilizes the spirit and begets its like. Thus a 
“style” develops. Furthermore, values influence each other across domains. 
This influence also comes to fruition in the revealed world of “objective 
spirit.” In a society whose life is absolutely dominated by religion, religion 
has the power to exercise decisive ideational influence on cultural crea-
tion—on art, ethics, the state, and the like. The political regime also has a 
great power to influence the stamp of the culture. Furthermore, the culture 
as “objective spirit” combines with those factors that determine the charac-
ter of the nation. Great personalities and great works shape the “spirit” of 
the nation, guiding its life into a certain track. And a continuity of the char-
acter that flows from the culture also fosters the continuity of the culture. 
Stylistic and ideational unity thus do not flow from an occult spiritual 
essence or soul embodied continually in the collectivity but from the mani-
fest power of “objective spirit” [i.e., the visible products of culture]. This 
can be inferred especially from the phenomena of the external influence of 
ethnic culture, which we have mentioned earlier. Cultural values can be 
transmitted from one nation to another, entirely foreign nation. Great cul-
tures have a tremendous power to influence, even after the nations that 
created them have perished. There is thus no commonality of essence or 
soul here. The influence is drawn from the wellspring of power hidden in 
the values themselves. Everything takes place in the sphere of objective 
spirit. The same holds true of the fructifying and creative influence of an 
idea. Buddhism was propagated among many different nations, and in each 
place it set its impress on life and culture. The same is true of Christianity 
and Islam. Among different nations, in different lands and in different 
times, these ideas established their symbolic worlds and determined the 
image of cultural creativity. This is the power of objective spirit. 
Absolute spirit as a universal power, the “national spirit” as the manifes-
tation of a single “idea” or principle, the flickering of a unified soul finding 
embodiment in a cultural body—all these are metaphysical conceptions, 
which do not arise from historical experience. But the creative human spir-
it, the power of creation of an ethnic group or the creative spirit of a nation, 
the power of objective spirit to create a stylistic imprint, the power of the 
idea in the sphere of objective spirit to shape the image of cultural values 
and fashion its symbols—all these are definitely empirical historical mat-
ters. 
The Source of Israelite Religion 
The question of the creation of ancient Israelite culture and, more precise-
ly, of the Israelite religion is for a scholar who wishes to remain in the 
realm of visible reality a historical-cultural question, one with which he is 
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obliged to deal in the same way that he deals with the manifestations of 
cultural creativity in general. 
I have dealt in detail in volume 1 of this book with the question of the 
beginning and source of Israelite religion. I showed that the various at-
tempts to solve this question of origin on the basis of various cultural con-
ditions or political circumstances offer only imaginary explanations of the 
phenomenon in question and are only trompes-l’oeil. There are scholars 
who seek the origin of monotheism in Egypt or Babylonia, saying that the 
development of religious consciousness in these great cultural nations ena-
bled the monotheistic idea to ripen. But it is clear that this explanation is no 
explanation. It is a fact that the monotheistic faith was not born in any na-
tion of antiquity—nor in any other nation, place, or time. If the religious 
consciousness of Egypt or Babylonia brought it about, why do we not find 
true monotheism there? Why only “currents” and “tendencies”? In the old 
Wellhausen school, the view was widespread that the monotheistic idea 
started to dawn in Israel in the eighth century B.C.E., and its first exponents 
were the literary prophets. This faith was victorious over idolatry in Israel 
only after the destruction of the Temple. The political upheavals of the 
Assyrian period gave rise to the monotheistic idea, and the political catas-
trophe of the Babylonian period helped to complete the people’s adherence 
to it. But the political upheavals of that period were universal historical 
events, which shook the foundations of life of all the nations. Assyria posed 
a threat also to Egypt and to the Canaanite peoples, and the Assyrian kings 
subdued and resettled many nations. Assyria, Babylonia, and Egypt suf-
fered destructions, as did other nations. Why did these upheavals not pro-
duce monotheistic belief in any of these nations? Why did similar political 
upheavals not produce it in any other nations? 
Therefore, it does not matter in what period we date the beginning of 
monotheistic faith. It is impossible to explain it on the basis of any condi-
tions or circumstances. Monotheism is a new cultural creation, and the 
ultimate source of any cultural creation available to empirical examination 
is man’s creative spirit. Since monotheism was born and developed only in 
Israel, we must say further that it was born of the creative spirit of the peo-
ple of Israel. 
But how and when did this happen? In recent years, the realization has 
advanced in biblical scholarship that the literary prophets were not the first 
to conceive the monotheistic idea. There is no hint in any of the prophetic 
writings that the idea is new. On the contrary, they rely on popular tradition 
and argue in its name. Thus monotheism existed in Israel before the eighth 
century. Some date the beginning of monotheism as early as Abraham, 
while others think that Moses laid the foundation for this belief. However, 
it is possible to say that within independent biblical scholarship there is 
consensus on two fundamental issues. First, monotheism came into being 
through a gradual evolution from pagan faith. The bridge and transition 
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points are sought in various ways. Some find monotheistic “currents” and 
“tendencies” in Near Eastern paganism, while others distinguish intermedi-
ate stages in Israelite religion itself. Among scholars, some argue that Isra-
elite religion was pagan in its first stages, or nearly so, and the Israelite God 
was local or national, becoming the sole God only in the course of time. 
The view is at any rate widespread that Israelite religion did not originally 
include absolute negation of idolatry. It was at first a faith in a national 
God. This faith was connected with a monolatrous demand, to serve the 
national God exclusively. The belief in a single universal God was born 
only at the end. Second, monotheism was at first the property of a few, of a 
circle—of “Levites” of “Rechabites,” of prophets and the “sons of proph-
ets” or of members of a particular class, but in the First Temple period it 
was not yet a popular religion. Israel at that time was generally a pagan 
nation; only after the destruction did monotheism become the national faith. 
I reject both these commonly held views in their entirety. Inasmuch as 
the development of paganism never arrived at monotheism in any nation or 
period, it follows that no matter how close we push monotheism and pagan-
ism together, no matter how many intermediate stages we postulate, we fail 
to explain the main thing: the appearance of monotheism only in Israel. 
Moreover, the harmonistic approach is rooted in an arithmetic conception 
of the question, according to which the difference between pagan and Isra-
elite religion is a difference in the number of gods. On the basis of the nu-
merical approach, one can find some “developmental” connection. But the 
arithmetic conception is fundamentally mistaken. The true difference is not 
numeric but essential and radical. I have dealt with this difference in detail 
in my book, but I will summarize it here in a single statement. The pagan 
deity is mythological and subordinate to a supreme, meta-divine order of 
existence that stands over it, whereas the Israelite deity is non-mythological 
and not subordinate to any other order—the divine will is itself the supreme 
ruling power. Paganism never arrived at this idea through any developmen-
tal path. Even pagan philosophy in its most exalted peaks never arrived at 
it. We have here an absolute beginning, a new creation, an entirely new, 
non-pagan conception of the world that cannot be explained by any notion 
of development within paganism. 
In addition, I have dealt in my book with many phenomena in the life of 
ancient Israel that demonstrate that monotheism was not, even in early Isra-
elite history, an isolated idea, a matter for sects or orders, but nourished the 
popular life and stamped it with its imprint. Religion in those times was not 
a “private matter,” nor was there any separation between “church” and 
“state.” Religion in all ancient nations was the very foundation of the cul-
ture, and nearly all domains of the culture were immersed in it to some 
degree. Religions were consequently popular phenomena. In the second 
millennium before the Christian era, when the Israelite religion was born, 
there were no religious “sects” or “orders.” Every religion was popular or 
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strove to become popular. Even the religion of Akhenaton strove to become 
popular, and that was the source of the tension between it and the religion 
of Amon, but it did not have enough time to succeed. It should come as no 
surprise that the new faith also filled, in the people amongst whom it was 
born, the same cultural role that all religions filled. It exercised a formative 
influence on the people’s life and culture. It became the fundamental idea 
of the national culture. Monotheism revolutionized the popular life from the 
ground up, and in the course of time it fashioned garbs and symbols in all 
the cultural domains: in prophecy, in the priesthood, in the cult, in the polit-
ical regime, in legend, in song, in law, in ethics, and more. Such deep-
rooted and many-faceted creativity could not have come about in the life 
environment of a pagan nation; and we must therefore say that not only was 
monotheism born in Israel, but the culture of the Israelite people provided it 
from the earliest times on with outward expression. Furthermore, this crea-
tive process started in the time of Moses, approximately at the end of the 
thirteenth century B.C.E. It was Moses who conceived the new idea, and it 
was he who brought about a religious revolution in the life of the Israelite 
tribes and implanted the new faith in them. From that point on, a new chan-
nel was carved out for Israel’s cultural creativity. In sum, the Israelite reli-
gion is a creation of the creative spirit that was revealed in the people of 
Israel from ancient times and created a monotheistic popular culture. 
Critics have arisen against this view. It would, therefore, be proper to 
examine it in the light of some of the objections that have been leveled 
against it. 
The Historical Place of Monotheism 
We shall deal here with the argument, expressed by one critic, that this 
view contradicts “all historical reality,” “all the history of primitive cul-
ture,” the testimony of “all tourists and travelers” who have visited savage 
tribes, and even “common sense” itself. For in every place religion begins 
with polytheistic belief, and monotheism is the fruit of later development, 
whereas my view assumes that the people of Israel developed “in contradic-
tion to human nature.”3 But it should be clear that I do not place the begin-
ning of monotheism in the period of “primitive culture” and prior to poly-
theism, and I do not attribute it to primitive tribes of the kind that tourists 
and travelers report (even though some important ethnologists of our time 
do so).4 I date the beginning of Israelite monotheism in the second millen-
nium B.C.E., in a period when ancient Near Eastern culture had arrived at 
the climax of its development. More precisely, it is my view that the new 
                                                     
3  Bustanai 24 (5699/1939). 
4  See this book [Toledot], Vol. 1, Book 2, 287–89, 315–23, where I have refuted this 
view. 
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religion was born at the end of that millennium, approximately 150 years 
after Akhenaton. The view that the Israelite tribes were primitive at that 
time can only be regarded now as outdated and unfounded, even though 
many still express it out of habit. These tribes had lived for many genera-
tions in the heart of the highly developed cultures of Babylonia, Canaan, 
and Egypt. Indeed, they preserved their special life pattern, but this did not 
prevent them from accepting cultural influence from their environment, 
especially after they had mingled with the surrounding peoples and inter-
married with them. Their religion was not primitive, but they participated in 
the religion of their cultural surroundings—in the same advanced polythe-
ism that prevailed in Canaan at that time, as the Ras Shamra inscriptions 
have now proved. In this respect there is indeed a certain connection be-
tween the development of paganism and the growth of the new idea. This 
idea was not born of paganism. But the high level of Near Eastern culture 
in that period certainly prepared the ground for its appearance. From its 
inception, Israelite religion received a rich legacy from Near Eastern cul-
ture, as I have stressed on several occasions. The history of the Israelite 
people as a people only begins with the birth of monotheism. But the Isra-
elite tribes did not emerge at that point from a test tube. Prior to this they 
lived the life of their surroundings, and they participated with their neigh-
bors in the same stages of development that “the tourists and travelers” 
report. Monotheism thus appeared in their midst after advanced polytheism. 
In this respect, there is no difference between the eighth century and the 
thirteenth century B.C.E. The question, therefore, as to when did monothe-
ism bring about a revolution in their lives certainly has nothing to do with 
“human nature” and the testimony of “tourists and travelers.” It is a fact 
that religious revolutions have taken place in the lives of many nations. The 
question is a question of the testimony of the sources, and I dealt with that 
testimony in detail in this book. 
The Creative Spirit and the Miraculous 
The view that the Israelite religion was the fruit of the creative spirit of the 
Israelite people was not acceptable to the critics of my book. S. D. Goitein 
argues that he does not know what is meant by the notions “spirit of the 
nation” and “original popular creation.” In his view, these concepts have no 
reality, and resorting to them is relying on a broken reed to leap over the 
abysses in intellectual history, which science is unable to investigate. If so, 
it is better to say so explicitly and forgo all such empty expressions.5 
Ephraim Urbach expresses similar criticisms. He wonders whether the con-
cepts “national culture,” “popular creation,” and “creative power of the 
                                                     
5  Supplement to Davar, 6 Elul, 5698/1938. 
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nation” can explain the source of the monotheistic idea. Apart from this, he 
asks what import these terms have if we are going to apply them to the 
Israelite tribes in the wilderness. He complains that I do not deal with the 
question of revelation, to which the biblical sources attribute the beginning 
of monotheistic belief. In its place, I resort to concepts that are “Hegelian in 
origin” and speak of “collective” creation in the spirit of Hegelianism. 
There is, he says, a fundamental “lack of clarity” here.6 
I have grounds for surmising that my words concerning the uniquely 
special character of Israelite religion and the impossibility of explaining it 
from the development of paganism were perceived as basically an argu-
ment for its miraculous, supernatural origin, but that I refrained from say-
ing so explicitly and obscured my view through the expressions “spirit of 
the nation,” “national creativity,” and the like. This is apparently also the 
reason for Goitein’s and Urbach’s complaints. Aharon Kaminka states this 
explicitly. He derives from my book the view that the revelation of the 
Israelite religion was an “extraordinary miraculous event that is an excep-
tion to the natural order,” and this view does not satisfy him. He even says, 
“One should not be misled by the veil that the author places over his view 
by speaking afterwards about the ‘popular legends’ and ‘creation of the 
popular soul.’”7 
But truly, if my words “lack…clarity” in a certain measure, this of ne-
cessity follows partly from the nature of these matters, and especially from 
the heavy burden of the legacy of the words we are forced to use. But who-
ever reads me carefully will find that they were said as clearly as possible, 
without any “veil.” 
It seems to me that after everything that I have said at the beginning of 
this essay it will be clear to the reader exactly what I do and do not have in 
common with the Hegelian and Spenglerian views. The common element is 
to be found only in the place where these views rely on historical experi-
ence, but there is no substantive, systematic commonality. The basis for my 
assertions, including my view concerning the origin of the Israelite religion, 
lies in identifying the human creative spirit as an independent factor. This 
is not a unitary “world soul” manifesting itself in symbols, nor a uniform 
“spirituality” embodied in national cultures. This is the same spiritual pow-
er that has always been manifested in creative individuals and in the pleni-
tude of human cultural creations. It seems to me that no one will deny that 
“spirit” in this sense is an empirical phenomenon. Disagreement occurs 
only regarding the explanation of this phenomenon: whether creation of the 
spirit is to be explained entirely from “circumstances” or whether an inde-
pendent power, whose source is in spirit’s own “nature,” is also manifested 
in it. At any rate, emphasizing spirit as an independent factor does not seek 
                                                     
6  See Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums, 1938. 
7  See Moznaim 8 (5699/1939): 469–76.  
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to leap over “abysses.” On the contrary, it rejects the attempts to leap over 
abysses by invoking “conditions” and “circumstances.” It argues that we do 
confront an “abyss” here, that we stand on the edge of one of the eternal 
riddles of existence. But since the phenomenon itself is empirically observ-
able, it is not “miraculous” in the accepted sense of that term. Spirit is un-
fathomable but not miraculous, and in this respect it is comparable to mat-
ter, space, time, movement, growth, life, and similar concepts. 
It is furthermore clear that the “national creative spirit” is only one of 
the forms of the human creative spirit, and the same rules apply to the one 
as to the other. Just as there is a creative power in an individual, so there is 
a creative power in a collective. This is also an empirical phenomenon: 
cultural creation has ethnic domains. This creative spirit is also an unfath-
omable phenomenon. It is a manifestation of the creative spiritual power in 
humanity, it is an independent factor, and one cannot leap over it through 
invoking “circumstances.” At the same time, it is not miraculous, only un-
fathomable.  
Everything that I have said concerning the creative spirit of the Israelite 
nation is set within this general theory concerning the creative spirit of all 
human beings and nations on earth. This is articulated explicitly and with 
full clarity in my book, volume 1, from page 11 onward, and in other places. 
Monotheism is an original creation of the Israelite nation. That is to say, it 
is a creation of the Israelite spirit, and it cannot be explained by means of 
conditions and circumstances. But I do not assume here a “miraculous” 
creative faculty that was given only to Israel. On the contrary, I include the 
phenomenon in a framework of universal phenomena. Israel created an 
original culture, as do all nations. Its culture was a major achievement and 
exerted a powerful influence, the same as other major creative nations who 
influenced the world. To be sure, monotheism was conceived only in Israel. 
But Egyptian art was conceived only in Egypt, Greek art and philosophy 
were conceived only in Greece, and Roman law was created only in Rome, 
and one could go on with additional examples. This generalization to a field 
of universal phenomena, this assertion concerning the class of phenomenon 
we have here, is the only possible explanation for it. At any rate, this gener-
alization asserts that the phenomenon is not an event that is “an exception 
to the natural order,” for it assigns it its place in “nature,” within the 
framework of the manifestations of the creative spirit in human life. It takes 
it out of the category of the “miraculous.” Nevertheless, this view neither 
affirms nor denies belief in revelation. We are dealing only with empirical 
history, not with personal faith. Original creativity is part of the “nature” of 
human spirit, and in this respect Israelite religion is “natural.” In the last 
analysis, however, this generalization relates to the form of the phenome-
non. But we have already seen that cultural creations are not equivalent to 
each other in their content—and especially not in their rank, and a “scale” 
of values does exist. This is undoubtedly an especially unfathomable phe-
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nomenon, and a person may say that revelation of the monotheistic idea in 
Israel is exceptionally wondrous in its content. For with monotheism, not 
only a new “style” was created. Every religion presents a new “style,” es-
pecially every major religion—the religion of Akhenaton, of Zarathustra, of 
Buddha, and so forth—each created a unique “style.” Nevertheless, all pa-
gan religions were stylistic variants of one religious essence—of “pagan-
ism.” Not so the Israelite religion, which was conceived from an entirely 
new idea, which divided the world into two parts: the pagan world and the 
Israelite world. With respect to the form, one can say that in the last analy-
sis this creation as well is nothing more than a new unique creation of the 
human spirit. But with respect to content, this is not so. We may therefore 
assume here a unique act of providence. But with this we have already left 
the realm of empirical history and entered the realm of faith. 
Israelite Religion and Israelite Culture 
Just as the Israelite religion is not unique in the world with respect to being 
a creation of the spirit, an original creation of a people, and a one-time phe-
nomenon, so it is not unique in its being the fundamental idea of a national 
culture. Not in the sense that an idea was unveiled that had been hidden in 
Israel’s national soul for generations and always operated from its hidden 
sanctum with a uniform culture-creating power, but in the sense that the 
people of Israel’s culture was stamped with the impress of the idea that was 
revealed in it in ancient times and that exercised a decisive influence on its 
life in the visible domain of “objective spirit.” Thus the matter is described 
with complete clarity in my book, volume 1, pages 11 and following, and in 
other places. This phenomenon is also not unique in the world. We have 
already mentioned that all religions in that period filled the role of a fun-
damental formative factor of the culture. Moreover, the cultural operation 
of this religious idea is comparable to the operation of ideas in other reli-
gions that were founded in some historical period by legislators. The Zoro-
astrian religion also became the foundation of a popular culture, and the 
domain of its influence was limited to its nation of origin. Buddhism was 
not influential in its nation of origin, but became a creative force in the 
popular culture in other nations. The fate of Christianity was similar. Islam 
first conquered its nation of origin and afterward conquered other nations 
and stamped their cultures with its impress. The Israelite religion built its 
world within the people of Israel and was unable to expand further in the 
world in its original form; however, it eventually enriched the lives of other 
nations through Christianity and Islam. 
In what sense, then, was the Israelite religion the creation of the national 
soul? In the same sense that every ancient religion was the creation of the 
nation that brought it forth. Moreover, when the major historical religions 
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came to different lands and adapted themselves to different environments, 
they absorbed elements of those popular cultures, and we may regard their 
local forms as the spiritual creations of their host nations in a certain re-
spect. The Israelite religion is a popular creation in the sense that even in its 
initial period it enriched the national life and was not an underground 
growth of monasteries or orders. Surely this religion in its full stature was 
not the creation of Israel in the wilderness. In that period the new vision 
only dawned in the spirit of that wondrous individual, Moses, and through 
his effort a revolution occurred in the life of the tribes. However, the Israel-
ite religion earned a world-historical status not on account of its leading 
idea alone, but as a result of the entire symbolic world that it created around 
this idea. The Israelite religion entailed a new prophecy, new legends, a 
new historical outlook, a new ethic, a new priesthood, a new ritual, the 
entire chain of prophecy, the kingdom of God, David, Jerusalem, sacred 
history, the vision of redemption, and so much more. Such a faith was not 
the creation of individuals; it was the creation of a monotheistic people. 
Indeed, the prevailing view also allows for popular monotheistic crea-
tion in the sense we have described, but it sets the beginning of the process 
after the destruction, because Second Temple Judaism was at any rate a 
popular monotheistic creation. According to this view, the Israelite idea 
became the foundation of a popular culture after the destruction of the old 
Israel, after the foundations of Israelite life in their first incarnation had 
been demolished. This theory rests on a bold systematic effacement and 
distortion of the entire history of ancient Israel. The kingdom of God in the 
period of the Judges is a retrojection of the later theocracy; the Torah post-
dates the literary prophets; the Priestly Code was composed in Second 
Temple times; the Genesis legend is the fruit of late Babylonian influence, 
perhaps from the period of the Babylonian exile; the Psalms were com-
posed mostly in Second Temple times; and so on. To this one may add the 
effacement of the entire distinctive Israelite impress of the creation of the 
early period—the early prophecy, the quest for God, the sacrifices, the fes-
tivals, and more. Not only did the Israelites worship “strange gods,” but 
Israelite religion itself was pagan to the core. All this is based on novel 
interpretations of scriptural verses in keeping with the pagan template. In 
recent years, biblical scholarship has become aware of the falsity of some 
of these distortions, but it still adheres to most of them. However, whoever 
recognizes that the Torah precedes literary prophecy, that most of the 
Psalms are from First Temple times (as I will prove in volume 2 of my 
book), that the prophetic “kingdom of God” is ancient, and that the creativi-
ty in the First Temple period was monotheistic in all its distinguishing 
characteristics is forced to posit that a monotheistic ethnic group already 
existed before the Second Temple period. That means that Israel was a 
monotheistic people and that the “paganism” of the First Temple period 
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was truly only a superficial phenomenon, a barren after-growth that pro-
duced no cultural fruit. 
Israelite Religion as an Intuitive Creation 
It is well known that the development of any culture is the fruit of an intui-
tive creation, not an intellectual-conceptual one. Similarly, the experience 
of a culture in the soul of its adherents is primarily and fundamentally an 
intuitive occurrence. This applies not only to the overall form of the cul-
ture, but also to its ideational root. The root idea is intuitively perceived by 
an inner sense, not grasped by abstract conceptualization. Language can 
serve as an example of this. The structure and rules of a language are fash-
ioned by an intuitive sense, not by knowledge of theoretical grammar. And 
in this manner, too, are they acquired by the individual. 
We should certainly regard religion as belonging to the class of intuitive 
ideational creations. Religion contains beliefs and views about the world 
and everything in it, but there is no guidebook—at least there was none in 
antiquity—to formulate them in theoretical and conceptual terms. It ex-
presses itself in signs and symbols. Whoever researches these tangible data 
can uncover their “essence” and formulate them in abstract, ideational 
terms. But they were not created through abstraction. For example, the 
worldwide phenomenon of magic rests on a certain conception of the 
world, and its actions follow certain patterns, as Frazer and others have 
demonstrated. But the creators of magic never formulated its “essence” and 
they never had any conceptual knowledge of its inner rules. Magic was 
created and practiced intuitively. 
The same applies to paganism in general, viewed as a unified phenome-
non. 
I demonstrated in my book that all pagan religions in the world embody 
a single basic idea: that the deity is subordinate to a meta-divine order of 
existence. In this respect, paganism is overall fundamentally an ideational 
creation. But there is no need to stress that paganism did not formulate 
itself or define its “essence” in these conceptual terms, much less that it 
was created from such an abstract idea. It exists throughout the entire 
world, and everywhere it is suffused with this idea, expressed in thousands 
of symbols and garbs. We can formulate this idea theoretically. But in pa-
ganism itself this was an intuitive ruling principle, weaving its symbolic 
tapestry from the depths of the psyche in every nation and language. 
If so, it is no surprise that the Israelite idea of a God beyond nature, su-
preme over all being, also came into the world in the form of an intuitive 
perception without conceptual formulation, creating its symbols and ex-
pressive garbs from the depths of the psyche, as I described in my book. 
Only by proceeding from this assumption can we open a door to peer into 
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the beclouded mystery of the “Götterdämmerung” drama that took place in 
ancient Israel. How did the new idea destroy the pagan world in which the 
Israelite tribes dwelt previously, and how did it start to build a new world 
from its remains? This event is covered in mystery, for we find no explicit 
answer to this question in the Bible. On the contrary: The Bible does not 
wage any war at all against true mythological paganism, but only against 
one of its incidental, secondary features—the worship of idols. This war on 
the worship of idols does find conceptual formulation in the Bible. It as-
sumes the theoretical garb of arguments and proofs: “Can a man make gods 
for himself? [No-gods are they!]” [Jer 16:20]; “Who would fashion a god 
or cast a statue [that can do no good]?” [Isa 44:10]; and many more such. 
But it is clear that this conceptual war, superficial and peripheral, is not the 
decisive war. Furthermore: Since the Bible lacks any theoretical conception 
of the essence of paganism, it also omits to express the true inner opposi-
tion between it and paganism in formulated concepts. The primary war 
must necessarily have been conducted on another plane—in the sphere of 
intuitive creation. 
The Riddle of the Biblical War against Paganism 
This phenomenon, that the Bible takes no account at all of mythological 
paganism, not even in a single utterance, is the most remarkable phenome-
non in the history of Israelite religion—indeed, is truly astounding. I know 
from experience that no one can deny the fact itself, but no one accepts the 
conclusion that follows from it. There can be only one conclusion: the bib-
lical period was already ignorant of the true essence of paganism. Aharon 
Kaminka (in the previously cited article) admits that the Bible’s lack of 
mention of true paganism is a “true and established fact.” He thinks, how-
ever, that it is “one of the boldest assertions” in my approach that I assume 
that the biblical authors had no knowledge of it. In his view, the prophets, 
psalmists, and wisdom authors of ancient Israel knew the myths about the 
gods and the theological views of the pagan priests. Moreover, he asserts 
that they were influenced by these views, and that this influence may have 
been one of the factors leading to the emergence of the belief in a single 
ethical God. But first, we have no material to decide whether or not this or 
that Israelite author in that period knew the true character of paganism. The 
main question is whether or not the “paganism” practiced in ancient Israel 
was true paganism. In addressing this question, we should assert that if 
ancient Israel had, indeed, been a pagan nation, it would have been impos-
sible that the biblical authors would have refrained from directing even one 
word of polemic against true paganism. Second, where is there even a hint 
in the words of the biblical authors that they knew true paganism? Do they 
not address their words to gentile nations as well? If, then, they knew what 
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true paganism was, how could they have believed that their arguments con-
cerning the worship of “wood and stone” would have any influence at all 
on their addressees? Moreover, where do they draw any distinction between 
paganism and the views of the pagan priests? Do they not regard pagan 
wisdom, too, as sin and rebellion? 
Kaminka says that the Bible’s war on paganism is “a riddle still seeking 
a solution.” Apparently he did not find in my words even an attempt to 
solve this riddle. But in truth, I did propose a solution, and I do not see the 
possibility of any other solution. The solution is this: the decisive battle 
with paganism in ancient Israel occurred at the beginning of the dawn of 
the new idea, in Moses’s day. The battle was short. Israelite paganism was 
smashed to smithereens, and the new faith was implanted in the Israelite 
nation. Something like this battle also occurred in Arabia in the days of 
Muhammad. Paganism disappeared once and for all from the horizon of the 
Arab nation, and was perceived as from behind a cloud. Only fossilized 
remnants of paganism remained among the Arab people. Likewise, the 
influence of foreign paganism on ancient Israel was fossilized from that 
time on and consisted of worship of idols. The cultural legacy that Israel 
received from paganism—legends, laws, poems—was the legacy of Isra-
el’s pagan past, which in the previous period had been connected to the 
pagan cultural world. There is nothing in that legacy to compel us to as-
sume contact in the later period. For this reason, the entire Bible perceives 
paganism through a cloud and conceives it to consist only of idol worship. 
We should recall that paganism was forgotten by the writers of Islam, too, 
in a relatively short time, and they knew it as little more than idol worship. 
Indeed, once the revolution had occurred in Israel at the start of its histo-
ry, the new faith began to build its special world. All of Israel’s life and 
culture served it as material. The golden age of original Israelite creativity 
had begun. From that time on, it appears as if one world exists within an-
other world or alongside it, without the two worlds touching one another. 
Israel is, as it were, enclosed within its own world, dedicated to building 
that new world. The true war against paganism is carried out through that 
creative labor, through weaving the symbols and garbs for the new faith. 
From time to time, foul streams of “paganism” pass through the people, 
especially from the courts of the kings and their foreign wives. But these 
are only superficial trickles. Neither the people nor the authors of the Bible 
are acquainted any more with true paganism. 
Such seclusion and even such blindness should not surprise us. We find 
similar phenomena wherever an original national culture is born and comes 
into the world. There was close contact between Egypt and the other coun-
tries of the Near East. But all the artistic works that were produced in Egypt 
in its original period have a unified style. How is it that no elements from 
the outside cultures were commingled in this art? Did the Egyptian artists 
not see other artistic styles? Is this not blindness? You will find a similar 
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stylistic uniqueness and similar blindness to the outside world in every 
domain of original national creativity. All the more should we expect to see 
it in Israel, whose faith constituted not merely a “stylistic” innovation but a 
new creation, radically and profoundly opposed to paganism. 
We have decisive evidence that this, indeed, is how it took place, sup-
plied by the parallel phenomenon, namely, that the pagan world likewise 
had no understanding of the Israelite religion. It seems to me that no one 
will cast doubt on this fact, but it is also astonishing. For over a thousand 
years, a religion existed that would eventually destroy paganism, yet the 
pagan world did not understand its nature. The prophets argued, “Your 
gods are wood and stone!” The gentiles responded, “Where are your gods?” 
This was the whole debate. Even the enlightened writers of Greece and 
Rome considered Judaism an atheistic religion—and this at a time when the 
Jews were already scattered among the gentiles and seeking to spread their 
religion among them. Here were two worlds, closed off from each other, 
the blind confronting the blind! 
The solution of the riddle is this: the biblical period does not know pa-
ganism, because it is a period of profound national cultural creation within 
the framework of the monotheistic idea. It was stricken with the blindness 
of creativity. As for biblical scholarship, one can say the following: since 
this fundamental phenomenon, namely, that the Bible does not know pa-
ganism, eluded it, the very essence of the whole biblical period eluded it as 
well. Since the riddle eluded it, it consequently could not find the solution 
either. Thus it transformed the period of original monotheistic creativity in 
Israelite history into a period of pagan creativity. 
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Summary
The biblical scholar, historian, and Jewish thinker Yehezkel Kaufmann (1889–1963) is 
best known for two magisterial works: a two-volume interpretation of Jewish history, 
Golah ve-nekhar (Exile and Alienation, 1928–1932), and a four-volume study of bibli-
cal religion, Toledot ha-emunah ha-yisre’elit (A History of the Israelite Faith, 1937–
1956). Toledot in particular is the most monumental achievement of modern Jewish 
biblical scholarship. No other figure, not even Martin Buber, has had such a pro-
found influence on the work of Jewish scholars of the Bible. Whether by supporting 
his ideas with new evidence, modifying them in light of new discoveries or methods, 
or attacking them, and whether addressing his work explicitly or implicitly, a sub-
stantial amount of modern Jewish biblical criticism builds upon the foundation set 
by Kaufmann. The latter’s phenomenological analysis of biblical monotheism as well 
as his critique of theoretical and methodological assumptions that are still dominant 
in historical studies in general, and biblical scholarship in particular, are an invalua-
ble asset for those who engage in biblical scholarship, historical studies, and com-
parative religion.
The idea of this volume was conceived at an international symposium held in Switzer-
land, from June 10–11, 2014, “Yehezkel Kaufmann and the Reinvention of Jewish Exe-
gesis of the Bible in Bern.” This gathering was held at the Universities of Bern and of 
Fribourg in order to commemorate the centenary of Yehezkel Kaufmann’s matricula-
tion at the University of Bern on May 5, 1914, and to document and reassess the sig-
nificance of his legacy and its reception. The symposium had three foci, correspond-
ing with sections I-III of this volume: Kaufmann’s biography and intellectual 
background, his impact on Jewish studies, and his contribution to modern biblical 
scholarship. 
The volume provides a comprehensive and multi-faceted account of Kaufmann’s 
work, through which Anglophone readers, students and scholars alike, can explore 
the hitherto unrecognized significance and profundity of Kaufmann’s legacy. It in-
cludes not only the symposium papers but also other essays, including two testimo-
nies by two of his students, Menahem Haran and Moshe Greenberg and some of 
Kaufmann’s own writings—all heretofore unavailable in English—that are crucial for 
a fuller appreciation of his life project.
Contributors: Job Y. Jindo, Lawrence Kaplan, Othmar Keel, Israel Knohl, Thomas Krapf, 
Adrian Schenker, Benjamin D. Sommer, Thomas Staubli, Nili Wazana and Ziony Zevit.
Zu diesem Buch 
Yehezkel Kaufmann (1889-1963) war der erste israelische Bibelwissenschaftler, der die 
Historische Kritik auf die Bibel anwandte und damit in die jüdische Tradition einführte. 
Einige betrachten ihn als «den größten und einflussreichsten jüdischen Bibelforscher 
der Moderne» (B. Sommer). Hundert Jahre nach seiner Immatrikulation als Student an 
der Universität Bern, wo er von 1914-1918 studierte, trafen sich jüdische und christliche 
Forscher zu einem Symposion in Bern und Fribourg, um Kaufmanns Relevanz für die 
Bibelwissenschaft, die Religionsgeschichte und das Selbstverständnis des Judentums 
zu ergründen. Der Band versammelt Beiträge von Job Y. Jindo, Lawrence Kaplan, Oth-
mar Keel, Israel Knohl, Thomas Krapf, Adrian Schenker, Benjamin D. Sommer, Thomas 
Staubli, Nili Wazana und Ziony Zevit. Darüber hinaus bietet er einige zum ersten Mal 
aus dem Hebräischen und dem Deutschen übersetzte Schlüsseltexte von Kaufmann 
selbst sowie Zeugnisse von seinen Schülern Menahem Haran und Moshe Greenberg.
